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The study of performance, in terms of an assessment of service delivery, is of pivotal 
importance in local government study. A study by Richard Crook and James Manor 
(1998) identifies accountability to the people as the most important cause, in a cluster of 
causes associated with successful local government performance. The belief that 
accountability to the people makes local government service delivery more effective 
and responsive to citizen desires is, according to Harry Blair (2000), the central premise 
behind experiments of democratic local governance. There is, therefore, a prevalent 
viewpoint that greater the accountability to the people, better will be the performance 
(service delivery) of local governments.  
 Available studies exploring the impact of accountability on local government 
performance suffer from certain methodological weaknesses such as the absence of 
careful operationalization of accountability, and the comparison of completely diverse 
cases with each other (instead of controlling important variables). In view of such 
weaknesses of the earlier studies, this study aims to re-examine the impact of 
accountability on local government performance by using an appropriate methodology. 
It defines accountability as popular control over local government, and carefully 
operationalizes it in terms of three dimensions of sanctioning, deliberation and 
monitoring. It carries out partially-controlled case comparison instead of directly 
comparing completely different cases. Furthermore, it gives due importance towards 
investigating the impact of other variables (capacity and finances) in order to uncover 
their salience (relative to accountability) as determinants of local government 
performance. 
 The study is set in India, and has been carried out in the two Indian states of 
West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh. Two Village Councils (Gram Panchayats or GPs) 
 ix 
 
have been selected as cases in each state and compared with each other. A two-fold 
approach has been employed to detect causality between accountability and 
performance in each state study. The components of this two-fold approach are (a) 
discovery of the association between accountability and performance (as evident from 
the results of the comparison between the two chosen cases or GPs) and (b) noting 
whether causal processes operate between accountability and performance within each 
case or GP. The drawing of conclusions for the entire study is done using the findings of 
both the West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh studies.  
 On the basis of the findings of the West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh studies, 
this study infers finances and capacity to be the salient determinants of local 
government (GP) performance. This study finds no evidence of accountability having a 
significant impact on GP performance. The impact of accountability on GP 
performance is highly constrained. The actual functioning of the accountability 
mechanisms in the chosen GPs is failing to fulfil mediating conditions (causal 
processes) through which a positive impact on performance could be brought about. 
The most important condition that is not fulfilled in this respect is performance–based 
sanctioning of incumbent local government representatives. Even the fulfilment of this 
condition, by itself, is likely to push up the performance of a local government only to a 
certain level. The importance of the availability of an adequate level of capacity and 
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CHAPTER 1                                  
INTRODUCTION  
 
The study of performance, in terms of an assessment of service delivery, is of pivotal 
importance in local government study. As Putnam (1993) states regarding the need for 
performance assessment, “…institutional performance is important because in the end 
the quality of government matters to people’s lives: scholarships are awarded, roads 
paved, children inoculated-or (if government fails) they are not” (Putnam 1993, 9). It is 
through service delivery that local governments make a difference to people’s lives. 
This has special relevance to developing countries, such as India, where local 
governments carry out developmental and poverty alleviation functions. Local 
governments, after all, exist for serving local needs through appropriate service 
delivery.  
 Few empirical studies actually examine the factors behind successful local 
government performance (Putnam 1993; Crook and Manor 1998; Faguet 2006). 
Various contextual factors (such as favourable socio-economic, political and 
socio-cultural enviroments) and factors pertaining to the structure and actual operation 
of local governments (which are autonomy, accountability, capacity and finances) have 
been identified in various studies as the determinants of local government performance. 
However, autonomy, accountability, finances and capacity are the four major direct 
determinants of local government performance, whereas the contextual factors would 
indirectly affect local government performance by influencing one or more of the direct 
determinants. One study of local government performance, carried out by Richard 
Crook and James Manor, identifies accountability to the people as the most important 
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cause, in a cluster of causes associated with successful local government performance 
(Crook and Manor 1998).  
 The accountability of local governments is a desirable priority in its own right, 
because it allows local residents to have control over their representatives who make 
decisions that affect their lives. There has been an adoption of formal popular 
accountability mechanisms in local governments (such as elections and deliberative 
forums) in the wave of democratic decentralization in developing countries, with the 
aim to increase popular control over local governance. On the other hand, some scholars 
see accountability in local governance as not just desirable in itself, but also as leading 
to improvement in local government service delivery. The belief that accountability 
makes local government service delivery more effective and responsive to citizen 
desires is, according to Harry Blair, the central premise behind experiments of 
democratic local governance or democratic decentralization (Blair 2000, 21). Based on 
the above premise and on the findings of the study by Crook and Manor (1998), a 
viewpoint emerges that higher the level of accountability, better will be the 
performance (service delivery) of local government units.  
 The Crook and Manor (1998) study is the only known empirical study to 
explicitly comment on the overall relationship between accountability and 
performance. This study, however, falls short of carrying out a detailed exploration of 
the various causal processes through which accountability has an impact on local 
government performance. Other shortcomings of this study are the use of a comparative 
methodology that compares completely diverse cases with each other instead of 
controlling important variables, and the failure to precisely conceptualize and 
operationalize accountability.  
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 There are other studies that make arguments about the 
accountability-performance linkage, though not in such explicit terms as the Crook and 
Manor (1998) study. These studies reveal insights about the impact of particular 
mechanisms of accountability, such as elections (Echeverri-Gent 1992; Fiszbein 1997; 
Faguet 2006; Majumdar 2009) or deliberative forums (Baiocchi 2001; Fung and Wright 
2001; Heller 2001) on local government performance or particular aspects of such 
performance. However these studies suffer from the major weakness of random 
assessment of accountability because of the failure to develop precise operational 
indicators.  
 Therefore the examination of the accountability-performance relationship 
warrants a comprehensive empirical study that addresses the weaknesses of the 
available studies. There is a need to first assess accountability in a nuanced and 
systematic way, through appropriate operationalization, before making any inference 
about the relationship between accountability and performance. The impact of specific 
accountability mechanisms must be systematically explored to reveal the causal 
processes that operate between specific dimensions of accountability and performance. 
In addition, an appropriate method of comparison, that controls certain variables and 
allows variation in others, is also required so that comparison between cases can yield 
robust and fruitful insights.   
 Apart from the methodological weaknesses seen in the existing 
accountability-performance studies, some other reasons also lead one to question the 
literature’s findings on accountability and performance. The findings of different 
studies on determinants of local government performance present a puzzle about the 
relative salience of finances, capacity, accountability and autonomy as performance 
determinants. The impact of the determinants of performance other than accountability 
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(such as capacity or finances) should be thoroughly investigated before ruling out their 
importance and identifying accountability as the most important determinant of 
performance. The study by Crook and Manor (1998) did not explore the impact of 
capacity on local government performance. There is a need for studies that explore the 
impact of the variables finances and capacity in a more careful and nuanced manner. 
 In contrast to the empirical studies already mentioned that argue about the 
positive impact of accountability (or specific accountability mechanisms) on local 
government performance, certain theoretical views caution that accountability (March 
and Olsen 1995; Hiskey 2010), or specific accountability mechanisms such as elections 
(Hickok 1995; Walsh 1996; Keefer and Khemani 2005) might not necessarily have a 
positive impact on performance or be able to solve all kinds of performance problems. 
Keefer and Khemani (2005) and Hickok (1995), for instance, highlight that competitive 
elections might fail to improve performance because of prevalent conditions such as 
popular voting on the basis of non-performance considerations like party loyalty and 
ethnic identity. Such theoretical views lead one to be critical about the findings of 
studies that argue about the positive and significant impact of accountability on local 
government performance. They lead us to recognize that the relationship between 
accountability and performance is complex, and subject to the operation of mediating 
conditions and intermediate processes. Any study of accountability and performance 
must make an attempt to explore such complexity and nuances in the relationship.  
 The above stated reasons point out that there is a need to re-examine the 
accountability-performance relationship with respect to local government, using an 
appropriate methodology and comparative techniques. In other words, the 
accountability-performance relationship needs to be subjected to careful empirical 
scrutiny, using methods that avoid the weaknesses of earlier studies. The essential 
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research question that arises is - Does higher accountability lead to better local 
government performance? This central (though broad) question will be explored in this 
study through the following specific questions:  
Firstly, does accountability have a tangible impact on local government performance? 
In other words, do noticeable causal processes operate between accountability and 
performance? 
Secondly, is accountability the most significant determinant of local government 
performance that explains performance variations between different local government 
units? 
Thirdly, if accountability is not the most salient determinant of local government 
performance, then which variable/s best explain/s performance variations between 
different local government units? 
 In exploring and attempting to find answers to the above questions, this study 
gives due importance to the complexities operating in the accountability performance 
relationship. In other words, it attempts to unpack the complexities operating in the 
accountability-performance relationship. Having identified the significance of this 
study and the main research questions, this introductory chapter proceeds to develop the 
groundwork for the whole thesis. The remaining sections of this chapter describe the 
setting of the study, its objectives and expected contributions, the framework of 
relationships among the variables used, a brief methodological description, the structure 
of the thesis and a summary of the major findings.  
 
Setting of the Study 
The country chosen for this study is India. This study is set in India’s Panchayat (rural 
local government) system, not in its urban local government system. In India, 
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Panchayat reforms were undertaken in the early 1990s because the lack of popular 
accountability in rural local government was seen as a major cause of inefficiency, 
leakages and corruption, and lack of responsiveness (Chaudhuri 2006, 162). Reformers 
felt that increasing the level of popular control over local governance would solve these 
problems. As a result, they introduced a variety of accountability mechanisms in rural 
local government. The importance given to increased accountability is evident in the 
institutionalization of regular elections and provision for Village Assembly meetings in 
India’s 73rd Constitutional Amendment, which defines the general features of India’s 
current Panchayat system. Given this background, India is one of the most suitable 
countries to investigate the accountability-performance relationship. The availability of 
a variety of local-level accountability mechanisms in India also makes it appropriate for 
comprehensively assessing local accountability and its impact on local government 
performance.  
 There is a great deal of diversity in the structure of rural local government 
among different Indian states, as each state has its own Panchayat Law. At the same 
time, the Panchayat Law of each state adheres to the basic principles of India’s 73rd 
Constitutional Amendment, making the findings of different state studies comparable 
and mutually relatable to a certain extent. A high degree of variation in socio-economic 
and other contextual conditions (which influence the actual functioning of local 
government) also makes it suitable for comparative study. Beyond inter-state 
comparison, a comparison of local governments within a single state can offer valuable 
insights about the impact of contextual conditions in shaping the actual functioning of 
local government, since the structural features would be common or controlled for the 
local government units within that state. The common structural features would be 
defined by the Panchayat law of the concerned state. 
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 Rural areas in most Indian states suffer from problems of poverty, illiteracy, and 
other forms of socio-economic backwardness that are typical of developing country 
contexts. Insights derived about the actual operation of rural local governments in India 
would therefore be applicable to certain degree to other developing country contexts 
(such as those in South Asia and Africa).  
 Finally, since 1993, Indian states such as West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Kerala 
and Karnataka have devolved decision making and implementation powers (for certain 
functional areas such as infrastructure development) and a certain degree of financial 
autonomy to their rural local governments. This makes rural local governments in these 
states more suitable for assessing their performance, compared to the past situation 
when these bodies lacked powers or finances to carry out autonomous service delivery. 
Rural local governments in Indian states are responsible for implementing central and 
state government development programmes (such as National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act, Twelfth Finance Commission Fund, and State Finance Commission 
funds) but they do have freedom to choose specific projects under these programmes 
and to implement them. The two Indian states of Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal 
have been chosen for this study. 
  
Objectives and Expected Contribution 
While the findings of this study are most relevant for the Indian context, as already 
stated, they may be applicable to a certain degree to other developing countries. This 
study has some major objectives: 
 Firstly, the study aims to discover the nature of the relationship between 
accountability and performance in local government in the chosen Indian states. It 
proposes to uncover the salience of accountability as a determinant of local government 
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performance, as well as specific causal processes through which accountability actually 
has, or fails to have, an impact on performance. This study essentially aims to critically 
re-examine, through a carefully chosen methodology, the taken-for-granted viewpoint 
that higher accountability leads to better local government performance.  
 Secondly, this study aims to shed light on the most significant determinant of 
local government performance in the two Indian states under consideration. It expects 
to find out if accountability, or any other determinant such as finances or capacity, 
explains variation in performance among different local governments.  
 The methodological strategies employed in this study in pursuit of the above 
stated objectives, are likely to result in certain contributions to the existing literature. 
These potential contributions pertain to three domains of literature, comprising the 
accountability-performance relationship literature, the local government performance 
literature, and the local accountability literature (discussed below).  
 
Accountability-Performance Relationship Literature 
This study expects to enrich the literature that covers the accountability-performance 
relationship in local government. It is designed to contribute an empirically based, 
insightful and nuanced analysis to this literature through the employment of appropriate 
methodological strategies. 
        Firstly, this study expects to offer meaningful insights on the 
accountability-performance relationship by employing suitable and precise 
conceptualizations and operationalizations of both accountability and performance. It 
recognizes the distinct nature of local accountability (compared to common public 
accountability). It accordingly uses a conceptualization of accountability that goes 
beyond mere answerability, and possesses operational dimensions to capture a 
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comprehensive notion of accountability as popular control. Performance is 
operationalized in terms of objective and subjective, quantity-based and quality-based 
indicators to provide a thorough assessment of service delivery. Such conceptualization 
and operationalization is also expected to generate a less random measurement of these 
variables, resulting in a robust analysis to explain the relationship between 
accountability and performance. 
 Secondly, this study explores the causal processes involved in the accountability 
performance relationship to show evidence of how accountability creates, or fails to 
create, an impact on performance. The exploration of the interaction between the 
specific dimensions of accountability and performance, and the complex processes 
transpiring between these variables, should yield a more refined understanding of the 
relationship between accountability and performance in local government. 
 Thirdly, through the use of an appropriate comparative methodology, this study 
expects to contribute to the literature robust and generalizable findings regarding the 
accountability-performance relationship. For the sake of robustness, this study avoids 
directly comparing with each other completely different cases, and carries out 
partially-controlled comparison of local governments within a particular state. For the 
sake of generalizability, final conclusions of the study are drawn on the basis of the 
findings from the comparisons carried out in two states (that differ from each other in 
structural features of local government). 
 Finally, this study expects to bridge the gap between theoretical speculations 
about the relationship between accountability and performance and the empirical reality 
of the relationship with respect to local governments. The theoretical literature on 
democratic governance (World Bank 1992; March and Olsen 1995) and local 
government (Walsh 1996) provide theoretical hypotheses that point to the possible 
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causal links that exist between these variables. This study expects to provide empirical 
evidence to uphold, modify or reject these hypotheses, with specific reference to the 
reality of rural local government in the Indian states of West Bengal and Madhya 
Pradesh.     
 
Local Government Performance Literature 
This study expects to contribute to the empirical literature on the determinants of local 
government performance, by making use of a multi-pronged and innovative 
methodology, and overcoming the methodological shortcomings of existing studies. 
Some existing studies carry out a cross-country or cross-case comparison of local 
government performance, but they actually compare totally diverse cases (Crook and 
Manor 1998; Crook and Sverrisson 2001) which affects the robustness of findings to 
some extent.1
  
 This study attempts to avoid the problem of comparing totally different 
cases by carrying out an intra-state comparison of local government performance in 
each of the two states selected, in which a crucial variable--autonomy (the extent of 
powers of local government, as defined by the law)--is controlled. Examining the 
inferences from the two state studies should lead to more generalizable conclusions on 
the relative significance of different performance determinants.  
Local Accountability Literature 
Accountability in this study is measured in terms of the effectiveness of formal 
accountability mechanisms of local government, corresponding to three accountability 
dimensions of deliberation, monitoring and sanctioning. This study hopes to contribute 
to the literature on the actual functioning of formal accountability mechanisms of local 
                                               




government such as elections and deliberative forums. The comparison of actual 
accountability levels between different local governments in the same state should 
demonstrate the differential operation of the accountability mechanism (having the 
same legal or structural features) in different socio-economic or political contexts. On 
the other hand, insights on the impact of the differing legal features of accountability 
mechanisms such as elections and deliberative forums are expected to be generated by 
comparing the findings of the two different state studies set in West Bengal and Madhya 
Pradesh. By investigating the role of formal accountability mechanisms in actually 
creating popular control, and the impact of such control on service delivery, this study 
also hopes to shed light on the actual usefulness of formal accountability mechanisms, 
which constitute an important aspect of the structural design of local government 
experiments.  
 
Analytical Framework: Variables and their Relationships 
The analytical framework of variables used in this study consists of the dependent 
variable and the independent variables likely to affect the dependent variable. The 
dependent variable is local government performance, and there are three primary 
independent variables--accountability, capacity, and finances--and one secondary 
independent variable.2
 
 In the actual empirical study, one or two of the three primary 
independent variables will be uncovered as the most important determinant/s of 
performance, the one/s that explain variation in performance between the two cases 
compared in each state.  
                                               
2The primary and secondary independent variables used in this study all constitute direct determinants of 
local government performance. Contextual factors, which indirectly affect performance, have not been 
included as separate variables in the framework of this study, though the way they shape direct 
determinants is analyzed in the study.  
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The Dependent Variable: Local Government Performance  
Local government performance is defined in terms of the service delivery carried out by 
local government. Since the lowest tier of local government (Village Council) is the 
unit of analysis in this study, local government performance in this study means Village 
Council performance. Such performance is evaluated in two functional areas of 
infrastructure and alternative primary education. Performance in the area of 
infrastructure is assessed in terms of effectiveness (measured by the ratios of actual 
output to targeted output, and of completed works to works actually taken up for 
implementation) and popular satisfaction with infrastructural assets. Performance in the 
area of alternative primary education is assessed in terms of the degree to which the 
Village Council fulfils its role in providing basic facilities (such as buildings, classroom 
and toilets) to alternative primary schools. Chapter 3 presents further details about the 
operational dimensions and indicators employed in this study to measure performance. 
 
Primary Independent Variables: Accountability, Finances, Capacity 
Accountability, capacity, autonomy and finances are the four major possible 
determinants of local government performance. These four variables are stated by 
Manor (1999, 55) to be the four crucial conditions for successful service delivery by 
decentralized local institutions (see Chapter 2). The extent of autonomy, which this 
author interprets as the extent of the powers held by local governments as defined by the 
law, is similar for both the Village Councils being compared in each state selected for 
study. Therefore, autonomy cannot explain variation in performance between the 
Village Councils in each state, and thus the study focuses on the three other primary 
determinants. Out of accountability, capacity and finances, one or two might be more 
important than the other/s in explaining variations in local government performance. 
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Each variable is briefly described below, in terms of its components (dimensions and 




This study explores the impact of all the three possible determinants stated above, but 
there is special emphasis in exploring the impact of accountability on local government 
performance. Accountability is defined in this study as the degree of popular control 
that people (local residents) can exercise on their local government (Village Council).  
 As already stated in this chapter, the belief that accountability makes for better 
service delivery is the main premise underlying experiments of democratic local 
governance (Blair 2000). Besides, the study by Crook and Manor (1998) identifies 
accountability to be the most significant determinant of local government performance, 
and other studies argue about the positive impact of specific accountability mechanisms 
on local government performance. These premises and arguments provide us with 
general hypotheses about the relationship between accountability and performance. The 
actual testing of these hypotheses however requires that accountability should be 
broken down into operational dimensions and indicators that would be more amenable 
to empirical examination. This is necessary for a more precise assessment of 
accountability, and of the impact of accountability on performance. This study borrows 
Joy Moncrieffe’s idea of accountability as having three dimensions--sanctioning, 
deliberation and monitoring (Moncrieffe 2001). These operational dimensions are also 
consistent with the institutional framework of rural local government in Indian states, 
characterized by the availability of accountability mechanisms corresponding to each of 
these dimensions.  
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 The sanctioning dimension of accountability is assessed in terms of the actual 
effectiveness of the sanctioning mechanism (elections), through which people can 
evaluate, and punish or reward, their incumbent Village Council representatives/ruling 
group, or evaluate contesting candidates to choose one over another. The deliberation 
dimension is assessed in terms of the actual effectiveness of the deliberative mechanism 
(Village Assembly meetings) which channelizes popular demands into the decisions of 
the Village Council. The monitoring dimension is evaluated in terms of the actual 
effectiveness of the monitoring mechanism (Social Audit) which is meant to involve 
local residents in scrutinizing and reviewing the actual functioning of the Village 
Council. The specific indicators of each of these three dimensions can be read in 
Chapter 3. 
 Each dimension of accountability is supposed to improve local government 
performance through certain causal pathways. In other words, each accountability 
dimension has to fulfil certain mediating conditions in order to have a positive impact 
on local government performance.  As already stated, the study that comments on the 
overall relationship between accountability and performance (Crook and Manor 1998) 
does not delineate the specific causal processes through which accountability improves 
performance. Therefore, this study borrows hypotheses about the possible causal 
pathways from the literature on the impact of particular accountability mechanisms on 
performance (for details see Chapter 2). These hypotheses will be subjected to 
empirical scrutiny in the chosen cases of this study.   
 The sanctioning dimension (assessed in terms of the degree of competitiveness 
of elections) can have an impact in three possible ways: (a) through pressure imposed 
by the impending possibility or high likelihood of electoral defeat of incumbent 
representatives contesting re-election, which compels them and the ruling group to 
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increase their efforts towards improving Village Council performance (b) through 
increased chances of worthy, talented election candidates being chosen over other 
election candidates (c) through generation of a numerically strong and assertive 
opposition group that keeps the ruling group alert to its shortcomings and pressurizes it 
to perform better.  
 The deliberation dimension can possibly improve one aspect of Village Council 
performance (the congruence of service delivery with popular demand) by bringing 
about a more widespread expression of popular demands, which in turn can possibly 
lead to a better reflection of popular demands in Village Council decision making. The 
monitoring dimension can possibly result reduce wastage of funds (by exposing such 
wastage and financial irregularities) and can lead to funds being utilized for productive 
ends, thus improving Village Council performance. It may also result in exposure of 
other performance shortcomings (such as delay in completing projects or poor quality 
of contruction work) and consequent correction of such shortcomings by the Village 
Council.  
 
Finances: Strength and Composition 
The importance of adequate financial resources for carrying out service delivery is 
obvious, though questions have been raised in some studies as to whether financial 
strength, by itself, can assure good local government performance (see Chapter 2). For a 
systematic assessment of the impact of this factor, this study uses precise indicators 
related to finances. Aggregate financial strength is employed as one indicator, of which 
both revenue side and expenditure side measures are employed. Aggregate revenue and 
expenditure are divided by population of each chosen Village Council to facilitate 
comparison of financial strength between Village Councils. An indicator on the 
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composition of finances is also included, since the availability or non-availability of 
suitable fund sources can have possible implications for Village Council performance. 
 This study subjects the widely assumed importance of financial strength to 
scrutiny by including an indicator on the actual rate of utilization of available financial 
resources (which indicates the proportion of aggregate income spent). The assessment 
of this indicator can offer crucial insights on how important financial strength is by 
itself. If a particular Village Council has a much lower utilization of resources 
compared to the other, then it means that variables other than financial strength are 
more significant in explaining performance variations.  
 
Capacity 
Mere financial resource availability, in the absence of local government capacity, might 
not be sufficient to significantly improve local government performance. Such capacity 
is likely to influence, in a notable way, the local government’s ability to utilize available 
funds, and thus have an impact on local government performance.  
 Capacity of Village Councils has various components. On the basis of studies by 
Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue (2003) and Talbott (2010), human resources and their 
management (human resource capacity), financial management and leadership are 
chosen as components of capacity.   Human resource capacity consists of the abilities 
and efforts of the elected members and staff of Village Councils. It embodies an 
element of human resource management, since human resource capacity, in this study, 
refers to the extent to which human resources are mobilized or utlilized. Material 
capacity is added to these components as another element of capacity; it comprises the 




Secondary Independent Variable:  Preferences of Decision Makers 
In addition to the three possible primary performance determinants stated above, one 
secondary determinant is likely to have an impact on Village Council performance. 
However its impact is more subtle, and less fundamental and obvious, than that of the 
primary independent variables. The preferences of Village Council decision makers 
constitute the secondary independent variable of this study.  
 Village Council performance is possibly shaped to a certain extent by the 
behaviour, and in turn, by the preferences, of decision makers not only at the level of 
Village Council but also at the higher levels (such as district and block). The 
perferences of decision makers at the Village Council level may affect the inclusiveness 
of decision making, which in turn may have a bearing on local government 
performance. The preferences of decision makers at higher levels may also have a 
subtle impact on local government performance, because co-operation and assistance 
provided by the higher tiers can contribute to better performance of the Village Council.  
 
Methodology and Case Selection 
This study may be characterized as a small n-study (since it explores a small number of 
cases) and the methodology used is case comparison with qualitative analysis. The 
study is set in the two Indian states of West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh. Two Village 
Councils (known as Gram Panchayats in India) have been selected in each state and 
compared with each other. The two Gram Panchayats (GPs) in each state have been 
selected to contrast each other on the level of electoral competition. Debipur GP and 
Nowdapanur GP are the two selected GPs in West Bengal. Goutampur Colony GP and 
Ramgarh GP have been picked for study in the state of Madhya Pradesh. 
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 Three levels of analysis are employed in the study: the first level is within-case 
analysis of each GP (to enable tracing of causal processes between accountability and 
performance). The second level is comparison between the two chosen GPs of each 
state (to discover the association between accountability, as well as the other 
performance determinants, with GP performance) and the third level is drawing of 
conclusions for the study, considering the findings of both the state studies.  
 Data for the study is gathered using structured survey interview of villagers, 
semi-structured elite interview (mainly of elected representatives and bureaucrats), and 
document analysis of local government records. Qualitative data analysis has been 
carried out to process the data and draw inferences.  
 While this study employs a qualitative methodology, it is inspired in one sense 
by quantitative methodology: this inspiration reflects in the construction of specific 
dimensions and indicators to assess variables, for the sake of precision. Accountability, 
performance and the other crucial variables of the study have been measured in terms of 
precise dimensions and/or indicators to prevent random assessment. A two-fold 
approach, comprising discovery of association between independent and dependent 
variables, and assessment of evidence of causal processes between them, has been 
employed to investigate the relationship between accountability and performance and 
reveal the salient determinants of local government performance. 
 This study relies on cross-sectional variation (comparing different cases at a 
given point in time) rather than temporal variation (comparing different time periods). 
Data gathering (field research) for this study has been conducted between August 2009 
and April 2010 in the two states of West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh. 
  The entire methodology of this study is aimed to generate an analysis that is 
nuanced and robust, and findings that are generalizable. The study does however 
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possess certain methodological shortcomings: notable among these are the drawing of 
conclusions on the basis of a small number of cases, and the small sample size of the 
villager survey. Chapter 3 contains a detailed account of the research design and 
methodology of this study, including its methodological limitations.  
 
Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis starts with the preliminary tasks of reviewing the literature (Chapter 2) and 
laying down the details of the research design and methodology adopted (Chapter 3). 
The findings from the empirical studies carried out in the two states are presented in 
Chapter 4 to Chapter 8. Chapters 4 and 5 provide the empirical findings on the 
assessment of accountability in the cases (GPs) of West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh 
respectively. Chapter 6 is concerned with an assessment of performance in the chosen 
cases for the two state studies. Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 are about the inference of the 
accountability-performance relationship for the West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh 
studies, and Chapter 9 provides final conclusions of the study based on the findings of 
the two constituent state studies.   
 Chapter 2 reviews the literature relevant to accountability and performance in 
local government. The local government performance literature throws up a puzzle as to 
which determinant of local government performance is most salient. While the study by 
Crook and Manor (1998) identifies accountability as the most important determinant of 
performance, such a finding cannot be accepted in an unquestioned way. This is 
because the extensive review of the literature on the accountability-performance 
relationship (including the Crook and Manor study) reveals that the available empirical 
studies suffer from significant weaknesses. These include the lack of proper 
operationalization of accountability and performance, failure to use proper methods of 
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comparison and inability to examine the causal processes between accountability and 
performance. The review of the literature concludes showing the need for a study 
possessing a convincing methodology to study the accountability-performance 
relationship and discover the salient determinants of local government performance.  
 Chapter 3 clarifies the methodological components of this study. It starts off 
with a description of case selection principles and identification of cases chosen in each 
state. The three levels of analysis (within-case, comparison of cases within each state, 
and final drawing of conclusions using findings from two state studies) are then 
explained. Following this is an account of the conceptualizations and multi-dimensional 
operationalizations of accountability and performance adopted in this study. The 
sources of data for the study and the methods of data analysis and inference used are 
then elaborated, concluding with an identification of the weaknesses and promise of the 
employed methodology.  
 The focus of Chapter 4 is on measuring and comparing accountability in the 
chosen local government units of West Bengal. The two chosen GPs in West Bengal are 
compared with each other with respect to three dimensions of accountability, viz. 
sanctioning, deliberation and monitoring. The sanctioning dimension is assessed with 
respect to the actual functioning of elections, most crucially with respect to electoral 
competition. Since West Bengal has party-based rural local government elections, the 
proportion of seats held by the ruling party of the GP is used as the main indicator of 
electoral competition. In assessing the actual functioning of the deliberative mechanism 
of Gram Sansad (Village Constituency Assembly) meetings, the GPs are compared 
with each other on several indicators including extent and inclusiveness of attendance, 
and inclusiveness of decision making. On the monitoring dimension, the GPs are 
compared with each other with respect to the effectiveness of Social Audit. Having 
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noted variations between the two West Bengal GPs on each accountability dimension, a 
final assessment of overall accountability is carried out to infer which GP has higher 
aggregate accountability.  
 Chapter 5 assesses and compares accountability in the two chosen GPs of 
Madhya Pradesh. The structure of the chapter is the same as Chapter 4, its components 
being measuring three dimensions of accountability (in terms of the actual effectiveness 
of corresponding accountability mechanisms), detecting variation between the GPs on 
each dimension, and carrying out a cumulative assessment of accountability. There are 
some unique legal features of the accountability mechanisms in Madhya Pradesh, given 
that West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh have their own, distinct local government laws. 
Given that elections in Madhya Pradesh GPs are not party-based, the proportion of GP 
members elected in a contested manner is used as the relevant indicator of electoral 
competition, in the assessment of the sanctioning dimension. While village 
constituency level Gram Sansad meetings are the deliberative mechanism for West 
Bengal GPs, Madhya Pradesh has single-village level Gram Sabha meetings as 
deliberative forums. The procedure of Social Audit, as carried out in Madhya Pradesh 
GPs, also differs in some ways from that in West Bengal GPs. 
 Chapter 6 is concerned with an assessment of performance in the chosen cases 
of each state, and comparison of such performance between them. Performance is 
assessed in two functional areas of infrastructure and alternative primary education.  On 
each functional area, the two GPs of each state are compared with each other to detect 
variation (which GP performs better). The indicators used in the area of infrastructure 
are the physical output-based measure of effectiveness and the perception-based 
measure of people’s satisfaction with infrastructural assets. In the area of alternative 
primary education, the indicators used relate to the availability of essential facilities 
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such as buildings, classrooms and drinking water sources in alternative primary 
schools, given that GPs have the responsibility of providing such facilities to these 
schools. On the basis of this analysis, there is an identification of the GP, in each state, 
that has higher performance than the other.  
 Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 explore the accountability-performance relationship 
and the relative salience of the different primary determinants of local government 
performance. Chapter 7 deals with the West Bengal study and Chapter 8 with the 
Madhya Pradesh study. The first part of each chapter delves into the impact of each 
accountability dimension on GP performance, looking at the association between each 
dimension and overall performance, and the fulfilment of causal processes between that 
dimension and performance. The overall association between accountability and 
performance (as revealed by the inter-GP comparison in each state) and the cumulative 
evidence from the causal processes are used to yield an inference about the impact of 
accountability on GP performance. The latter parts of Chapters 7 and 8 assess the 
impact of other possible performance determinants (capacity, finances and the 
secondary determinants) on performance. The entire analysis in Chapters 7 and 8 is 
geared towards uncovering whether accountability has a tangible impact on GP 
performance, and the salience of accountability as a performance determinant. If 
accountability variations are found to be inadequate in explaining performance 
variations, then there is an identification of the variable/s that best explain/s 
performance variations between the two chosen GPs in each state.   
 Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by drawing final inferences about the 
accountability-performance relationship and the salient determinants of local 
government performance, by comparing and contrasting the findings of the two 
comparative state studies. This chapter lays down the major academic and policy 
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contributions of the thesis. It concludes by identifying the possible future avenues of 
research which can further illuminate our understanding of the relationship between 
local government accountability and performance.  
 
Findings and Main Argument 
In the West Bengal study, one GP was found to have better aggregate performance 
while the other GP did better on aggregate accountability. Debipur GP was found to be 
the better performing GP, on the basis of its superior performance in both the chosen 
functional areas of infrastructure and alternative primary education. However, Debipur 
GP had lower aggregate accountability than the other selected GP, Nowdapanur GP. 
Nowdapanur GP had higher aggregate accountability because it did better on two out of 
three dimensions of accountability, sanctioning (because of higher electoral 
competitiveness) and deliberation (due to its higher and more inclusive Gram Sansad 
meeting attendance). Therefore accountability does not appear to explain better GP 
performance for the West Bengal study.  
 Evidence from the functioning of causal processes also reveal the insignificant 
impact of the existing accountability mechanisms on performance in the West Bengal 
cases, most notably the insufficient impact of the crucial sanctioning dimension on 
performance. Competitive elections are failing to push GPs towards better performance 
mainly because electoral defeat or success of members who do contest re-election is not 
linked to performance considerations. Financial strength and capacity are found to be 
the determinants that explain superior GP performance in the successful case. Capacity 
is found to be an especially critical factor in explaining performance differences 
between the two West Bengal GPs, because of its role in explaining the much higher 
fund utilization in the successful case.  
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 Unlike in the West Bengal study, the Madhya Pradesh GP that had better 
performance also had higher aggregate accountability. In the state of Madhya Pradesh, 
Goutampur Colony GP was found to be the better performing GP, on the basis of its 
overall superior functioning in both the functional areas of infrastructure and alternative 
primary education. Goutampur Colony GP had higher aggregate accountability due to 
its better situation on the deliberation dimension - it had higher and more inclusive 
Gram Sabha attendance and more regular Gram Sabha meetings (compared to the very 
poor situation with respect to the same in the other chosen GP, Ramgarh GP) - and also 
better functioning of the monitoring mechanism (Social Audit). In the Madhya Pradesh 
study, the GP with higher aggregate accountability (Goutampur Colony GP) was 
actually behind the other (Ramgarh GP) on the sanctioning dimension because of 
non-existent electoral competition. However, the dismal record of Ramgarh GP with 
respect to the deliberation and monitoring dimensions, together with its 
not-so-impressive levels of overall electoral competition, meant that Ramgarh GP had 
to be assessed as being lower on aggregate accountability.  
 In the Madhya Pradesh study, the finding of the same GP possessing both better 
aggregate accountability and better performance does not indicate necessary causality 
between accountability and performance. Mere association, without evidence of causal 
processes between the two variables, is not conclusive of a causal relationship between 
them. As in the West Bengal study, evidence from the Madhya Pradesh cases on the 
operation of causal processes also reveals the insignificant impact of the existing 
accountability mechanisms on performance. For instance, the deliberative mechanism 
of Gram Sabha has a relatively marginal impact on GP functioning. Even in Goutampur 
GP (whose Gram Sabha has relatively higher effectiveness) it mainly acts as a forum of 
providing information to the people about the rules of government welfare programmes. 
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In Ramgarh GP, which has relatively more competitive elections, elections did not have 
an impact on GP performance because no incumbent representative sought re-election. 
This resulted in the absence of pressure on the GP and its members to perform well. As 
in the West Bengal study, finance and capacity are found to be the crucial determinants 
of GP performance in the Madhya Pradesh study as well. In the Madhya Pradesh study, 
fund composition and capacity together explain performance variations between the 
two chosen cases.  
 This study therefore shows that there is no evidence of accountability having a 
significant impact on performance in the chosen local governments. The accountability 
mechanisms are creating a degree of popular control, but such control is not having a 
tangible impact on local government performance. The impact of accountability on GP 
performance is highly constrained, since the actual functioning of the accountability 
mechanisms is failing to fulfil mediating conditions (causal processes) through which 
such impact could be brought about. The most notable reason for such constrained 
impact is that the sanctioning mechanism of elections (which potentially could have had 
the greatest impact) is failing to improve performance because (a) either it does not 
provide the opportunity to actually sanction incumbents because they hardly stand for 
re-election or (b) even when incumbents do stand for re-election, their 
punishment/rewarding by voters is not linked to performance considerations.  
 The most significant way through which accountability can have an impact on 
local government performance is through competitive elections in which sanctioning of 
candidates is linked to performance considerations. Such impact, by itself, is however 
likely to push up local government performance only to a certain level. The importance 
of the availability of an adequate level of capacity and finances for achieving high 
performance levels remains. Capacity is especially important because it is critical for 
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effective utilization of available finances. When the capacity and financial position of a 
local government are at a poor level, accountability can improve performance only to a 





CHAPTER 2                                
LITERATURE REVIEW   
 
 
The institution of local government has been identified by different authors as having 
different purposes, justifications and benefits. While some traditional local government 
theorists have argued that the essential rationale of local government lies in enhancing 
democracy, others have argued that local government is essentially an instrument for 
achieving greater efficiency in service delivery. 
  Liberal democratic theorists such as Alexis de Tocqueville, J.S. Mill and Bryce 
stress that the true value of local government lies in promoting democracy. John Stuart 
Mill’s seminal arguments view that local governments play an essential role in 
promoting democracy, because they provide wider opportunities for local residents to 
participate in public affairs, and thus perform the important role of educating citizens in 
the art of politics and government (Mill 1911; cited in Stoker 1996, 5). Local 
government was for Mill, “a school of political responsibility” (Hill 1974, 28). Thinkers 
such as Tocqueville and Bryce have also hailed the democracy-promoting role of local 
government (Pinto 2000). According to Tocqueville, “A nation may establish a free 
government, but without municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty” 
(Tocqueville 1835; cited in Pinto 2000). 
 While British liberal democratic thinkers such as Mill see the democratic role of 
local government lying in promoting civic education, American democratic thinkers 
such as Thomas Jefferson see such a role lying in the expression of individual 
sovereignty and the right of the individual to participate in and determine local affairs 
(Wolman 1996). According to the Jefferson, the role of local government is to reflect 
the will of the people. Jefferson thus advocated direct democracy at the local level, so 
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that all citizens could play a part in decision making. Such heightened citizen role, 
according to Jefferson, could be achieved in a system of small wards known as ‘little 
republics’ (Wolman 1996).  
 While the above theorists see the main value of local government in promoting 
democracy, there are other theorists who view that the main role of local government is 
to provide efficient service delivery, rather than democracy. One such view is the 
utilitarian view, elaborated by Bentham and his followers. According to the utilitarian 
view, local government is an instrument of greater efficiency in service delivery (Stoker 
1996). Langrod (1953; cited in Hill 1974) saw local government as an instrument of 
administrative efficiency, rather than of democracy, since he believed that the 
dominance of sectional interests at the local level reduces the benefits of democracy. 
Mill also believed in the efficiency benefits of local government; he believed that local 
interest, knowledge and capacity to oversee were all conducive to efficient and effective 
service provision (Mill 1911; cited in Stoker 1996). Unlike thinkers such as Bentham 
and Langrod, Mill gave equal importance to the efficiency role of service provision and 
to the democratic role of local government (Mill 1861; cited in Stoker 1996); he 
believed that local government can promote both democracy and efficiency.   
An advocacy of the benefits of local government logically translates into an 
advocacy of decentralization in some form. Decentralization is the transfer of powers 
and functions from higher tiers of government (such as national or provincial 
governments) to local governments. In the last two decades, there has been a 
proliferation of academic studies on decentralization. Some of these studies are 
cross-country (Crook and Manor 1998; Huther and Shah 1998; Blair 2000; Crook and 
Sverrisson 2001; Heller 2001) while others are set in a single country or province 
(Echeverri-Gent 1992; Fiszbein 1997; McCarten and Vyasulu 2004, 2006; Azfar, 
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Livingston, and Meagher 2006; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006a; Faguet 2006; Keefer, 
Narayan, and Vishwanath 2006). The empirical literature on decentralization is 
essentially concerned with the evaluation of the actual functioning of local government 
units to which powers and finances have been transferred. This literature may be seen as 
a backdrop for the specific literature dealing with local government accountability and 
performance, the main variables of this study.   
A central and abiding concern of the decentralization literature is service 
delivery by local governments, especially in terms of the congruence of service delivery 
with the preferences of local residents. Such congruence has been termed ‘allocative 
efficiency’ by some scholars (Tiebout 1956) and ‘responsiveness’ by others (Crook and 
Manor 1998; Crook and Sverrisson 2001). Different views on how such congruence of 
services with local preferences may be achieved have been proposed, corresponding to 
the contextual diversities between developed and developing countries.  
 The traditional literature on decentralization, mostly applicable to the context of 
USA and other developed nations, has been referred to as the “fiscal federalism” 
literature (Oates 1972; cited in Bardhan 2002). Scholars of fiscal federalism such as 
Wallace Oates advocate decentralization as a superior means of achieving allocative 
efficiency, given that people’s preferences are heterogeneous and there is no spillover 
across jurisdictions (Oates 1972; cited in Bardhan 2002). The famous Tiebout model 
constitutes the fulcrum of the fiscal federalism literature. This model relies on the 
assumption that individuals can achieve a match between their own preferences and the 
services offered by local government units by moving to the jurisdiction of that local 
government whose services best satisfy their preferences (Tiebout 1956).  
 The Tiebout model is not readily applicable to the situation of local 
governments in developing countries because local residents in developing countries 
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lack inter-jurisdictional mobility, and also because the model takes for granted that 
individuals can pressurize their local governments effectively to deliver services in 
accordance with their preferences (Litvack, Ahmed, and Bird 1998; Bardhan 2002). 
The fiscal federalism theory assumes that accountability (popular control) exists in the 
presence of local elections.  In developing country contexts, however, accountability 
may be at a low level in spite of the presence of local elections. The actual operation of 
accountability mechanisms such as elections might not necessarily create a high degree 
of accountability in such contexts, and such accountability might not necessarily have 
an impact on service delivery. Therefore, there is a need to go far beyond the fiscal 
federalism framework when exploring service delivery in local government in 
developing country contexts.    
 Accountability has been of major interest to researchers of decentralization in 
developing countries, both as a concern in its own right and as a condition behind 
responsive, equitable service delivery. Therefore local government performance 
(service delivery) and accountability are two pivotal concerns of the decentralization 
literature dealing with developing countries.  
 This chapter shall review in detail the literature on local government 
performance, local accountability, and the relationship between local government 
accountability and performance. The structure of the chapter is as follows: the first 
section reviews the literature on local accountability. Following this is an examination 
of the literature on local government performance, consisting of the review of the 
conceptualization and measurement of performance and the determinants of local 
government performance. Keeping with the main focus of this thesis, an extensive 
review of the accountability-performance relationship follows, evaluating both 
theoretical and empirical studies on the topic. The review highlights the contribution 
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and weaknesses of the past studies and proposes the need for a study using proper 
methodologies for the investigation of this relationship. 
 
Local Accountability: Concept and Mechanisms  
This section reviews the literature on local accountability in two parts, first the 
conceptual literature and then the literature on mechanisms of local accountability. The 
latter part evaluates the studies on the actual effectiveness of various mechanisms of 
local accountability.  
 
The Concept of Accountability 
Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee state that accountability can be defined in two 
alternative ways – in terms of the ‘nature of the political process’ (the political view) or 
in terms of the ‘outcomes induced’ (the economic view) (Bardhan and Mookherjee 
2006b, 5). The former view is concerned with popular control or popular pressure 
exerted on officials by citizens. The latter is concerned with the government’s 
distribution of resources among different groups in society in accordance with their 
demographic size or intensity of need (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006b, 5-7). This 
study, however, is only concerned with the former process-based definition, and not the 
latter outcome-based definition of accountability. 
 The basic idea embedded in the concept of accountability is control of 
accountability ‘holdees’ (Romzek and Dubnick 1998) or agents by accountability 
‘holders’ or principals. In other words, accountability involves mechanisms that allow 
principles to pressurize their agents to act in accordance with their preferences (Philp 
2009). In a democratic form of government, people are the principles, and elected 
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representatives are their agents.3
 As seen above, the answerability conception yields two key dimensions of 
accountability – monitoring and sanctioning. Moncrieffe (2001) however has criticized 
definitions of accountability that are limited to answerability. Moncrieffe’s conception 
of accountability goes beyond these two dimensions to include another important 
dimension known as ‘deliberation and consultation’. Moncrieffe feels that 
accountability in a wider and more meaningful sense will result only when the people, 
who are the accountability holders, have some means of making their preferences heard 
so that representatives may consider such preferences when they make decisions. This 
implies the importance of mechanisms of deliberation and consultation. Such 
mechanisms can function as forums of interaction between representatives and the 
people and can allow people to express their views, problems and priorities. The 
deliberation and consultation dimension of accountability suggested by Moncrieffe has 
special relevance for local accountability. The small size of jurisdictions in local 
 Such control of agents by principles is commonly 
understood in terms of answerability (Shafritz 1988; Caiden 1989; Romzek and 
Dubnick 1998; Mulgan 2000). Romzek and Dubnick (1998) define accountability as “a 
relationship in which an individual or agency is held to answer for performance that 
involves some delegation of authority to act.” Monitoring to see that performance 
expectations are being met, and sanctioning (punishing) agents for not following 
expectations are therefore the two key dimensions of accountability, as seen in the 
traditional conceptualization. Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin (1999) identify 
sanctioning as the cornerstone of accountability of elected representatives to the people, 
since it is only through sanctioning that citizens can retain in office those incumbents 
who meet their expectations, and remove from office those who do not.  
                                               
3While the elected representatives are agents of the people, bureaucrats are the agents of elected 
representatives in democratic forms of government. 
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government makes the use of deliberative means of accountability feasible. 
Furthermore, the actual reality of local government in some countries is characterized 
by the use of deliberative mechanisms (such as public meetings or village assemblies) 
to reflect popular preferences in decision making.   
 
Local Accountability: Mechanisms and Actual Functioning 
Accountability in this thesis means popular accountability of local governments, i.e. 
accountability of local governments to the people. Therefore the focus of this literature 
review is popular accountability, rather than upward accountability of local 
governments to higher tiers of government. While upward accountability is not an area 
of focus in this study, such accountability is significant in the sense that it does have a 
likely impact on local government performance. Devas and Grant (2003, 315) argue 
that upward accountability, though inimical to the downward accountability of local 
councils to the people, is probably having a greater impact on the performance of local 
councils in Uganda and Kenya than accountability to the people through the means of 
elections. 
 Popular accountability of local governments has two aspects – direct 
accountability (of elected representatives to the people), and indirect accountability (of 
bureaucrats/staff members to elected representatives). Studies such as Crook and 
Manor (1998), Blair (2000), and Devas and Grant (2003) have assessed such 
accountability in local governments of developing countries and pointed to its 
significance for overall accountability. 4
                                               
4Crook and Manor (1998) use the term ‘institutional accountability’ instead of ‘indirect accountability’. 
 The lack of effective control of elected 
representatives over bureaucrats, the continuing effective accountability of bureaucrats 
to line departments of central or provincial governments rather than to local councils, 
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and bureaucratic resistance to the wishes of elected representatives are themes 
highlighted in these studies. The decentralization experiment in the Indian state of 
Karnataka is however seen as an exception, where effective accountability of 
bureaucrats to elected representatives of local councils could be established (Crook and 
Manor 1998; Blair 2000).  This thesis is mainly concerned with direct accountability 
and has dealt with indirect accountability briefly; hence the indirect accountability 
literature is not explored in detail in this review of existing studies.  
A major theme in the literature on local accountability is the identification of 
mechanisms of popular accountability and their effectiveness in different contexts. 
Blair (2000) in his six-country analysis of democratic local governance in Bolivia, 
Honduras, India (state of Karnataka), Mali, Philippines, and Ukraine, identifies 
elections, political parties, civil society, the media, public meetings, formal grievance 
redressal procedures and opinion surveys as the direct accountability mechanisms of 
local government. Elections, formal grievance redressal procedures and public 
meetings are formal accountability mechanisms whereas political parties, civil society, 
the media and opinion surveys constitute the informal mechanisms of accountability. 
This section reviews the literature on specific mechanisms of local accountability, 
focusing specially on three types of formal mechanisms--elections, deliberative 
mechanisms (public meetings or village assemblies) and monitoring mechanisms 
(Social Audit)–that are relevant for this study. 
 
Elections  
There is a division of views among authors with respect to the effectiveness of elections 
as an accountability mechanism. Blair (2000), Bardhan (2002) and Vijayalakshmi 
(2006) point to the inadequacy of elections as an accountability mechanism, and the 
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need for additional mechanisms to strengthen local accountability. Blair (2000, 27) 
finds that elections only enable the electorate to indicate their “general approval or 
disapproval” for the performance of an incumbent candidate. Vijayalakshmi points to 
the special circumstances of the Indian context, where the reservation of seats for 
women and marginalized caste groups (which is often by rotation) means that the 
possibility of re-election of incumbents is often low. Such a situation deprives people of 
the opportunity to sanction incumbents and accordingly reduces the effectiveness of 
elections as an accountability mechanism. Grindle (2007, 143) argues that heightened 
inter-party electoral competition in municipality elections in Mexico allowed citizens to 
hold their public officials accountable. However, like Vijayalakshmi, she feels that the 
legal prohibition on incumbent representatives contesting re-election constrained such 
electoral accountability to some extent, since it prevented the direct rewarding or 
punishment of incumbents (Grindle 2007, 175).  
  Apart from Grindle (2007), some other authors also link the realization of 
accountability through elections to electoral competition. For instance Westergaard 
(1986) and Echeverri-Gent (1992) find that competitive elections are functioning as an 
effective accountability mechanism in the Indian state of West Bengal. Echeverri-Gent 
illustrates his view with an example of a local council in Midnapore district of West 
Bengal, where local representatives reputed to be corrupt lost when they contested 
re-election (Echeverri-Gent 1992). 
 The argument that competitive elections are a source of popular pressure is 
logically convincing. However, there is a need to go beyond anecdotal observations (as 
seen in Echeverri-Gent 1992) and carry out studies that systematically scrutinize the 
working of competitive elections as a means of accountability. Such studies should 
systematically operationalize ‘competitiveness of elections’ in terms of concrete 
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indicators such as degree of turnover of candidates or the percentage of seats not won by 
the ruling group.5
 
 They should also provide more systematic evidence about how 
elections are functioning as a source of effective popular pressure. Research from a 
variety of contexts would help generate more convincing evidence about why elections 
fail as accountability mechanisms in some contexts and succeed in others, shedding 
light on the role of competitiveness of elections in this respect.  
Deliberative Mechanisms  
The advent of deliberative mechanisms in local government experiments in several 
countries draws one’s attention to the idea of deliberative democracy, or the democratic 
ideal that these experiments aspire towards, but can achieve very rarely. Appropriate 
procedure is a pivotal element of the idea of deliberative democracy, and Joshua Cohen 
has proposed the components of the “ideal deliberative procedure” (Cohen 1997, 
73-75). Cohen states that there are certain components of deliberative procedure: 
participants decide on an agenda for deliberation, propose alternative solutions to the 
problems on the agenda, back the proposed solutions with reasons or rational 
arguments, and finally arrive at a decision by choosing one of the proposed alternative 
solutions. According to Cohen, these procedural components must meet certain 
requirements: the outcomes of deliberation are truly democratic only if they arise from 
free and reasoned (rational) deliberation among participants who are equal. Equality of 
participants must not only be procedural but also substantive. Procedural equality 
means that there should be equal standing or uniform rights of all persons at all stages of 
the deliberative process, i.e. every participant should have the right to propose issues for 
the agenda, propose solutions and reasons backing those solutions, and criticisms of 
                                               
5Grindle (2007) , however, is an exception since this study does assess electoral competition in terms of 
the indicator of percentage of seats won by the opposition party, and commendably provides extensive 
and systematic data and analysis on the same.  
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proposed solutions.  Substantive equality means that factors such as power and wealth 
of participants should not have any impact on people’s contribution to deliberation and 
the outcomes of deliberation. Cohen recognizes that while ideal deliberation is based on 
the idea of consensual decision making, such true consensus is difficult to achieve. If 
true consensus cannot be achieved, then majority-based voting can be used for decision 
making. The results of voting would be fairer in the presence of the commitment to find 
a solution that is ‘persuasive’ to all.  
It must be recognized that the features of the ideal deliberative model proposed 
by Cohen are noble and a fit ideal to aspire towards, but very difficult to achieve in real 
life. Therefore it is pertinent to turn to features of real world deliberative democracy 
experiments for a more realistic understanding of local deliberation and its successes. 
By synthesizing the features of various successful local deliberative experiments in 
developed and developing countries, Fung and Wright (2001) have proposed a model 
known as Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD). EDD is based on three 
principles or characteristics: the practical orientation of finding solutions to real world 
problems, bottom-up participation (i.e. free participation by ordinary citizens) and 
deliberative solution generation (i.e. the generation of solution through rational debate 
and discussion).   
A number of studies have examined the actual functioning of public meetings or 
deliberative forums in local governance, whereby local residents gather, discuss and 
decide on governance issues affecting their lives. A part of the literature centers on the 
assessment of real world experiments of the aforementioned ‘Empowered Deliberative 
Democracy’ (EDD) model (Baiochhi 2001; Heller 2001). Some of the hailed EDD 
stories are the widespread people’s participation in the Gram Sabha (Village Assembly) 
meetings during the People’s Planning exercise in the Indian state of Kerala 
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(Bandopadhyay 1997; Heller 2001; Sharma 2007) and Participatory Budgeting in Porto 
Alegre, Brazil (Baiochhi 2001).  
In contrast to the above studies, Blair (2000) finds that for the cases selected by 
him, public meetings are, overall, weak as local accountability mechanisms. It is only 
for Honduras that Blair, in his six country study, finds public meetings to be viable 
accountability mechanisms   This assessment is rather problematic, because Blair also 
mentions that public meetings ‘have become quite successful’ in Mali, by enabling 
people’s participation as stakeholders in the implementation of the decentralization 
programme (Blair 2000, 30). This points to the need for more precise and less random 
assessment of accountability, according to clear parameters or indicators.  
There is thus a need for more studies that systematically assess the effectiveness 
of deliberative mechanisms, using a variety of relevant indicators such as extent of 
people’s participation, inclusiveness of participation, and inclusiveness of decision 
making, which also partly reflect the ideal values of deliberative democracy. While 
Baiocchi’s (2001) study of the deliberative mechanism of Participatory Budgeting in 
Porto Allegre does not systematically explore all these indicators, it is commendable 
because of its detailed assessment of the inclusiveness of people’s participation and the 
extent of expression by the poor as vital indicators of the effectiveness of this 
deliberative mechanism. Devas and Grant (2003, 313) in a brief but interesting account, 
sum up the low overall effectiveness of the deliberative mechanism of annual budget 
conferences in Ugandan local councils, by stating that attendance in the conferences is 
lower than required by laws, meetings are not as frequent as desired, and that the 
language and style of these meetings are alienating many residents from attending. 
 An interesting, though under-developed,  stream of literature on the working of 
deliberative mechanisms is about the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh, where village 
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assemblies have been given all the powers of the Village Council under an experiment 
known as Gram Swaraj (which means ‘village self-rule’). James Manor points to the 
unique nature of the experiment, in the entire developing world, heralding it as a 
transition to direct democracy at the village level (Manor 2001). Few works are 
available on the actual operation of Gram Swaraj. Behar and Kumar (2002), Behar 
(2003) and Sisodia (2007) have noted serious problems with respect to the actual 
operation of the system in its initial years, such as the continued low attendance in 
Village Assembly meetings (Behar and Kumar 2002; Behar 2003).  
 The reviewed studies documenting the successes of the deliberative mechanism 
in the Kerala and Porto Alegre cases, and the failures in Madhya Pradesh, indicate that 
the mere presence of formal deliberative mechanisms does not generate effective 
accountability by itself, and that contextual factors are important in influencing their 
actual functioning. Societal factors such as social divides, weak civil society and a lack 
of social capital (McCarten and Vyasulu 2006; Sisodia 2007) have been cited as reasons 
why a bold institutional innovation like Gram Swaraj has supposedly failed to achieve 
the desired levels of accountability.6
 More refined insights on the question of why deliberative mechanisms function 
effectively in some contexts and not in others are required, going beyond the general 
insights seen in the literature. Such insights can be obtained if researchers adopt 
appropriate comparative methodologies. Variations in institutional design as a factor 
affecting the effectiveness of the mechanism can be revealed by comparing two cases 
 The involvement of civil society in making formal 
mechanisms effective has been pointed out as a critical factor with respect to the 
successes of the People’s Planning campaign in Kerala; NGOs there played an 
important role in the conscientization of local residents (Heller 2001; Sharma 2007).   
                                               
6 Haque (2008) mentions social divides as an obstacle to local accountability in decentralization 
experiments of South Asian countries.  
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that have similar socio-economic contexts but different institutional (legal) features in 
their deliberative mechanisms. Similarly, variations in socio-economic context as a 
factor affecting the actual functioning of the deliberative mechanisms can be uncovered 
by comparing two cases whose deliberative mechanisms have the same institutional 
features but whose socio-economic contexts differ.  
 
Monitoring Mechanisms 
The institutionalized monitoring mechanism of Social Audit is a form of 
community-based or citizen-based oversight Interesting findings on the impact of 
popular monitoring are available in studies of Social Audit, as carried out in the Indian 
states of Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan. These two states are reputed for their successes 
in conducting Social Audit, an institutionalized mechanism of popular scrutiny and 
review. The most important achievement of Social Audit in these states, as highlighted 
by Aakella and Kidambi (2007) and Afridi (2008), is the revelation of corruption and 
irregularities. Afridi (2008) for instance finds that irregularities in expenditure were 
uncovered through Social Audit in almost all Village Councils in the Nagarkurnool area 
of Mehbubnagar district of Andhra Pradesh.  
 The other important findings related to the actual effectiveness of Social Audit 
pertain to the eventual punishment of officials as a result of their misdeeds being 
exposed through Social Audit. Aaakella and Kidambi (2007) find that Social Audit in 
Andhra Pradesh resulted in several lower-level field bureaucrats being dismissed from 
service. Afridi (2008) however finds from her Andhra Pradesh study that powerful 
elected representatives such as chairpersons of Village Councils remain unscathed from 
the Social Audit process. Furthermore, she found from her Rajasthan study that 
instances of corrupt functionaries being legally punished are few; the only form of 
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sanctioning that takes place is social sanctioning through public naming and shaming of 
corrupt officials.  
 The findings from Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan reveal the potential of Social 
Audit as an effective accountability mechanism. However the successes in these states 
are probably a result of unique contextual factors such as active civil society 
(Rajasthan) and political will of the state government to make Social Audit effective 
(Andhra Pradesh). Social Audit is now being carried out in Village Councils throughout 
India, as mandated by the provisions of India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act (NREGA). Studies should be conducted in other Indian states for a more robust 
assessment of the effectiveness of Social Audit as an accountability mechanism, and 
also to reveal what particular contextual conditions are responsible for its effectiveness 
or ineffectiveness.  
  It is also worth looking at findings about the impact of Social Audit or similar 
forms of community-based oversight from developing countries other than India. A 
report prepared by the Social Development Department of the World Bank cautions that 
community-based or citizen-based oversight is often ineffective because citizens lack 
sufficient information and knowledge to carry out such oversight (World Bank 2009, 
43-4). Furthermore, the report comments that the level of people’s involvement in such 
monitoring is often of a low level. As seen in Uganda (Azfar, Kahkonen, and Meagher 
2001; cited in World Bank 2009) and Tanzania (Boon 2007; cited in World Bank 2009), 
members from better-educated or affluent sections of society, or persons chosen by the 






Final Comments on the Local Accountability Literature 
The review of the literature on three types of formal accountability mechanisms 
(elections, deliberative mechanisms and Social Audit) seen in this section brings to light 
that proper methods of comparison must be used by researchers who investigate the 
actual working of such mechanisms. This is critical to resolve the puzzle of why the 
mechanisms fail in some contexts but succeed in others. Societal level factors such as 
social divides and inequality (McCarten and Vyasulu 2006; Sisodia 2007) are important 
contextual factors that explain the actual effectiveness of formal accountability 
mechanisms. Informal mechanisms of accountability such as civil society (Heller 2001; 
Sharma 2007) and mass media such as radio and the press (Crook and Manor 1998; 
Devas and Grant 2003; Azfar, Livingston, and Meagher 2006) can also be seen as 
important factors that can conscientize people and keep them armed with information, 
and thus increase the effectiveness of formal accountability mechanisms.  
 A significant problem seen in studies dealing with local accountability such as 
Crook and Manor (1998) and Blair (2000) is the non-systematic and random assessment 
of levels of accountability. For instance, Blair (2000) in his six country study states that 
voluntary neighbourhood groups in Honduras have pressed for better service delivery in 
health and sanitation, but he does not assess civil society as a viable accountability 
mechanism for the Honduran context. He also assesses the deliberative mechanism of 
public meetings as being a viable accountability mechanism only in Honduras, but 
comments on its success in Mali. Blair’s assessment of which accountability 
mechanism is viable or not viable in a particular country context is somewhat random 
and not backed by satisfactory evidence. 
Empirical studies that  assess accountability of local government in developing 
countries and judge  it as being ‘high’ or ‘low’ frequently do so without carrying out an 
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a priori conceptualization and operationalization of accountability. This is a weakness 
seen in studies such as Crook and Manor 1998 (see page 66 of this thesis for details), 
Faguet (2006), Blair (2000) and Afridi (2008). Faguet (2006, 137-8) for example states 
that lower accountability in the less successful Bolivian municipality in his study is 
indicated by the presence of opportunistic alliances between parties, and low voter 
turnout. He assesses accountability in a rather complex way, as being related to the 
inefficacy of the mandate bestowed by people through the electoral process, and the 
consequent lower voter turnout that results from people not believing in the efficacy of 
their bestowed electoral mandate (given that opportunistic inter-party alliances often 
distort the electoral mandate). Afridi (2008, 39) argues that accountability of public 
officials can be improved through better stakeholder participation in the Social Audit 
process and sanctioning of officials identified as guilty through the Social Audit 
process.  Such examples give as an idea that different authors interpret and understand 
the term ‘accountability’ in different ways. Given such diversity in interpreting or 
understanding accountability, there is a need for studies to have an a priori coherent 
conceptualization of accountability so that readers may be more convinced about why 
accountability in a particular case is judged as higher or lower.  There is also a need for 
studies to construct detailed, specific and clear dimensions and indicators to assess the 
effectiveness of accountability mechanisms, so that it can be made clear as to why 
accountability, or the effectiveness of a particular accountability mechanism, in a 
particular case is judged as being high or low.  
 
Local Government Performance: Concept, Measurement and Determinants 
This section reviews the literature on local government performance. It first evaluates 
the definition and measurement of local government performance in different studies. 
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This is followed by the critique of the literature on the various determinants of local 
government performance and their relative salience.  
 
Conceptualization and Measurement 
The general literature on performance measurement has served as guide for the 
assessment of local government performance in different studies. Therefore it is 
pertinent to briefly review the general performance measurement literature, before 
turning to assessments of local government performance.  
 ‘Performance’ as understood in the public administration literature refers to the 
service delivery or outputs of governmental institutions. In the performance 
measurement literature, efficiency and effectiveness are considered to be the economic 
indicators of performance (Brudney and England 1982). Efficiency indicates the extent 
to which a given output is produced with the least possible use of resources (Hatry 
1978, 28). Effectiveness refers to the extent that goals are met (Baekkeskov 2007); it is 
the ratio of actual output to targeted output. Scholars have recognized that economic 
indicators might not be sufficient for measuring the performance of governments which 
after all, are institutions of public welfare and different from private firms. Morgan 
(1979; cited in Brudney and England 1982) therefore proposed two additional 
dimensions which make up the ‘political’ dimension of service delivery–he called them 
‘responsiveness’ and ‘equity’. The essence of responsiveness is citizen satisfaction with 
service delivery. Equity concerns the distribution of services (especially with regard to 
demographic or spatial groups) and which groups benefit or do not benefit from such 
services.  
 Some local government researchers have highlighted the weakness of 
‘responsiveness’ as a perception-based or revealed-demand based indicator. The true 
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measure of responsiveness, as most people would agree, should ideally be the extent to 
which the services delivered by local government are meeting the felt needs of the 
citizens. However, as revealed by Crook and Sverrisson (2001), Azfar, Livingston, and 
Meagher (2006), and Keefer, Narayan, and Vishwanath (2006), sometimes people’s 
expressed preferences may not match their true needs. Azfar, Livingston, and Meagher 
(2006) argue that the lack of scientific knowledge among local residents led to a low 
demand for immunization in Uganda, while Keefer, Narayan, and Vishwanath (2006) 
point to the low local demand for girls’ schools in Pakistan.  
 The ‘efficiency-effectiveness-responsiveness-equity’ scheme of performance 
measurement has the merit of being a comprehensive operational scheme that combines 
objective and subjective indicators. The quality-based measures of responsiveness and 
equity ensure that performance measurement goes beyond technical measures such as 
efficiency and effectiveness. However, in view of the weaknesses of responsiveness 
measures, it is proper to use performance measures based on revealed preferences in 
combination with objective indicators in order to assess the quality of service delivery.  
 One measure overlooked in the prevalent performance measurement scheme is 
functionality (Schedler 1998 makes a passing reference to this as ‘usefulness’). This 
measure can reconcile the dichotomy between objective and subjective indicators, 
between the satisfaction of true ‘need’ and the satisfaction of ‘demand’ (revealed 
preference) to yield a better measure of the quality of service delivery. It essentially 
signifies whether or not services are meeting the purposes for which they are being 
provided, or solving the problems they were meant to solve. For example, the 
functionality dimension of a school’s performance would exclude indicators such as 
efficiency, but could include indicators of parental satisfaction along with objective 
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indicators relevant to the functioning of schools (such as the teacher-student ratio or 
availability of basic facilities such as separate classrooms for each grade).   
 How have researchers measured local government performance? A study by 
Faguet (2006) compares the local government performance of two Bolivian 
municipalities. Faguet however merely assesses performance in terms of 
‘responsiveness’, relying only on perception-based assessments of survey respondents, 
(mostly grassroots leaders) who classify overall performance in general terms such as 
‘good’ ‘very good’ ‘regular’ or  ‘bad’. Measuring local government performance using 
the overall assessment by ‘key informants’ seems to insufficiently robust. In contrast to 
Faguet’s work, two studies of local government performance have carried out detailed 
and multi-dimensional operationalizations of performance (Putnam 1993; Crook and 
Manor 1998). Putnam’s study is relevant to the developed country context while the 
Crook and Manor (1998) study is applicable to developing country contexts in South 
Asia and West Africa. The Putnam (1993) and Crook and Manor (1998) studies, while 
focusing on the service delivery aspect, also include input and process indicators in 
their operational scheme in a random manner. This affects the coherence of their 
operational schemes to assess performance. 
 In his study of regional government in Italy, Putnam primarily bases his 
assessment of performance on what he calls the ‘policy implementation’ dimension, 
though he also includes dimensions of ‘policy formulation’ and ‘quality of policy 
pronouncements’ (Putnam 1993, 65). While Putnam’s twelve diverse performance 
indicators are found to be highly correlated to each other in statistical terms, they seem 
to lack conceptual coherence and consistency. For instance, he combines indicators 
related to specific policy areas with a general indicator named‘bureaucratic 
responsiveness’ to assess the sub-dimension ‘spending capacity’ under the policy 
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implementation dimension; furthermore ‘bureaucratic responsiveness’ has questionable 
validity as an indicator of spending capacity (Putnam 1993, 70-73).  
 In their operationalization of performance, Crook and Manor (1998) develop a 
modified version of the efficiency-effectiveness-responsiveness-equity scheme already 
discussed. They use three sub-categories of performance: effectiveness, responsiveness 
and process. The responsiveness dimension also encompasses equity indicators. The 
process dimension incorporated by the authors is meant to assess levels of fairness, 
probity, and transparency in the operation of local governments. The process dimension 
pertains not only to the internal functioning of local governments but also to their 
dealings with the public. The operational scheme used by Crook and Manor seems to 
have some validity problems–the inclusion of an element such as the fairness of 
elections (in the process dimension) does not seem logically justifiable as an element of 
performance and adversely affects the coherence of their operational scheme. This is 
more so because their study treats accountability as a causal variable determining 
performance, and fair elections may be considered to be an indicator of accountability. 
 
Determinants of Government Performance  
This chapter has already briefly examined the performance measurement literature in 
Public Administration as a source of indicators of local government performance. 
Similarly, while examining the possible determinants of local government 
performance, it is important to touch on the general literature on the determinants of 
public sector organizational performance. Talbott (2010) reviews several such 
performance models. These models are mostly multi-dimensional in nature, in 
recognition of the complex and multi-faceted nature of government performance in 
today’s age. Examples of such models are UK’s Audit Commission Framework (Audit 
 48 
 
Commission 1984), Canada’s Management Accountability Framework (Treasury 
Board of Canada Secretariat n.d.) and the Public Service Excellence Model developed 
by Talbott (1998, 1999). The Public Service Excellence Model developed by Talbott is 
commendable because unlike many other models, it distinguishes between ‘enablers’ of 
performance, and performance results. By analyzing and finding patterns in the various 
multi-dimensional performance models reviewed by him, Talbott (2010) proposes a 
model containing twelve determinants of performance, divided into three clusters: (a) 
values, aim (missions, goals, mandates), legitimacy, and governance arrangements 
(including accountability and democratic control) (b) strategy, leadership, structures 
and partnerships (c) resources and their management, human resources and their 
management, processes and their management and customer service focus 
(responsiveness). Shaped by the overall environment of innovation and proper risk 
management, these determinants have an impact on service outcomes, which in turn 
have an impact on society (Talbott 2010).   
 There is scope for further simplifying Talbott’s (2010) model by grouping some 
of the factors together into a single factor: strategy, leadership, human resources and 
their management, innovation, and processes and their management may all be grouped 
into a single capacity variable. One must recognize that the local government 
performance environment of developing countries, while complex in nature, is 
qualitatively different from that of public organizations in general, and especially 
different from that of public organizations in developed countries. For instance, 
elements such as public-private partnerships, risk management, and sophisticated 
missions are not relevant to most local governance contexts in developing countries.  
Elements of Talbott’s model such as accountability, certain components of capacity and 
resources are indeed relevant as possible determinants of local government 
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performance in developing countries. Autonomy from higher tiers of government, 
which is a crucial concern for local governments in developing countries, is left out of 
Talbott’s model because it applies mainly to federal or other higher tiers of 
governments that are autonomous. Talbott’s model, conceived from a developed 
country perspective and focusing on general public organizational performance, 
therefore is applicable, but only to a limited extent, for understanding performance 
determinants of local governments in developing countries.   
 
Determinants of Local Government Performance 
Different studies have identified different determinants of local government 
performance. Manor (1999, 55) pinpoints autonomy, accountability, finances and 
administrative capacity as the four crucial conditions required for successful service 
delivery by decentralized institutions (local governments). These four determinants 
pertain to the structure and actual operation of local governments as institutions. Some 
authors have identified factors pertaining to the economic, social or political context as 
significant factors affecting local government performance. Faguet (2006) identifies 
economic and political competition, Putnam (1993) identifies social capital and Crook 
and Manor (1998) pinpoints a ‘supportive social and political context’ with features 
such as egalitarian social order, lively civil society and multi-party system. These 
contextual factors, however, do not directly affect local government performance. They 
can have an impact on local government performance only by influencing or shaping 
the direct determinants of performance, especially one or more of the four conditions 
identified by Manor (1999).  
  Autonomy, finances, accountability and capacity may thus be identified as the 
four major determinants of local government performance. It can be seen in the 
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following paragraphs that arguments have been made about the significance of each 
determinant. Therefore a puzzle emerges as to which among these factors is the most 
significant determinant of performance. Specifically, the fundamental question that 
remains unanswered is: what is the salience of accountability as a determinant of local 
government performance, viz. a` viz. the other determinants? 
 Local government theorists such as John Stuart Mill have argued that local 
governments can better satisfy local preferences through service delivery than higher 
tiers of government because of superior local knowledge, interest and capacity to 
oversee (Mill 1911; cited in Stoker 1996). Such benefits can only be forthcoming if 
local governments possess autonomous powers to make decisions that satisfy the 
preferences of local residents instead of those of higher-level governments. Successful 
cases of local government performance such as the Indian states of Kerala (Vijayanand 
2007) and pre-1992 Karnataka (Crook and Manor 1998) were characterized by a high 
degree of devolution of powers and functions to local governments. Crook and Manor 
(1998, 291) point to the importance of the ‘appropriate form of decentralised structure’ 
as one of the determinants of local government performance, implying the importance 
of the transfer of appropriate powers to local governments.  
 It is indeed a truism that without adequate finances, local governments cannot 
perform satisfactorily. Bird and Rodriguez (1999) argue that local governments in 
developing countries almost invariably suffer from hard budget constraints, and 
therefore increasing fiscal transfers to local bodies is critical to increase their ability to 
fulfil popular demands and needs. Fund constraints are often blamed by local elected 
representatives as the primary factor responsible for the poor performance of local 
government (Kumar 2006). For some scholars, what seems as important as the amount 
of funds transferred is financial autonomy (meaning freedom in spending funds), a 
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factor seen in the Karnataka experiment (Crook and Manor 1998) but absent in many 
cases where central or provincial governments dictate how funds are to be spent (Aziz 
et al. 2002; Keefer, Narayan, and Vishwanath 2006). 
 In spite of the apparent importance of finances as a determinant of performance, 
some studies give evidence to show that finances are important only to an extent in 
improving service delivery. Crook and Manor (1998) find that increasing fund flow to 
local councils in Ghana and Bangladesh did not lead to appreciable improvements in 
service delivery. In the success story of Karnataka, on the other hand, the total amount 
of funds transferred remained the same as before the decentralization experiment with a 
notable improvement of the performance of the councils after decentralization. Crook 
and Manor, however, have not precisely compared the actual financial strength of their 
different cases. They have only provided general measures of financial strength such as 
‘inadequate’ or ‘plentiful’ for their different chosen cases relying on the perceptions of 
local elected representatives. It is important to compare the actual financial strength of 
cases whose performance is being compared, using appropriate measures such as 
revenue per head of population, in order to obtain a clearer picture of the importance of 
finance as a determinant of performance. In the absence of such evidence, inferences 
about the importance or insignificance of funding would remain inconclusive.  
 Furthermore, a comparison of the utilization of finances between different cases 
would clarify how important the mere availability of funds is. It is possible that two 
local governments may have similar financial strength but wide disparities in utilization 
of finances. Such disparities would lead us to look for factors other than the amount of 




 While autonomy and funding are important, they do not guarantee that funds 
will be well utilized or spent in a manner that is responsive to popular demands. This 
brings us to the possible importance of mechanisms of accountability. Accountability 
mechanisms bring popular pressure to bear on local government decision makers, and 
may increase the likelihood that actual decisions will be in conformity with people’s 
preferences, and that funds will be well–utilized. The studies that have elaborated the 
importance of accountability as the crucial determinant shaping local government 
performance (most notably Crook and Manor 1998) will be reviewed in the next 
section. 
 While several studies point to the positive impact of accountability on local 
government performance, other studies indicate that accountability is not sufficient to 
improve performance. The most important requirement highlighted in this respect is 
capacity. Capacity is a broad term encompassing technical and administrative ability to 
carry out decision making and implementation tasks required for service delivery. In 
this sense a certain level of capacity seems to be an indispensable requirement for local 
government service delivery.  
 Capacity is seen as an important determinant of performance not just in the local 
government literature, but also in the general literature on government or public 
organizational performance. Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue (2003) see capacity as the 
crucial determinant of government performance, the factor that is pivotal to the 
effective transformation of resources into policy results. Capacity for Ingraham, Joyce, 
and Donahue (2003) means management capacity, and possesses four ‘levers’ or 
components: management systems, leadership, integration and alignment, and 
managing for results. Management systems, in turn, have four elements, viz. financial 
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management, human resources management, information technology management and 
capital management.7
 The framework provided by Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue (2003) is a valuable 
guide for understanding the nature of capacity and its importance for government 
performance. It is worthwile to examine how applicable it is to local government in 
general, and local governments in developing countries in particular. Poister and Streib 
(1997, 101), writing from a US perspective believe that management capacity, in the 
form of strategic management, is indeed important for local governments because of the 
need for a coherent sense of direction in local governments to deal with the  complex 
environment and ever-changing community needs, political trends, inter-governmental 
relations, fiscal conditions and citizen expectations. Yet these authors caution that 
strategic management is also difficult to implement in local governments because of 
constraints such as limited powers (that rest on mandates bestowed by higher levels of 
government), sources of funding over which local governments have no control (since 
they come from higher tiers of government), and human resource problems such as low 
morale of workforce and personal antagonisms inside councils (Poister and Streib 1997, 
105,123). All these problems are generally even more pronounced in local governments 
of developing countries. Smoke (2010) comments that inadequate technical and 
managerial capacity is a common problem in developing and transition countries. 
Narayana (2005) mentions the problem of poor capacity in Village Councils in India, 
especially as far as the knowledge and awareness of elected representatives is 
concerned. Management capacity, as it exists in local governments of developing 
countries, is therefore not as advanced or sophisticated as it exists in USA and other 
developed countries (especially in their higher tiers of government).  
 
                                               




It therefore makes sense to adopt a notion of capacity that adopts certain 
elements from the Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue (2003) model, but is more in line with 
the reality of local government contexts in developing countries. Because of low or 
non-existent levels of computerization, information technology management would not 
be very relevant as an indicator of local government capacity in many developing 
countries. Nor would capital management be relevant as an indicator when local 
government planning, budgeting and expenditure management are often short–term 
(i.e. conducted on an annual basis). Management for results, too, is not very relevant as 
a capacity component for local governments in developing countries, because the New 
Public Management techniques of internally setting clear and measurable performance 
goals and results-oriented management are usually alien ideas for such contexts.  
Financial management techniques in local governments of developing countries 
(including budgeting) are often rudimentary and in no way resemble the advanced and 
intricate financial management carried out by higher tiers of government. It must be 
noted that the mere availability of sufficient human and financial resources is of 
fundamental importance in local governments of developing countries because of their 
poor situation with respect to staff availability, skills and technical expertise and levels 
of funding relative to magnitude of needs. Nevertheless, appropriate mobilization and 
utilization of available financial and human resources (staff as well as elected 
representatives) are also significant as components of capacity for local governments in 
developing countries, since it is important for them to properly and strategically utilize 
their limited available resources, given numerous constraints such as low levels of 
autonomy in spending and bureaucratic stipulations imposed by higher tiers of 
government.  Keeping in mind the Talbott (2010) and Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 
(2003) studies, human resources and their management, and financial management are 
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therefore relevant as indicators of local government capacity in developing countries. 
Having recognized such significance, it makes sense to briefly explore the literature on 
the concept of financial management, and its state in local governments of developing 
countries such as India. 
 Effective financial management, according to Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 
(2003) must possess characteristics such as efficient and accountable spending, ability 
to allocate resources among strategic priorities, and the dual abilities of budget 
allocation and budget execution. Meyers (1997) adds elements such as accurate revenue 
and expenditure forecasting, planning for emergencies, awareness of the link between 
cost and performance, and flexibility.  
 Budgeting is a core concern in financial management. Wildavsky (1961, 184) in 
fact states that budget is the ‘lifeblood of the government, the financial reflection of 
what the government does or intends to do.” Budgets, therefore are not just about 
money, but have broader significance as statements of the vision, aims, goals and 
strategies of government. Wildavsky highlights the political nature of budgeting, since 
it involves judgments and conflicts over how to allocate limited resources among 
different demands and ends. Therefore budgets are not just about the technical or 
administrative concern of efficiency, but also about the political concern of allocation. 
Wildavsky argues that budgets always have to reconcile the two priorities of politics 
and efficiency.  
 Wildavsky (1961) comments that budgeting, as it prevails in US government, is 
incremental in nature, since it only involves minor changes from previous years, and 
only considers a few alternatives in decision making. He also highlights the prevalent 
problem of ‘slack’, i.e. less than optimum utilization of available resources because of 
lack of information and effort on the part of participants that hinders efficiency in the 
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budgetary process. Shafritz and Russel (2003) reveal that incremental budgeting is still 
the dominant form of budgeting in US government, in spite of the advent of newer 
forms such as PBBS (Planning-Programming-Budgeting System) and zero-based 
budgeting, and the ‘re-inventing government’ movement of the 1990s.  
 Having seen insights on the general theory and state of financial management, it 
is pertinent to turn to insights on financial management in local government. Shafritz 
and Russell (2003, 461-2) reveal that traditional styles of budgeting are mostly 
prevalent in local governments in the US; furthermore, given the relatively less 
complex functions of local government, budgets are relatively simpler. These authors 
add that the main difference between federal government and local government budgets 
is that local governments, unlike federal governments, have to prepare balanced 
budgets. 
 The above mentioned characteristics of local government financial management 
are also applicable to developing countries. In addition, local governments in 
developing countries such as India (especially in rural areas) face intense challenges in 
budgeting and financial management because of lack of control over fund sources 
(which come from higher tiers), and lack of advanced knowledge and skills among 
elected representatives and staff. Narayana (2005) finds that elected representatives in 
the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh have no clear idea about budgeting and fund sources 
for their Village Councils. Vyasulu (2004) and   Sodhi and Ramanujam (2006) highlight 
the need for training and capacity building of elected representatives in Indian 
Panchayats (rural local governments) with respect to accounting, budgeting and other 
basics of financial management.  
While financial management is important for local governments in developing 
countries, it can be seen that sophisticated or highly effective financial management (of 
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the kind that prevails in higher levels of government, especially in developed countries) 
is difficult to achieve in these contexts. In fact financial management in local 
governments of developing countries should be judged on the basis of more 
rudimentary and less sophisticated criteria compared to that in higher tiers of 
government, especially in developed countries.   
As seen in Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue (2003), leadership is a fundamental 
capacity component. It is also important as a component of local government capacity 
in developing countries because of the potential role of leaders in managing and 
mobilizing the limited human and financial resources, and co-ordinating, directing and 
integrating the overall functioning of the local government. Lankina (2008, 36) states 
that leadership is often neglected as a determinant of local government performance, 
but leaders can make a crucial difference to performance in various ways such as 
“generating consensus on policy areas or pushing through a vital development agenda.”  
Faguet (2006) and Grindle (2007) speak of the role of entrepreneurship or innovation 
that leaders can play in improving local government performance. Grindle (2007) 
argues that the quality of governance in Mexican municipalities explored by her was 
significantly influenced by the entrepreneurial activities of elected and appointed 
municipal leaders, who were able to rapidly introduce administrative modernization.  
Fiszbein (1997) comments that leaders of local governments must possess both political 
and managerial skills, and elaborates the diverse and crucial roles that leaders can play 
in strengthening local government capacity: motivating the local administration and 
breaking its inertia, co-ordinating complex and diverse tasks, drawing on latent 
capacity, and managing conflict within local councils.    
The term ‘capacity’ is sometimes used in a narrower sense to refer to the 
technical knowledge required to make and implement policies, something that trained 
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bureaucrats or staff members usually possess and inexperienced or untrained elected 
representatives and the citizenry usually lack. In this narrow sense, capacity might 
actually be reduced by accountability, and mere accountability would then not be 
sufficient for good performance. Heller (2001) and Sharma (2007) have pointed to the 
possible tension between two requirements of performance--accountability (in its 
deliberation dimension) and capacity. These authors find that a significant decision 
making role exercised by deliberative bodies made up of ordinary citizens (who lack the 
necessary technical skills) can lead to a reduction of technical capacity in the decision 
making process. In order to overcome the possible negative impact on performance 
created by high popular control, deliberative experiments (such as People’s Planning in 
Kerala and Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil) have had to use 
intermediate tiers of skilled or trained actors. The function of such intermediate tiers of 
actors is to carry out complex and technical tasks of decision making, leaving mere 
demand identification to the popular deliberative assemblies (Bandopadhyay 1997; 
Baiocchi 2001; Heller 2001; Sharma 2007).  Fiszbein (1997), in his exploration of 
capacity building in Columbian municipalities, however argues that high 
accountability, through competitive elections that result in competent local government 
representatives being chosen, and inflow of people’s inputs into the decision making 
process, can actually increase the capacity of local government. Fiszbein’s 
understanding of capacity however fits into the wider notion of capacity that goes 
beyond technical capacity. 
 Crook and Manor (1998), who identified accountability as the crucial 
determinant of local government performance, considered the impact of finances as a 
performance determinant but did not consider the role of capacity. Crook and Manor’s 
successful case was one that had ‘plentiful’ and ‘stable’ finances (1998, 290) and also 
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high accountability. Neither the Crook and Manor study, nor any other study however, 
deals with a case that has high accountability but low finances and capacity. What 
would the performance of such a case be like? Would its performance be better than that 
of a case having lower accountability but higher finances and capacity? This is indeed a 
question worth exploring.  
 The conflicting evidence on the relative importance of the difference 
performance determinants, and the unanswered question about the salience of 
accountability compared to the other factors, create the need for a study that would 
solve the puzzle of the relative salience of different performance determinants. Such a 
study would have to use the appropriate comparative methodology and operational 
measures of variables to yield robust and convincing answers.  
 
The Relationship between Accountability and Performance  
This section reviews the literature dealing with the accountability-performance 
relationship, examining firstly the theoretical literature and then the empirical studies 
on the topic. It must be recognized that the relationship between these two variables is 
not necessarily one-way. Local government service delivery or performance may also 
have an impact on accountability. Chaudhuri (2006) states that widespread performance 
failures (such as lack of responsiveness to people’s needs, corruption and leakages) in 
local service delivery in India were the reason behind India’s democratic 
decentralization reforms that took important steps to strengthen local accountability by 
bolstering local accountability mechanisms. Local residents in Tanzania are legally 
empowered to prepare and submit mass petitions against councillors who have failed in 
their dut ies. This formal mechanism has often been effectively used by Tanzanian 
NGOs but rarely by common people (World Bank 2009, 27). The rural local 
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government law in the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh provides village assemblies the 
right to recall the Village Council’s elected representatives (Government of Madhya 
Pradesh 2002, 2009), thus legally empowering the former to bring about the dismissal 
of the latter on grounds of arbitrary behaviour and violation of the decisions of the 
Village Assembly (Government of Madhya Pradesh 2005). Performance failures may 
conceivably push local residents to cast off their apathy and actually participate in 
mechanisms to hold their local governments accountable. One such example is the use 
of the informal accountability mechanism known as hartal (strike) by local residents in 
Bangladesh. In response to performance failures, local residents in Bangaldeshi cities 
have been seen to participate in mass mobilization and paralyze daily life, albeit on 
instigation by politically-connected muscle men. There are many instances of elected 
local governments in Bangladesh being dismissed as a result of such hartals (World 
Bank 2009, 27).  
 Such illustrations of the two-way relationship between accountability and 
performance make us realize the complexity of the relationship between them. Since the 
focus of this study is the impact of accountability on performance, the remaining 
treatment in this section is devoted to the review of studies dealing with the impact of 
accountability on performance.  
 
Theoretical Explanations 
Theories about the impact of accountability on performance reveal causal processes that 
operate between these two variables. Some of these perspectives apply not just to local 
government but to the functioning of governments in general. One such theoretical 
perspective is the ‘Good Governance’ perspective developed by the World Bank. In the 
World Bank’s view, accountability is important to ensure the congruence between 
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public policy and actual implementation and the efficient allocation and use of public 
resources (World Bank 1992).  
 March and Olsen (1995) have examined the impact of accountability on an 
important aspect of performance, which is decision making. These authors found that 
accountability can have positive and negative effects. On the positive side, it makes 
social control more effective and political actors more responsive to social pressures 
and to standards of appropriate behaviour. On the flip side, accountability can lead to 
delay in decision making through procrastination and excessive consideration of 
possibilities, and reduce risk taking. March and Olsen’s view is relevant to the micro 
context of the individual decision maker. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that 
macro-level governance is after all the aggregation of individual decision makers at the 
policy making, implementation and service delivery stages, and their combined 
propensities are very likely to have some impact on the overall functioning of 
institutions. March and Olsen’s view indicates that one should be careful about 
assuming that increased accountability will automatically result in good performance. 
 Keefer and Khemani (2005) provide theoretical insights about the impact of a 
specific accountability mechanism (elections) on service delivery by governments in 
general. They argue that certain factors hinder the positive impact of electoral 
competition on public goods delivery. Firstly, voters lack information about the specific 
role of different incumbents in the service delivery process, which lowers the incentive 
of incumbents to respond to the performance expectations of the citizens. Besides, voter 
choice in fragmented societies is determined not by performance considerations but by 
identity- based factors such as the ethnic identity of the candidate. These are important 
arguments which should temper one’s acceptance of the widely assumed view of 
competitive elections (whether in local government or at any other level) leading to 
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better performance. Hickok (1995) also argues that competitive elections are necessary, 
though not sufficient to bring about performance-based sanctioning of incumbent 
candidates. The reasons for this are voting on the basis of non-performance 
considerations such as party affiliation of candidates, and the complicated nature of the 
policy process that makes it difficult for voters to follow who is responsible for a 
particular policy decision or action.   
 Some theoretical perspectives are specifically relevant to the examination of 
accountability and performance at the level of local government; they elaborate whether 
local accountability can help improve local service delivery or local government 
performance (Walsh 1996; Bardhan 2002; Hiskey 2010). 8 Hiskey (2010), adopting a 
principal-agent view of local accountability, argues that local accountability might have 
both a positive or negative impact on local government performance. The closeness of 
local governments to the people, he argues, might bring about better oversight and 
sanctioning of elected representatives (agents) by the people (principals), thus bringing 
about a better conformity of the  actions of the former with the preferences of the latter 
(through improved monitoring capability and  interest compatibility9
                                               
8Walsh examines the role of ‘local democracy’ in promoting efficiency of service delivery; however his 
understanding of local democracy is almost equivalent to local popular accountability. 
). On the negative 
side, intense control by the local populace might constrain the autonomy or 
independence of elected representatives and force them to continually pander to the 
wishes of the local residents, thus preventing them form taking up courses of action that 
fail to win popular favour but are actually good for the long term well being of local 
residents and performance prospects of local government. Hiskey concludes by 
encouraging reformers and architects of decentralization experiments to have a clear 
9Interest compatibility between principals and agents can be brought about through the means of agent 
selection i.e. choosing or sanctioning of elected representatives by local residents. Such selection would 
enable them to choose new representatives, or retain incumbent representatives, whose preferences are 
compatible with their own preferences (Hiskey 2010) 
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conception of whether enhanced accountability and participation, or efficient service 
delivery, is their preferred goal, since one possibly (though not always) can come at the 
expense of the other.  
 Walsh’s (1996) view is valuable since it examines in a nuanced way (albeit from 
an economics perspective), the differential impact of local accountability on various 
aspects of performance, and also the varying impacts of different accountability 
mechanisms. For instance, he argues that for the realization of x-efficiency in service 
delivery (meaning efficiency in the economic sense of minimization of wastage), what 
is important is not so much elections but the concrete answerability of individuals who 
indulge in wastage. What will work to bring about x-efficiency is performance 
standards, and bodies for monitoring performance against such standards such as audit 
agencies, rather than accountability to the electorate.  
 Walsh argues that local popular accountability mechanisms have a much greater 
impact on the fit between services and local preferences (allocative efficiency or 
responsiveness) than on efficiency in its economic sense. This is because expression of 
people’s preferences is essential for service delivery to meet such preferences, and 
accountability mechanisms of local government can help in such expression. Walsh 
however feels that elections are not sufficient for this, and that deliberative mechanisms 
such as citizen panels are required, in addition to elections, to reveal preferences.  
 Walsh’s theoretical work on the accountability-performance relationship in 
local government is useful as a guide for empirical research. His theoretical arguments 
about the impact of specific accountability mechanisms (such as elections and 
deliberative mechanisms) on specific dimensions of performances (such as efficiency 
and the congruence of services with local preferences) provide clear hypotheses that can 
guide any empirical examination of the relationship between accountability and 
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performance. The theoretical views proposed by Walsh, combined with those of Keefer 
and Khemani (2005) and Hickok (1995), lead one to question whether competitive 




The Crook and Manor (1998) study has explicitly identified accountability as the most 
important determinant of local government performance. It comments on the overall 
relationship between accountability and performance. While other empirical studies do 
not argue about the accountability-performance connection in such explicit terms, the 
positive relationship between the two variables seems implied in most of their findings 
and arguments. Such studies examine the impact of particular accountability 
mechanisms on local government performance or particular aspects of performance. 
Some such studies argue about the positive impact of competitive elections on 
responsiveness of service delivery (Echeverri-Gent 1992; Sengupta and Gazdar 1997; 
Faguet 2006). Others attribute improvement of school teacher performance to the 
impact of community monitoring (Rana, Rafique, and Sengupta 2002; McCarten and 
Vyasulu 2004). Local deliberation, according to the EDD studies, leads to more 
equitable and efficient service delivery (Baiocchi 2001; Fung and Wright 2001; Heller 
2001). Aziz et al. 2002 believe that Social Audit can reduce corruption. The first part of 
this review of empirical accountability-performance studies evaluates the study that 
comments explicitly on the overall relationship, while the latter part critiques the 
studies that examine the impact of particular accountability mechanisms (elections, 




The Overall Relationship between Accountability and Performance 
Crook and Manor’s (1998) study is a makes a clear argument about the relationship 
between local government accountability and performance. Richard Crook and James 
Manor study four cases-the Indian state of Karnataka, Bangladesh, Ghana and Cote 
d’Ivoire. They find only Karnataka to possess an unambiguous record of good 
performance, and conclude that an optimum combination of factors is needed to 
produce such performance (defined in terms of ‘responsiveness’ and not mere quantity 
of outputs), including an ‘appropriate form of decentralized structure’, a ‘supportive 
social and political context’, adequate resources and most crucially effective systems of 
popular and institutional accountability (Crook and Manor 1998, 291).10
 Crook and Manor’s study is of immense usefulness and value as a guide to other 
research and scholarship in the field of local government studies. This frequently cited 
work has the merit of being a comprehensive analysis and investigation into the factors 
associated generally with successful local government performance. What makes it 
valuable is their assessment of performance in terms of a set of concrete indicators and 
not in vague, general terms, a characteristic seen in very few studies. Their 
operationalization of performance, though commendable in this respect, also has certain 
weaknesses (see page 47 of this thesis for details). They claim to have discovered only 
an association between certain factors and local government performance, of which 
 None of the 
other cases (all categorized as unsuccessful in terms of responsiveness of service 
delivery) possess significant degrees of both popular and institutional accountability. 
They identify accountability as the crucial link between increased participation and 
improved performance since it enables influence from the grassroots to be transmitted 
to the governmental institutions which manage resources and implement policy.  
                                               
10Crook and Manor (!998) use the term ‘popular accountability’ for direct accountability of elected 




popular and institutional mechanisms of accountability are the most important. The 
authors expressly state the limitations of their methodology that relies on a comparison 
of four totally disparate cases and especially on the identification of a deviant case (in 
their study, the Indian state of Karnataka that is the only case to show successful local 
government performance).  
 Because of the limitations of its methodology, the Crook and Manor study 
yields a tentative hypothesis about the relationship between accountability and 
performance that should be subjected to further empirical scrutiny. It is important to 
investigate the accountability-performance relationship by comparing cases that are 
comparable in some way, rather than totally disparate. This can possibly lend greater 
rigour to any findings about the relationship. Besides, accountability is not explored as a 
variable in its own right in the Crook and Manor study. It is seen merely as a link 
between increased participation and improved performance. Therefore the authors do 
not identify the detailed dimensions of accountability or attempt to systematically 
operationalize the concept. It is important to note that they claim a distinction between 
participation with accountability: they provide the examples of Ghana and Bangladesh 
that are found to possess high levels of participation with low levels of accountability. 
They find accountability in the successful case (Karnataka) to result from forces such as 
the competitiveness of the party system, a free and active media, and the tradition of a 
civil service that is used to working under and obeying elected representatives.  
 There is a major weakness in Crook and Manor’s argument about the 
relationship between accountability and performance: the authors state that 
accountability enables popular demands to bear on and be transmitted through the 
institutions of policy making and implementation. Yet it is questionable whether mere 
accountability (even in both its direct and indirect forms), enables this. The authors 
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have not considered the role of procedural stipulations formulated by higher levels of 
government and mandatorily enforced by the bureaucracy, and the role of the attitudes 
of the decision making and implementing actors (viz. bureaucrats and elected 
representatives) in possibly hindering the actual translation of expressed popular 
demands into service delivery congruent with such demands. The authors have not 
defined accountability; this makes it all the more difficult to understand how 
accountability can achieve the transmission of popular pressures throughout the internal 
systems of local government.  
 Crook and Manor also include indicators pertaining to freeness and fairness of 
elections inside their operational scheme to assess performance, thus failing to keep 
distinct the variables accountability and performance. Putting it simply, the authors fail 
to clearly distinguish between accountability, the impact of the intervening factors 
affecting the accountability-performance relationship (such as preferences of 
bureaucrats), and performance. Accountability should be assessed in terms of detailed 
dimensions and indicators (something that Crook and Manor did not do) so that the 
assessment of accountability is more robust, less random, and kept distinct from other 
variables in the study. 
 While the Crook and Manor (1998) study contains a qualitative assessment of 
the local government accountability-performance relationship, the study by Azfar, 
Livingston, and Meagher (2006) provides a quantitative analysis of this relationship. 
These authors use the term ‘political disciplines’ instead of accountability (though its 
meaning is equivalent to that of accountability as popular pressure). In their study of 
decentralized institutions of Uganda, they run a regression of a specific measure of the 
dependent variable service delivery (quality of education) on two different dimensions 
of the independent variable ‘political disciplines’ (media use and voting).  
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The quality of education variable in the Azfar, Livingston, and Meagher (2006) 
study is measured in terms of test scores of primary school students and a 
perception-based assessment of quality of education (based on household survey 
responses). The first dimension of political disciplines--media use--is conceptually 
based on the idea of accountability as transparency, and is measured in terms of an 
index that combines specific measures of whether the media (and not local politicians) 
is the primary source of information for households, and frequency of newspaper and 
radio use by households. The second dimension of political disciplines—voting and 
political action—is conceptually based on the idea of accountability as voice, and is 
measured in terms of an index that combines specific measures of whether households 
voted, whether households voted for ‘good’ reasons (such as candidate’s agenda and 
prior experience of candidate, but not religion, race, language), and whether the 
households participated in political action.  
 Azfar, Livingston, and Meagher (2006) run a regression of the service 
delivery variable – quality of education – on the two dimensions of ‘political 
disciplines’ or accountability, for 75 cases (subcounties). The results are that the ‘media 
use’ dimension of accountability has a statistically significant positive impact on the 
quality of education, whereas the effect of ‘voting and political action’ is negative and 
not statistically significant. The authors of this study thus find that the use of media as a 
source of information on local politics is related to better service delivery in the area of 
education, and that there is no noticeable impact of voting on education quality. Higher 
use of independent media as a source of information, the authors infer, enables better 




 The Azfar, Livingston, and Meagher (2006) study is praiseworthy for its use of a 
large sample of 75 local councils (sub-counties) and its nuanced assessment of the 
impact of accountability or ‘political disciplines’ on service delivery. This study helps 
us appreciate the complexity of the accountability-performance relationship, by 
showing that different dimensions of accountability can have different impacts on 
performance. However, the study does possess certain limitations. The hypothetical 
causal linkage or causal story between the dimension ‘voting and political action’ and 
the dependent variable ‘quality of education’ (that rests on indicators such as test scores 
and subjective quality of education) is not clear. Test scores are more suited as an 
indicator of school performance, rather than local government performance, since it 
depends on factors such as teacher quality, sincerity, pedagogy and regularity rather 
than the performance of local councils or their representatives. Apart from the role of 
district level governments in recruiting teachers and paying them, the role of Ugandan 
local governments with respect to education provision is not clear. It is not clear, 
therefore, how popular voting in subcounty or district elections could conceivably 
affect such educational outcomes. It must be acknowledged, however, that the 
dimension of media use can have a conceivable causal impact on quality of education 
(though not necessarily on test scores), since it enables availability of information about 
financial resources and consequent tracking of educational expenditures, thus 
constraining corruption. Such constraining of corruption can enable a more productive 
utilization of financial resources for improving education.   
 The operationalization of political disciplines in Azfar, Livingston, and 
Meagher (2006) is conceptually coherent (since it equates overall effectiveness of 
political disciplines to availability of information and its consequent use to sanction or 
pressurize public officials). However, the operationalization of this variable is, by no 
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means, comprehensive or complete. The authors could have included certain crucial 
indicators pertaining to the functioning of deliberative mechanisms to bolster their 
operationalization of the ‘voice’ dimension of accountability, considering that the 
deliberative mechanism of annual budget conferences are available at all levels of local 
councils in Uganda, in which local residents can participate and voice their preferences 
(Devas and Grant 2003).   
 
Impact of Elections on Performance 
Some authors have pointed out linkages between elections and specific dimensions of 
performance, such as responsiveness of service delivery to popular needs and 
preferences. Electoral competion has been suggested by some authors as a necessary 
condition for elections to have a positive impact on local government performance. 
Various theoretical views (Walsh 1996; Keefer and Khemani 2005) and empirical 
findings (Echeverri-Gent 1992; Sengupta and Gazdar 1997; Crook and Manor 1998; 
Faguet 2006; Majumdar 2009) point to the importance or limitations of competitive 
elections in improving local government performance. The literature mentions three 
specific causal mechanisms or pathways through which competitive elections might 
have a positive impact on performance. The first pathway is through the defeat of 
incumbents that creates pressure for improving performance. The second pathway is 
through oversight of the ruling group by the numerically strong opposition group in 
local councils. The third and final pathway is through the selection of competent 
election candidates as chairpersons/representatives of councils and rejection of 
incompetent ones.  
 The first causal process that is implicit in various author’s arguments is that 
competitive elections are leading to the turnover of incumbent representatives or ruling 
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groups and thus creating pressure for improved performance. Echeverri-Gent (1992) 
points out that there is a positive association between electoral competitiveness and 
responsiveness of local governments, as seen in the Indian state of West Bengal. He 
gives a specific example of how voters turned out representatives reputed to be corrupt 
in a particular local government in Midnapore district, but does not show if such 
turnover had a positive impact on responsiveness for that particular local government.  
 Majumdar (2009) finds that both her chosen Village Councils in West Bengal 
have experienced regular alteration of ruling party (indicating operation of 
anti-incumbency effect), but this has not led to any significant improvement of the area 
in terms of infrastructure or amenities. The author’s explanation is that since important 
policy decisions are centralized, electoral competition alone cannot be a sufficient force 
for improved service delivery. Majumdar’s argument about why electoral competition 
is not having an impact on performance is not convincing because Village Councils in 
West Bengal have been given a degree of autonomy with respect to certain functional 
areas such as infrastructure provision (while they continue to lack autonomy with 
respect to other functional areas such as health care). Furthermore, local governments 
have been given freedom in spending on projects up to a reasonable limit and are now 
less dependent on higher levels of government. Therefore there must be some other 
explanation about why electoral competition is not having a positive impact on 
performance. A possible reason why frequent electoral turnover in Majumdar’s cases is 
not inducing performance improvements might be that such turnover is not based on 
performance considerations. In other words, local residents are possibly not choosing or 
rejecting their individual representatives on the basis of performance considerations.  
 Majumdar’s study uses evidence of frequent turnover of ruling party and 
anecdotal accounts of slim victory margins of individual candidates as evidence of a 
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high degree of electoral competition. Her study does not provide evidence of the degree 
of turnover or defeat of individual incumbent representatives seeking re-election. The 
most effective pressure on incumbents, that could push them towards better 
performance, is likely to come from the increased likelihood of their personal defeat in 
the upcoming elections, rather than that of the ruling party. The evidence on victory 
margins would have been more convincing, had it come from records of election results 
rather than from interview responses of a few local representatives.  
 Sengupta and Ghosh (2006) in their empirical study of ten Village Councils in 
West Bengal, interestingly find that voters in Village Council elections are guided not 
by the past performance of their council or the scale of development in their locality, but 
by party loyalty while exercising their choice. Therefore it is not ensured that voters 
would use electoral sanctions to oust a non–performing candidate or party. One may 
infer from the authors’ observation that in such an event, competitive elections would 
not generate any pressure for improved performance. The relationship between 
electoral competition (in the form of frequent turnover of incumbents) and performance 
appears to be moderated by a particular condition, and this condition is voting on the 
basis of performance considerations.  
 While the reviewed literature in this area furnishes useful insights that can serve 
as hypotheses for an empirical study of accountability and performance, it suffers from 
one weakness. It does not distinguish between how competitive elections, through 
turnover of incumbents, promote accountability and how they promote responsiveness 
or better performance. Cementing some gaps in the above arguments, it makes better 
sense to hypothesize that frequent turnover makes accountability realizable since it 
causes the actual or likely defeat (sanctioning) of most incumbents. Frequent turnover 
arising from competitive elections make better performance realizable when the 
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pressure created by such turnover (which is based on performance considerations) 
actually pushes local government representatives or ruling groups to perform well.  
 Oversight of the ruling group by a numerically strong opposition group in local 
councils (that is generated through competitive elections) leads to a reduction in 
wrongdoings and corruption and increase in responsiveness on the part of the ruling 
group, according to some authors (Crook and Manor 1998; Blair 2000; Matthew 
2007a). Some studies have identified interesting mediating conditions in this respect. 
One such condition is party-based electoral competition. Crook and Manor (1998, 
295-6) believe that non-party elections can lead to ‘supine’ local councils with no 
interest in monitoring or challenging behaviour of the council chairperson. Blair (2000) 
inferred from the case of Honduras and Crook and Manor (1998) from the case of 
Karnataka that party-based electoral competition generated lively and vigilant 
opposition groups in the successful local governments. Such findings imply that 
competitive elections must be party-based to generate a strong and vigilant opposition.  
 Faguet (2006) finds that while competitive elections generate a numerically 
significant opposition bloc (as it did in both his chosen Bolivian municipalities), the 
actual oversight of the ruling bloc by the opposition bloc happens only in the absence of 
underhand and opportunistic dealings between the two blocs. Therefore meaningful 
political competition needs to supplement electoral competition for electoral 
competition to have an impact on performance. This was seen in his successful case of 
Baures municipality but missing in the unsuccessful case of Guayaramerin. Political 
competition that is lively, but harmonious at the same time, and without gross 
opportunism is important, according to some authors for competitive elections to have 
an impact on performance (Crook and Manor 1998; Faguet 2006). 
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 The third causal process between competitive elections and performance 
pointed out in the literature is that competitive elections are leading to election of good 
quality leaders, which in turn results in good local government performance. This is 
observed by Fiszbein (1997) for Columbia, where competitive elections leading to 
competent, responsible persons being chosen as mayors and councillors, are improving 
the policy performance of municipalities. Faguet (2006) argues that electoral 
competition fosters ‘policy entrepreneurship’ by bringing about election of mayors and 
councillors who are capable of policy innovation and thus, better equipped to serve the 
well-being of their constituents. This particular causal process indicates that 
competitive elections can have an impact on performance not just through turnover 
between two or more elections but also through selection of capable candidates in a 
single election.  
 The above hypotheses derived from the literature, related to the impact of 
competitive elections on local government performance, should be subjected to 
empirical examination by comparing and contrasting the performance of two or more 
local governments which differ in degrees of electoral competition. The need to subject 
these hypotheses to empirical examination arises especially because of theoretical 
perspectives (Hickok 1995; Keefer and Khemani 2005) and certain empirical findings 
(Grindle 2007; Moreno-Jaimes 2007) challenging the idea that competitive elections 
necessarily improve local government performance. Moreno-Jaimes (2007) in his 
quantitative study of Mexican municipalities, finds that electoral competition in these 
municipalities has had no impact on their performance (in terms of coverage of essential 
civic services). Merilee Grindle argues that the impact of increased electoral 
competition on the performance of Mexican municipalities was constrained because 
such electoral competition generated a more contentious environment inside councils, 
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in terms of division of views between councillors, party-based conflicts over the 
distribution of resources, and the consequent disruptions in decision making. Such 
contention created difficulties in governing the municipalities; as a result, the 
heightened pressure created by intense electoral competition did not have a positive 
impact on performance (Grindle 2007, 78).   On reading Grindle’s work, one can 
question whether the contentious environment created by inter-party electoral 
competition was the only reason for popular pressure created by elections not having an 
impact on performance. Grindle (2007, 38) notes that the law prevented elected officials 
of municipalities from contesting re-election for their incumbent position at the end of 
the three-year term. The absence of pressure on individual elected representatives 
(because of the lack of the opportunity to contest re-election for the same position) may 
possibly have been a factor for the lack of such impact (since elected representatives 
might have felt a reduced incentive to put in their best efforts into the exection of their 
duties).  This particular aspect is worthy of further exploration and research.11
Furthermore, the literature suggests certain possible pathways between electoral 
competition and improved GP performance, but these pathways might not be actually 
fulfilled in all kinds of contexts.  This also makes us question if electoral competition 
will always be successful in improving performance. The extensive literature 
elaborating the impact of competitive elections on performance provides us with a set of 
hypotheses about such impact, and reveals the possible causal processes that operate 
between competitive elections and performance. It needs to be seen, through empirical 
studies employing the appropriate methodology, whether these hypotheses or possible 
causal processes are fulfilled in different cases and contexts. As an improvement to the 
available studies, comprehensive operationalization and sound measurement of the 
   
                                               
11Grindle (2007) notes the prohibition on re-election as a factor contraining accountability, but does not 
explore it as a factor constraining performance.  
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variables concerned (such as ‘responsiveness’ or ‘performance’ and ‘electoral 
competition’) in terms of precise indicators, should be carried out for a better 
assessment of the impact of electoral competition on performance.  
 
Impact of Deliberative Mechanisms on Performance 
The EDD framework highlights the impact of deliberative mechanisms on local 
government performance (Fung and Wright 2001). EDD is a framework based on the 
common features of real world deliberative experiments that involve people in decision 
making and implementation. The crux of the EDD framework is the realization of 
benefits in service delivery and solving of practical problems through the use of local 
deliberation. The benefits of EDD lie not just in realizing democratic ideals of 
meaningful people’s participation, but also in generating service delivery gains. The 
deliberative mechanisms embodied in the EDD experiments, Fung and Wright (2001) 
believe, might even be superior to elections in enhancing the responsiveness, equity and 
effectiveness of service delivery. The utility of the EDD framework lies in specifying 
the possible causal processes that operate between local deliberation and superior 
service delivery.  
 Deliberative mechanisms in EDD experiments can be expected to generate 
service delivery gains because they involve and utilize the genius of people close to 
points of action who possess intimate knowledge about relevant situations. They also 
put in place a decision making process whereby superior solutions may be generated 
because all participants have the opportunity to offer useful inputs. Local deliberation 
can also bring about equity in service delivery by including people from marginalized 
sections in the deliberation process and revealing their preferences (Fung and Wright 
2001, 25-7).  
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 Real world cases that have experimented with EDD, such as  the Participatory 
Budgeting process in municipal government in Porto Alegre, Brazil and People’s 
Planning in Kerala, India, have experienced service delivery gains as a result of the 
successful operation of their deliberative mechanisms. It is noteworthy, however, that 
adaptations and design innovations have had to be made in these cases to overcome the 
challenges arising from the implementation of the utopian provisions of the EDD 
framework. In Kerala, a shift in allocation priorities was seen as a result of People’s 
Planning, with increases of financial outlay to meet people’s most pressing needs such 
as housing, sanitation and drinking water (Heller 2001). In Porto Alegre, the evidence is 
stronger, with outcomes from Participatory Budgeting seen in the form of greatly 
improved access to amenities and increased standards of living (Baiocchi 2001).12
Some cases in the developing world have had less spectacular and more modest 
gains compared to the hailed EDD cases such as Kerala and Porto Alegre. Such 
experiments are also commendable as improvements over earlier periods where people 
were deprived of any voice in the service delivery process. An example is Kenya where 
the deliberative process of citizen participation in the preparation of the Local Authority 
Service Delivery Action Plan has “dramatically increased the extent of public 
consultation at the local level” and resulted in projects that apparently better reflect 
citizens’ interests, compared to earlier projects that were prioritized by the local 
authorities (Devas and Grant 2003, 314).  
 
Heller (2001, 140-1) lauds the Porto Alegre experiment for the replacement of 
patronage-defined allocations by community-defined priorities, reconciling of local 
needs with city-wide needs, and significantly widened range of services provided by the 
municipality.  
                                               
1298% people had access to drinking water, 98% sewage coverage was achieved, and there were 89 
functioning municipal schools, compared to the 29 that existed before Participatory Budgeting was 
started (Baiocchi 2001). 
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The EDD propositions, however, need to be empirically verified in a wider 
range of cases  (and not just in urban areas such as Porto Alegre or rural areas with high 
literacy such as those in Kerala) in order to see that deliberative experiments are indeed 
having a positive impact on local government performance. Deliberative experiments in 
a variety of contexts deserve to be investigated for their functioning in terms of the 
extent of popular participation generated, for their impact on service delivery, and for a 
discovery of the institutional features or contextual conditions of these experiments that 
are hindering or promoting service delivery gains. 
 Some other considerations strengthen the case for EDD hypotheses to be tested 
in a variety of empirical contexts. Capacity problems have been observed by some 
authors with respect to the real world operation of deliberative experiments (Heller 
2001; Sharma 2007).  Baiocchi (2001, 48) also acknowledges that a combination of 
direct or deliberative and representative democracy is required for the ‘complex 
management’ of an entire municipality; it is implicit in his argument that direct 
democracy, by itself, might create capacity problems and be constrained in its ability to 
improve service delivery. Intermediate tiers of delegates or skilled persons have been 
used in the higher tiers of decision making in the Participatory Budgeting process in 
Porto Alegre (Baiocchi 2001) and People’s Planning in Kerala (Bandopadhyay 1997), 
with the lower level direct democracy forums carrying out mere demand identification.  
A minimum amount of finances and local government capacity must be available for 
the service delivery gains foreseen by EDD proponents to be actually forthcoming. 
 Intervening factors, such as the rules imposed by bureaucrats and the resistance 
of bureaucrats and elected representatives within the decision making and 
implementing structures of local government, might constrain the translation of popular 
inputs from deliberative forums into actual benefits for the people. Ghatak and Ghatak 
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(2002) in their evaluation of the deliberative mechanism of Gram Sansad meetings in 
rural local government in West Bengal, comment that the connection between popular 
deliberation in such meetings and actual decision making of local government is 
indirect and tenuous.  They also argue that a significant amount of local government 
decision making is dictated by the preferences of higher-level bureaucrats rather than 
the popular preferences expressed in the deliberative bodies. 13
Even in the EDD success story of Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre, the 
actual prioritization of projects is done by the intermediate tiers of regional delegates 
and the Municipal Council of the Budget, and not by the people in direct democracy 
forums (Baiocchi 2001, 46-7).  This raises issues and questions about the considerations 
that govern the prioritization and final selection of projects, and subject people’s 
expressed preferences to selectivity and filtering. There are complexities in the decision 
making process in deliberative experiments that remain to be explored carefully before 
coming to any conclusive judgment about the impact of deliberative or direct 
democracy forums on service delivery.  
 Such factors might 
constrain the positive impact of deliberative mechanisms on performance in actual 
reality, as result of which the EDD propositions might not be empirically borne out in 
all kinds of contexts.  
 
Impact of Monitoring Mechanisms on Performance 
The empirical evidence about the impact of popular monitoring on local government 
performance is conflicting. The evidence mostly pertains to the success or failure of 
such monitoring in reducing corruption that causes wastage of resources. 
                                               
13With reference to the current situation in West Bengal, this argument is more relevant as far as decision 
making on selection of welfare programme beneficiaries by Village Councils is concerned, and less 
relevant to decisions regarding the selection of infrastructural works.  
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 Aziz et.al (2002) in their study of the three South Indian states of Karnataka, 
Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh argue that ineffective popular monitoring is 
responsible for corruption and the poor quality of public works executed by Village 
Councils. One important reason for such poor popular monitoring, the authors feel, is 
the ineffectiveness of the Village Assembly and the absence of Social Audit by people 
and community organizations. The media and the opposition parties in the rural areas 
do highlight instances of corruption but these mechanisms, according to the authors, 
remain largely ineffective in checking corruption.14
 The available empirical studies on Social Audit in India mostly focus on Social 
Audit as a mechanism of accountability (examining its role in exposing irregularities 
and getting corrupt public functionaries punished) instead of focusing on whether 
Social Audit is actually leading to performance gains. As a result there is no conclusive 
evidence about the positive effect of Social Audit on local government performance, 
through causal processes such as prevention of wastages through the reduction of 
corruption. One study however informs that Social Audit in the states of Rajasthan and 
Andhra Pradesh has  led  to the recovery of a small proportion of funds pilfered by 
public officials through the identification of such officials, and consequent application 
of social sanctions to them (Afridi 2008). A World Bank report comments that the 
actual impact of citizen-based monitoring mechanisms is negligible and insignificant, 
 The authors feel that only public 
vigilance through Social Audit can check large-scale corruption and ensure that works 
are of good quality and executed on time. (Aziz et al. 2002, 307). The inferences of the 
authors are not based on any concrete evidence of the effectiveness of Social Audit in 
actually checking corruption or improving performance; therefore their speculations 
remain at an abstract level without being borne out by concrete empirical evidence.   
                                               




as seen, for example in Ethiopia. This report however acknowledges that more 
empirical research is required to ascertain the actual impact of such monitoring (World 
Bank 2009, 44).  
 Another stream of literature about the impact of community monitoring pertains 
not to local government per se, but to the functioning of alternative primary schools and 
their teachers in some Indian states. Monitoring by the local community has been seen 
as a crucial reason for the success of alternative primary schools in Madhya Pradesh  
known as EGS (Education Guarantee Scheme) schools (McCarten and Vyasulu 2004, 
2006) and those in West Bengal, called Shishu Shiksha Kendras or SSKs (Rana, 
Rafique, and Sengupta 2002). The teachers are recruited locally, and observers feel that 
because of their closeness to the village community, they can be effectively monitored 
by the parents and the community (McCarten and Vyasulu 2004, 2006).  One study also 
noted a better performance of SSKs compared to mainstream primary schools in its 
sample areas in terms of lower teacher absenteeism, higher student attendance, and 
better teacher-student relationship (Rana, Rafique, and Sengupta 2002; cited in Jha 
2003). The teachers of SSKs are found to perform better than mainstream primary 
school teachers despite poorer pay and working conditions. Furthermore parental 
monitoring is supposed to be playing a more crucial role in improving the performance 
of these schools than the ineffective bureaucratic school inspection system (Rana et al. 
2003).  
 However the present reality in Indian states such as Madhya Pradesh and West 
Bengal is that mainstream primary schools and their teachers are also being subjected to 
the same monitoring mechanisms (such as parent-teacher meetings and local 
Management Committees made up of parents) that alternative primary school teachers 
are subjected to. Local recruitment of mainstream primary school teachers, which 
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enables the local community to keep a better watch on them, is now the norm in the 
villages of Madhya Pradesh. Therefore, mere community or parental monitoring does 
not explain why alternative primary school teachers perform better than mainstream 
primary school teachers. There must be some other decisive factor, in addition to 
community monitoring, that explains the differences between the performance of 
mainstream and alternative primary school teachers. Rana et.al (2003) identify the 
dependence of the tenure of alternative primary school teachers in West Bengal on the 
continuing approval of the school Management Committees (because of temporary or 
contract-based appointment) as the cause behind their superior performance. In other 
words, the possibility of performance-based sanctioning (in the form of termination of 
tenure linked to performance failure) is the critical condition that explains the better 
performance of alternative primary school teachers. This explains more cogently the 
impact of accountability on the better performance of alternative primary school 
teachers, rather than mere parental or community monitoring.  
 
Conclusion 
Very few theoretical and empirical studies explicitly comment on the relationship 
between accountability and performance. Many studies do not explicitly refer to the 
accountability-performance relationship, but implicitly point to it. Such studies 
examine the relationship between specific dimensions of accountability and 
performance. Some studies in the available literature lead us to recognize that the 
relationship between accountability and performance is complex, and subject to the 
operation of several mediating conditions and possible tensions. 
 While the available studies yield valuable insights on the relationship between 
accountability and performance in local government, they also contain significant 
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weaknesses. Firstly, the operationalization of accountability and performance in the 
available studies lacks comprehensiveness and precision. This study has developed 
multi-dimensional operational schemes, with careful indicator selection, to carry out the 
assessment of accountability and performance. The endeavour is to minimize 
randomness in their assessment.    
Secondly, methodological weaknesses such as directly comparing completely 
different cases and not adequately exploring complex intermediate processes and causal 
mechanisms have been seen in available studies on the accountability-performance 
relationship. To avoid such weaknesses, this study carries out partially controlled case 
comparison, and also explores the complex processes and causal mechanisms operating 
between accountability and its constituent dimensions, and performance.  
The literature is a valuable source of hypotheses for this study. However, the 
hypotheses need to be subjected to further empirical scrutiny. This thesis integrates, into 
an examination of the hypothesized overall relationship between accountability and 
performance, the examination of the specific hypotheses about the impact of different 
accountability mechanisms on different performance aspects. It is an attempt to 
overcome some of the weaknesses of earlier studies, and to add to the interesting 
observations made in the literature by subjecting the accountability-performance 





CHAPTER 3                                  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
 
This chapter is an elaboration of the research design and methodology used in this 
study, the fundamentals of which were mentioned in Chapter 1. The first section of this 
chapter describes the case selection principles and the nature of cases selected. The 
second section elaborates the levels of analysis that correspond to the study’s three 
major methodological strategies. The third section gives an account of the 
operationalization of the variables accountability and performance. The final section is 
about the data gathering and data analysis methods used in the study, the latter revealing 
the analytical processes used at different levels of inference.   
 
Case Selection 
Since India is a vast country with 28 states, it is very difficult to study the whole of the 
country. Therefore the search for cases has been narrowed down to two Indian states. 
The two Indian states of Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal have been selected for this 
study. Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal lie in a handful of Indian states that have 
carried out any notable or meaningful devolution of powers and finances to rural local 
governments, and are therefore suited to be selected for a study of local government 
performance.  
 Considering the variable accountability too, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal 
are suitable for selection because a variety of accountability mechanisms is in place in 
their respective Panchayat (rural local government) systems. West Bengal is unique for 
being the only major Indian state which has had timely Panchayat elections on a party 
basis regularly since 1978. An important contrast between the two states, relevant to 
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elections as an accountability mechanism, is that West Bengal has party-based 
Panchayat elections while Madhya Pradesh does not. Madhya Pradesh has made unique 
efforts to empower the Village Assembly, by transferring significant powers to the 
single-village level Village Assembly. Similarly, Panchayat reforms in West Bengal 
have introduced mandatory Village Assembly meetings at the grassroots level of the 
village constituency. Therefore, the interesting contrasts and similarities between the 
two states can help shed light on different accountability dynamics and the relationship 
between accountability and performance. 
 In each state, two local government units (cases) have been compared with each 
other to discover the determinants of local government performance, and the salience of 
accountability as a determinant of local government performance. Intra-case analysis of 
each local government unit is also carried out to trace the causal processes between 
accountability and performance.  
 Before elaborating the principles of case selection within each state and 
identifying the local government units selected for study, it is necessary to briefly state 
the structure of rural local government in India. The Panchayat system of each Indian 
state is divided into three tiers of district (the highest tier), block (the intermediate tier) 
and village (the lowest tier). Councils made up of elected representatives are the local 
government units at each level; therefore the three types of rural local governments or 
Panchayats in each state are the district councils, the block councils and the village 
councils. In this study, the Village Council (the Indian term for which is Gram 
Panchayat) is the unit of analysis; each Village Council selected constitutes one ‘case’ 
in this study. Therefore there are two cases in each state, making up a total of four cases.    
 The choice of cases within each state is done as follows:   The chosen dimension 
of variation between the cases in each state is level of electoral competition, which is an 
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indicator of accountability (see section on conceptualization and operationalization of 
variables for details). One GP with a low level of electoral competition and another with 
a higher level of electoral competition are accordingly selected in each state.  
 Electoral competition is an appropriate criterion for case selection since it is a 
pivotal indicator of accountability. The variation introduced around this parameter is 
consistent with the author’s conscious attempt to introduce prior variation or contrast in 
accountability between the two cases in each state. The prior availability of data on 
election results of GPs in the two selected states also contributed to the choice of 
electoral competition as a dimension of variation. The following three-point logic 
makes variation in electoral competition a suitable technique of introducing variation in 
accountability between cases–firstly, sanctioning is a pivotal dimension of 
accountability (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999). Secondly, elections represent the 
most regular and widely available sanctioning mechanism in local government. Thirdly, 
mere elections are not sufficient to serve as a sanctioning mechanism; electoral 
competition is critical in this respect (see Chapter 2 for the background of these 
assumptions).  
 In keeping with the stated case selection principle, Debipur GP located in 
Memari-I block of Burdwan district, and Nowdapanur GP of Berhampore block in 
Murshidabad district are the two West Bengal GPs studied. Debipur GP is a case of low 
electoral competition, while Nowdapanur GP has a high level of electoral competition. 
Goutampur Colony GP in Obaidullahgunj block of Raisen district and Ramgarh GP in 
Narsinghgarh block of Rajgarh district have been covered in the Madhya Pradesh study. 
The electoral competition level in Goutampur Colony GP is low while a higher level of 
such competition is seen in Ramgarh GP. The cases selected in the two states and their 
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characteristics are summarized in Table 1. The characteristics of the chosen GPs in 
West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh can be seen in the Appendix.  
 
Table 1: Selected Cases in Both States 
GP  Characteristics Selected GPs (with location) West Bengal Madhya Pradesh 
Lower electoral competition 
Debipur GP 
(Burdwan District) 
Goutampur Colony GP 
(Raisen District) 





Source: The author’s case selection 
 
 This study relies on cross-sectional or spatial variation (that is, comparing 
different cases at a given point in time) rather than temporal variation (comparing 
different time periods).15
 
 The field research for this study has been conducted in three 
phases between August 2009 and April 2010: August-October 2009 and December 
2009-January 2010 in West Bengal, and February-April 2010 in Madhya Pradesh.  
Research Design: Levels of Analysis 
This study aims to investigate the relationship between accountability and performance 
through three specific strategies.  The first strategy is to explore and uncover the causal 
processes between the two variables. The second strategy is to discover the association 
between accountability and performance through the appropriate form of comparison. 
The third strategy is to avoid narrowness in overall findings by carrying out the study in 
two local government systems that vary in terms of their institutional structure.  The 
                                               
15The data gathered is mostly for the financial year 2008-09, though data for other years has been used 
with respect to some indicators of accountability and performance. On every indicator used in the study, 
cases have been compared with each other using data for the same year. 
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three levels of this study have been decided with a view to execute these three 
strategies.  
 
Intra-Case Analysis  
Delving into a single case allows a detailed observation of causal processes (Gerring 
2007). The intra-case analysis of each selected case (GP) in this study is carried out to 
measure accountability and performance for each case, trace the causal processes 
between them, and also assess the other variables of the study. This level of analysis is 
important for unpacking the complexities operating in the accountability-performance 
relationship, in terms of mediating conditions and intermediate processes.   
 
Intra-State Comparison of Cases  
Two GPs in each state have been compared with each other in this study. Since they 
belong to the same state, their institutional structure is common. The purpose of such 
comparison is to control for the autonomy of the GPs (which is determined by legal 
provisions and rules). The two GPs in each state therefore have the same decision 
making powers and are also governed by the same legal constraints for e.g. the 
maximum amount that they can autonomously spend on a single project.    
 As already stated, variation between these two cases has purposely been 
introduced with respect to electoral competition. Since the two compared cases in each 
state are governed by the same Panchayat law, the legal features of their accountability 
mechanisms are also common (though the actual functioning of these mechanisms 
varies). This makes the two cases suited for comparison with respect to accountability. 
The aim of the comparison is to rule out differences in institutional structure 
(specifically differences in the autonomy of GPs) as an explanatory factor behind 
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observed differences in performance, and discover which variable–accountability, 
capacity or finances–best explains variation in performance between the GPs in each 
state. 
 
Inter-State Comparison  
Findings derived from the comparison of local governments within a single state might 
be too narrow to serve as a basis for generalizing about the relationship between 
accountability and performance. Therefore this study has been conducted in two states. 
The final conclusions about the salient determinants of local government performance 
and the relationship between accountability and performance are those that are valid for 
both the state studies. The deriving of conclusions through two state studies, 
considering the diverse contexts, institutional structures and accountability mechanisms 
in the two selected states, adds greater robustness and generalizability to the overall 
conclusions of the study.   
 
Conceptualization and Operationalization of Variables  
One important priority in this study is to develop appropriate conceptual definitions and 
operational indicators of the variables used, keeping in mind the shortcomings of 
previous studies. This section presents the conceptual definitions of accountability and 
performance, as employed in this study, and the dimensions and indicators used to 
assess them. The operational dimensions and indicators of the other variables of the 





Accountability: Concept and Operationalization 
Accountability in this study refers to accountability to the people or popular 
accountability. Accountability of local government to the people has two 
components--direct (of elected representatives to the people) and indirect (of staff 
members to elected representatives). Staff members of local government are usually 
accountable to elected representatives, who in turn are accountable to the people. 16
 This study focuses mainly on direct accountability in the assessment of overall 
accountability. Indirect accountability (in terms of the control of elected representatives 
over staff members) is also explored, albeit briefly.  This study does not find any 
perceptible variation between the chosen local governments in each state with respect to 
indirect accountability. Therefore, the variation in accountability between the two cases 
in each state, as seen in this study, only represents the variation in direct accountability. 
  
 Accountability in this study is defined as the degree of popular control that the 
people (local residents) are able to exert over local government. ‘Popular control’ 
ranges from popular voice in the formation and functioning of local government to 
concrete popular pressure on local government.17
                                               
16In some exceptional situations, local government staff might be made accountable to the people 
directly. This is seen in Madhya Pradesh where the Secretary, a staff member of the GP, is made directly 
accountable to the Village Assembly. Such mechanisms, wherever present, are also included in the 
assessment of direct accountability in this study. 
  Such popular control is exercised 
through the means of sanctioning, monitoring and deliberation. The traditional 
conception of accountability is associated with the first two dimensions (‘monitoring’ 
refers to oversight and ‘sanctioning’ to punishment), seeing these two dimensions as the 
instruments through which people hold their governments answerable for their actions. 
This study however employs a wider understanding of accountability, and borrowing 
17It should be noted that this study uses a process-based concept of accountability, and not an 
outcome-based concept. In other words, accountability means popular control (voice or pressure) 
expressed or exercised by the people, and not the actual extent of fulfilment of people’s preferences by 
local government or the allocation of services and benefits by local government according to 
demographic weights or needs of different groups. See Chapter 2 for a clarification of the process and 
outcome based concepts of accountability, as stated by Bardhan and  Mookherjee (2006b). 
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from Moncrieffe (2001) brings in a third accountability dimension of ‘deliberation’. 
The logic behind such inclusion is that local accountability is distinct in nature from 
common public accountability, which is usually the focus of authors who have 
developed the traditional notion of accountability. 
 One important feature of local accountability is the reflection of popular 
preferences in a more direct and assured way in the working of local government than is 
endeavoured in higher levels of government. Therefore, in contrast to central or 
provincial governance, local governance requires (and makes feasible, due to the small 
size of jurisdictions) the employment of deliberative mechanisms of accountability such 
as village assemblies with powers of discussion and decision making. This means that 
local accountability should be assessed not only in terms of the functioning of 
monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms such as audits and elections, but also in terms 
of the working of deliberative mechanisms that are more likely to ensure that  popular 
preferences are brought to bear  on the decisions of the local government.  
 Accountability in this research project has been operationalized in terms of the 
functioning of only formal accountability mechanisms of local government in terms of 
their effectiveness in creating popular control, and not in terms of the working of 
informal mechanisms such as civil society associations, NGOs and mass media. Each 
dimension of accountability identified in the conceptual scheme--sanctioning, 
monitoring and deliberation--has been operationalized into observable indicators for 
the purpose of measurement. The indicators for each dimension pertain to the actual 
functioning of the available accountability mechanism corresponding to that dimension. 
Elections are the accountability mechanism corresponding to the sanctioning dimension 
of accountability. The deliberation dimension of accountability is assessed according to 
various indicators pertaining to the actual functioning of Village Assembly meetings. 
 92 
 
Indicators pertaining to the formal mechanism of popular monitoring known as Social 
Audit are used to assess the monitoring dimension of accountability. A summary of the 
dimensions of accountability (with the indicators for each dimension) is given in Table 
2, and the detailed description of each dimension can be seen in the following 
paragraphs. 
 





Proportion of seats not obtained by single largest/ruling party 
Proportion of contested seats 
Degree of defeat of incumbent representatives seeking re-election 
Turnover (change) of single largest or ruling party 
Voter turnout 




Frequency of meetings  
Extent of people’s attendance  
Inclusiveness of people’s attendance  
Inclusiveness of actual decision making  





Extent of popular involvement 
Raising of issues and exposure of grievances 
Perceived  effectiveness (according to elected members and staff) 
Source: The author’s operationalization 
 
Sanctioning Dimension 
While all three dimensions represent important aspects of accountability, the 
sanctioning dimension is its most crucial dimension. After all, it is the actual 
punishment (or threat of punishment) of incumbent local government representatives 
that is likely to be the cornerstone of popular pressure. Elections are the most basic and 
only available way for voters to punish or reward their elected representatives for their 
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performance in office, and therefore the most obvious mechanism of sanctioning. 
However, the mere holding of elections is not enough to ensure effective accountability; 
electoral competition is critical, as already seen. Elections will be evaluated as a 
mechanism of sanctioning in this study mainly in terms of their competitiveness, with 
additional indicators on freeness and voter turnout. The competitiveness indicators are 
the core or crucial indicators of the sanctioning dimension.  
 Highly competitive elections are a potent source of popular pressure on 
incumbent candidates, since more competitive or closely contested elections result in 
stronger alternatives for people to choose from. Higher electoral competition can 
provide a stronger threat to the incumbent ruling group and representatives that they can 
be turned out of office, thereby increasing the effectiveness of elections as a sanctioning 
mechanism. The first way of assessing electoral competition in each case is to use the 
relevant indicator pertaining to GP elections, such as relative strength of ruling and 
opposition groups in the GP, or the proportion of seats filled in a contested manner.18
 While the aforementioned competitiveness indicators pertain to the threat of 
incumbent representatives or ruling groups being ousted through electoral defeat, other 
crucial indicators of competitiveness pertain to the actual extent of defeat. These 
indicators assess the extent of actual defeat of incumbent elected members standing for 
re-election, and whether or not there is turnover of the ruling group of the GP. Apart 
from competitiveness indicators, freeness (absence of intimidation) and a high voter 
turnout are also basic conditions for elections to function as a sanctioning mechanism. 
  
                                               
18Different indicators of electoral competition are relevant in the two chosen states. In West Bengal, 
which has party based rural local government elections, party-based competition in terms of the 
percentage of seats not held by the ruling party is relevant as an indicator. In Madhya Pradesh, elections 
are not conducted on party basis. Here the proportion of representatives chosen through contested 




Therefore freeness and voter turnout are included as indicators of the effectiveness of 
elections.  
 
Deliberation Dimension  
Village Assembly meetings constitute the deliberative mechanism of accountability. 
India’s 73rd Constitutional Amendment and the respective Panchayat laws of Indian 
states have made it mandatory for these meetings to be held. The Village Assembly has, 
in the chosen Indian states, been bestowed by the respective Panchayat laws with 
certain powers of deliberation (discussion and decision making). Its meetings, through 
widespread attendance of villagers, are supposed to function as forums for the inclusive 
expression of villager’s preferences. As per the law, such preferences are brought to 
bear on the GP’s decision making in a binding way. As a source of binding decisions 
that defines the work agenda of the GP, the deliberative mechanism of Village 
Assembly meetings is a clear source of popular control on the local government, and 
therefore valid for incorporation in a measurement of accountability.  
              The functioning of the Village Assembly is assessed according to the 
following indicators. The first indicator pertains to the frequency of meetings; the 
regular holding of meetings (at least as many times as required by the law) is basic to the 
effectiveness of village assemblies as a deliberative mechanism. The extent of people’s 
(local residents’) attendance in the meetings is the second indicator. Mere holding of 
meetings is not a guarantee of their effectiveness; respectable attendance (at least 
meeting the quota requirement laid down by the law) is necessary, and higher 
attendance is a crucial indicator of the higher effectiveness of these meetings.  
 The third indicator to assess the effectiveness of Village Assembly meetings is 
the inclusiveness of attendance. Mere attendance, though crucial, may not ensure that 
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various sections of the village population (such as women, marginalized 
socio-economic groups, and non-partisan people or people holding opposition political 
views) are attending. If these groups do not attend, then their preferences will fail to find 
their way into the decisions of the Village Assembly. The fourth indicator assesses the 
extent of the actual inclusiveness of decision making by the Village Assembly. Here the 
focus is on evaluating, on the yardstick of inclusiveness, the processes and actors 
involved in actual decision making by the Village Assembly. Putting it more clearly, 
this indicator tries to assess if actual decision making of Village Assembly is dominated 
by the preferences of a few powerful actors, or if the preferences of a wide section of 
local residents are able to find their place in its decisions.  
 The final indicator on the deliberation dimension is the extent of scrutiny of GP 
functioning in the Village Assembly meetings. Village Assembly meetings allow 
villagers to interrogate their elected representatives, and also scrutinize and ratify 
important GP records such as the budget and annual plan of work. The extent of popular 
scrutiny of GP functioning in Village Assembly meetings would indicate the extent to 
which local residents are taking interest in, evaluating and commenting on the 
functioning of the GP.  
 
Monitoring Dimension  
The mechanism of popular monitoring in the GPs of the chosen Indian states is Social 
Audit. In this study, ‘Social Audit’ means a systematic and institutionalized procedure 
of review, not by upper levels of government, but by the local residents themselves. 
Social Audit in this sense is being carried out only for only one area of GP functioning 
in the chosen states, which is the implementation of India’s National Rural Employment 
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Guarantee Act (NREGA). 19
 Specific indicators related to the effectiveness of Social Audit assess not just its 
frequency, but also the extent of meaningful popular participation in Social Audits. The 
two GPs in each state are therefore compared with each other for the number of times 
that each has held Social Audit, and also whether a popular assembly of villagers is 
given a role in the Social Audit process. In the absence of such assembly being 
convened, the Social Audit exercise becomes the preserve of a few local elites and 
devoid of people’s involvement. The actual functioning of Social Audit is also 
evaluated through its success in identifying irregularities or grievances. The final 
indicator is about the effectiveness of Social Audit in the GP as perceived by the GP’s 
elected members and staff. The above indicators together provide a cumulative measure 
of the effectiveness with which Social Audit is being carried out in a particular GP.  
 Social Audit can potentially generate effective public 
scrutiny and visibility of the GP, and may uncover irregularities and incompetence in 
GP functioning. If effective, Social Audit would keep GP members on their toes and 
thus act as a significant source of popular pressure. 
 
Performance: Concept and Operationalization 
In this study, performance is understood in terms of service delivery--outputs of local 
government and people’s satisfaction with those outputs. The 
efficiency-effectiveness-responsiveness-equity scheme developed in the performance 
measurement literature (see Chapter 2) is a comprehensive framework and a valuable 
guide to assess performance, with a balance of objective and subjective, quantitative 
and qualitative indicators. All the four parameters of the scheme might not, however, be 
applicable to all functional areas or types of outputs. It is important to use, for each type 
                                               
19 NREGA is not just an employment generation programme but also a programme to create 
infrastructural assets for the improvement of the quality of life in the villages.  
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of output, parameters that are most directly relevant to the functionality of the particular 
output (that is, the fulfilment of the purpose behind its provision). Furthermore, the 
same parameters might not be equally important in the context of developed and 
developing countries. In developing countries (especially in rural areas) a consideration 
such as efficiency in spending is secondary, and  the mere availability of certain 
amenities such as concrete roads may be considered an achievement in service delivery 
(Crook and Manor 1998) since it leads to a noticeable improvement in the living 
standards of the rural people.   
 The use of the term ‘responsiveness’, as stated in the operational scheme in the 
performance measurement literature, is problematic. Different authors have defined this 
term differently, some seeing it in terms of congruence of outputs with needs, while 
others see it in terms of characteristics such as speed, timeliness etc. that are related to 
service quality. Essentially, this is a measure of people’s satisfaction with service 
delivery. Therefore the use of the term ‘popular satisfaction with outputs’ is preferable 
in place of ‘responsiveness’, and it indicates congruence of outputs with popular 
preferences.   
 This study focuses on an evaluation of performance of GPs in two selected 
functional areas viz. rural infrastructure (rural roads, drinking water sources, water 
bodies, bridges, drains and other construction activities) and alternative primary 
education.20
                                               
20Alternative primary education has been chosen because GPs have a greater role to play with respect to 
the functioning of alternative primary schools than mainstream primary schools which are controlled by 
the state government’s board of primary education. These schools are called SSKs in West Bengal and 
EGS schools in Madhya Pradesh. 21GPs have the responsibility of executing specific infrastructural 
projects carried out under these programmes. Village assemblies propose the specific works (along with 
their location) to be carried out under these programmes and GPs are responsible to implement the works 
proposed by the village assemblies.    
 Different indicators are applied to each functional area, keeping in mind 
their suitability for assessing performance in the concerned area. The operational 
scheme employed in this study covers a combination of objective and perception based 
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indicators for a balanced and robust assessment of performance. The summary of 
indicators used to measure performance in the selected functional areas is given in 
Table 3, and the details can be read below. For the purpose of measurement, each 
functional area corresponds to one ‘dimension’ of performance.  
 
Table 3: Dimensions and Indicators of Performance 
Dimension or 





Ratio of actual output to targeted output 
Proportion of completed works among works 





Satisfaction with quality of roads 
Satisfaction with quality of drinking water 
sources 






facilities of schools 
(objective measure) 
Availability of own building 
Availability of toilets 
Availability of drinking water source 
Classroom grade ratio 
Teacher 
satisfaction 
Perception of teachers regarding facilities of 
schools  
Satisfaction of teachers regarding support 
received from the GP  
Source: The author’s operationalization 
 
Performance Assessment in Infrastructure Provision 
The available output data for infrastructure is in the form of outputs of specific central 
and state government programmes (for example NREGA, State Finance Commission 




 The first effectiveness measure employed is the proportion of the works that 
were actually completed among the targeted works of the GP. This effectiveness 
indicator, however, is not sufficient because it does not reveal the proportion of works 
completed from among the works actually taken up for implementation. Therefore, an 
additional effectiveness indicator is used, that reveals the proportion of completed 
infrastructural works among the projects actually taken up for implementation. The data 
for the above indicators has been obtained from GP records. The data for the different 
programmes in the area of infrastructure are cumulatively considered to assess overall 
effectiveness. 
 The two sub-dimensions used to measure performance in infrastructure 
provision are effectiveness and popular satisfaction with infrastructural assets.   
 The second sub-dimension in the functional area of infrastructure is popular 
satisfaction with infrastructural assets such as roads and constructed drinking water 
sources.22  Mere outputs of local government might not be a conclusive measure of their 
impact on local residents. What matters is that local residents benefit from and feel 
satisfied with these outputs. This reason makes popular satisfaction with infrastructural 
assets the crucial parameter in the area of infrastructure.23
                                               
21GPs have the responsibility of executing specific infrastructural projects carried out under these 
programmes. Village assemblies propose the specific works (along with their location) to be carried out 
under these programmes and GPs are responsible to implement the works proposed by the village 
assemblies.    
 Popular satisfaction with 
22Roads and constructed drinking water sources are categories of infrastructural outputs that are normally 
delivered by GPs, and not by the higher levels of government.  
23Some may argue that satisfaction with infrastructural assets reflects the performance of past incumbent 
local councils as well, and not just of the present incumbent council. However, one should note that the 
quality of infrastructural assets constructed earlier depends significantly upon the repair and up-gradation 
work done by the present council. The author acknowledges that there is a degree of durability or 
continuity in this indicator of performance, in the sense that the performance of earlier councils does 
affect it. Corresponding to such continuity in performance, this study incorporates some elements of 
continuity or durability in the assessment of accountability. Electoral competitiveness, the main indicator 
of the sanctioning dimension of accountability, considers the election results of two successive local 
government elections to note a trend. The use of villager survey responses to assess some indicators of the  
deliberation dimension of accountability sheds light on enduring patterns in the actual functioning of the 
deliberative mechanism, unlike the data taken from local government records that sheds light on 
functioning of the mechanism for one year (2008-09) only.  
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infrastructural outputs is operationalized through two indicators of quality satisfaction 
and accessibility satisfaction. These satisfaction indicators are measured through the 
results of the villager survey employed in each chosen GP. In the survey, villagers were 
asked about their satisfaction with the physical condition of the roads and drinking 
water sources (quality satisfaction) and whether they found the drinking water sources 
to be located at a convenient distance from their homes (accessibility satisfaction).  
 
Performance Assessment in Alternative Primary Education 
GPs in the two chosen states have the specific responsibility of providing basic facilities 
to alternative primary schools. The availability or otherwise of basic facilities in these 
schools therefore directly reflects the performance of the concerned GP. Therefore GP 
performance for the domain of alternative primary education is assessed in terms of the 
availability of basic facilities of alternative primary schools in the GP area such as their 
availability of own building, availability of functioning drinking water source, 
availability of functioning toilets, and number of classrooms compared to number of 
grades.  
 Apart from the above objective measures, the satisfaction of alternative primary 
school teachers with the facilities of the school and the degree of support received from 
the GP is also considered for an overall assessment of GP performance in the functional 
area of alternative primary education. 
 
Data Gathering and Data Analysis 
This study has drawn on diverse data sources. The first part of this section elaborates the 
sources from which data for the study has been gathered. The techniques of data 




The Gathering of Data  
Three major methods of data collection have been used in this study: structured survey 
interview of samples of local residents (villagers), semi-structured elite interview and 
document analysis of local government records. The author supplemented data from the 
above sources with insights obtained from direct observation during her fieldwork 
period. 
 
Survey of Villagers  
In each GP covered in this study, a sample of villagers was selected in order to 
administer a structured interview. The survey questions were designed to assess 
relevant indicators of accountability (such as attendance and speaking in village 
assembly meetings) and performance (satisfaction with roads and drinking water 
sources). The sample of  sixteen villagers for each GP24 was chosen on the basis of the 
quota sampling method, with a view to make it representative of the actual 
characteristics of the GP population on the parameters of gender, and caste (with 
reference to the general, Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) categories). 25
                                               
24The sample size was decided at sixteen villagers for each GP in order to evenly represent various 
localities (villages/ settlements/constituency areas) of each GP. The two chosen Madhya Pradesh GPs 
have three and four constituent localities (villages and settlements) respectively. West Bengal GPs are 
much larger with one chosen GP having twelve and the other having seventeen constituency areas. The 
author chose four constituency areas in each West Bengal GP (to represent both ruling party and 
opposition controlled constituencies). To evenly represent four localities of each GP, the author fixed the 
sample size at sixteen for each GP (4x4=16). 
 
The proportion of subjects for each category (female, male, SC, ST, general) was 
chosen on the basis of available census data to reflect the actual distribution of these 
categories in the population. The subjects were chosen through the means of household 
visit in the GP area (calling non-selectively on households in selected localities and 
25 ‘General’ as a sampling category in this study refers to all non-SC and non-ST subjects.  In the Madhya 





 A total of 64 villagers belonging to the four GPs covered (16x4=64) 
have been personally interviewed by the author in this study through villager survey.  
Elite Interviewing  
Elite interviews in this study have been used as a source of qualitative insights to assess 
relevant aspects of accountability, performance and the causal processes between them, 
and also relevant aspects of primary performance determinants such as capacity. They 
have also been used to supplement and check the reliability of data from GP records. 
Elite interviews revealing the attitudes of subjects are also a data source used in 
assessing the secondary independent variable ‘preferences of decision makers’.  
 The elite subjects fall under several categories: The first category is the elected 
representatives at the GP level. The subjects interviewed in this category are the 
members representing each village (in Madhya Pradesh) or chosen constituency (in 
West Bengal) of each GP, along with the GP chairperson (known as Pradhan in West 
Bengal and Sarpanch in Madhya Pradesh ) and the chairpersons of the GP’s functional 
committees on education and public health, and infrastructure (in West Bengal).27
                                               
26In the West Bengal study, the author purposefully selected four localities, and in the Madhya Pradesh 
study the author covered all the localities in the GP (see previous footnote). Within these localities, the 
author purposefully visited specific neighbourhoods (populated by people of particular caste categories) 
to fill the caste–based quotas in the sample. 
 In 
the Madhya Pradesh study, both current and former elected representatives were 
interviewed since new GPs, almost entirely made up of first time incumbents lacking 
experience, had just been constituted at the time of fieldwork (February-April 2010).. 
The spouses of some reticent female representatives, who function as de facto 
representatives, were also interviewed. The total number of GP elected representatives 
(and their spouses) interviewed for this study is 31.  
27The Sarpanch is the ex-officio chairperson of the functional committees of the GP in Madhya Pradesh. 
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 The second category of elite subjects comprises elected representatives at the 
block and district level Panchayats (rural councils) corresponding to the four chosen 
GPs. The subjects interviewed in this category were the chairpersons of the education 
and infrastructure standing committees of the block and district level Panchayats, 
representatives of the chosen GPs in the block Panchayats and the chairpersons of the 
block level Panchayats. A total of eleven block and district level elected representatives 
were interviewed. 
 The third category comprised members of the staff/bureaucracy. This consisted 
of GP staff members and bureaucrats of the district and block Panchayats 
corresponding to each GP. A total of seven GP staff members and seven block and 
district bureaucrats were interviewed.  
  The fourth category comprised teachers of alternative primary schools in the 
chosen GPs of both the states. These subjects have been interviewed specifically to 
obtain insights on GP performance in the functional area of alternative primary 
education. The total number of teachers interviewed is sixteen, covering a total of seven 
schools for both state studies.  
 Apart from all these categories of semi-structured elite interviews (that are 
common to the West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh studies) there was one category of 
elite subjects unique to the West Bengal study viz. the secretaries of the intermediary 
organization known as Gram Unnayan Samiti (Village Development Committee) or 
GUS. 28
 In addition to the interviews of various categories of functionaries stated above, 
the author interviewed a few miscellaneous elite subjects. These included experts in the 
state capitals of Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal, interviewed for a better 
 A total of seven GUS secretaries were interviewed for this study.  
                                               
28There is no equivalent of the GUS in the actual functioning of the chosen Madhya Pradesh GPs.  
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understanding of the functioning of Panchayats in each state. These diverse 
authoritative subjects comprised--a senior official in the Panchayats and Rural 
Development Department of the Government of West Bengal, an experienced 
functionary of a well-known Madhya Pradesh NGO, a journalist working with a Hindi 
Language daily in Madhya Pradesh who covers rural affairs, and highly ranked 
bureaucratic personnel in the West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh State Election 
Commissions.  The miscellaneous interviews also included those of two trainers of GP 
members in West Bengal, two politicians in Madhya Pradesh, an NGO co-ordinator in 
Berhampore Block, two elderly villagers in Ramgarh GP, and an anonymous school 
teacher in Goutampur Colony GP in Madhya Pradesh. The total number of 
miscellaneous elite interview subjects was thirteen.  
 Adding up the subjects in all the categories above, the total number of elite 
interview subjects for this study is 92. All interviews (whether villager survey or elite) 
were personally conducted in the local language (Bengali in West Bengal and Hindi in 
Madhya Pradesh) by the author. All interview responses have been translated by the 
author into English.  
 
Document Analysis  
The perusal of local government records has yielded objective data on the physical 
outputs of GPs, which has been used to assess the effectiveness indicator of GP 
performance. Information from GP records about proceedings and attendance in 
Village Assembly meetings has been used to measure the relevant operational 
indicators of accountability. Minutes of GP meetings, external audit and self-evaluation 
reports of GPs, GP budgets and income-expenditure reports have all been examined to 
obtain a thorough understanding of GP functioning, and to reveal insights on important 
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variables, such as the financial strength of the GPs. Data on GP election results have 
been obtained from the State Election Commissions of West Bengal and Madhya 
Pradesh.  
 Data on the institutional structure of GPs in each state (including the laws 
determining the features of the formal accountability mechanisms) and the rules related 
to the programmes implemented by GPs are of obvious importance to the study. The 
actual operation of GPs makes sense only when their institutional structure and legal 
constraints are clearly understood. Such data has mainly been obtained from various 
state government publications, including the Panchayat Act of each state. 
 
Data Analysis and Inference  
This study uses a qualitative methodology to analyse data and arrive at inferences.  Yet 
some data gathered is in numerical form, like, the physical output figures of GPs, 
attendance figures in Village Assembly meetings and election result figures. Simple 
arithmetic operations such as calculation of averages, percentages and ratios have been 
applied to assess relevant numerical indicators of accountability and performance (such 
as ‘effectiveness’ indicators of performance, and the Village Assembly attendance 
indicator of accountability) and other variables (such as financial strength).  Simple 
comparison of magnitude of these numerical measures between the two chosen GPs in 
each state has been carried out.  
 The non-numerical data is of two types: (a) interview responses, from elite 
interviews and villager survey (b) data from documents and publications. Interview 
responses have been subjected to scrutiny in order to discover patterns and important 
insights. The villager survey interviews have both closed ended responses and open 
ended responses, while the elite interview responses are open ended. Simple summary 
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statistics like percentages have been applied to the closed-ended  responses of the 
villager survey interview, to assess relevant indicators such as the extent of satisfaction 
of villagers with the quality of physical outputs.  Close scrutiny for discovering patterns 
and insights has naturally been applied to open ended responses (from both elite and 
villager survey interviews) since the patterns in these responses are often not readily 
obvious.  
 The drawing of inferences from data in this study has been employed for three 
tasks: Firstly, to assess indicators of accountability, performance and other variables; 
secondly, to arrive at aggregate measures of accountability and performance and the 
other crucial variables in the study; thirdly, to investigate the causal relationships 
between accountability (and other possible performance determinants) and 
performance.  
 While this study employs a qualitative methodology, it is inspired in one sense 
by quantitative methodology. This inspiration reflects in the construction of specific 
dimensions and indicators for assessment of variables, which lends precision to the 
process of investigation. The actual aggregate assessment of accountability and 
performance (and their respective dimensions) is however done qualitatively, and not 
through the construction of numerical scores or indexes. The assessment of indicators 
of accountability, performance and other variables in the study has been done through 
the analysis of numerical or non-numerical data obtained through direct observation, 
document analysis and the analysis of villager survey and elite interview responses. 
Since the method used to execute the task of measuring indicators has already been 
described, the techniques used for carrying out the other two tasks of inference are 




Assessment of Measures of Variables 
The development of an aggregate assessment of multi-dimensional variables such as 
accountability and performance involves firstly, a combination of their relevant 
indicators into dimensions, and then combining the assessed dimensions into an overall 
measure of the variable. In combining indicators into dimensions, a case that is assessed 
as being higher on all the indicators of a dimension is obviously inferred as having done 
better on that dimension. For instance, a case having done better on all the indicators of 
the deliberation dimension of accountability would be inferred as being better on the 
whole dimension. A case that is superior on all the indicators/sub-dimensions of the 
infrastructure area of performance would be assessed as having the higher performance 
in that area. However, where the evidence is more conflicting, then there is a weighing 
of evidence to infer which case has done better for the whole dimension. A case that is 
ahead on a higher number of indicators, or that has clearly done better on crucial 
sub-dimensions/indicators (if any) is assessed as being the superior one for that 
dimension.29
 The combination of dimensions into an aggregate measure of the concerned 
variable is done as follows:  a case that is ahead on a higher number of dimensions is 
generally rated as higher for the variable. In measuring accountability, a case assessed 
as superior on all three dimensions or on two dimensions (including the crucial 
sanctioning dimension) would clearly be seen as having higher accountability. Having 
said so, the evidence might not always be so clear; one case might have done better on 
the crucial sanctioning dimension of accountability but another might be ahead on the 
  
                                               
29With respect to the accountability dimensions of deliberation and monitoring, no specific indicator has 
been identified as a crucial indicator. Therefore, being ahead on a majority of indicators is used as the 
yardstick to assess a case as being higher on each of these accountability dimensions. In the sanctioning 
dimension of accountability, the competitiveness indicators are the crucial or core indicators.  In 
measuring the infrastructure dimension of performance, the ‘satisfaction with infrastructural assets’ 
sub-dimension is the crucial set of indicators.  
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other two dimensions. In such an event, there is a weighing and balancing of evidence in 
order to arrive at an assessment about which case has higher aggregate accountability. 
Chapter 4 and 5 of this thesis show how this author has assessed accountability in the 
chosen cases, illustrating in Chapter 5 the weighing of evidence that is used as a basis 
for arriving at inferences.  
 With respect to performance, too, a similar logic would apply, as mentioned in 
the previous paragraph. A case that is superior on both the functional areas 
(dimensions) of performance would clearly be seen as having higher performance, 
However, the evidence would be more conflicting when one case does better in one area 
and the other on the other area. Given such a situation, there would be qualitative 
weighing and balancing of evidence on the various constituent sub-dimensions of the 
two areas in order to arrive at a judgment about which case has overall higher 
performance. The illustration of the methods of assessment of performance can be seen 
in Chapter 6.      
 
Investigation of Causality 
Three methodological parameters, or conditions, are laid down for investigating the 
causal relationship between accountability and performance.  The first condition is the 
association between variables, as evident from the comparison between the two cases in 
each state. If a case which has higher overall accountability also has higher overall 
performance compared to the other case, then this condition will be met. Secondly, if 
such association is evident, then there should also be convincing evidence of causal 




 Causality as inferred in any one state on the basis of the first two steps is not 
sufficient for the inference of causality for the whole study. The third condition of 
causality being inferred in the West Bengal study as well as the Madhya Pradesh study 
should also be met for a robust inference of the causal relationship between 
accountability and performance. The causal relationship between other likely 
performance determinants (such as finances and capacity) and performance should also 
meet the test of the above three conditions.  
 
Methodological Limitations 
The small number of cases covered is the most significant methodological weakness of 
this study. This study makes inferences about the accountability-performance 
relationship by covering only four cases. Time and resource constraints, together with 
the imperative of subjecting each case to in-depth examination, are the reasons for the 
inability to study a larger number of cases. It cannot be denied that the use of a larger 
number of cases would increase robustness and generalizability of findings, provided 
that appropriate techniques of comparison were employed. On the other hand, this study 
attempts to ameliorate the weakness of using a small number of cases by employing 
sensible case selection and comparison techniques. As already stated, case selection and 
comparison in this study are based on a combination of control of an important variable 
with purposeful variation in other significant conditions. Given the shortcomings in 
each single state comparative study (that uses only two cases), final conclusions have 
been drawn using findings from two state studies to increase their generalizability. 
 The findings derived from the villager survey interview have to be looked at 
keeping in mind the small sample size of sixteen persons for each GP. The limited 
randomness is another weakness, given the fact that subjects have not been selected on 
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the basis of a sampling frame (such as a list of households). The author has consciously 
tried to maintain variation in the sample in terms of gender and caste quotas, and also in 
terms of visiting different localities and neighbourhoods in each GP. The sample is 
representative of the GP population with respect to the categories of caste and gender. 
The actual survey respondents are quite diverse not only in terms of caste and gender 
but also in terms of economic, occupational and educational status, political affiliation 
and organizational affiliation.  
 This study employs a cross-sectional research design (different cases compared 
at a given point of time), which means that the only dimension of variation is spatial. 
The lack of availability of records for earlier time-periods and the imperative of 
conducting the study within a short time frame are the reasons for this study’s inability 
to include temporal (time-based) variation. The incorporation of temporal in addition to 
the existing spatial variation would increase the robustness of inferences about the 
accountability-performance relationship. The drawing of inferences on the basis of 
comparison between different cases would no doubt be more robust if long term trends 
in accountability and performance (in contrast to accountability and performance 
assessments for a given year) were used as a basis for such inference.  
 This study attributes variation in overall local government performance to a few 
primary and secondary independent variables (see framework of variables in Chapter 
1). The actual world of local government performance is very complex, and it is likely 
that various other variables also sometimes affect local government performance. This 
study, for instance, acknowledges that upward accountability has a likely impact on 
local government performance, but is unable to guage the extent of such impact or 
notice variation in upward accountability between cases. This also brings us to the 
difficulty of measuring all variables that have a bearing on local government 
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performance. Extraneous variables such as land and labour availability are also 
excluded from the framework adopted in this study. Such extraneous variables might 
directly affect specific aspects of performance; they do not, however, make a significant 
difference to overall local government performance. Wherever the impact of extraneous 
variables on specific aspects of local government performance is noticed--for instance 
the impact of labour availability on output performance under the programme known as 
NREGA--such impact is mentioned in this study.  
 While this study possesses the above mentioned methodological weaknesses, it 
also possesses methodological strengths - such as careful case selection, meticulous 
operationalization of variables, and employment of multiple levels of analysis and 
appropriate comparative techniques to compensate for these weaknesses. These 
methodological strengths have facilitated a nuanced and comprehensive examination of 
the relationship between accountability and performance in local government, and 
generated robust and insightful findings.     
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CHAPTER 4                                
 ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE WEST BENGAL CASES  
 
This chapter is concerned with an evaluation of accountability in the chosen local 
government units of West Bengal. It accordingly discusses the legal provisions defining 
the various accountability mechanisms, and evaluates their actual functioning in the two 
chosen GPs of this state. The first three parts of the chapter pertain to assessments of the 
sanctioning, deliberation and monitoring dimensions of accountability respectively, for 
the two chosen GPs.  
 While the first three sections are concerned with direct accountability of GP 
elected representatives to the people, the fourth section of this chapter assesses the 
accountability of GP staff towards elected representatives (indirect accountability). 
Because of the absence of noticeable variation between the chosen GPs with respect to 
indirect accountability, the variation in overall accountability between the two GPs only 
represents the variation in direct accountability. The concluding section of the chapter 
provides an assessment of the aggregate level of accountability in the chosen GPs, 
based on the three dimensions of direct accountability.  
 
The Sanctioning Dimension of Accountability 
Elections in local government serve as a mechanism of sanctioning, giving voters the 
power to remove from office representatives who fail to meet their expectations. In 
West Bengal’s rural local government (Panchayat) system, elections remain the only 
mechanism of popular sanctioning because the Right to Recall provision is not provided 
in its Panchayat law. This section contains a comparative analysis of the sanctioning 
dimension of accountability between the two chosen cases in West Bengal–Debipur GP 
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and Nowdapanur GP–with respect to the effectiveness of elections as a sanctioning 
mechanism. Table 4 presents the summary of the comparison between the two GPs with 
respect to the various indicators pertaining to the sanctioning dimension (see Chapter 3 
for a description of the various indicators and their suitability). The main emphasis in 
comparing the sanctioning dimension between the two cases is on showing their 
differences in the degree of electoral competition. 
 
Table 4: The Sanctioning Dimension of Accountability: Effectiveness of Elections 
in the Two West Bengal GPs (2003 and 2008 Panchayat Elections)  
Indicators 
Gram Panchayat 
Debipur GP Nowdapanur GP 
2003 2008 2003   2008  
Proportion of seats not 
obtained by single 
largest party 
1/23 
































Turnover of the 
incumbent single 
largest/ruling party 







Voter turnout 87.5% 84.88% 93.5% 90.52% 










Source: Data on first five indicators obtained from West Bengal State Election 
Commission (West Bengal State Election Commission 2003a, 2003b, 2008) and 
Berhampore Block (BDO) Office. Data on freeness of elections obtained from villager 




Proportion of Seats Not Won by Single-Largest Party 
West Bengal has party-based Panchayat elections right down to the lowest level of the 
GP. Therefore, it is appropriate to evaluate electoral competitiveness in West Bengal 
GPs on the basis of the proportion of seats that the ruling or single largest political party 
failed to capture. A high proportion of such seats indicates a high degree of electoral 
competitiveness.  
As per the results of the last Panchayat elections (held in 2008), Debipur GP is 
characterized by a heavy dominance of the ruling party, the Communist Party of India 
Marxist [CPI (M)], whereas the other chosen GP, Nowdapanur GP is characterized by a 
much more competitive scenario. Table 4 shows that only three out of the twenty seats 
of Debipur GP were not in the hands of the ruling party; as many as 17 out of 20 seats 
were won by CPI (M), the ruling party in this GP (West Bengal State Election 
Commission 2008). In Nowdapanur GP, the single largest party was Congress (I), also 
known as Indian National Congress (INC). More than half of the seats of this GP were 
not in the hands of the single largest party (see Table 4). The INC was able to win only 
42.8% of the seats in Nowdapanur GP and therefore was not able to obtain a majority on 
its own, as per data obtained from the Berhampore block (BDO) office. It formed a 
ruling alliance by entering into a partnership with two Muslim League members. 
 The 2003 Panchayat election results, together with the 2008 results, illustrate a 
trend of the widely varying degrees of electoral competition between the two GPs. In 
2003, the CPI (M) failed to win only one out of 23 seats in Debipur GP, capturing an 
overwhelming 95.6% of the seats (West Bengal State Election Commission 2003 b, 
215-17). In Nowdapanur GP, the INC was able to capture a majority in the 2003 
elections, winning 61.1% of the seats, and failing to win seven out of 18 seats (West 




Proportion of Contested Seats 
A higher proportion of seats filled in a contested manner is an indicator of higher 
competitiveness of elections. When a candidate for a particular seat faces contest from 
other competing candidates, then that seat becomes a contested seat. When only one 
candidate seeks election for a particular seat, with no other candidate contesting for that 
seat, then that candidate is said to be elected from the concerned seat in an uncontested 
manner.  
 The proportion of GP representatives elected in a contested manner is higher for 
Nowdapanur GP, showing its higher electoral competitiveness. Nowdapanur GP had no 
member elected in an uncontested manner for the 2008 elections; all its members were 
elected in a contested manner. Debipur GP had seventeen out of 20 members elected in 
a contested manner and three members elected in uncontested manner in the same 
elections. In the 2003 elections, fifteen members out of a total of 23 (65.2%) were 
elected in a contested manner in Debipur GP, while in Nowdapanur GP, sixteen 
members, out of a total of  eighteen (88.9%) were elected in a contested manner 
(Government of West Bengal 2003a, 2003b). 
 
Degree of Electoral Defeat of Incumbent Representatives  
Electoral competitiveness can also be assessed from the rate of turnover of incumbent 
representatives between elections. If` incumbent representatives stand for re-election, 
and there is evidence of replacement of such candidates by new representatives, then we 
can speculate about the possibility that voters are punishing incumbents who failed to 
meet their expectations. A high rate of defeat of representatives who seek re-election 
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indicates a high degree of competitive pressure on incumbent local government 
representatives.  
 In Debipur GP, only one incumbent representative from the previous term 
sought re-election in the 2008 Panchayat elections, and was successfully re-elected 
(West Bengal State Election Commission 2003b, 2008). Therefore, there was no defeat 
of incumbent GP members contesting re-election in Debipur GP. In Nowdapanur GP, 
we find that six incumbent candidates sought re-election in the 2008 Panchayat 
elections, four of whom were successfully re-elected and two sitting members were 
defeated (West Bengal State Election Commission 2003a, 2008). Therefore we do see 
the operation of turnover through electoral defeat to some (albeit a small) degree in 
Nowdapanur GP. 
 One possible reason behind only one incumbent GP member of Debipur GP 
contesting re-election might be the very high percentage of reserved seats in Debipur 
GP, 30
                                               
30As mandated by the India’s 73rd Constitutional Amendment and West Bengal’s Panchayat election law, 
there is reservation of 1/3 seats for women, and for SCs and STs on the basis of the proportion of their 
population to the total population of the GP area (Government of West Bengal 2003, Section 17). Only 
those constituencies are eligible for SC and ST reservation in which the proportion of SC and ST 
population to total population is not less than half (Government of West Bengal 2006, Rule 22). The 
selection of constituencies from a list of eligible constituencies meant to be reserved for SCs and STs is 
done on a rotational basis for a period of three general elections. The reservation of seats/constituencies 
for women is also done on rotational basis for a period of three Panchayat elections (Government of West 
Bengal 2006, Rule 22).  
 together with the rotation of reserved seats, which can prevent incumbent 
members willing to contest re-election from doing so. Thirteen out of the total of 20 
seats (65% of seats) of Debipur GP were reserved for women, Scheduled Castes (SCs) 
and Scheduled Tribes (STs) collectively in the 2008 Panchayat elections, as per data 
obtained from the Memari-I block administration office. Seats reserved in one election 
for a particular category are not reserved for that category in the next election, because 
the West Bengal Panchayat election laws stipulate reservation by rotation. This can 
prevent sitting members from standing for election in two ways:  firstly, a seat that is 
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unreserved in one election might be reserved in the next election, which means that an 
incumbent who does not belong to that reserved category cannot contest from that seat 
in the next election. Secondly, a seat that is reserved in one election might be 
de-reserved for that category in the next election: this means that the candidate from the 
reserved category (belonging to marginalized groups such as women, SCs or STs)  
might not have the incentive to contest in the next election for fear of defeat in open 
competition against general candidates.  
 Furthermore political parties too usually place candidate belonging to reserved 
categories only in reserved constituencies, even though the election law does not bar the 
contesting of candidates from reserved categories in general, unreserved constituencies. 
Nowdapanur GP has a much smaller percentage of reserved seats compared to Debipur 
GP: only five seats out of the total 14 (35.71%) were reserved in the 2008 Panchayat 
elections, as per data obtained from the Berhampore block administration office. All 
these were reserved for women. Debipur GP has a large SC and ST population 
compared to Nowdapanur GP, which explains the higher percentage of reserved seats in 
the former, which in turn explains to an extent why only one incumbent GP member of 
Debipur GP sought re-election in the 2008 elections.  
 
Turnover of Ruling/Single-Largest Party 
In addition to turnover of individual incumbent representatives, it is also useful to 
consider the turnover of single largest party or ruling party as an indicator of 
competitiveness of elections. In both the GPs, there was no change in single largest 
party between the 2003 and 2008 Panchayat elections. In Debipur GP, the ruling party 
CPI (M) won overwhelming majorities in both the 2003 and 2008 elections. In 
Nowdapanur GP, the INC failed to obtain a majority in the 2008 election and had to 
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concede to the selection of a GP Pradhan (chairperson) from the party supporting it, the 
Muslim League. A no-confidence motion passed within the GP against the Pradhan 
belonging to the Muslim League and support for the INC’s Pradhan candidate from two 
independent members resulted in an INC member obtaining the position of Pradhan in 
late 2009.  
 
Voter Turnout 
The voter turnout for a GP refers to the percentage of the GP’s registered voters who 
actually voted. For the 2008 Panchayat elections, both Debipur GP and Nowdapanur 
GP had extremely high voter turnouts, and a slightly higher turnout was seen in the 
electorally more competitive GP, that is, Nowdapanur GP (see Table 4). One villager 
survey respondent in Nowdapanur GP (an elderly SC lady), when asked whether she 
voted in the last Panchayat election, replied, “Obviously one has to vote” (Author’s 
field interview with female, SC villager survey respondent of Nowdapanur GP, dated 
19/12/2009). This attitude seems typical of the village folk, for voting is considered an 
essential duty.    
 
Freeness of Election 
The villager survey respondents in both the GPs chosen for study were asked about 
whether they voted freely in the 2008 Panchayat elections or whether they felt any 
coercion or intimidation inflicted by political parties or election candidates. In Debipur 
GP, thirteen respondents out of sixteen had voted, and all thirteen stated that there was 
no coercion or intimidation. In Nowdapanur GP, all sixteen respondents had voted, and 
all sixteen stated that they had voted according to their free choice, there being no 




Overall Effectiveness of Sanctioning Mechanism 
It can be seen from Table 4 and the above account that the degree of electoral 
competitiveness was higher in Nowdapanur GP than in Debipur GP. There is no major 
difference between the two GPs on the other indicators related to voter turnout and 
freeness of election. Nowdapanur GP therefore does better than Debipur GP on the 
sanctioning dimension of accountability.  
 In Debipur GP, the overwhelming dominance of CPI (M) implies that there is no 
feasible alternative to replace the CPI (M) as a ruling party or coalition. In Nowdapanur 
GP, the close electoral contestation between the political parties and their candidates 
indicates that there is greater possibility of the ruling party being replaced in elections, 
and also greater real choice in the hands of voters. This has positive implications for 
accountability as popular control. The higher competitiveness of elections in 
Nowdapanur GP implies that the competitive pressure on the incumbent ruling party 
and its representatives in this GP is relatively higher, and people have strong 
alternatives to turn to should they decide to vote out their incumbent representatives or 
ruling party.   
 
The Deliberation Dimension of Accountability 
There is provision for two types of deliberative forums—Gram Sabha (Village 
Assembly) meetings and Gram Sansad (Village Constituency-level Assembly) 
meetings—in West Bengal’s Panchayat Law. The former are held at the level of the 
entire GP and the latter are held at the level of the electoral constituencies into which 
GPs are divided for the purpose of Panchayat elections (Government of West Bengal 
2009a, Section 2). Gram Sansad and Gram Sabha meetings are forums in which voters 
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(village residents whose names are on the electoral list) meet in a particular venue at a 
pre-decided time, and participate in discussion and decision making on matters related 
to GP governance. Elected members and staff members of the GP are required to be 
present in these meetings. The meetings of each Gram Sansad are required to be held at 
least twice a year; the half-yearly meeting is to be held in November and the annual 
meeting is to be held in May. There is no legal bar on holding additional meetings. The 
Gram Sabha meeting of every GP is supposed to be held once a year, in December 
every year.  
 The quorum for holding Gram Sansad meetings has been fixed at 10%; if less 
than 1/10th of the voters are present in a particular Gram Sansad meeting, then the 
meeting is postponed to exactly a week later (Government of West Bengal 2009a, 
Section 16A); the quorum requirement for the postponed meeting is 5% (Government 
of West Bengal 2008a). The quorum for holding Gram Sabha meetings is 5%  or 1/20th 
of all voters; the meeting is postponed to a week later in the absence of a quorum, and 
there is no quorum requirement for the postponed meeting (Government of West 
Bengal 2009a, Section 16B).  
 Gram Sansads have been given significant powers. The Gram Sansad has the 
power to identify beneficiaries, or lay down principles for identification of 
beneficiaries, for various welfare or poverty alleviation programmes. It also has the 
power to suggest specific development works (‘schemes’) to be taken up under central 
and state government development programmes that are being implemented by the GP 
(Government of West Bengal 2009a, Section 16A). The recommendations of the Gram 
Sansad, related to selection of both beneficiaries and works, are binding on the GP, as 
per the law (Government of West Bengal 2009a, Section 16A). The GP is required to 
place in Gram Sansad and Gram Sabha meetings, for discussion, comments and 
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approval, a number of records. These include the budget of GP for the following year, 
latest audit report of the GP, the income-expenditure report of the previous year, 
beneficiary lists of different welfare programmes, a report on work done by the GP in 
the previous year, and  the annual action plan for the coming year (Government of West 
Bengal 2009a, Section 17A).  
 Gram Sansad meetings in practice are more important than Gram Sabha 
meetings because it is through Gram Sansad meetings that popular inputs are actually 
brought to bear on the decision process. The GP-level Gram Sabha meetings usually are 
only used for a final popular endorsement of the action plan and budget of the GP, 
before these records are passed on to the higher levels of government for approval. The 
smaller size of Gram Sansads leads to more meaningful participation than in Gram 
Sabha. According to the law, however, all topics meant to be discussed in Gram Sansad 
can also be discussed in Gram Sabha.  
 Given that Gram Sansad meetings are more important than Gram Sabha 
meetings in actual practice, it is appropriate to assess the deliberation dimension of 
accountability mainly in terms of the functioning of Gram Sansad meetings. However, 
given the special role of Gram Sabha meetings in endorsing the annual budget and 
action plan of the GP, aspects of the functioning of Gram Sabha meetings have been 
included in the assessment of deliberation under one indicator ‘Extent of scrutiny of GP 
functioning.’ The actual functioning of Gram Sansad (and where applicable, Gram 
Sabha) meetings in the two GPs is evaluated below with respect to indicators for the 
deliberation dimension of accountability (already stated in Chapter 3). Table 5 
summarizes the comparative situation in the two GPs with respect to these indicators, 
while the following paragraphs provide a detailed account of the comparison.  
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Table 5: The Deliberation Dimension of Accountability: Functioning of Gram 
Sansad and Gram Sabha in the West Bengal GPs  
Indicator Gram Panchayat Debipur GP Nowdapanur GP 
Frequency of Gram 
Sansad meetings 
Both mandated meetings held in 
all constituencies. 
Both mandated meetings held in all 
constituencies.  
Extent of 
attendance in Gram 
Sansad meetings 
One constituency did not achieve 
quorum in the half-yearly meeting. 
Six constituencies did not achieve 
quorum in annual meeting.  
 
All constituencies, for which 
records are available, achieved 
quorum in annual and half-yearly 
meetings. Considering interview 
responses, only one constituency in 
this GP fails to achieve quorum. 
Average overall attendance of 
11.31%. 
Average overall attendance of 
13.08%. 
Inclusiveness of 
attendance in Gram 
Sansad meetings 
Non-partisan people and people 
not belonging to ruling political 
party hardly attend. 
Non-partisan people attend. 
Inclusiveness of 
decision making of 
Gram Sansad 
Intermediate body (GUS) prepares 
proposal list which is ratified in 
Gram Sansad meetings. Proposals 
made by villager attendees are 
added to the list during the Gram 
Sansad meetings. 
 
GUS, in its list, includes proposals 
collected from neighbourhood 
meetings.  
 
Lower inclusiveness of expression 
in Gram Sansad meetings (where 
additional proposals are 
collected), because non-partisan or 
opposition-affiliated persons 
hardly attend, let alone speak. 
Intermediate body (GUS) prepares 
proposal list which is ratified in 
Gram Sansad meetings. Proposals 
made by villager attendees are 
added to the list during the Gram 
Sansad meetings. 
 
GUS rarely makes use of 
neighbourhood meetings in 
preparing its list. 
 
Higher inclusiveness of expression 
in Gram Sansad meetings (where 
additional proposals are collected), 
in terms of higher demand 
expression by non-partisan 
attendees. 
Extent of scrutiny 
of GP functioning 
in Gram Sansad 
and Gram Sabha 
meetings 
GP records presented but popular 
scrutiny absent. 
 
GP records presented. Drawing of 
attention to GP shortcomings seen 
in Gram Sansad meetings of 
opposition constituencies. 
 
Questioning of GP members about 
individual problems. 
 
Questioning of GP members about 
individual problems. 
 
Source: Data obtained from GP records (2008-09 figures), elected representative 
interviews, villager survey interviews and direct observation. 
 
The data on Gram Sansad meetings held, their extent of attendance, and the minutes of 
their proceedings (for the financial year 2008-09) was obtained from records of the two 
GPs. Other insights used for evaluating the different indicators were obtained from 
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villager survey and elected representative interviews and direct observation by the 
author. 
 
Frequency of Gram Sansad Meetings 
In Debipur GP, data obtained from the GP office shows that the mandated half-yearly 
and annual Gram Sansad meetings were held in all constituencies in 2008-09, though 
postponed sessions were held in some constituencies because of lack of quorum. In  
Nowdapanur GP, half yearly and annual Gram Sansad sessions in 2008-09 were held in 
all the constituencies for which data was available, and quorum was attained in all 
sessions. 
 
Extent of Attendance in Gram Sansad meetings 
Nowdapanur GP had overall higher Gram Sansad meeting attendance than Debipur GP 
in 2008-09, in terms of its attainment of quorum in a higher proportion of 
constituencies, and its higher overall people’s attendance. For Nowdapanur GP, 
attendance records were available for five out of twelve constituencies. None of these 
five constituencies in Nowdapanur GP had to postpone sessions because of lack of 
quorum, either for the half-yearly or the annual sessions. In Debipur GP, all but one of 
the 17 constituencies were able to obtain the quorum in the half yearly Gram Sansad 
meeting of 2008-09. Only one constituency was not able to achieve a quorum of 10%, 
and therefore had to hold a postponed half yearly meeting. The Annual Gram Sansad in  
Debipur GP for 2008-09 saw postponed sessions in as many as six constituencies. Out  
of the six constituencies of Debipur GP that held postponed annual meetings, four were 
able to achieve the required 5% quorum. 
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 Table 6 shows the overall attendance achieved in the annual and half-yearly 
Gram Sansad sessions held in the two GPs, and also the highest and lowest attendance 
figures among all their constituencies. Considering the overall attendance of both the 
half–yearly and annual sessions, Debipur GP had an average overall attendance of 
11.31% for 2008-09 (see Table 5). Nowdapanur GP shows a slightly higher overall 
attendance for its Gram Sansad meetings than Debipur GP for both the half-yearly and 
annual sessions (see Table 6), and also a higher average overall attendance of 13.08% 
(see Table 5).  
  
Table 6: Attendance in Half-yearly and Annual Gram Sansad Meetings (2008-09)  
Session Attendance in Debipur GP  (%) 
Attendance in Nowdapanur GP 
(%) 
 Overall Highest Lowest Overall Highest Lowest 
Half Yearly  10.75 13.41 4.71 12.73 21.92 10.16 
Annual  11.88 27.68 3.98 13.44 26.02 11.24 
Source: Data obtained from GP records 
 
 One methodological weakness in the arriving of inferences on Gram Sansad 
meeting attendance in Nowdapanur GP is that the inferences are made on the basis of 
records available for only five out of its twelve constituencies. Interviews with some 
elected representatives of the GP however revealed that quorum in Gram Sansad 
meeting attendance is generally attained in all the constituencies of the GP, with the 
exception of one constituency named Soluadanga.31
                                               
31The interviewed representatives who provided details about Gram Sansad meeting attendance are the 
Upa-pradhan (deputy chairperson), the head of the Infrastructure committee, the head of the Education 
and Public Health committee, and three opposition members (two representing Soluadanga constituency 
and one representing Bejpara constituency). Attendance records for Soluadanga were not available in the 
GP office at the time of fieldwork. 
 The two GP members representing 
Soluadanga confirmed that the attendance in the meetings in their constituency is very 
low. One of the villager survey respondents from Soluadanga who is a member of the 
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INC and highly educated, also confirmed the low attendance and failure to reach 
quorum there. The evidence obtained from these interviews indicates that even if the 
attendance of all constituencies of Nowdapanur GP was to be considered, its overall 
attendance would still be higher than that of Debipur GP (given that there is evidence of 
only one of its constituencies failing to achieve quorum, compared to as many as six in 
Debipur GP). 
 The inferences about GP attendance stated above are mainly based on the 
attendance records maintained by the GP offices. Because of reliability concerns that 
are often harboured about government documents, especially GP records, it is prudent 
to refer to interview data (in addition to data from records) to obtain a clearer idea about 
Gram Sansad meeting participation. In Nowdapanur GP, which has poorer record 
keeping than Debipur GP, the elected representatives interviewed gave an estimate of 
Gram Sansad attendance in their respective constituencies that matched with the 
records. Data from the villager survey interviews also serve as a means to verify the 
reliability of the information obtained from the GP’s attendance records. The interview 
data from the villager survey confirms whether Gram Sansad meetings are indeed 
actually being held regularly in the constituencies in which the respondents reside, and 
sheds qualitative insights on the inclusiveness of Gram Sansad meeting participation. 
These insights are as valuable as numerical attendance figures in assessing the 
functioning of Gram Sansad meetings as a deliberative forum. In Debipur GP, three 
persons among the sixteen villager survey respondents had ever attended Gram Sansad 
meetings, while in Nowdapanur GP eight out of the sixteen respondents had done the 
same.32
                                               
3250% attendance among the survey respondents does not mean that 50% villagers attend Gram Sansad 
meetings in Nowdapanur GP. Attendance in the meetings is higher than in Debipur GP, but it is not as 





Inclusiveness of Attendance in Gram Sansad Meetings 
The inclusiveness of attendance is as important as the extent of attendance as a criterion 
to assess the functioning of Gram Sansad meetings as a deliberative mechanism.  The 
exclusion of any significant section of a GP’s population from Gram Sansad meeting 
attendance would mean that the inclusiveness of Gram Sansad meeting attendance in 
that GP is low. In Debipur GP, all three respondents among the sixteen villager survey 
respondents who attended Gram Sansad meetings are members of the ruling party 
CPI(M), while none of the non-partisan respondents (i.e. respondents who not members 
of any party) ever attended Gram Sansad meetings. Some non-partisan non-attendees in 
Debipur GP expressed being put off by the perception of ruling party control expressed 
in Gram Sansad meetings in this heavily CPI (M) dominated GP; one such non-attendee 
in this GP commented that “Gram Sansad meetings have become like party meetings” 
(Author’s field interview with male, general category villager survey respondent living 
in the ruling party-controlled Debipur-Chhotodhamas constituency of Debipur GP, 
dated 12/09/2009). The Self Evaluation Exercise Report prepared by Debipur GP for 
2007-08 admits that the reason for the low attendance in Gram Sansad meetings in the 
GP is that “people holding divergent views do not feel interested to attend the 
meetings.” Such evidence shows that CPI (M) domination repels non-partisan people or 
people affiliated to opposition political parties from attending Gram Sansad meetings in 
Debipur GP. 
 In Nowdapanur GP, unlike Debipur GP, all the Gram Sansad meeting attendees 
among the villager survey respondents are not political party members: three of the 
eight attendees among its villager survey respondents are political party members, 
                                                                                                                                       
reflect the actual extent of attendance among the whole GP population. Please see Chapter 3 for the 
details and strengths and limitations of the quota sampling method applied in this study. 
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while the remaining are non-partisan. In Nowdapanur GP which has a more competitive 
political scenario, we at least see non-partisan people attending among the villager 
survey respondents. Politicization affecting Gram Sansad meetings does not augur well 
for establishing popular voice in a wide and inclusive sense through the medium of 
these meetings, and seems to be much more malignant in the case of the GP with the 
less competitive political scenario, Debipur GP.  
 From the above account, one observes a positive association between levels of 
electoral competition and attendance in Gram Sansad meetings: the GP with higher 
electoral competition has higher and more inclusive GP attendance. Even within 
Debipur GP, which is heavily dominated by one party, it is an opposition 
constituency–Mobarokpur—that shows the highest average Gram Sansad attendance in 
2008-09. Mobarokpur is controlled by the All India Trinamool Congress (AITC), and is 
an island in this GP permeated by the ocean of CPI (M) dominance. 33
 Unlike Debipur GP, opposition controlled constituency areas in Nowdapanur 
GP--Bejpara and Sundipur East--do not show the highest attendance. Sripurdanga (a 
constituency controlled by the ruling INC) had the highest attendance in both the half 
yearly and annual Gram Sansad sessions in Nowdapanur GP. However it might be 
noted that politics on the whole (even in ruling party constituencies) is very competitive 
in Nowdapanur GP. Debipur GP, on the other hand, has an overwhelming dominance of 
 The residents of 
Mobarokpur therefore possibly perceive some degree of space for participation free 
from hegemonic ruling party control.  
                                               
33Mobarokpur is a two member constituency and both its GP representatives are from the AITC. Both the 
members told the author that they encouraged the people of their area to attend these meetings and talk 
about their problems and grievances in these meetings as a matter of right. One member also stated that 
compared to the earlier term when this constituency was controlled by the ruling CPI (M), people now 
feel more free to attend the meetings and talk about their problems (Author’s field interviews with the two 
GP members representing Mobarokpur constituency, dated 17/09/2009 and 8/10/2009). 
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the CPI (M), with the opposition constituencies offering greater relative space for 
inclusive participation.  
 
Inclusiveness of Decision Making by Gram Sansad  
The inclusiveness of the decision making process in Gram Sansad meetings should also 
be assessed as a basis for judging the effectiveness of Gram Sansad as a deliberative 
mechanism in actual practice. As already seen, West Bengal’s Panchayat law states that 
Gram Sansad has the power to identify beneficiaries and suggest specific development 
works. In actual reality however, the Gram Sansad meeting attendees are not the sole 
source of proposals for identifying beneficiaries and suggesting development works. 
The reality in both Debipur GP and Nowdapanur GP is that an intermediate 
organization named the Gram Unnayan Samiti (GUS) or Village Development 
Committee plays an important role in preparing the list of proposals. This list of 
proposals is approved in Gram Sansad meetings and considered to be the decision of 
the Gram Sansad.  
 The GUS is a body that exists at the level of every Gram Sansad area or 
electoral constituency, and may be considered to be the executive committee of the 
Gram Sansad (Government of West Bengal 2008a).  The GP member representing the 
constituency, a member of the opposition political party of the constituency, nominees 
of Self-Help Groups and community-based or voluntary organizations, and a 
government employee and school teacher residing in the constituency area are all 
members of GUS, in addition to persons elected in Gram Sansad meetings to serve as 
members of GUS.34
                                               
34The number of elected members in GUS is either 10 or one tenth of the total number of voters of the 
Gram Sansad, whichever is higher (Government of West Bengal 2008a). 
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 In both GPs, the list of proposals is actually prepared by the GUS, and it is 
approved in Gram Sansad meetings. In Debipur GP, GP members are asked by the 
Pradhan, during the general body meeting of the GP, to convene GUS meetings in 
order to prepare the list of beneficiary and work proposals for their respective 
constituencies. 35 Additional proposals are however added by the villager attendees 
during the Gram Sansad meetings. The minutes of the Gram Sansad meetings for 
Debipur GP show individual named requests for benefits and infrastructural works 
made during the meetings.  In Nowdapanur GP too, the priority list of demands is 
actually made by the GUS, and is approved in Gram Sansad meetings where additional 
proposals are added by the present villagers in the meetings (Author’s telephonic 
interview with the Head of the Education and Public Health Committee of Nowdapanur 
GP, dated 10/02/2010). The villager survey respondents in both GPs also recollected the 
specific requests made by them in Gram Sansad meetings. A male attendee in Debipur 
GP (who is a CPI (M) member), for instance, had demanded a tap for his locality. A 
female, non-partisan attendee in Nowdapanur GP had spoken of her misery because of a 
lack of place to stay and requested Indira Awas Yojana (IAY) assistance for herself36
 What are the implications of the GUS playing an important role in the decision 
making process of Gram Sansad? The GUS is a highly politicized organization, and it is 
natural that political considerations (especially of the ruling party in the concerned 
 
(Author’s field interview with female, SC villager survey respondent of Nowdapanur 
GP, dated 19/12/2009), while another non-partisan female attendee of this GP, who 
heads a Self-Help Group, requested financial assistance for the productive activities of 
the group (Author’s field interview with female, general category villager survey 
respondent of Nowdapanur GP, dated 2/01/2010).  
                                               
35As stated in the minutes of the GP general body meetings for Debipur GP for 2008-09.  
36Indira Awas Yojana is a central government programme for providing financial assistance to deserving 
beneficiaries for constructing their own houses. 
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constituency) will significantly influence the way it chooses proposals. As a result there 
can be no guarantee that the proposals prepared by GUS are actually reflective of 
genuine popular need or demand. On the other hand, GUS role in preparing the proposal 
list may also promote inclusiveness of expression to a certain extent An INC member of 
Nowdapanur GP opined that because of opposition party representation in GUS, the 
opposition can influence the preparation of the proposal list. In the absence of GUS, he 
said that the ruling party of the GP would have a free hand in preparing the lists, and the 
resulting lists ratified in the Gram Sansad meetings would be arbitrary and less 
inclusive. The ideal situation would be one where demands made by the people 
themselves (and not by intermediaries) would make up the proposal lists. However, the 
use of GUS to formulate proposal lists is preferable at least to a situation where the 
Pradhan or the ruling party GP members are the dominant authors of the proposal lists. 
 In Debipur GP, the various GUSs incorporate in their lists proposals collected 
from the lay residents of their respective constituencies in para baithaks or 
neighbourhood meetings. Holding para baithaks in this GP is an established practice, 
and these meetings are held frequently (monthly or twice a month) in the constituencies 
of Debipur GP. The villager survey findings for Debipur GP show that even 
non-partisan persons attend them and speak about their needs in them. In Nowdapanur 
GP, para baithaks are not yet an established practice and are rarely held, though the 
GUS secretary of one constituency stated that such meetings are sometimes conducted 
in his Gram Sansad area. None of the villager survey respondents of Nowdapanur GP 
had ever attended para baithaks.  
 It is problematic to come to a judgment about which GP has more inclusive 
decision making in its Gram Sansad meetings since the evidence in this respect is 
conflicting. In Debipur GP, we find that participatory neighbourhood meetings are one 
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(but not the sole) source of proposals for the GUS lists that are ratified in the Gram 
Sansad meetings, while the actual attendance in Gram Sansad meetings where 
proposals from villager attendees are added is lower and less inclusive. In Nowdapanur 
GP, we see the near absence of para baithaks but we do see higher attendance and more 
inclusive attendance in Gram Sansad meetings which are an additional source of 
proposals. The collecting of additional proposals during Gram Sansad meetings in 
Nowdapanur GP (where non-partisan persons also attend) serves to ameliorate the 
inclusiveness defects that arise from the non-use of para baithaks in formulating the 
GUS list of proposals. The evidence from the villager survey interviews shows that 
non-partisan people not only attend, but also freely express their demands in Gram 
Sansad meetings in Nowdapanur GP, unlike the apparent situation of Gram Sansad 
meetings in Debipur GP. Given such conflicting evidence, no conclusive assessment 
can be made as to which GP, Debipur or Nowdapanur, has more inclusive decision 
making in Gram Sansad meetings. Nowdapanur GP, however, clearly has more 
inclusive expression of popular demands in its Gram Sansad meetings because of the 
higher extent of attendance and speaking by attendees not belonging to the ruling party. 
 
Extent of Scrutiny of GP Functioning by Gram Sansad and Gram Sabha 
The law vests in Gram Sansad meetings the power to discuss and ratify important 
records of the GP such as the budget, income expenditure report and annual action plan, 
thus making it possible for the Gram Sansad and Gram Sabha attendees to discuss, 
comment on and criticize important aspects of the GP’s proposed and actual courses of 
action. A perusal of the minutes of the Gram Sansad meetings in both the selected GPs 
showed that records such as income expenditure report, budget and supplementary 
budget, last audit report and annual action plans were presented in Gram Sansad 
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meetings. However the actual level of popular scrutiny and discussion seems to be low. 
The minutes of the annual Gram Sansad meeting for 2008-09 in Debipur-Chhalalpur 
constituency of Debipur GP, where these records were presented, stated, “Since nobody 
among the present voters participated in the discussion on the stated topics, the 
Sabhapati (person presiding over the  meeting) announced the session as closed at the 
end of his comments.” 
 There is more indicative evidence (obtained from the author’s own observation 
of a Gram Sabha meeting in Debipur GP in December 2009) on the lack of popular 
scrutiny and inputs on the records presented for ratification in Debipur GP. The author 
observed the presentation of the budget for 2010-11 by a Sahayak (administrative 
assistant) of the GP. A lot of English terms were used but there was just reading of the 
budget with no explanation at all. The Sahayak presented the request for approval of 
budget, and the attending voters were asked if they had any suggestions to make. No 
inputs came from the public and a show of hands (without actual counting) was taken as 
a sign of approval. It should be noted that this show of hands was conducted in an 
atmosphere of darkness and poor visibility. The same ratification procedure was 
adopted with respect to the annual action plan of the GP. The evidence shows that the 
role of the Gram Sansad and Gram Sabha meetings of Debipur GP in examining and 
deliberating on GP records is passive. 
 In contrast, there is evidence of an active Gram Sansad role in certain 
constituencies of Nowdapanur GP in scrutinizing and commenting on GP records. The 
minutes registers of the annual Gram Sansad meeting held in two constituencies in 
Nowdapanur GP showed an interesting detail: Soluadanga Gram Sansad and Bejpara 
Gram Sansad demanded in the resolutions of their annual meetings that proposals 
adopted in their previous Gram Sansad meetings but not given place in the annual plan 
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of the GP till then, have to be accommodated by the GP in the annual plan for the 
upcoming year. From this it appears that the ruling party (possibly driven by political 
motivations) has omitted to include in the GP’s annual plan proposals suggested by the 
Gram Sansads of constituencies not controlled by it. Furthermore, it is apparent that 
that the GP and GUS members belonging to the non-ruling political parties use the 
Gram Sansad meetings to highlight the shortcomings of the ruling party, and Gram 
Sansad meeting resolutions as a medium to pressurize the ruling party of the GP.  
 The account in the previous paragraph affirms that the Gram Sansad is a 
politicized forum; political considerations mediate the drawing of attention to work not 
done by the GP.37
 While the extent of popular discussion and scrutiny of GP records is often low, 
villagers do use the medium of Gram Sansad meetings to discuss and scrutinize the 
functioning of the GP in other ways. Gram Sansad meetings provide an opportunity to 
the villagers to publicly question elected representatives about non-fulfilment of 
promises, non-availability or breakdown of infrastructural assets such as tube-wells or 
roads, or failure or delay in extending promised benefits of welfare programmes. The 
author learnt from elected representatives in both GPs that people ask a lot of questions 
 Yet the positive aspect of this is that the Gram Sansad resolutions in 
opposition areas of Nowdapanur GP are drawing attention to work not done, and 
compared to Debipur GP, Gram Sansads in Nowdapanur GP are playing a more active 
(albeit politically motivated) role in examining and commenting on GP records. The 
minutes of the annual Gram Sansad meetings of the constituencies controlled by the 
ruling party of Nowdapanur GP only stated that the records were presented, and did not 
mention anything about the discussion or people’s comments about these records.  
                                               
37As per the provisions of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, the Pradhan is required to preside over all 
Gram Sansad meetings. Yet it was seen in the meeting minutes of Debipur GP that the Pradhan presided 
over the Gram Sansad meetings of the constituencies controlled by the ruling party, while the opposition 
area Gram Sansad meetings were presided by the representing GP member. This is further evidence of 
the politicization of Gram Sansad meetings. 
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in the Gram Sansad meetings. However questions raised and complaints made, are 
usually about individual problems such as why the attendee is not getting a Below 
Poverty Line (BPL) card while his neighbour is, or why there is a delay in arrival of 
pension money.  
 
Overall Effectiveness of Deliberative Mechanisms 
On the basis of the comparative situation in both GPs according to all the indicators, 
Nowdapanur GP is inferred as having higher effectiveness of its deliberative 
mechanisms in actual practice. Nowdapanur GP therefore does better than Debipur GP 
on the deliberation dimension of accountability. The evidence of higher attendance 
(higher overall attendance and attainment of quorum in a higher proportion of 
constituencies), clearly more inclusive attendance, and a relatively more active role in 
scrutiny of GP records point to Nowdapanur GP’s superiority in this respect. There is no 
variation between the two GPs seen with respect to frequency of meetings, and the 
evidence on the remaining indicator of inclusiveness of decision making does not show 
the clear superiority of one GP over the other.   
 
Gram Sansad Meetings : True Forums of Deliberative Democracy? 
As seen in the above account, Nowdapanur GP was ahead of Debipur GP in terms of the 
effectiveness of the deliberative mechanism, mainly due to its higher and more 
inclusive meeting attendance. Deliberation, as it is taking place in both the West Bengal 
GPs, however, merely refers to expression of personal demands. The Gram Sansad is 
simply a proposal collecting or demand identification forum as far as its actual 
functioning is concerned. This role is not trivial or insignificant; it results in the needs of 
poor, deprived persons being expressed and finding their way into the GP’s action plan 
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or work agenda, and is thus creating a degree of accountability or popular control. 
However, it must be recognized that there are deficiencies in the functioning of Gram 
Sansad in both GPs, which hinder the establishment of deliberative democracy in the 
true sense. In the absence of true deliberative democracy, true accountability or popular 
control also remains to be fully realized. It is pertinent to turn to the criteria of Cohen’s 
ideal deliberative procedure (Cohen 1997) described in Chapter 2 of this thesis, to 
gauge the degree to which Gram Sansad meetings are able to realize the ideals of 
deliberative democracy.  
 An element of the ideal deliberative procedure is that participants themselves 
must decide on the agenda for meetings. However, in the actual functioning of the 
Gram Sansad meetings in West Bengal GPs, the agenda of each meeting is pre-decided; 
agenda items are fixed in accordance with the law, with additional items added by the 
GP and higher tiers of government. The very fact of an imposed agenda hinders the 
establishment of true deliberative democracy.  
 Rational debate i.e. proposing of alternative solutions by participants and 
reasons to back the proposed solutions is an essential element of ideal deliberative 
procedure.  However such rational debate is not seen in the actual functioning of the 
Gram Sansad meetings in both GPs. The actual functioning of the Gram Sansad shows 
that it is a forum for making demands, rather than for carrying out rational debate of 
alternative solutions to village problems. The minutes of the Gram Sansad meetings in 
both GPs show that the demands made by attendees are mostly very personal in nature, 
either for proposing names of themselves or family members as beneficiaries, or for 
asking for amenities and infrastructure in their neighbourhood. The Secretary of 
Nowdapanur GP pointed to a reduction of people’s interest in attending Gram Sansad 
meetings due to recent changes in the beneficiary selection rules of central government 
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programmes such as the housing programme Indira Awas Yojana (IAY) and the Indira 
Gandhi National Old Age Pension Scheme (IGNOAPS). The beneficiaries are now 
selected on the basis of their score on the BPL (Below Poverty Line) criteria specified 
by the government, and not on the basis of Gram Sansad demands. The Secretary added 
that topics like road construction, which yield general rather than individual benefits, 
are now the main focus of Gram Sansad discussions, as a result of which there is no real 
interest among the people to attend the meetings (Author’s field interview, dated 
18/12/2009).  
A positive aspect of these meetings is that most attendees perceive that they 
have freedom to speak and express themselves in these meetings, which fulfills Cohen’s 
criteria of procedural equality of participants to some degree. All three attendees among 
the survey respondents in Debipur GP believed that there was freedom of speech in the 
Gram Sansad meetings, stating that anyone who wishes to speak may freely speak in 
them. Five out of the eight attendees among the villager survey respondents in 
Nowdapanur GP, believed that there was freedom of speech in the meetings. 38
On the flip side, substantive equality is constrained by the fact that 
organizational affiliation and political party affiliation mediate people’s attendance and 
 In 
Debipur GP, two out of the three attendees among the villager survey respondents have 
ever spoken in Gram Sansad meetings, while one has not. In Nowdapanur GP, three out 
of the eight attendees could recall ever having spoken in Gram Sansad meetings. The 
criteria of substantive equality is fulfilled to the degree that there is no barrier to 
attendance by poor people, and poor people freely attend the meetings. In fact the 
survey responses show that affluent people mostly do not attend these meetings.  
                                               
38 The three attendees who did not express a belief in freedom of speech did not have any clear opinion on 
whether there is such freedom. They however, did not mention any external constraints. They made 
comments such as  lack of recollection of meeting proceedings, personally not having anything to say, 
and only Self-Help Group (SHG) leaders (and not ordinary SHG members) having something to say.  
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expression in Gram Sansad meetings to an extent. All three respondents who attended 
the meetings in Debipur GP are CPI (M) members, and one of these three attendees is 
both an SHG (Self-Help Group) member39
The survey responses in both GPs show that persons holding leadership 
positions in their local political party organization or in their SHGs often speak not just 
to forward personal demands but to forward demands on behalf of the members of the 
organization they represent. One female attendee in Debipur GP, who heads a local 
women’s committee of the CPI (M), stated that she speaks very frequently and conveys 
demands of the women’s committee (Author’s field interview with female, general 
category villager survey respondent of Debipur GP, dated 8/09/2009). In Nowdapanur 
GP, one female attendee who is an SHG leader stated that she makes demands for 
economic assistance on behalf of SHGs (Author’s field interview with female, general 
category villager survey respondent of Nowdapanur GP, dated 2/01/2010) while one 
highly educated and well-to-do male attendee of Nowdapanur GP, who is a local INC 
leader, stated that he makes demands on behalf of poor people of his village (Author’s 
field interview with male, general category villager survey respondent of Nowdapanur 
GP, dated 05/01/2010). Other attendees, it seems from the survey responses, speak 
rarely, and even if they do, speak to make personal demands such as for IAY money or 
construction of a tap near their house. A female attendee in Debipur GP said that she 
made a proposal for construction of tap near house and  threatened to stop voting in 
 and party member. In Nowdapanur GP, 
unlike Debipur GP, all the attendees are not party members; three of the eight attendees 
are party members. One attendee is both an SHG member and party member. There are 
three SHG members among the eight attendees in Nowdapanur GP, and all the three 
SHG members profess attending by virtue of belonging to or leading SHGs.  
                                               
39 Self Help Groups (SHGs) are groups of 10-20 villagers, especially women in a neighbourhood who 




elections if the tap was not provided (and the tap was finally given) (Author’s field 
interview with female, general category villager survey respondent of Debipur GP, 
dated 17/09/2009). A female attendee in Nowdapanur GP spoke of her misery because 
of a lack of place to stay and requested an IAY house for herself (Author’s field 
interview with female, SC villager survey respondent of Nowdapanur GP, dated 
19/12/2009).  
Substantive equality also demands that the outcomes of deliberation should not 
be influenced by factors such as wealth or power; this condition is not entirely satisfied 
in Gram Sansad meetings in both GPs. As already seen in the assessment of 
inclusiveness of Gram Sansad decision making, proposal lists prepared by intermediary 
bodies such as GUS (which are significantly influenced by political preferences) are a 
significant component of Gram Sansad decisions.  Power does therefore influence the 
outcomes of deliberation. The ideal situation would have been one of villager attendees 
of such meetings preparing the entire proposal list through free discussion and reasoned 
debate.  
Cohen gives importance to the use of proper decision making procedures such 
as true consensus or suitable voting for arriving at fair decisions in deliberative forums. 
Individual proposal collecting, which is a major function of these meetings, does not 
require any collective decision making techniques. While subjecting action plans, 
budgets and other records to ratification by Gram Sansad or Gram Sabha meeting 
attendees, there is no proper decision making procedure or systematic voting used. As 
already seen, a vague show of hands is treated as sign of assent or approval in the Gram 
Sabha meetings of Debipur GP, and the level of people’s discussion, scrutiny and input 
in the ratification of records by deliberative forums is low in both GPs. 
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Another issue that contraints the establishment of true deliberative democracy is 
the politicization of Gram Sansad meetings. As already seen, political factors influence 
these meetings in various ways; they influence who attends and who does not, they 
influence scrutiny and criticism expressed in Gram Sansad meetings, and they also 
influence who presides over the meetings. It cannot be denied that political party 
influence is injecting a degree of dynamism, vitality and energy into Gram Sansad 
meetings: this is evident, for instance, in the utilization of Gram Sansad meetings in 
opposition constituencies of Nowdapanur GP for expressing criticism of the GP’s 
ruling party. However, these meetings will never be truly inclusive meetings “of the 
people, for the people, by the people” and true forums of deliberative democracy unless 
they shake off such political influences.    
  
The Monitoring Dimension of Accountability 
‘Social Audit’ broadly refers to audit or monitoring/evaluation activities conducted by 
the people themselves. It can be contrasted with audit which is conducted by auditors 
from higher levels of government. Social Audit not only aims to detect financial 
irregularities and breach of rules,  but also aims to assess if implementation activities of 
the local government are in accordance with the felt needs of the people (Matthew 
2007b; Government of West Bengal 2008b), and to expose complaints and grievances 
that people affected by such implementation activities might have. At the time of this 
study, the NREGA was the only programme being implemented by West Bengal GPs 
that provided for Social Audit in its rules. Therefore the NREGA Social Audit is the 




 The Government of West Bengal’s NREGA Guidelines (Government of West 
Bengal 2008b) and its other directives identify the GUS and the Social Audit Team as 
the bodies meant to carry out Social Audit. A Social Audit Team is required to be 
constituted in each GP to co-ordinate the overall task of NREGA Social Audit and work 
along with the GUS in conducting Social Audit. The Social Audit Team of the GP is to 
be constituted in a special session of the Gram Sabha. Apart from one GP staff member 
and one GP elected representative of the opposition party, it is supposed to have eleven 
other members. GUS, Self-Help Group and NGO representatives, and current or retired 
teachers and government employees residing in the GP are supposed to be members of 
the Social Audit team. According to the Social Audit rules, every constituency in the 
GP should be covered under Social Audit at least once a year, and depending on the 
number of constituencies in the GP, the Social Audit Team may study one or more than 
one constituency every month (Government of West Bengal 2008b). 
  The Social Audit Team, in its attempt to uncover existing discrepancies, 
shortcomings and irregularities, is required to undertake the following major tasks in 
the Social Audit process: (a) examination of Muster roll (attendance record of workers) 
and other NREGA records (b) visiting at least two NREGA work sites in each 
constituency, and carrying out of observation and discussion with workers 
(Government of West Bengal 2008b). Additionally, the GUS is required to interview 
five NREGA beneficiaries in the concerned constituency.  The findings of the Social 
Audit Team are required to be submitted to a public meeting of villagers known as the 
‘Social Audit Sabha (meeting)’. In this public meeting to be held in each constituency, 
the Social Audit Team is supposed to read out its findings in the presence of GP 
representatives and various bureaucratic officials belonging to higher tiers. The Social 
Audit Team should make modifications, if required, to its Social Audit report 
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considering the inputs generated in the Social Audit Sabha. The final Social Audit 
report, thus prepared, is to be submitted to the GP (Government of West Bengal 2008b).  
 The GP is required to take action with respect to the issues and grievances 
exposed within seven days of the Social Audit, and report the result to the Social audit 
Team, and also the block level programme officer of NREGA. The block level 
programme officer, a bureaucratic functionary, is also held responsible for ensuring that 
corrective action is taken on issues and grievances arising out of Social Audit 
(Government of West Bengal 2008b). There is no mention in the rules of any provision 
for punitive action to be taken in case of non-redress of issues and grievances arising out 
of the Social Audit exercise. The actual operation of Social Audit in the two chosen GPs 
is examined below, with respect to the indicators developed in Chapter 3. Table 7 
summarizes the actual situation with respect to the various indicators for both GPs. 
 
Frequency of Social Audit 
Staff members of both Debipur GP and Nowdapanur GP mentioned that Social Audits 
have been conducted in their GPs. The available data for Debipur GP (obtained from the 
NREGA website) shows the date of the earliest Social Audit as 23/7/09. The data 
obtained from the NREGA website shows that six Social Audits were done in this GP in 
2009-10 (Government of India 2009-10a).40
                                               
40While the figures for the other accountability mechanisms such as Gram Sansad meetings and elections 
were collected for 2008-09, the Social Audit figures were collected for 2009-10 because Social Audits in 
West Bengal were not conducted before 2009-10 The dates on which Social Audits were conducted in 
Debipur GP are 23/7/09, 24/7/09, 28/7/09, 30/7/09, 4/8/09, 6/8/09 (Government of India 2009-10a).  
 The NREGA website showed that some 
other GPs in Memari –I block (to which Debipur GP belongs) had conducted a higher 
number of Social Audits, with Amadpur GP and Daluibazar-I GP having conducted 
eleven Social Audits each and Nimo-I GP having conducted fourteen.  
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For Nowdapanur GP, the data obtained from the NREGA website showed that 
only one Social Audit was conducted in this GP in 2009-10, on 1/8/2009. In fact all the 
GPs of Berhampore block, and even Murshidabad district (to which Nowdapanur GP 
belongs), had conducted only one Social Audit each in 2009-10 (Government of India 
2009-10a). The much higher number of Social Audits conducted in the GPs of 
Memari-I block and Burdwan district, compared to the GPs of Berhampore block and 
Murshidabad district, possibly indicates the greater pressure of the higher tiers on GPs 
for conducting Social Audit. 
 
Table 7: The Monitoring Dimension of Accountability: Functioning of Social 
Audit in the West Bengal GPs (2009-10)  
Indicator Gram Panchayat Debipur GP Nowdapanur GP 
Frequency  Six Social Audits conducted. One Social Audit conducted. 
Extent of popular 
involvement  
Conducted by Social Audit 
Team and GP staff members.  
 
No convening of public 
assembly to discuss Social 
Audit findings. 
Conducted by Social Audit 
Team and GP staff members. 
 
No convening of public 
assembly to discuss Social 
Audit findings. 
 
Raising of issues  
and exposure of 
grievances  
No record of issues or 
grievances. 




(according to GP 
staff and elected 
members) 
Social Audit conducted in 
more serious manner. 
 
 
Positive perception, seen as 
exposing shortcomings. 
 
Social Audit conducted in less 
serious manner. Procedural 
irregularities seen. 
 
Not seen as having an impact 
or revealing shortcomings 
because of its superficial, 
non-serious nature. 
 
Source: Data obtained from Social Audit pages of NREGA website (Government of 





Extent of Popular Involvement in Social Audit 
The representation of civil society interests and educated persons such as teachers and 
government officials in the Social Audit Team, which conducts Social Audits, appears 
to be advantageous for an independent scrutiny of the GP’s NREGA implementation.  
However it is desirable that the mass of lay village residents, who are the actual 
beneficiaries of NREGA, should also be involved in some way in the Social Audit 
process.  In both GPs, Social Audit in its actual functioning is more of a top-down 
exercise, lacking widespread popular involvement.  
 The author learnt from the staff members in both the GPs that the Social Audit 
Team members, together with the GP staff members, prepare the Social Audit report. 
Till the time of fieldwork, the findings of Social Audit had not yet been presented in 
specially convened public meetings or even in the Gram Sansad or Gram Sabha 
meetings in both GPs. The degree of popular input in preparing the Social Audit report 
is very meagre, and is from the interview responses of five NREGA beneficiaries 
elicited by the Social Audit team, and conversation of the team members with a few 
workers at the NREGA worksites.  
 
Raising of Issues and Exposure of Grievances 
Social Audit may be said to be functioning as an effective monitoring mechanism if it is 
able to expose irregularities, people’s grievances or any other shortcoming in 
implementation. In reality, however, there was no available mention of the issues raised 
or grievances revealed through Social Audit in the two GPs, either in the records of the 




Perceived Effectiveness of Social Audit 
Contrary to the lack of mention of issues and grievances raised by Social Audit in the 
records, the Executive Assistant (the highest ranked staff member) of Debipur GP 
claimed that Social Audit was leading to faults and shortcomings in the NREGA 
implementation process becoming visible. Such information, he felt, was benefitting 
the GP in its NREGA implementation work (Author’s field interview, dated 
29/12/2009). The Pradhan of this GP, too, expressed a belief in the effectiveness of 
Social Audit in checking corruption in NREGA implementation (Author’s field 
interview, dated 14/09/2009). 
 The Executive Assistant of Debipur GP revealed that the district administration 
of Burdwan district was pressurizing the GPs of the district to properly conduct Social 
Audit, and future allocation of NREGA funds by the district and block to the GPs could 
be refused in case of the GPs’ failure to conduct Social Audit. Therefore, the conduct of 
Social Audit was treated with seriousness in Debipur GP (Author’s field interview with 
Executive Assistant of Debipur GP, dated 29/12/2009). In contrast, the Executive 
Assistant of Nowdapanur GP felt that Social Audit in his GP was being done in a 
superficial, non-serious way and was not playing any role in exposing shortcomings or 
grievances (Author’s field interview, dated 17/12/2009). An elected member of 
Nowdapanur GP, belonging to the ruling INC disclosed that the actual conduct of 
Social Audit in his GP was marked by procedural irregularities such as forging of 
signatures of absent members of the Social Audit team. He commented that Social 
Audit is ineffective because of political interference and influence, and felt that it would 
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be more effective of higher level government officials were involved (Author’s 
telephonic interview, dated 13/02/2010). 41
 
 
Overall Effectiveness of Monitoring Mechanism  
Compared to Nowdapanur GP, Debipur GP, like the other GPs of Burdwan district 
seems to be taking the task of Social Audit more seriously. The overall higher 
effectiveness of Social Audit in Debipur GP is evident from its higher regularity and its 
higher perceived effectiveness among staff and elected members. Debipur GP therefore 
is ahead of Nowdapanur GP on the monitoring dimension of accountability. Both GPs, 
however, suffer from a failure to involve the wider public in the Social Audit process 
and the lack of records on grievances exposed through Social Audit. The greater 
pro-active pressure from the higher tiers appears to be responsible for the relatively 
greater importance given to Social Audit in Debipur GP compared to Nowdapanur GP. 
 
 Popular Monitoring in the two GPs : More Insights  
The institutionalized mechanism of Social Audit is nascent and top-down in reality; 
therefore there is a need for more insights on popular monitoring. Such insights can 
come from an understanding of monitoring actually carried out by the people outside 
the institutionalized forum of Social Audit. One simple and obvious way for people to 
monitor their representatives is to ask questions to them, whether in the formal forum of 
Gram Sansad, or through visits to the GP office, or even in informal settings. Four out 
of sixteen villager survey respondents in Debipur GP stated that they had asked 
questions to their GP representatives, while five out of sixteen in Nowdapanur GP had 
asked questions to their GP representatives. The questions are mostly related to 
                                               
41The involvement of higher level government officials is naturally incongruous with the idea of Social 
Audit. However, this response shows a belief that monitoring carried out by the higher tiers of 
government is more effective than popular monitoring.  
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personal benefits (such as inclusion in BPL list, IAY allocation), and sometimes related 
to slightly broader concerns (like the condition of the road in the village, or the tubewell 
not working). Nevertheless, it is quite significant that in GPs, elected representatives are 
much more accessible and visible than representatives of higher levels of government; 
this prompts at least some people to contact their representatives and ask them questions 
with respect to their demands and problems.  
The initiating of effective popular monitoring necessitates certain contextual 
conditions, both on the demand and supply sides. On the supply side, there is a need for 
the availability of information. The Right to Information act, which has been in 
operation since 2005, establishes the right of the villagers to view all public documents 
such as GP records. Yet it is questionable as to how many villagers would take the 
initiative to come to the GP office and ask to view GP records. Other means of making 
available information therefore have to be adopted.  
GPs are required to make visible details pertaining to their implementation work 
through means such as notice boards outside the GP office, and the painting of 
important information on the outer walls of the GP office. 42
                                               
42The West Bengal NREGA guidelines state that in accordance with the Right to Information Act 2005, 
the displaying of important NREGA work related information is also required on boards at the NREGA 
work-sites (Government of West Bengal 2008b). 
  This researcher observed 
the posting of information in bright yellow and black paint related to the latest position 
in NREGA implementation on the GP wall of Debipur GP, and also information about 
the rights of people with respect to various other schemes. The GP walls are a good way 
of giving readily-visible information to the people about the work being done by the 
GP. Debipur GP also circulates a booklet among its Gram Sansad annual session 
attendees giving details of the outputs, income, expenditure and miscellaneous details 
about the GP. Nowdapanur GP does not circulate such a booklet, the reason being (as 
this researcher was told by the GP Secretary) the lack of funds.   
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The higher institutional capacity of Debipur GP enables it to bear the costs of 
adopting superior means of disseminating information among the village residents. Yet 
how much of the actual working of the GP people are able to understand even in this GP 
is questionable, even with all the available information. The fact remains that the GP 
continues to exercise a great deal of discretion in deciding the actual sequence of taking 
up of works for implementation, and the considerations that govern such decision 
making still remain mysterious (political considerations are probably significant in this 
respect). The desired level of transparency in the working of the GP is not yet 
forthcoming. The incomplete minutes registers of Gram Sansad meetings and meetings 
of GP committees seen by this researcher show that the record keeping practices of GPs 
still have a long way to go.  
The demand side factors for monitoring are critical; even if information is made 
available, the absence of popular awareness and a desire on the part of the people to 
scrutinize the activities of their GP will mean that people will not realize the importance 
of monitoring or take the initiative to demand information and detect irregularities and 
shortcomings in the GP’s functioning. The presence of a popular movement is critical to 
the success of popular monitoring. In the Indian state of Rajasthan we see the example 
of NGOs taking initiative to involve the village people in the popular monitoring 
process (Afridi 2008). In Debipur GP, this researcher did not find any indication of 
NGO role (the CPI (M) dominance here does not leave space for any autonomous civil 
society organizations). In Nowdapanur GP, there is an NGO called ‘Sebabrata’, but its 
role in purely developmental 43
                                               
43Sebabrata is involved in activities such as testing of drinking water for arsenic, training of village 
women in livelihood activities such as silk spinning, and education 
 rather than activist in any way. Given the poor 
development of civil society and the absence of activist NGOs, it would not be 
surprising if levels of popular monitoring were low in both GPs. 
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To gauge the effectiveness of popular monitoring, the author asked the 
following question to the villager survey respondents:   “Can people of this area keep a 
watch on their representatives?” This question yields insights on people’s perception of 
their ability to monitor their representatives. In the educationally and 
socio-economically more developed Debipur GP, six respondents, out of the sixteen 
survey respondents, said yes. Out of the two who felt that people here cannot keep 
watch, one respondent stated that people here can understand what is going on but 
cannot express themselves (Author’s field interview with male, general category 
villager survey respondent of Debipur GP, dated 19/09/2009). This response seems 
more related to his perception about the absence of impact of monitoring than the 
absence of monitoring per se. The other respondent who felt that people could not keep 
a watch, felt that people in her GP lacked the information to monitor (Author’s field 
interview with female, general category villager survey respondent of Debipur GP, 
dated 12/09/2009). There were five no opinion responses, and the remaining responses 
fell in the grey area between ‘yes’ and ‘no’:  one respondent stated that she herself keeps 
watch (Author’s field interview with female, general category villager survey 
respondent of Debipur GP, dated 8/09/2009). Another respondent stated that he had no 
opinion on the matter, but felt that people in general have opportunities to ask questions 
to their representatives (Author’s field interview with male, general category villager 
survey respondent of Debipur GP, dated 13/09/2009).  One subject commented that 
there had been improvement from before with respect to people’s ability to monitor 
(Author’s field interview with male, general category villager survey respondent of 
Debipur GP, dated 13/09/2009). These gray area responses have a positive ring to them, 
and reflect that there is a degree of popular monitoring in this GP.  
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 In the socio-economically more backward Nowdapanur GP, only one 
respondent respondent believes that people of the area can keep a watch on their 
representatives, compared to six in Debipur GP. This is somewhat surprising given the 
competitive political scenario of the GP and the higher average attendance in Gram 
Sansad meetings. Three stated that the people could not keep watch, of whom one 
opined that since meetings of the GP are held in secrecy, one cannot keep watch 
(Author’s field interview with female, general category villager survey respondent of 
Nowdapanur GP, dated 1/01/2010). Seven were clear no opinion responses. Other 
responses fell in the gray area between yes, no and no opinion: One subject said that he 
does not give any importance to the idea of keeping watch (Author’s field interview 
with male, general category villager survey respondent of Nowdapanur GP, dated 
1/01/2010). Another commented that he personally does not keep watch, and accepts 
whatever the GP does (Author’s field interview with male, general category villager 
survey respondent of Nowdapanur GP, dated 19/12/2009). Another respondent stated 
that “some can monitor, others cannot” (Author’s field interview with female, general 
category villager survey respondent of Nowdapanur GP, dated 2/01/2010). Two 
subjects said that they themselves do not keep watch. Unlike the gray area responses in 
Debipur GP, these responses mostly have a negative slant and do not reflect positively 
on the extent of popular monitoring in Nowdapanur GP.  
The reasons behind the differences in perceived levels of popular monitoring in 
the two GPs are complex and difficult to infer, since they are likely shaped by factors 
such as the respondents’ own experience and their perception of others’ experience and 
abilities, and also by factors such as the levels of education and awareness and 
information supply. Sampling limitations with respect to the villager survey also make 
it very problematic to arrive at any conclusive explanation.  One possible explanation 
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behind the lower perceived levels of people’s ability to monitor in Nowdapanur GP 
might be its higher levels of illiteracy and socio-economic backwardness compared to 
Debipur GP. The higher levels of illiteracy in Nowdapanur GP (perhaps resulting in 
lower overall consciousness and awareness) possibly explains the higher number of 
people who believe that the people here cannot keep watch, and the negative tone of 
people’s opinions on popular monitoring. One subject in Nowdapanur, an illiterate SC 
lady living in a neighbourhood inhabited by SCs, in fact commented that people in her 
locality do not have the education that is required for monitoring (Author’s field 
interview with female, SC villager survey respondent of Nowdapanur GP, dated 
19/12/2009). Debipur GP, which has higher levels of perceived ability of people to 
monitor, has higher literacy levels and relatively better information dissemination than 
Nowdapanur GP.  
Among the complex factors that shape people’s ability to monitor and their 
perception of it, two factors are therefore especially worth mentioning: the education 
level in the GP and the information made available by the GP.  Respondents themselves 
make references to factors such as education, information and secrecy in their 
responses. While Debipur GP has relatively higher levels of people’s perceived ability 
to monitor, it can be seen that in absolute terms, such levels are low in both GPs. Higher 
levels of education and awareness, conscientization of the people by civil society 
organizations and better information dissemination can possibly play a role in 
generating more active monitoring by the people in both GPs.  
 
Indirect Accountability: Accountability of GP Staff  
The three sections already seen in this chapter assess the functioning of mechanisms of 
accountability of elected representatives to the people (direct accountability). The GP, 
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however, consists not just of elected representatives, but also of staff members such as 
the Nirbahi Sahayak (Executive Assistant), Sachib (Secretary), Nirman Sahayak 
(Construction Assistant), Sahayak (administrative assistant) and GP Karmee (GP 
workers) who assist the GP members and the Pradhan in the GP’s administrative tasks. 
This section evaluates the accountability of GP staff members to elected 
representatives, known as indirect accountability. Indirect accountability means the 
control of the GP’s elected representatives on its staff members. It is operationalized in 
this study in terms of the effectiveness of the formal or institutionalized mechanisms of 
control of the elected representatives of the GP over GP staff members.  
 This section uses the ‘sanctioning-monitoring-deliberation’ scheme as a guide 
to evaluate accountability of GP staff members. The ‘deliberation’ dimension is 
however replaced by a ‘decision making control’ or ‘administrative control’ dimension 
that signifies the decision making powers of elected representatives vis a` vis the 
decision making powers of staff members. This dimension indicates whether staff 
members have decision making autonomy or have to abide by the decisions made by 
elected representatives. It is, therefore, a suitable indicator of control of elected 
representatives over staff members.  
 
Sanctioning Dimension 
The extent to which elected representatives have disciplinary control over GP staff 
members indicates the power of the former to sanction (punish) the latter. The GP’s 
body of elected representatives has no power to award punishment to its staff members. 
Such power lies with two higher-level bureaucratic functionaries, namely the Block 
Development Officer or BDO, who is the Executive Officer of the Panchayat Samiti 
(Block level Panchayat) and the District Magistrate, who is the Executive Officer of the 
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Zilla Parishad (District level Panchayat) (Government of West Bengal 2009a, Section 
36). It also has no power to pass resolutions for the recall of its most important staff 
members such as Executive Assistant, Secretary, Nirman Sahayak and Sahayak.  
 Since there is no available formal mechanism of sanctioning of staff members 
by elected representatives, formal sanctioning of staff members by elected 
representatives is non-existent in West Bengal GPs. There is therefore no variation 




The indicators of monitoring of staff members by elected representatives are the 
availability (and use) of institutionalized mechanisms for elected representatives to 
cross examine or monitor their staff, and whether elected representatives have the 
power to review performance of their staff through mechanisms such as writing 
performance reports. Apparently, there is a performance report of GP staff members 
known as the Prakashya Karmanyata Pratibedan (translated as non-confidential 
performance report) in which they are evaluated on the criteria of attendance, skill or 
expertise, and integrity. This report is prepared by the higher-level bureaucratic official 
known as Panchayat Development officer (PDO), who is the ex-officio Secretary of the 
Panchayat Samiti. This report is presented by the PDO to the Executive Officer of 
Panchayat Samiti. The GP Pradhan or other elected representatives have no 
contribution in the writing of the performance report (Author’s field interview with 
Joint Secretary of Panchayats and Rural Development Department, Government of 
West Bengal, dated 10/08/2009).  
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 The recent constitution of GP staff members into the Block and District 
Panchayat Cadres has opened up possibilities for their transfer to other GPs (within the 
same block or district) and promotion. This can be contrasted with the earlier situation 
when they were recruited locally and were supposed to remain in the same GP 
throughout their career. Their constitution into the cadres has introduced a measure of 
answerability for their performance, with the possibilities of promotion linked to their 
performance. Such answerability however is essentially to the upper tiers of the 
administrative structure, and not to the elected representatives of the GP.  
 The staff members of the GP and the Pradhan work closely together in the same 
office in executing the responsibilities of the GP, because of which there is ample 
opportunity for the latter to keep watch on the former. Yet, there is no institutionalized 
monitoring forum (such as an institutionalized periodic question-answer forum) 
available for the Pradhan and other GP elected members to question GP staff.44
 
 Due to 
the unavailability of insititutionalized monitoring mechanisms such as performance 
review or question answer forums, there is no variation between the chosen West 
Bengal GPs on the monitoring dimension of indirect accountability.  
Decision Making Control  
The West Bengal Panchayat law clearly states that the GP Pradhan shall exercise 
administrative control over GP staff (Government of West Bengal 2009a, Section 34). 
This means that GP staff members are obligated to follow and carry out the 
administrative orders of the Pradhan. The Executive Assistant of Nowdapanur GP told 
this author that he enjoyed no independent executive powers because of having to 
                                               
44At the block level, there is the mechanism known as Block Sansad. The Block Sansad consists of all 
elected members of all the GPs in the block and all Panchayat Samiti members (Government of West 
Bengal 2009a, Section 115A), and is a forum where the elected members may hold the block level 
bureaucracy answerable and seek information from them on various matters. 
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compulsorily follow the administrative orders of the Pradhan (Author’s field interview, 
dated 17/12/2009). In all West Bengal GPs, therefore, GP staff members are under the 
decision making control of elected representatives.    
 On the monitoring and sanctioning dimensions of indirect accountability, the 
Pradhan has hardly any control on GP staff members, but s/he does enjoy significant 
decision making control over the staff members. This is the common situation in both 
the chosen West Bengal GPs, and thus there is no significant or noticeable variation 
between them as far as the actual operation of the formal mechanisms of indirect 
accountability is concerned.  
 The responsibility of staff members is to preserve rules, regulations and 
government orders, and ensure that these are followed in the decisions of the GP. Such 
situations frequently arise, as pointed out by the Executive Assistants of the two GPs, 
where the orders of the Pradhan are in conflict with the existing rules, especially those 
pertaining to beneficiary selection or spending in schemes being implemented by GPs.
 The Executive Assistant is on the one hand held answerable by the bureaucratic 
personnel in the higher tiers if rules are violated in GP decisions, and on the other hand 
has no independent administrative powers and has to compulsorily follow the orders of 
the Pradhan. The Executive Assistants of the chosen West Bengal GPs told the author 
that they often have to face such sticky situations of conflict between rules and Pradhan 
orders (Author’s field interviews with Executive Assistants of Debipur GP and 
Nowdapanur GP, dated 11/09/2009 and 17/12/2009 respectively). The Executive 
Assistant of Debipur GP revealed that he seeks help and advice from the block-level 
bureaucrats such as the BDO when such situations of conflict arise (Author’s field 
interview, dated 11/09/2009).  
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 The overall situation for GP staff members is one of conflict between 
accountability to the higher tiers and accountability to the Pradhan. After all, the GP 
does not recruit its own staff. While staff members are obliged to follow administrative 
orders of the Pradhan, they are employees of the state government, and their 
recruitment, pay, transfer, leave, punishment and promotion are all handled by the 
higher tiers of the state administration.              
 
Conclusion  
It was seen in this chapter that Nowdapanur GP was ahead of Debipur GP on two out of 
three dimensions of (direct) accountability--the sanctioning dimension and the 
deliberation dimension. Nowdapanur GP did clearly better on the sanctioning 
dimension because of the higher competitiveness of its elections. It was also ahead on 
the deliberation dimension because of its higher and more inclusive attendance in Gram 
Sansad meetings and also a more active role of Gram Sansad meetings in scrutinizing 
and criticizing GP records. On the monitoring dimension, however Debipur GP was 
ahead because of its higher frequency of Social Audit, its relatively more serious 
carrying out of Social Audit, and also the higher perceived effectiveness of Social Audit 
according to its staff members and elected members. In summary, Nowdapanur GP has 
higher overall accountability than Debipur GP because it is ahead on a majority of 
accountability dimensions, including the crucial sanctioning dimension.  
 This chapter carried out an assessment of accountability in two GPs of West 
Bengal using a systematic operational scheme of accountability dimensions and 
indicators. The accountability mechanisms for both these GPs have the same 
institutional (legal) features, and what was assessed in this chapter was the variation in 
the actual functioning of these mechanisms. A broader understanding of accountability 
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can be obtained through a study of GP accountability in another Indian state, which has 
accountability mechanisms with different institutional features. Therefore, the next 
chapter (Chapter 5) will elaborate the operation of accountability in the chosen GPs of 
Madhya Pradesh, whose accountability mechanisms such as elections and deliberative 
forums (Gram Sabhas) have highly interesting and distinct institutional features.   
 The operation of accountability mechanisms is creating a certain degree of 
popular control on the West Bengal GPs and their members, but one should not assume 
that such control will automatically improve GP performance. Each accountability 
mechanism can have a significant impact on GP performance only if it fulfils certain 
conditions. The impact of the accountability mechanisms operating in the chosen West 
Bengal GPs on GP performance will be explored in a later chapter (Chapter 7).  
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CHAPTER 5                                  
 ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MADHYA PRADESH CASES  
 
This chapter assesses the extent of accountability in the two chosen cases (GPs) in the 
state of Madhya Pradesh.  The first three sections of this chapter correspond to the 
assessments of the sanctioning, deliberation and monitoring dimensions of 
accountability respectively. As already stated, accountability as measured in this study 
focuses on accountability of the GP to the people, known as direct accountability.45
 Following these three sections is a brief section on the extent of the 
accountability of staff members to elected representatives in the two GPs (indirect 
accountability). Because of the lack of any noticeable variation in indirect 
accountability between the two chosen GPs, the variation in overall accountability 
between the two Madhya Pradesh GPs only reflects the variation in direct 
accountability. The concluding section provides an aggregate assessment of 
accountability in the two chosen Madhya Pradesh GPs, on the basis of the cumulative 
assessment of the three (direct) accountability dimensions.  
 It is 
such direct accountability that is assessed in the first three sections of this chapter. 
 
The Sanctioning Dimension of Accountability 
In Madhya Pradesh’s Panchayat law, elections and Right to Recall are the two available 
mechanisms through which local residents can sanction their elected GP 
representatives. In reality, however, the Right to Recall has never been exercised in 
either of the two GPs of Madhya Pradesh chosen for this study. Therefore the 
sanctioning dimension of accountability will be assessed in terms of indicators 
                                               
45Normally direct accountability is only of elected representatives to the people. Madhya Pradesh’s 
Panchayat Law however also makes the GP staff member (Secretary) directly accountable to the people 
in some ways.  
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pertaining only to elections. The main emphasis in evaluating the effectiveness of 
elections as a sanctioning mechanism is on assessing their competitiveness.  
 The indicators used to assess elections as a sanctioning mechanism pertain to 
their competitiveness, freeness, and voter turnout. Madhya Pradesh’s Panchayat law 
does not allow for Panchayat elections at any level (GP, block or district) to be 
conducted on a political party basis. 46  Therefore, the assessment of electoral 
competitiveness in Madhya Pradesh GPs cannot be based on indicators such as 
proportion of seats not won by the ruling political party and turnover of ruling party; it 
is therefore based on indicators related to proportion of GP seats that were contested, 
and contestation of chairperson seat. The actual situation with respect to various 
indicators of the sanctioning dimension in the two chosen Madhya Pradesh 
GPs–Goutampur Colony GP and Ramgarh GP–is described in the remaining 
paragraphs of this section, and summarized in Table 8 below. Data for the 2005 and 
2010 Panchayat elections has been used to assess these indicators.47
 
  
Proportion of Contested Seats and Contestation of Sarpanch Seat 
In the 2005 election in Goutampur Colony GP, only two out of twenty Panch (GP 
elected representative other than chairperson) seats were filled through contested 
election, and eighteen seats were filled in an uncontested manner. In the 2010 election, 
all twenty Panch seats of this GP were filled in an uncontested manner. In Ramgarh GP, 
in 2005, five out of the fourteen GP seats were filled through contested election, and 
                                               
46While political parties in reality play an unofficial or de facto role in block and district level Panchayat 
elections, GP-level elections are almost devoid of political party involvement. 
47Election figures for the Madhya Pradesh GPs have been gathered both for the latest election (2010) and 
the previous one (2005). The 2005 figures have been obtained because the data pertaining to other 
accountability mechanisms, and the performance figures of the GPs, are mostly for 2008-09 or 2009-10, 
for both the West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh studies. It is necessary to note the electoral composition of 
the GP that was in power in 2008-09 and 2009-10, especially for the purpose of inferring the causal 
relationship between accountability and performance. The 2010 figures have also been used, for the 
purpose of inferring persisting trends of electoral competitiveness, and also because of non-availability of 
data on indicators such as voter turnout, turnover of incumbents and freeness for the earlier elections.  
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nine were filled in an uncontested manner. In the 2010 elections, only thirteen out of 
fourteen seats of Ramgarh GP were filled, since one seat was empty at the end of the 
election. Contested election was held in five seats out of the thirteen seats, and eight 
were filled in uncontested manner. 
 
Table 8: The Sanctioning Dimension of Accountability: Effectiveness of Elections 
in the Madhya Pradesh GPs (2005 and 2010 Gram Panchayat Elections) 
Indicators 
Gram Panchayat 
Goutampur Colony GP Ramgarh GP 
2005 2010 2005 2010 
Proportion of 
contested seats  2/20 (10%) 0/20 (0%) 
5/14 




yes no yes 




Degree of defeat  
of incumbent 
representatives 
seeking re-election  
No data Not applicable No data 
No incumbent from 
previous term stood 
for re-election 
Voter turnout No  data Not applicable No data 92.73% 
Freeness of 
elections No data 
Not 
applicable No data 
No coercion or 
intimidation of voters. 
Source: Data obtained from Madhya Pradesh State Election Commission, villager 
survey interviews and interview of the Secretaries of the two GPs  
 
 According to Madhya Pradesh’s Panchayat law, the Sarpanch (chairperson) is 
elected directly by the people (Government of Madhya Pradesh 2009a, Section 17). The 
Sarpanch seat in Goutampur Colony GP was filled through contested election in 2005 
but was uncontested in 2010. The Sarpanch election in Ramgarh GP was contested in 
both 2005 and 2010, and was actually very hotly contested in the latter. The Sarpanch 
position of Ramgarh GP was reserved for a woman in the 2010 elections, and as many 
as fourteen candidates contested, with the results showing a tie between the two leading 
candidates. Both leading candidates obtained 194 votes each, and the second runner-up 
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was close behind winning 190 votes. The winner was chosen through a draw-of- lots in 
accordance with election rules. 
 The election results of Goutampur Colony GP for 2005 show a low degree of 
electoral contestation while the 2010 results show a total absence of such contestation. 
The author, through conversations with the newly elected Sarpanch and Panchas of 
Goutampur Colony GP, tried to discover the reasons behind the total absence of 
competition in 2010. The newly elected Sarpanch of this GP stated dialogue and 
agreement among the villagers about the benefits of uncontested elections (including 
the reward money that would be obtained from the state government) to be the reasons 
behind the occurrence (Author’s field interview, dated 17/03/2010). 48
 Contrasted with the views of the Sarpanch and Panchas about how the totally 
uncontested election of Goutampur Colony’s GP members and Sarpanch was achieved 
through discussion and rational consensus, there were some views that stressed that the 
absence of contestation was not the result of widespread discussion or genuine 
consensus. A school teacher in the GP (who requested anonymity) opined that the 
uncontested election was a sham; ordinary villagers, he said, had no role to play in the 
process. This teacher said that the Sarpanch actually sent his own supporters to the 
meetings where discussion and selection of candidates were held (Author’s field 
interview, dated 22/03/2010). A local politician belonging to the Indian National 
Congress (INC) revealed that the uncontested election of Sarpanch in Goutampur 
 Some newly 
elected Panchas elaborated that villagers unanimously agreed on the names of 
candidates of their choice during meetings held in temples in all the villages and 
hamlets of this GP (Author’s field conversation, dated 18/03/2010).  
                                               
48 The Department of Panchayats and Rural Development, Government of Madhya Pradesh, has 
instituted a Nirvirodh Nirvachan Puraskar Yojana (programme to reward uncontested election) where 
prize money is given to GPs electing their Sarpanch in an uncontested manner, or Sarpanch and all 
Panchas in uncontested manner, or all women GPs with Sarpanch and all Panchas elected in uncontested 
manner (Government of Madhya Pradesh 2008-09). 
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Colony GP was possible because the Sarpanch seat was reserved for an Other 
Backward Classes (OBC) candidate (Author’s field conversation, dated 28/03/2010).49
 The actual reality of how the completely uncontested election happened in 2010 
in Goutampur Colony GP is difficult to infer, in view of the contradicting responses. 
However it must be noted that even in the previous (2005) election a very high 
proportion (90%) of Panchas were chosen in an uncontested manner. Therefore the 
relative absence of any major electoral contestation seems to be the enduring reality in 
this GP. The consensus on selection of Panchas achieved in the 2010 elections should 
be seen as an incremental progress on the 2005 elections, rather than as solely a product 
of the Sarpanch’s efforts (or machinations, according to the critical view). As far as the 
uncontested election of the Sarpanch is concerned, it can be attributed significantly to 
the low availability of candidates due to OBC reservation. 
 
This GP has an overwhelming SC and ST majority, with only seven OBC households in 
the whole GP. There was no contestation in the Sarpanch election because of the low 
availability of candidates.   
 In Ramgarh GP, the state of electoral contestation, as far as Sarpanch election is 
concerned, is completely in contrast to that of Goutampur Colony GP. The competition 
in the Sarpanch election in 2010 was extremely intense, and the Sarpanch contest was 
seen by villagers as an inter-village competition, a contest between candidates 
representing the constituent villages of the GP. The interviews with the Panchas, 
Sarpanch, GP Secretary and villagers of this GP revealed the mutual distrust between 
the residents of the constituent village of Neenaur and Ramgarh, a discord aggravated 
                                               
49Reservation for women, and SCs and STs, is applied to Sarpanch positions as per Madhya Pradesh’s 
Panchayat law and Panchayat election rules. The proportion of Sarpanch seats reserved for SCs and STs 
to the total number of Sarpanch seats in a block should equal the proportion of SC and ST population to 
the total population of the block. Where the total population of SCs and STs in a block is less than 50%, 
there is reservation of 25% of Sarpanch seats for OBC candidates. Half of all Sarpanch seats in a block 
are reserved for women. The selection of GPs in which Sarpanchas are to be from the reserved categories 




by the results of the Sarpanch election. Because of the victory of the Neenaur candidate 
and the defeat of the Ramgarh candidate, there were some minor incidents of violence 
in Ramgarh village in the aftermath of the elections.  
 However, it is not proper to attribute all electoral contestation in Ramgarh GP to 
the inter-village divide alone; such divide is not relevant to the election of Panchas who 
are chosen from wards that lie within single villages. Five Panchas were chosen 
through contested elections in both the 2005 and 2010 elections, which implies that 
there is a degree of electoral contestation within villages as well. While the degree of 
contestation of Panch elections of Ramgarh GP is no doubt relatively higher than that of 
Goutampur Colony GP, it is quite low in absolute terms: the majority of Panch 
positions of this GP were filled in an uncontested manner. Such low contestation points 
to the low interest in contesting Panch elections. Such low interest might be due to the 
lower power and influence enjoyed by Panchas (compared to the Sarpanch), and is in 
keeping with the overall pattern in Madhya Pradesh where interest to contest Panch 
elections is low. 50
 It is worth asking to what degree the phenomenon of uncontested elections is 
due to lack of interest among villagers to participate as candidates in elections, and to 
what degree it can be attributed to a genuine consensus and harmony of viewpoints. 
Lack of interest appears to be an important reason behind the low levels of contestation 
of Panch elections in both GPs. However, 100% uncontested election, where achieved, 
is not possible only through lack of interest and requires some purposeful consensus 
building efforts to attain it. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the lack of 
 
                                               
50In the 2005 Panchayat elections, 57.2% of all Panch seats in Madhya Pradesh were filled in an 
uncontested manner. In these elections, only 3.6% Sarpanch positions were filled in an uncontested 




contestation should be rewarded (as the Madhya Pradesh state government does), 
because it may be attributed, at least partly, to the lack of interest to contest elections. 
 
Degree of Electoral Defeat of Incumbent Representatives  
The degree of electoral turnover of GP members, through electoral defeat of incumbent 
members contesting re-election, is an indicator of electoral competitiveness. In 
Goutampur Colony GP, the fact of 100% uncontested election of GP members in 2010 
meant that none of the members from the previous term contested re-election in 2010 
(because there was no contested election). Only one Panch from the previous GP 
became a member in the new (uncontested) GP chosen in 2010. In Ramgarh GP, all the 
Panchas and even the Sarpanch chosen or elected in 2010 are first time GP members. 
None of the members of the previous term of Ramgarh GP stood for elections in 2010, 
as per information obtained from the Secretary of this GP (Author’s telephonic 
interview, dated 9/09/2010).  
 What could be the reasons for the total absence of incumbent members 
contesting re-elections in Ramgarh GP? Reservation of seats with rotation of reserved 
seats might be one valid reason behind the phenomenon, since it is very likely to 
discourage interested incumbents from contesting. A high percentage of seats is 
reserved in this GP—50% for women and 25% for OBCs—in addition to a smaller 
percentage reserved for SCs and STs.51
                                               
51This reason was also stated by the Secretary of Ramgarh GP (Author’s telephonic  interview, dated  
06/03/2012), and an INC politician and highly educated native of Ramgarh GP (Author’s field interview, 
dated 5/04/2010).    
  Reservation for OBCs and women is on a 
rotational basis, which prevents willing candidates, if any, from seeking re-election 
from their own constituency. The Sarpanch seat became reserved for women candidates 
in 2010 because of rotational reservation, preventing the incumbent male Sarpanch 
from contesting for it.   
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 Yet the question remains–if the proportion of seats subjected to rotational 
reservation was of a low degree, would a significant proportion of incumbent Panchas 
seek re-election in Ramgarh GP? While it is not possible to give a conclusive answer to 
this, it remains questionable whether a significant number of members would be willing 
or interested to contest re-election in the first place. It has already been seen that interest 
in contesting Panch elections is quite low, and it will be seen in a later chapter of this 
study that low enthusiasm and motivation are also a feature of incumbent Panchas. 
Given such low interest, it remains highly questionable whether there would be many 
Panchas willing to contest re-elections in the absence of constraints imposed by 
rotational reservation.  
 
Voter Turnout  
The voter turnout in the 2010 Panchayat elections in Ramgarh GP was 92.73%, as per 
figures obtained from the Madhya Pradesh State Election Commission. All sixteen 
respondents of the villager survey in Ramgarh GP said that they had voted in the last GP 
elections in 2010. There was no voting for GP candidates in Goutampur Colony GP in 
2010 because of uncontested election of all Panchas and the Sarpanch.  
 
Freeness of Elections 
All the sixteen villager survey respondents of Ramgarh GP stated that they had faced no 
intimidation or coercion during voting in the GP elections of 2010. As already stated, 
there was no voting in Goutampur Colony GP in 2010 because of totally uncontested 
GP election, therefore the indicator of freeness is not relevant for the 2010 elections in 




Overall Effectiveness of Sanctioning Mechanism 
The account given in this section shows that Ramgarh GP is ahead of Goutampur 
Colony GP on two indicators related to electoral competitiveness (proportion of 
contested seats and contestation of Sarpanch seat). No inference can be made about 
Ramgarh GP’s superiority on the other competitiveness indicator (degree of electoral 
defeat of incumbent representatives). This is because none of Ramgarh GP’s incumbent 
members contested re-election, while the absence of contested elections in Goutampur 
Colony GP in the latest GP election (2010) rules out the possibility of any incumbent 
member contesting re-election. On the basis of the above-mentioned two indicators on 
which valid comparisons have been made, Ramgarh GP is inferred as having higher 
electoral competitiveness than Goutampur Colony GP. 
 On the voter turnout and freeness indicators, too, valid comparisons between the 
two GPs are not possible with respect to GP elections because of the lack of contested 
GP election in Goutampur Colony GP in 2010. Considering all the indicators pertaining 
to the effectiveness of elections as a sanctioning mechanism, Ramgarh GP can therefore 
be seen as having a higher effectiveness of elections as a sanctioning mechanism. This 
is due to the higher competitiveness of its Panch and Sarpanch elections for the 2005 
and 2010 elections. In fact the 2010 election results show a very clear contrast between 
the two GPs’ levels of electoral competition with respect to the Sarpanch election. The 
fact of uncontested election of Sarpanch in one versus a tie between the two leading 
candidates in the other illustrates this contrast very clearly.  
 The results of the 2005 and 2010 elections combined show a trend of higher 
electoral competitiveness in Ramgarh GP vis a`vis Goutampur Colony GP. Voters of 
Ramgarh GP therefore enjoy relatively greater choice in evaluating contesting 
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candidates and choosing their Sarpanch and Panchas, which results in a higher degree 
of accountability (in terms of popular voice) exercised through the means of elections.  
 
The Deliberation Dimension of Accountability 
Like some other Indian states such as West Bengal and Kerala, Madhya Pradesh has 
also gone in for deliberative assemblies at a level lower than the whole GP. Madhya 
Pradesh’s Panchayat law provides for single-village level Village Assembly meetings 
known as Gram Sabha meetings (Government of Madhya Pradesh 2009a, Section 2 and 
Section 5-A).52
 Four regular meetings of the Gram Sabha are to be held in one year--in April, 
August, October and January--and special meetings have to be held whenever ordered 
by higher-level authorities such as the District Collector, Janpad Panchayat (block 
level Panchayat) or Zila Panchayat (district level Panchayat). The GP may also 
convene special meetings, as may the members of Gram Sabha if they so desire 
(Government of Madhya Pradesh 2010).
 This implies that if a GP has more than one village, then each village in 
that GP shall have its own Gram Sabha.  
53 According to Madhya Pradesh’s Panchayat 
law, the quorum required for holding Gram Sabha meetings is one-tenth of all the 
members of Gram Sabha, or 50 members, whichever is less (Government of Madhya 
Pradesh 2009a, Section 6).54
 The Panchayat law in Madhya Pradesh is unique compared to those of other 
Indian states because of its provision of Gram Swaraj. With the introduction of the 
system of Gram Swaraj in 2001, Gram Sabhas have, by law, been made sovereign in 
  
                                               
52Gram Sabha meetings in West Bengal refer to the meeting of all the voters in the whole GP area, 
whereas in Madhya Pradesh it refers to single-village level meetings of voters. 
53The Secretary of the GP has to convene a meeting of Gram Sabha within seven days if 10% members of 
Gram Sabha, or the Sarpanch of the GP, make a request for a special meeting of Gram Sabha to be held. 
54As per the amendment to the Panchayat law made in 2001, the quorum was fixed at 20% or one-fifth. In 
2005 this quorum requirement was reduced to one-tenth. 
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village governance through transfer of all GP powers to the Gram Sabha. This reform 
was heralded by some authors as signifying a transition from representative democracy 
to direct democracy at the village level (Manor 2001; Behar and Kumar 2002).  
 The binding nature of the decisions made by the Gram Sabha is stated clearly in 
Madhya Pradesh’s Panchayat law. As per the law, the GP is supposed to carry out the 
recommendations made by the Gram Sabha in the exercise of its powers (Government 
of Madhya Pradesh 2009a, Section 7). Some of the powers of Gram Sabha in Madhya 
Pradesh are similar to the powers of Gram Sansad in West Bengal: these include the 
powers to identify development works and beneficiaries. They also include powers of 
ratification, for example powers to ratify/approve the annual plan and budget of the GP.  
 What is unique in the legal provisions of Madhya Pradesh’s Panchayat system 
is that executive, implementation and regulatory powers, which one expects to be the 
preserve of an executive body like the GP, are given to the Gram Sabha. These powers, 
transferred from the GP to the Gram Sabha include (a) powers to construct and 
maintain assets such as public wells, roads, drains etc. (b) regulatory powers such as 
regulation of shops and eating houses, and maintenance of records of births, deaths and 
marriages (c) implementation powers such as the execution of development schemes 
and development work being done in the Gram Sabha area (Government of Madhya 
Pradesh 2009a, Section 7). Legally speaking, the role of the GP in Gram Swaraj is to 
carry out whatever is decided in Gram Sabha meetings; therefore the Sarpanch and the 
GP are required by the law to entirely subordinate themselves to the control of the Gram 
Sabha (Government of Madhya Pradesh 2005).  
 For the execution of its executive and regulatory functions, the Gram Sabha is 
legally empowered to constitute standing and ad-hoc committees. The present legal 
provisions provide for two standing committees of Gram Sabha: the Gram Vikas Samiti 
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(translated as Village Development Committee) and Gram Nirman Samiti (translated as 
Village Construction Committee) (Government of Madhya Pradesh 2009a, Section 
7-A).  
 The Gram Nirman Samiti is supposed to execute all construction works 
entrusted by the GP or Gram Sabha. The Gram Vikas Samiti is required to perform 
functions as defined by rules (Government of Madhya Pradesh 2010), though such rules 
are yet to be made by the government. The Sarpanch of the GP, as per the Panchayat 
law, is supposed to be the ex-officio president of both these standing committees of 
Gram Sabha (Government of Madhya Pradesh 2009a, Section 7-B). This is one caveat, 
among others, through which the power of the Sarpanch is preserved in the context of 
Gram Swaraj. Apart from the standing committees, the Gram Sabha can also constitute 
ad-hoc committees to perform particular implementation tasks in a time bound manner, 
as and when it wishes (Government of Madhya Pradesh 2009a, Section 7-A). 
 The above account describes the legal (institutional) features of the Gram 
Sabhas in Madhya Pradesh. The revolutionary legal provisions create positive 
expectations about the actual role of the deliberative forum of Gram Sabha in the GPs 
of Madhya Pradesh. It is not necessary, however, that the actual functioning of Gram 
Sabha will in all cases, fulfil the requirements of the law. The actual effectiveness of 
Gram Sabha in the two chosen Madhya Pradesh GPs is evaluated in the following 
paragraphs of this section, according to the indicators of the deliberation dimension of 
accountability. Table 9 summarizes the comparative situation in the two GPs with 
respect to these indicators, using 2008-09 data from GP records, and other sources such 





Table 9: The Deliberation Dimension of Accountability: Functioning of Gram 
Sabha in the Madhya Pradesh GPs  




Total of 11 meetings held for 2 
villages (average of 5.5 for each 
village) as per records. 
Total of 13 meetings held for 3 
villages (average of 4.3 for each 





Average attendance of 18.7%. 
The larger village, Goutampur 
Colony, however had lower than 
quorum attendance in most 
meetings, and average 
attendance of 7.4%, as per 
records. 
  
More widespread attendance 
due to higher awareness about 
Gram Sabha and its meetings  
Attendance figures in GP 
records are of questionable 
reliability. Actual reality (as 
revealed through interviews 
with villagers and elites) appears 
to be of very meagre attendance, 
usually far below quorum. 
 
Very few villagers attend 
because of very low awareness 
about Gram Sabha and when its 
meetings are held. 
Inclusiveness 
of attendance in 
Gram Sabha 
meetings 
High degree of attendance by 
women 
 
High attendance by SCs and STs  
Low degree of attendance by 
women 
  




Gram Sabha  
 
GP prepares list of proposals and 
gets it approved in Gram Sabha 
meetings. 
 
Proposals made mostly by GP, 
and rarely by villagers. 
GP prepares list of proposals and 
gets it approved in Gram Sabha 
meetings. 
 
Proposals made mostly by GP, 
and rarely by villagers. 
 
Extent of 




Attendees are very vocal. Some 
degree of scrutiny and 
interrogation by attendees about 
GP functioning.  
Almost non-existent scrutiny 
and interrogation of GP 
functioning by attendees. 
One-sided communication by 
Sarpanch and Secretary. 
 
Source: Data obtained from GP records (2008-09 figures), GP Secretary interviews, 
villager survey interviews and direct observation 
   
Frequency of Gram Sabha Meetings 
The official records of Goutampur Colony GP show that a total of eleven Gram Sabha 
meetings were held in this GP in 2008-09. Seven of these meetings were held in its 
larger constituent village (Goutampur Colony village) and four were held in its other 
village, Kesalwada. This means that the average number of meetings held in each 
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village is 5.5. The meetings held in the villages of Goutampur Colony GP comprised 
regular and special sessions. As already stated, the law mandates the holding of four 
regular meetings in every Gram Sabha area (village) in a year. In Goutampur Colony 
village, all four regular meetings were held in 2008-09. In Kesalwada village, records 
show that only two out of the four regular meetings were held. In addition to the regular 
meetings, three special sessions were held in Goutampur Colony village, and two such 
sessions were held in Kesalwada village. The special sessions were convened by higher 
bureaucratic authorities for discussion of particular topics such as discussion of 
NREGA action plan and labour budget, and addition of names to voters lists. 
 In Ramgarh GP, a total of thirteen Gram Sabha meetings for its three constituent 
villages were held in 2008-09, as per GP records.  This means that the average number 
of meetings held in each village is 4.3, and therefore lower than Goutampur Colony GP. 
The records state that five meetings each were held in the constituent villages of 
Neenaur and Ramgarh, and three were held in the village of Bawdikheda.  
 
Extent of Attendance in Gram Sabha Meetings 
The average Gram Sabha meeting attendance of Goutampur Colony GP, calculated on 
the basis of attendance figures from GP records, is 18.7%. For Goutampur Colony 
village of this GP (which is the larger constituent village of this GP), the average 
attendance in the meetings held in 2008-09, however, was only 7.4%. Only one meeting 
in this village (with 63 out of its 602 voters attending) had an attendance figure that met 
the quorum. None of the other six meetings of Goutampur Colony village achieved the 
quorum, though only two meetings out of these were rescheduled because of low 
attendance. This shows that the legal provision of quorum is not applied strictly. For 
Kesalwada village of Goutampur Colony GP, the average attendance of 15 persons out 
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of the total voter strength of 50 (30%) is much higher than the quorum and is actually 
quite high. The average attendance figure of 18.7% for the whole GP is quite high, but 
can be significantly attributed to the disproportionately high attendance in Kesalwada 
village.  
 In Ramgarh GP, attendance records of Gram Sabha meetings are kept by the GP 
office, though their reliability is thrown into doubt when one considers villager survey 
responses. Ramgarh GP’s records for 2008-09 show that quorum was achieved in all the 
Gram Sabha meetings held in its three villages, with the average attendance in Ramgarh 
village being 10.64%, in Neenaur village being 12.8%, and in Bawdikheda village 
being 12.74%, respectively. The average attendance in Ramgarh GP (calculated on the 
basis of the available figures from the GP records) was 12.06%, thus lower than the 
average attendance of Goutampur Colony GP. The evidence from GP records however, 
has been checked with interview-based insights in order to assess reliability. While the 
survey responses do not precisely reveal the actual extent of attendance, they do provide 
valuable qualitative insights that help establish, or throw into doubt, the reliability of the 
figures from GP records. Therefore the author spoke to village residents in both GPs in 
order to obtain a better picture of the actual reality of Gram Sabha attendance in the two 
GPs.  
 A striking difference about the reality of Gram Sabha meetings between the two 
GPs emerges from the villager survey findings. One fourth of the villager survey 
respondents of Ramgarh GP claimed that Gram Sabha meetings are either not held in 
their village, or were last held more than five years back. No survey respondent of 
Goutampur Colony GP made such a claim. However, the claim that Gram Sabha 
meetings are not held at all in Ramgarh GP does not seem to be true, because two survey 
respondents in Ramgarh GP (one recent Gram Sabha attendee and one non-attendee, 
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both belonging to Ramgarh village) attested to the fact that meetings are indeed held in 
their village.55  A highly educated politician (belonging to the INC), who is a native of 
Bawdikheda village of Ramgarh GP, also confirmed that meetings are indeed held in 
Ramgarh GP, but with very low attendance (Author’s field interview, dated 5/04/2010). 
Reconciling the various villager survey and elite responses obtained from Ramgarh GP, 
the reality seems to be that meetings are held in this GP, though with extremely low 
people’s attendance and awareness. Very few people in Ramgarh GP even come to 
know that Gram Sabha meetings are being held, and it appears that the GP makes no 
effort to publicize these meetings and mobilize people’s attendance in them. Given the 
very low awareness among the people about Gram Sabha56
 In Goutampur Colony GP, on the other hand, awareness about the holding of 
Gram Sabha meetings is much higher, and people’s attendance in them is also 
appreciably higher.  This is corroborated by the author’s own observation of a Gram 
Sabha meeting in this GP (where the meeting room was completely filled with 
attendees),
 and when its meetings are 
held, actual attendance in its meetings appears to be very meagre and usually far below 
the quorum. The attendance figures given in the records of Ramgarh GP are therefore of 
questionable reliability.  
57  by the interview responses of several recent Gram Sabha meeting 
attendees,58
                                               
55Among the 16 villager survey respondents of Ramgarh GP, only three had ever attended Gram Sabha 
meetings. Out of these three, only one was a recent attendee, and the remaining two had attended more 
than five years back.  
 and by the fact that no respondent claimed that meetings are not held in 
their village. There is no apparent mismatch between the records given in the figures 
and data from other sources such as interviews and direct observation.  
56As many as five persons among the 16 villager survey respondents of Ramgarh GP had never heard of 
Gram Sabha. This is higher than the corresponding figures for all the four GPs covered in this study (two 
in West Bengal and two in Madhya Pradesh).  
57The author observed a Gram Sabha meeting in Goutampur Colony village during her fieldwork period, 
on 14th April 2010.  
58In Goutampur Colony GP, seven respondents out of 16 had ever attended Gram Sabha meetings, of 





Inclusiveness of Attendance in Gram Sabha Meetings 
As already seen in Chapters 3 and 4, inclusiveness of attendance refers to the extent that 
significant sections of the GP population show meaningful attendance in Gram Sabha 
meetings. In Madhya Pradesh GPs, where political party affiliation does not 
significantly affect GP functioning or people’s participation, socio-economic criteria 
such as gender and caste are relevant for assessing inclusiveness of Gram Sabha 
attendance.  
 The most obvious difference in the inclusiveness of attendance between 
Goutampur Colony GP and Ramgarh GP is with respect to the attendance of women. In 
the former, women make up a significant proportion of the attendees. This was seen by 
the author during her direct observation of a Gram Sabha meeting in this GP where 
there were several female attendees, of whom many were very vocal during the 
meeting. Furthermore, as many as five out of the seven villager survey respondents of 
this GP who had ever attended Gram Sabha meetings were women. Such high 
attendance by women can be attributed to the relatively more emancipated status of 
women in Goutampur Colony GP, and the absence of feudal social customs that 
mandate female seclusion.  
 The reality of female attendance in Ramgarh GP is quite different from that in 
Goutampur Colony GP. Out of the three villager survey respondents of this GP who had 
ever attended Gram Sabha meetings, only one was a woman.59
                                               
59This female attendee, in her survey interview, revealed a highly outspoken and assertive nature, 
standing in complete contrast to the usually very docile and diffident characteristics of women in this GP.  
This woman is a member of a Self Help Group, and works as an Anganwadi Kendra (childcare centre) 
cook . She belongs to the OBC community, which is relatively less affected by the customs of female 
seclusion compared to the other numerically significant community of this GP, the Rajputs. However 
 A highly educated 
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young politician belonging to INC, who is a native of Bawdikheda village of this GP, 
informed the author that women hardly attend Gram Sabha meetings of this GP because 
of the presence of feudal social customs (Author’s field interview, dated 5/04/2010). In 
fact, the prevalent social customs of this GP dictate that women, even if veiled, usually 
are not supposed to appear in front of males not belonging to their immediate family. 
One female villager survey respondent expressly told the author that purdah (the 
custom of female seclusion) is her reason for not attending Gram Sabha meetings 
(Author’s field interview with female, general category (Rajput) villager survey 
respondent of Ramgarh GP, dated 3/04/2010).  
 Apart from female attendance, the other parameter to judge inclusiveness of 
Gram Sabha attendance is attendance by the marginalized caste groups, SCs and STs. 
Goutampur Colony GP’s population is overwhelmingly dominated by the SCs and STs. 
Accordingly, as many as fifteen out of sixteen villagers in the villager survey sample 
were SC and ST, and all seven persons who ever attended Gram Sabha meetings also 
belonged to the SC and ST community. In Ramgarh GP, while there is no conclusive 
evidence of the actual extent of SC and ST attendance, it does appear that attendance of 
SCs and STs in Gram Sabha meetings is very low. Overall attendance by villagers is at 
a very low level in this GP, and it appears that such attendance is especially low among 
the SC and ST communities. None of the four SC and one ST respondents in the 
Ramgarh GP villager survey sample ever attended Gram Sabha meetings. Ramgarh GP 
has a sizeable Rajput population, and the influence of the dominant Rajput culture has 
created a very feudal social context.   
 The feudal social context reinforces inequalities in Ramgarh GP, and hinders the 
participation of women, and very likely also of the weaker sections such as SCs and 
                                                                                                                                       
Rajput influence has resulted in other caste groups such as the Scheduled Castes adopting feudal social 
customs such as female seclusion.  
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STs, in Gram Sabha meetings. The relatively egalitarian social context of Goutampur 
Colony GP, on the other hand, is responsible for higher attendance of SCs and STs and 
women in Gram Sabha meetings. Goutampur Colony GP, therefore, has much more 
inclusive Gram Sabha meeting attendance in comparison to Ramgarh GP.  
 
Inclusiveness of Gram Sabha Decision Making  
The Panchayat Law of Madhya Pradesh bestows Gram Sabha with the power to decide 
the list of specific ‘schemes’ or development projects, which define the work agenda of 
the GP (Government of Madhya Pradesh 2009a, Section 7). This list of schemes, which 
is ratified in Gram Sabha meetings, is considered the decision of the Gram Sabha. 
However in actual reality, it is not the body of Gram Sabha meeting attendees of both 
the chosen GPs that prepares the list of schemes. It is the GP (the general body of GP 
members) that actually prepares this list (as admitted by the Secretaries of both GPs), 
which is then ratified in the Gram Sabha meeting. The Secretaries of both GPs told the 
author that any additional proposal made by attendees during Gram Sabha meetings is, 
however, added to the list of schemes (Author’s telephonic interviews, dated 
11/06/2011).  
 There are certain limitations in the actual functioning of Gram Sabha itself in 
the chosen Madhya Pradesh GPs that act as obstacles to inclusive proposal making by 
attendees in these meetings. The attendance in Gram Sabha meetings is low in both the 
GPs, and especially low in Ramgarh GP. The non-attendance of the overwhelming 
majority of villagers means that most villagers are excluded from the process of 
expressing demands, especially so in Ramgarh GP.   
 The actual extent to which additional proposals are collected in Gram Sabha 
meetings of both GPs is also quite questionable. In Ramgarh GP, the Sarpanch and 
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Secretary dominate the Gram Sabha meeting proceedings and the making of proposals, 
as revealed by a Gram Sabha attendee of this GP (Author’s field interview with male, 
general category villager survey respondent of Ramgarh GP, dated 5/04/2010)  and a 
young INC politician who is a native of this GP (Author’s field interview, dated 
5/04/2010). The Gram Sabha minutes of Goutampur Colony GP do not show any 
record of any proposals made by the attendees (nor did the author see any scheme being 
proposed in the meeting she observed). In fact the meeting minutes of this GP show that 
the meetings are used mainly to dispense information about the rules of various 
government programmes, and sometimes to inform people about the amount of money 
received by the GP and the progress of work being done by it, rather than to collect 
proposals from the people. The Gram Sabha has become a mere forum to supply 
information. Its demand–side role is quite peripheral: for instance its meetings are used 
to add names to the voters’ list. 
  In both GPs, therefore, the body of GP members seem to be dominating the 
expression of demands for all the villages within them. While the Gram Sabha meetings 
of Goutampur Colony GP have higher attendance and more vocal expression by the 
attendees, the actual extent of Gram Sabha attendees’ role in decision making is 
negligible. Its higher Gram Sabha attendance is not leading to more inclusive decision 
making. Ramgarh GP also suffers from the problem of negligible role of Gram Sabha 
attendees in decision making. There is, therefore, no significant difference between 
both the GPs as far as the inclusiveness of decision making is concerned.   
 It was seen previously (Chapter 4) that in the GPs of West Bengal, too, it is not 
the attendees of the deliberative forum (Gram Sansad) who actually prepare the scheme 
list. The list in West Bengal GPs is prepared by the GUS, which is the executive 
committee of Gram Sansad, with additional proposals from villagers added during 
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Gram Sansad meetings. In Madhya Pradesh, the law provides for executive committees 
of the deliberative forum (Gram Sabha) known as Gram Vikas Samiti and Gram 
Nirman Samiti. However, in actual practice, these committees are non-functional in 
both GPs.60
  Given the shortcomings seen in the Gram Sabha meetings in the two Madhya 
Pradesh GPs, the absence of committees of Gram Sabha in them is aggravating the lack 
of inclusiveness in Gram Sabha decision making. An active committee of Gram Sabha 
for each village in both GPs could have probably assured more inclusive decision 
making (in comparison to centralized proposal list formulation by the GP). This would 
be especially true if such committees employed participatory mechanisms such as ward 
meetings or neighbourhood meetings to interact with the village residents and collect 
proposals from them.  
  
 
Extent of Scrutiny of GP Functioning in Gram Sabha Meetings 
While the Gram Sabha meetings of Goutampur Colony GP are playing a negligible 
decision making role, they are playing the role of exposing the GP to a degree of 
scrutiny, interrogation and criticism. These meetings are enabling people of Goutampur 
Colony GP to raise complaints and express grievances about matters related to GP 
governance.  
 The elements of excitement, shouting and criticism among attendees were very 
much present in the Gram Sabha meeting observed by the author in Goutampur Colony 
GP. The people freely sought explanations from the Secretary in the meeting, and the 
Secretary even answered their queries. In the observed meeting, one female attendee 
asked why her name had been dropped from the Atigaribi (extremely poor) list of 
                                               
60In Ramgarh GP, the Secretary informed that the two committees of Gram Sabha have been constituted 
but are non-functional; they don’t receive any money or do any work. In Goutampur Colony GP, the 
Secretary revealed that these committees don’t even exist.     
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persons, to which the Secretary replied that she no longer was eligible to be on the list 
because she had become a beneficiary of a government pension scheme. The 
demanding and rendering of such explanations makes for a modicum of transparency 
and helps demystify, to some extent, the procedural details of government programmes 
to villagers. Furthermore, the Secretary asked the attendees if they were satisfied with 
the provision of nutritious food at the Anganwadi Kendras located in the GP, in 
response to which some attending women raised complaints about the quality of food 
and the misappropriation of food by the woman in charge of distribution of meals.61
 In Ramgarh GP, in contrast, the Gram Sabha meetings are not functioning as 
forums of scrutiny, interrogation and criticism of GP functioning. The author learnt 
from a Gram Sabha meeting attendee that the only components of the meetings are 
signing of the attendance register by the attendees, and speeches by the Sarpanch 
(Author’s field interview with male, general category villager survey respondent of 
Ramgarh GP, dated 5/04/2010). The meetings are characterized by one-sided 
communication by the Sarpanch or Secretary, and devoid of inputs or expression by the 
few people who do attend. Furthermore, barring a handful of people, hardly any villager 
even comes to known when Gram Sabha meetings are being held; this insulates the GP 
from the scrutiny and criticism of almost the entire GP population.  
 
 
Overall Effectiveness of Deliberative Mechanism 
The above assessment of the functioning of Gram Sabha in the two GPs, shows that 
Goutampur Colony GP overall has a higher effectiveness of Gram Sabha as a 
deliberative mechanism. This is because of its superior situation with respect to four out 
of five indicators pertaining to the effectiveness of Gram Sabha. On the remaining 
                                               
61GPs are responsible in a broad sense for the proper functioning of Anganwadi Kendras and educational 
institutions within their area. They are, however, required to exercise regular supervision over these 
institutions to ensure their smooth functioning.  
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indicator of inclusiveness of Gram Sabha decision making, both GPs have no 
significant difference, because both of them exhibit domination of such decision 
making by the GP, and negligible role of Gram Sabha attendees in making proposals for 
works.  
  Goutampur Colony GP not only has a higher frequency of Gram Sabha 
meetings, but also has higher attendance in these meetings. Goutampur Colony GP also 
has much more inclusive attendance in these meetings, owing to a high degree of 
attendance by women and the SC and ST groups. The Gram Sabha meetings of 
Goutampur Colony GP also play a more effective role of scrutiny of GP functioning 
compared to those in Ramgarh GP. Ramgarh GP, in contrast, is characterized by poor 
functioning of Gram Sabha because of meagre attendance. The most glaring defect of 
Gram Sabha meetings in this GP is that most villagers do not come to know about the 
existence of Gram Sabha or the occurrence of its meetings.  Among the very few who 
do attend, the presence of women and SCs and STs is low. The meetings are 
characterized by one-sided communication by the Sarpanch and Secretary, and 
minimal input and interrogation by the villager attendees. In summary, the Gram Sabha 
meetings of Goutampur Colony GP (while not involving attendees in  decision making) 
exercise higher accountability or popular control than those of Ramgarh GP, because 
they involve a much wider section of villagers, who are at least able to subject the GP 
Sarpanch and Secretary to interrogation and scrutiny.  
 
Gram Sabha Meetings: True Forums of Deliberative Democracy? 
It was seen in the above account that Gram Sabha meetings are relatively more 
effective as a deliberative mechanism in Goutampur Colony GP than in Ramgarh GP. 
However, it must be noted that the deliberative role of these meetings is rather minimal; 
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even in Goutampur Colony GP, such role pertains only to information dissemination 
and a degree of interrogation and criticism of GP functioning by villagers. There are 
significant shortcomings present in the functioning of Gram Sabha in the Madhya 
Pradesh GPs, which prevents them from emerging as true forums of deliberative 
democracy. Due to the failure to establish deliberative democracy, accountability or 
popular control remains limited. This section assesses Gram Sabha meetings in the two 
Madhya Pradesh GPs according to Cohen’s (1997) criteria of ideal deliberative 
procedure.  
 One yardstick of Cohen’s deliberative procedure is that the participants of 
deliberation should themselves choose the agenda of deliberation. However, in actual 
practice, the agenda of Gram Sabha meetings in Madhya Pradesh GPs is, as observed in 
the meeting minutes registers, pre-decided and fixed by the upper levels of the 
government i.e. the state government or the block/district administration. The agenda of 
the Gram Sabha meeting in Goutampur Colony GP (observed by this researcher on 
14/04/2010) was also fixed and very lengthy, and with 23 points seemed like a shopping 
list with items to be ticked off. In any event, such a lengthy agenda is hardly conducive 
to meaningful discussion on individual items. 
 Rational debate—the proposing of alternative solutions backed by reasons—is 
an element absent in the Gram Sabha meetings of the chosen Madhya Pradesh GPs. As 
already seen, the Gram Sabha meetings are used mainly for information dissemination 
(Goutampur Colony GP) or characterized by one-way communication by the GP 
Sarpanch or Secretary to a very small audience (Ramgarh GP).  Goutampur Colony GP 
is in a relatively better position than Ramgarh GP as far as expression and participation 
by attendees is concerned. Nevertheless, an absence of rational debate is evident in the 
chaotic meeting proceedings of the Gram Sabha meetings of Goutampur Colony GP. 
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Such absence of an orderly and rational approach was evident in the Gram Sabha 
meeting of Goutampur Colony village of Goutampur Colony GP, observed by the 
author on 14th April 2010. An account of a portion of the proceedings is presented 
below: 
The GP Secretary, who was conducting the meeting’s proceedings, informed the 
attendees that the government programme known as Nal Jal Yojana (tap water 
programme) would become operational from the end of the month. He said that 
keeping in mind the villagers’ complaints regarding water shortage, he would, 
subject to the villagers’ agreement, be framing a resolution stating that all the 
villagers were ready to pay the required amount of money needed for individual 
tap connections. He asked if the villagers were ready to pay and take the 
connections. There was no coherent reply to the Secretary’s query from the 
attending villagers. On being asked by the Secretary again, one female villager 
commented that she couldn’t pay, and suggested that it would be better if a few 
common pipes were installed in the village in place of individual connections. In 
the absence of any clear answer from the body of present villagers, it in unknown 
what resolution the Secretary noted down for this topic.  
There were noisy and chaotic scenes when the topic of BPL list was 
introduced by the Secretary.  The Secretary told the attendees that Gram Sabha 
had the power to recommend deletion of names from the BPL list but the Gram 
Sabha is not exercising this power, even though villagers always blame the 
Secretary for undeserving persons being on the list. The Secretary read out the 
names of all the persons on the BPL list (87 names) and Atigaribi (extremely 
poor) list (25 names) and asked for recommendation of deletions. Two Panchas 
present at the meeting proposed that the names of all persons owning land should 
be deleted, to which one lady Panch (who professed being BPL and a land title 
holder) objected. The scene became disorderly when attendees stood up and 
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crowded around the Secretary’s desk. The Sarpanch and some villager attendees 
suggested that the Gram Sabha should recommend names for addition before 
recommending names for deletion, a view that the Secretary turned down. 
Finally, in the absence of any coherent viewpoint in the meeting, the Secretary 
announced his decision that names would neither be added to, nor deleted from 
the BPL list, and any person wishing to add his name had to go directly to the 
tehsildar (a bureaucratic revenue functionary). Some present villagers listed, on 
a piece of paper, their individual names for addition to the BPL list and tried to 
give them to the Secretary, but the Secretary sent them back and  again told them 
to go to the tehsildar. 
The author observed that there was no systematic decision making system in 
place in the meeting. In fact, no clear collective resolution was seen being reached in the 
meeting, though there was scope for decisions on at least two issues: the BPL names 
deletion issue and the water connection issue. This can be blamed partly on the way the 
meeting was conducted. There was no counting of hands, or attempt to systematically 
identify people in favour of or against particular courses of action, or any attempt to 
generate consensus through rational debate. However, the inability to reach decisions 
must partly be attributed to the body of villagers as well: their lack of any unified 
organized viewpoint, and their unwillingness to take responsibility on issues such as 
bearing the cost of individual pipelines (or alternatively coherently indicating their 
unwillingness to do so), or identifying undeserving persons in the BPL list, are also 
significantly responsible for the failure to reach decisions. The Secretary thus ends up 
being the final arbiter on the issues in the absence of any coherent viewpoint from the 
attending villagers. There is an evident need for conscientization of villagers to make 
them more capable of rational debate and collective action, and also for the adoption of 
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meeting procedures that are more conducive to rational debate and systematic decision 
making.  
Cohen’s ideal deliberative procedure includes parameters such as procedural 
and substantive equality of participants.  One indicator of procedural equality (i.e. the 
equal rights of participants at all stages of deliberative process) would be the extent of 
freedom of speech in Gram Sabha meetings. On the positive side, most Gram Sabha 
meeting attendees that this author spoke to perceive that there is freedom of speech. 
Five of the seven attendees among the sixteen villager survey repondents in Goutampur 
Colony GP believed that there is freedom for everyone to speak in the meetings. Two 
out of three attendees among the sixteen villager survey respondents of Ramgarh GP 
have recollection of their participation experience, and both these attendees said that 
there is freedom for attendees to speak in the meetings. The author herself has observed 
that the elements of criticism, contention and questioning are very much present in the 
Gram Sabha meeting of Goutampur Colony GP. There appears to be no coercive barrier 
on attending villagers speaking in such meetings. Nevertheless, procedural equality is 
highly constrained; because what is expressed by the attendees is not given much 
importance by the persons conducted the meeting.  One Gram Sabha attendee in 
Goutampur Colony GP expressed that she did not believe that there was any freedom to 
speak in Gram Sabha, because the Sarpanch does not listen to or give importance to 
attendees’ proposals (Author’s field interview with female, general category villager 
survey respondent of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 22/03/2010). One of the Ramgarh 
GP Gram Sabha meeting attendees complained that meetings are ‘useless’ and in 
practice, the only speaking in the meetings is done by the Sarpanch (Author’s field 




In Goutampur Colony GP, as many as five out of the seven Gram Sabha 
attendees in the villager sample stated that they have spoken in the meetings. The 
interesting thing to note is the recalled content of what the attendees said: contrary to 
expectation, most of them (including the non-affluent attendees) did not present their 
personal demands for benefits of social security schemes, but spoke of general matters 
such as water logging and the progress of development works in the village. One 
attendee who did not speak felt that proposals made by attendees are “thrown in the 
dustbin” (Author’s field interview with female, general category villager survey 
respondent of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 22/03/2010). In Ramgarh GP, only one 
attendee among the three attendees remembers having spoken in Gram Sabha meetings 
(she attended more than five years back), and she presented a personal demand for an 
IAY house (Author’s field interview with female, OBC villager survey respondent, 
dated 3/04/2010).  
The yardstick of substantive equality defines that the outcomes of deliberation 
must not be influenced by wealth or power. Attendance by the poor or marginalized 
groups is not a problem, at least in Goutampur Colony GP. Several poor people, people 
from the SCST communities and women attend Gram Sabha meetings, as evident from 
the author’s own observation and the villager survey responses. Ramgarh GP, however, 
has the problem of very low levels of attendance in general, and low inclusiveness of 
attendance in particular, especially of women and SCSTs. Unlike in West Bengal GPs, 
party affliation is not a determinant of attendance and does not affect its inclusiveness. 
The Goutampur Colony villager sample had two party members (one from INC and one 
from BJP) but none of them attend Gram Sabha meetings. The Ramgarh sample had 
one party member (belonging to the BJP) but this subject does not attend. 
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 There is a linkage between organizational affiliation and attendance, as in West 
Bengal.  There were three SHG members in the sample of Goutampur Colony GP, and 
two out of these three attended Gram Sabha meetings. There was one SHG member in 
the sample of Ramgarh GP and she has attended Gram Sabha meetings. One attendee in 
Goutampur Colony GP attended by virtue of being a member of the Vigilance and 
Monitoring Commmittee for NREGA Social Audit, while an attendee in Ramgarh GP 
had attended in the past by virtue of being a member of Nyay Panchayat (rural judicial 
body). While there is an apparent association between organizational affiliation and 
attendance in Gram Sabha meetings, it must be noted that people not affiliated to 
organizations also attend Gram Sabha meetings (as seen in both GPs), and speak in 
Gram Sabha meetings (as seen in Goutampur Collony GP). Organizational affiliation 
does not appear to be a serious constraint on substantive equality in the Gram Sabha 
meetings of Madhya Pradesh GPs.   
The final criterion of substantive equality is whether the decisions of the 
deliberative forum are free of the influence of wealth or power. This important criterion 
of deliberative democracy is unfortunately not fulfilled in Gram Sabha meetings of both 
GPs, because as already seen, the so-called decision of the Gram Sabha in both GPs is 
mostly the decision of the GP itself, passed on to villagers as ‘information’ in Gram 
Sabha meetings. The villager attendees have hardly any role to play in decision making,  
and are reduced to recipients of information.  
It can thus be seen that Gram Sabha meetings in Madhya Pradesh GPs have 
serious shortcomings which prevent their emergence as true forums of deliberative 
democracy. This failure is all the more glaring, because Madhya Pradesh’s Panchayat 
Law has vested all decision making powers pertaining to village governance in the 
Gram Sabha. The Gram Swaraj system was expected to galvanize Gram Sabhas and 
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make them vibrant forums of direct democracy at the grassroots. There is evidently, a 
huge gap between the ideal of Gram Swaraj as envisaged by the law, and the actual 
functioning of Gram Sabha.    
 
The Monitoring Dimension of Accountability 
In Madhya Pradesh, the term ‘Social Audit’ as used in Panchayat governance refers to 
not only the institutionalized monitoring process under NREGA but also the popular 
audit of GP functioning with respect to the various other programmes that it 
implements.62
 The government rules state that Social Audit is to be conducted whenever the 
state or district administration asks for it to be conducted (Government of Madhya 
Pradesh 2010). The Madhya Pradesh NREGA rules envisage the role of two bodies at 
the GP level in carrying out Social Audit—the Vigilance and Monitoring Committee 
(VMC) and the Gram Sabha. The VMC, consisting of six villager representatives, is 
supposed to be constituted in the Gram Sabha meeting (Mahatma Gandhi State Institute 
of Rural Development 2010). The duty of the VMC is to monitor the progress and 
quality of NREGA works. It is supposed to submit a report on completed NREGA 
works to the Gram Sabha. In addition to this, the Sarpanch of the GP also has to present 
to the Gram Sabha the complete details of NREGA funds obtained by the GP, and also 
details of the completed and in-progress works such as date of approval of the work, the 
amount of funds spent till date, the physical progress of the construction work, etc. The 
Gram Sabha can either indicate its approval of what is presented to it, or express its 
 However, it is only the NREGA Social Audit process that is clearly 
defined and institutionalized. ‘Social Audit’ as evaluated in this section refers only to 
the NREGA Social Audit.  
                                               
62The government rules state that work done under employment generation programmes, beneficiary 
oriented programmes and other general work done by the GP shall all be evaluated under social audit 
(Government of Madhya Pradesh 2010). 
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disapproval about the GP’s work; in case of the latter it can convey a complaint to the 
state administration (Government of Madhya Pradesh 2010). The Social Audit 
procedure of Madhya Pradesh, like that of West Bengal, therefore shows a combination 
of top down and participatory elements.  
 The Social Audit rules of Madhya Pradesh provide for redress mechanisms to 
deal with objections raised by Gram Sabha in the aftermath of Social Audit. On 
receiving a complaint from the Gram Sabha, the bureaucratic functionary of the state 
government known as the Sub-divisional Officer may convene a janch samiti 
(investigation committee) to examine the complaints. This committee, after 
investigation, is required to submit a report to the Sub-divisional Officer, which is then 
presented in the next Gram Sabha meeting. The Gram Sabha may, on the basis of the 
obtained report, choose to ask the Sub-divisional Officer to institute punitive measures 
against any identified guilty party (Government of Madhya Pradesh 2010).  
 The above account briefly describes the legal or institutional features of 
NREGA Social Audit. The actual functioning of Social Audit in the two chosen 
Madhya Pradesh GPs is evaluated below, with respect to the indicators specified in 
Chapter 3. Table 10 presents a summary of the actual functioning of Social Audit in the 
two chosen GPs. 
 
Frequency of Social Audit 
The data from the NREGA web site shows that only one NREGA Social Audit (in the 
sense of the elaborate institutionalized procedure described above) had been conducted 
in the 2009-10 financial year in each of the two GPs.63
                                               
63The earliest available data for NREGA Social Audits in Madhya Pradesh is for the year 2009-10. Before 
this, Social Audits were held, but in a rudimentary sense involving the mere sharing of information about 
NREGA works with Gram Sabha, rather than the more elaborate procedures involved in its current form. 
  Goutampur Colony GP’s Social 
Audit was held from 15-23rd August 2009, and Ramgarh GP’s Social Audit was held 
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31st July to 15th August 2009, as per the NREGA website (Government of India 
2009-10b). Mere presentation of information related to NREGA works was, however, 
seen as a frequent item in the minutes of Gram Sabha meetings of both GPs. 
 
Table 10: The Monitoring Dimension of Accountability: Functioning of Social 
Audit in the Madhya Pradesh GPs (2009-10)  
Indicator 
Gram Panchayat 
Goutampur   Colony GP Ramgarh GP 
Frequency  One Social Audit conducted. One Social Audit conducted. 
Extent of popular 
involvement  
GP staff member (Secretary) 
actually prepares Social Audit 
report due to lack of capacity of 
VMC. 
 
Gram Sabha involvement seen 
as accepted requirement. 
 
Credible evidence about actual 
Gram Sabha role in Social 
Audit.  
VMC only carries out casual, 




Gram Sabha involvement seen 
as accepted requirement. 
 
Absence of credible evidence 
about actual Gram Sabha role 
in Social Audit. 
 
Raising of issues 
and exposure of 
grievances 
Queries were raised with 
respect to four NREGA works. 
Documents pertaining to these 
four works were examined but 
no complaints made. 
 
No evidence of issues raised, 
documents examined or 
complaints made.  
Perceived 
effectiveness 
(according to GP 
staff) 
Social Audit being done 
properly, but not really relevant 
because there is anyway full 
transparency and absence of 
irregularities in the GP. 
 
Social Audit is leading to 
exposure of irregularities and 
questioning by villagers.  
 
Source: Data obtained from Social Audit pages of NREGA website (Government of 
India 2009-10b), Gram Sabha meeting minutes of the two GPs, and interviews with GP 
Secretaries 
 
Extent of Popular Involvement in Social Audit 
The VMC, which is a committee of village residents, has an important role to play in the 
conduct of Social Audit, as per government rules.  The GP and Gram Sabha meeting 
minutes of both selected GPs mention the constitution of the VMC, along with the 
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names of the members. VMC members of Goutampur Colony GP, however, find their 
task challenging because of not being aware of their responsibilities and powers, as 
stated in the GP meeting minutes of this GP (Minutes of GP general body meeting dated 
23/07/2009). The Secretary of Goutampur Colony GP also said that the onus of 
preparing the Social Audit report falls on him, because the VMC members don’t 
understand the technical details of NREGA implementation and are ill-equipped to 
perform the task of Social Audit (Author’s field interview, dated 7/04/2010).  The VMC 
members of Ramgarh GP, too, are not carrying out monitoring in a sustained way, 
though they do make keep a watch on execution work now and then, and convey their 
suggestions for improvement to the GP (Author’s telephonic interview with Secretary 
of Ramgarh GP, dated 11/06/2011).  
 The availability of an external monitoring body (VMC) that has villager 
representatives indeed has positive prospects for vigilant monitoring of NREGA works 
being done by the GP. The evidence of actual VMC functioning from the two GPs 
however suggests that VMCs are not being able to perform the task of monitoring in an 
effective or sustained way.  
 Apart from the VMC, the other component of villager involvement in the Social 
Audit process is the role of a popular assembly (the Gram Sabha, as per Madhya 
Pradesh’s NREGA rules). In fact, the latter is a superior means of popular involvement 
since it can involve villagers en masse, unlike the VMC. In the GPs of Madhya Pradesh, 
Gram Sabha involvement in Social Audit appears to be an accepted requirement. This 
is apparent from the Gram Sabha meeting minutes for both the GPs, which show Social 
Audit as a regular item on the agenda of meetings.  
 The NREGA website shows credible evidence about actual Gram Sabha 
involvement in Social Audit in Goutampur Colony GP. The website has a record of the 
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minutes of the Gram Sabha meeting held for the purpose of conducting Social Audit in 
Goutampur Colony GP, containing details such as the date of the meeting (22nd August 
2009), and names of the present nodal officer (observer) sent by the government, the GP 
Secretary and VMC representative. These minutes also mention the presence of 43 
villager attendees at the Gram Sabha meeting held in Goutampur Colony GP for 
conducting Social Audit (Government of India 2009-10b). There is no record, in the 
NREGA website, of the Gram Sabha meeting held for conducting Social Audit in 
Ramgarh GP. There is no mention of the date, the persons present at the meeting or any 
other detail about such meeting. In the absence of such credible evidence, it cannot be 
inferred that such a meeting was indeed held in Ramgarh GP.  
 
Raising of Issues and Exposure of Grievances 
The NREGA website states that in Goutampur Colony GP, the Social Audit process 
demanded scrutiny of four NREGA works in progress during that period, and as a result 
documents pertaining to these four works such as some job cards, muster rolls, cash 
books, employment registers etc. were examined (Government of India 2009-10b). No 
discrepancies were found in these documents, and no complaints or grievances were 
expressed. No information about the queries or issues raised, documents examined and 
grievances expressed in the Social Audit of Ramgarh GP was available in the NREGA 
website.  
 
Perceived Effectiveness of Social Audit  
The Secretary of Goutampur Colony GP, when asked about the effectiveness of Social 
Audit in his GP, said that there was anyway full transparency in his GP, with no 
procedural irregularities and nothing to hide, because of which Social Audit was 
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actually unnecessary. Nevertheless, the Secretary expressed that the Social Audit 
procedure was properly conducted in his GP, with complete information being 
presented before villagers, and the villagers also raising questions for the Sarpanch and 
Secretary to answer (Author’s field interview, dated 17/03/2010).  
  The Secretary of Ramgarh GP perceived that Social Audit in his GP was 
leading to some irregularities and problems being exposed (for example revealing that 
some villagers’ NREGA job cards were not yet made). He also mentioned that villagers 
sometimes questioned the income-expenditure statement. The Secretary perceived that 
Social Audit was leading to benefits for the villagers (Author’s telephonic interview, 
dated 27/01/2011). The Secretary’s response does not, however, fit in with the data 
obtained from the NREGA website.  
 
Overall Effectiveness of Monitoring Mechanism 
Both Goutampur Colony GP and Ramgarh GP have conducted the same number of 
Social Audits (just one), both their VMCs are not adequately performing their task, and 
both their Secretaries have positive perceptions about the effectiveness of Social Audit 
in their GP. However, balancing the cumulative evidence on various indicators 
examined above indicates that Goutampur Colony GP has relatively higher 
effectiveness of its Social Audit process. This is because there is credible evidence of 
some mass role (through Gram Sabha involvement) in Social Audit, queries being 
raised and documents being examined because of Social Audit in this GP.  The absence 
of such evidence for Ramgarh GP implies that Goutampur Colony GP is conducting 




Popular Monitoring in the two GPs: More Insights 
Apart from the popular monitoring activities taken up in the institutionalized 
mechanisms such as Social Audit, popular monitoring also exists in other forms. One 
such form is villagers asking questions to their elected representatives or the Secretary, 
not only in Gram Sabha meetings but also in informal settings. Visits to GP office to ask 
questions is seldom seen in both GPs; in both of them, it was seen that the GP office 
remains closed, only opening for special occasions such as Gram Sabha and GP 
meetings, and the office work of the GP is done in the Secretary’s residence or in the 
Block office. 
As many as ten villager respondents (out of sixteen) in Goutampur Colony GP 
stated that they had asked questions to their elected representatives. In Ramgarh GP 
eight out of sixteen villagers interviewed said that they had asked questions to their 
elected representatives. The villager survey responses do not show any significant 
difference in this respect between the two GPs, and indicates that many people question 
their elected representatives, even in the highly feudal and backward Ramgarh GP. The 
questions asked by the respondents in both GPs, however, were mostly queries about 
beneficiary-oriented development schemes, though one female respondent of 
Goutampur Colony GP, who described herself as the pol-kholna (unmasking or 
exposing) type, questioned a representative about water logging of village roads 
(Author’s field interview with female SC villager survey respondent of Goutampur 
Colony GP, dated 21/03/2010). One interesting response came from a villager 
respondent in Ramgarh GP who stated that when he enquired about a welfare 
programme he wished to be a beneficiary of, the elected representative in turn asked 
him whether he had voted for him in the past GP elections (Author’s field interview 
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with male, general category villager survey respondent of Ramgarh GP, dated 
5/04/2010).  
This researcher endeavoured to find out the villager survey respondents’ 
perception of people’s ability to monitor their representatives. The question asked was: 
“Can people of this area keep a watch on their representatives?” In Goutampur Colony 
GP, nine subjects expressed their belief that people of their GP can keep watch on their 
elected representatives, five subjects expressed a contrary view, one subject stated that 
the people can keep ‘partial watch’, while one expressed no opinion. In Ramgarh GP 
eight subjects stated that people can keep watch, four stated that they cannot, one 
expressed that only those who attend Gram Sabha have information and can keep 
watch, and three subjects stated that they have no opinion.  
Unlike the West Bengal study, where there were significant differences between 
the two GPs with respect to responses to this question (the more socio-economically 
backward but electorally competitive GP had a noticeably lower proportion of subjects 
who believed that villagers could keep watch), there seems to be no significant 
difference between the two Madhya Pradesh GPs with respect to responses to this 
question. Furthermore, the proportion of respondents in both the Madhya Pradesh GPs 
who believe that people can monitor their representatives is higher than the proportion 
of respondents who believe the same in both the West Bengal GPs.64
No definitive conclusion about the experiences and perceptions of the entire GP 
populations for the selected GPs in both states can be made because of the sampling 
limitations. The reasons affecting people’s ability to monitor; and their perception of 
such ability are also complex and difficult to infer. However, one possible reason for the 
  
                                               
64 It can be recalled  that among the West Bengal GPs, Debipur GP had a higher proportion of people who 
believed that people could keep a watch. Six respondents in this GP believed that people could keep a 
watch. In the two Madhya Pradesh GPs, the number of respondents who belived that people can keep a 
watch are nine (Goutampur Colony GP) and eight (Ramgarh GP).  
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observed trends in the Madhya Pradesh villager survey responses could be the high 
accessibility in Madhya Pradesh GPs. The Madhya Pradesh GPs have a much smaller 
ratio of representation for elected representatives, along with much smaller size of 
villages and GPs. This makes for greater accessibility and visibility of elected 
representatives. Even if not attending Gram Sabha meetings, villagers can still easily 
meet and talk to their representatives, and many of them thus believe that they are able 
to keep watch on them. The West Bengal GPs are much larger and the ratio of 
representation is much higher, and means of communication and transportation within 
GPs are quite underdeveloped, which might be reasons why few people believe that 
they can keep a watch on the activities of the GP.  
Lack of education had been identified as one of the possible determinants of 
people’s ability to monitor in West Bengal GPs. The incidence of illiteracy, especially 
female illiteracy is quite high on the samples of both the Madhya Pradesh GPs.65
                                               
65 There were eight illiterate respondents in the Goutampur Colony GP sample, of which six were 
women. There were six illiterate respondents in the Ramgarh GP sample, of which five were women.  
  In 
spite of this, perceived levels of ability to monitor are quite high in Madhya Pradesh 
GPs. None of the respondents in both Madhya Pradesh GPs mention education as a 
factor linked to ability to monitor. Only one subject mentions lack of consciousness as a 
factor - one subject in the Goutampur Colony GP sample (who is a former teacher), 
mentions the lack of consciousness as the reason for low ability of people to monitor 
(Author’s field interview with male, SC villager survey respondent of Goutampur 
Colony GP, dated 21/03/2010). One respondent in Goutampur Colony GP however 
reveals a demand or desire to monitor, by commenting that “One has to be aware of 
what is going on” (Author’s field interview with male, ST villager survey respondent of 
Goutampur Colony GP, dated 22/03/2010).  Two persons in Ramgarh GP mention the 
demand side factors of the lack of time because of being busy with livelihood (Author’s 
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field interviews with male, SC and male, general category villager survey respondents 
of Ramgarh GP, dated 5/04/2010).  
The supply-side factor of information availability figures quite prominently in 
the survey responses of the Madhya Pradesh GPs. Five respondents in Goutampur 
Colony GP link ability (or inability) to monitor to the availability of information. Three 
of these five respondents believe that there is a lack of information; one of them stated 
that the Sarpanch doesn’t share information with villagers (Author’s field interview 
with female, ST villager survey respondent of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 
23/03/2010). One respondent in Goutampur Colony GP links ability to monitor partially 
to lack of full information availability (Author’s field interview with male, SC villager 
survey respondent of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 21/03/2010) while one mentions 
that people can keep watch because there is information available (Author’s field 
interview with female, ST villager survey respondent of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 
23/03/2010). Four respondents in Ramgarh GP link their responses to the availability of 
information. Two of them explicitly mention that information is available; one states 
that information is not available, while the remaining respondent states that those who 
attend Gram Sabha meetings have information (Author’s field interview with female, 
ST villager survey respondent of Ramgarh GP, dated 3/04/2010). Gram Sabha 
attendance is mentioned by one respondent each in Goutampur Colony GP and 
Ramgarh GP as being a basis of ability to monitor. The predominantly information 
supplying role of Gram Sabhas in Madhya Pradesh is relevant in this respect; one good 
thing about Gram Sabha meetings is that they are giving people some information about 




Spatial factors are also mentioned: for example one Goutampur Colony GP 
respondent mentioned that he cannot keep watch on the Sarpanch because the latter is 
from a different village (Author’s field interview with male, ST villager survey 
respondent of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 23/03/2010), and one subject from 
Ramgarh GP mentions that he can keep watch on the Up-sarpanch because he is from 
the same village as himself (Author’s field interview with male, SC villager survey 
respondent of Ramgarh GP, dated 5/04/2010). Two Goutampur Colony GP respondents 
mention that monitoring is possible because of the close-knit nature of the rural 
community; they say that people in the village know each other (including their 
representatives) well, and can thus keep watch on their representatives (Author’s field 
interview with male, ST villager survey respondent of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 
22/03/2010 and with female, ST villager survey respondent of Goutampur Colony GP, 
dated 23/03/2010).  
The factors determining the ability to monitor, and the perception of such 
ability, are complex and difficult to generalize. The Madhya Pradesh villagers seem to 
link it mainly to basic information availability and greater visibility which comes from 
spatial factors--such as small-sized villages, close-knit rural community, and whether 
they and their leaders (such as Sarpanch and Up-sarpanch) belong to the same 
village--without necessarily expecting to scrutinize intensely the decision making 
considerations and behaviour of the GP and its members. This might be a possible 
reason why education and consciousness levels do not emerge as prominent 
determinants of the perception of people’s ability to monitor from survey responses in 




Indirect Accountability: Accountability of GP Staff  
Madhya Pradesh’s Panchayat law allows GPs to have two categories of staff members: 
the Sachiv or Secretary, and additional staff members, if required. The Secretary was 
found to be the sole staff member in both the GPs chosen for this study. The Secretary is 
a local resident chosen by the GP, and his appointment has to be approved by the Gram 
Sabha (Government of Madhya Pradesh 2002, 105). This appointment, however, is also 
subject to approval by the Zila Panchayat.  
 Staff members of local councils, in most local government systems, are only 
indirectly accountable to the people; they are accountable to elected representatives, 
who in turn are directly accountable to the people. Madhya Pradesh’s Panchayat law is 
unique since it also provides for direct accountability of GP staff members to the Gram 
Sabha (Government of Madhya Pradesh 2009a, Section 6-B). The law, however, does 
not specify the mechanisms of Gram Sabha control over the Secretary, making it 
difficult to assess the extent of such control. However, it has already been seen in this 
chapter that the Secretary can be subjected to interrogation by villagers in the 
deliberative forum of Gram Sabha, as seen with respect to Goutampur Colony GP.  
 In addition to providing for the direct accountability of the Secretary to the 
Gram Sabha, the law also lays down indirect accountability of this functionary to the 
GP and its Sarpanch. Such indirect accountability is the focus of this section. Indirect 
accountability here refers to the effectiveness of formal mechanisms of control of 
elected representatives over the GP Secretary. Three dimensions of sanctioning, 
monitoring and decision making control of the GP elected representatives over the 





The GP and its Sarpanch have not been given any power of sanctioning over the 
Secretary, as per the law. Such powers have been given to the Sub-Divisional 
Magistrate, a bureaucratic functionary of the state administration. The Zila Panchayat 
has also been given power to initiate disciplinary action against the Secretary, though 
the actual proceedings of the disciplinary action are conducted by the Sub-Divisional 
Magistrate (Author’s telephonic interview with Secretary of Goutampur Colony GP, 
dated 16/03/2011).  
 Due to the absence of formal sanctioning mechanisms, both the GPs in Madhya 
Pradesh lack the possibility of formal sanctioning of the Secretary by the elected 
representatives. There is, therefore, no variation between Goutampur Colony GP and 
Ramgarh GP with respect to the sanctioning dimension of indirect accountability.  
 
Monitoring Dimension 
As far as the monitoring dimension is concerned, the Sarpanch of the GP has been 
given the power to inspect and supervise the work being done by the Secretary to ensure 
that the paperwork of the GP is done properly (Government of Madhya Pradesh 2010). 
The provision of writing performance reports is not relevant to Madhya Pradesh GPs, as 
Secretaries are chosen locally and assigned to  a single GP, and are therefore not subject 
to promotion or transfer. 66
 Even with respect to the general powers of supervision that the Sarpanch 
possesses with respect to the Secretary, it appears that the common situation in both 
 The Sarpanch therefore only has general powers of 
supervision over the Secretary, given that there is no specific institutionalized 
mechanism available for him/her to evaluate the performance of the Secretary.  
                                               
66This information is correct with respect to the fieldwork period (February-April 2010).  
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GPs is that the Sarpanch is unable to exercise effective supervision of this kind. This is 
because of the information and knowledge asymmetry between the Sarpanch and the 
Secretary. In both GPs, the Sarpanchas face the problem of inadequate comprehension 
of administrative tasks (such as budget preparation), as revealed by the Secretaries of 
the two GPs (Author’s field interviews, with Secretaries of Ramgarh GP and 
Goutampur Colony GP, dated 30/03/2010 and 17/03/2010 respectively). Therefore, it is 
unlikely that they are able to exercise effective supervision over the execution of such 
tasks by the Secretaries. On the monitoring dimension of indirect accountability, too, 
there is no noticeable variation between the two GPs. 
 
Decision Making Control 
The third dimension of indirect accountability of GP Secretaries is the decision making 
control of the Sarpanch and the GP’s body of elected representatives over the Secretary. 
If Secretaries were legally placed under the administrative control of the GP and/or its 
Sarpanch, then there would obviously be a high degree of decision making control of 
the former over the latter, since the Secretary would be bound to follow the decisions or 
orders of the GP and/or the Sarpanch.  GP Secretaries in Madhya Pradesh, however, 
have been placed under the administrative control of the CEO (JP), the Chief Executive 
Officer of the Janpad Panchayat (block-level Panchayat)67
                                               
67The Chief Executive Officer of Janpad Panchayat is the bureaucratic functionary who is the chief staff 
member of the Janpad Panchayat. 
 and not of the GP or the 
Sarpanch, as per the law (Government of Madhya Pradesh 2009b, Rule 6). This means 
that the administrative orders of the Sarpanch are not always binding on the Secretary. 
The government rules further clarify the administrative accountability of the Secretary 
to the CEO (JP) by stating that “non-compliance of the valid directions given by the 
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Chief Executive Officer shall amount to misconduct  in the discharge of his duties” 
(Government of Madhya Pradesh 2009b, Rule 6).  
 With respect to decision making control, the common situation in both GPs is 
that the Secretaries execute the decisions of the GP, though such decisions are not 
necessarily binding on the Secretary. The legal provisions imply that the orders of the 
CEO (JP) would have precedence over the orders of the Sarpanch and/or the GP, in the 
event of a clash between the two.  
 On the one hand, the Secretary of Madhya Pradesh GPs is accountable (in 
general terms) to the Sarpanch, and on the other hand he is under the control of the 
higher-level authorities. The mechanisms of accountability to the Sarpanch, however, 
have not been specified in the law or rules. This makes the actual nature of such 
accountability very unclear in the law and in actual practice, and therefore reduces its 
effectiveness. 
 The Secretary has been assigned with the responsibility of ensuring the 
preservation of laws and rules. Even though he is accountable (in principle) to the GP, 
his responsibility to preserve rules is most fundamental. In fact it is his duty, under the 
rules, to promptly inform the CEO (JP) when any decision or order of the GP/Sarpanch 
is in violation of the law or any rule or government order (Government of Madhya 
Pradesh 2009b, Rule 3). This provision, together with the administrative control of the 
CEO (JP) on the Secretary, and the disciplinary control of higher bureaucratic 
authorities such as the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, resolves the ambiguity in the 
accountability of the Secretary, by tilting the balance decisively in favour of 
accountability to the higher level bureaucratic personnel. This happens in spite of the 
fact that the Secretary is chosen by the GP in Madhya Pradesh.  
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 The interview responses of the Secretaries of both chosen GPs indicate that they 
themselves give more importance to their accountability to the bureaucracy at the 
higher levels, compared to their accountability to the GP’s elected members. The 
Goutampur Colony GP Secretary said that he did not experience any accountability 
conflict because the Sarpanch and Panchas of his GP don’t really pressurize him to 
violate rules, and even if they ever do, he is very clear in his mind that he will not violate 
rules in any event (Author’s field interview, dated 17/03/2010). The Ramgarh GP 
Secretary revealed that elected representatives sometimes make demands inconsistent 
with rules in the early days of their tenure, but they soon give up their unreasonable 
expectations and come to realize the primacy of rules (Author’s field interview, dated 
30/03/2010).  
 It is therefore obvious that the level of control of GP elected representatives on 
the GP Secretary in Madhya Pradesh GPs is quite low, as established by the law and 
also in actual practice. Considering the formal sanctioning, monitoring and decision 
making control mechanisms, there is no noticeable variation between Goutampur 
Colony GP and Ramgarh GP as far as indirect accountability is concerned.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter shows that Goutampur Colony GP is ahead of Ramgarh GP on two out of 
three dimensions of accountability, the deliberation dimension and the monitoring 
dimension. Goutampur Colony GP did better on the deliberation dimension owing to its 
appreciably higher attendance and inclusiveness of attendance in Gram Sabha 
meetings, and also due to its more active scrutiny of GP functioning by Gram Sabha 
attendees. On the monitoring dimension too, Goutampur Colony GP was ahead because 
of its relatively more serious conduct of Social Audit, as revealed through credible 
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evidence of its popular involvement in Social Audit and of examination of documents 
pertaining to on-going NREGA works.  
 Ramgarh GP does better than Goutampur Colony GP on the sanctioning 
dimension of accountability because of its higher electoral competitiveness. While the 
sanctioning dimension is the most significant dimension of accountability, it is not 
appropriate to assess Ramgarh GP as having higher aggregate accountability merely on 
account of doing better on this dimension. It has already been stated in the methodology 
of this thesis (Chapter 3) that a GP which does better on the sanctioning dimension 
along with doing better on another dimension will clearly be inferred as having higher 
accountability. Ramgarh GP’s poor record with respect to the other two accountability 
dimensions (especially the deliberation dimension) implies that it cannot be assessed as 
having higher aggregate accountability. After all, accountability should not be a one-off 
affair that is exercised only at election time: there should also be some popular control 
between elections. It can be recalled that in the West Bengal study, the higher electoral 
competitiveness of Nowdapanur GP was actually responsible for higher attendance in 
its deliberative forum (Gram Sansad), while no such dynamic operated in the case of 
the more electorally competitive GP in the Madhya Pradesh study.  
 Furthermore, even though Ramgarh GP is relatively better on the sanctioning 
dimension, there are shortcomings in its functioning of elections as a sanctioning 
mechanism, such as electoral competitiveness being restricted mainly to Sarpanch 
elections. Therefore, balancing the evidence on the accountability dimensions, it is not 
proper to assess Ramgarh GP as having higher aggregate accountability merely on the 
basis of its relatively higher electoral competitiveness. Considering all these aspects, 
Goutampur GP, which is ahead on a majority of accountability dimensions (two 
dimensions of deliberation and monitoring), is assessed as having higher aggregate 
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accountability than Ramgarh GP. The relationship between accountability and 
performance for the chosen Madhya Pradesh GPs will be explored in Chapter 8.  
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CHAPTER 6                                  
PERFORMANCE OF THE CHOSEN CASES IN THE TWO STATES   
 
GPs in Indian states have been entrusted with diverse roles in various functional areas 
such as village infrastructure, primary education, social security, agricultural 
assistance, welfare of women and children, healthcare and sanitation. This chapter 
evaluates the performance (in terms of service delivery) of the chosen GPs in the states 
of West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh with reference to the two functional areas of 
infrastructure and alternative primary education. These two particular functional areas 
have been chosen because GPs in West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh possess a degree of 
decision making and implementation autonomy with respect to them. An attempt is 
made to compare the aggregate performance of the chosen GPs in West Bengal in the 
first section, and of the chosen GPs of Madhya Pradesh in the second section of this 
chapter, with the final section of the chapter briefly summarizing the findings on 
performance for the two state studies.  
 
Performance of the Chosen GPs of West Bengal 
The performance of the two chosen GPs of West Bengal–Debipur GP and Nowdapanur 
GP–is evaluated in this section with respect to two functional areas: firstly 
infrastructure and then, alternative primary education, followed by an assessment and 
comparison of aggregate performance of the two GPs.  
 
Performance in the Functional Area of Infrastructure  
Infrastructure development is of special importance in rural local governance, because 
amenities such as all-weather roads and readily accessible sources of water supply 
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which are often taken for granted in urban areas are not frequently found in rural areas, 
and their availability makes a significant difference to the quality of life of the rural 
populace. The GP’s role in developing rural infrastructure stems from two sources: the 
state Panchayat law, and state and central government infrastructural programmes. The 
West Bengal Panchayat Act vests GPs with the power and duty to construct and 
maintain “public streets”, sources of water supply, and means of irrigation 
(Government of West Bengal 2009a, Section 19). The GP’s role in infrastructural 
development, however, arises more specifically from its task of implementing central 
and state government infrastructure development programmes. Almost all GP 
infrastructural works are undertaken under these programmes (with funds transferred 
from central/state government), since the GPs usually have negligible amounts of 
Own-Source Revenue. GPs have the power to undertake specific infrastructural 
projects under these programmes (selected from the list of works proposed by the Gram 
Sansad).68
 The performance of the two selected GPs in the functional area of infrastructure 
is assessed with respect to two sub-dimensions or components: objective output-based 
measures, and villager satisfaction with infrastructural assets.  
 In implementing such works, GPs are required to adhere to the rules of these 
programmes, and conform to a spending limit of INR 200,000 on any specific project.   
 
Objective Output-Based Measures  
In West Bengal’s GPs, infrastructure construction, repair and up-gradation are almost 
always taken up under central government and state government programmes/funds 
such as NREGA, the Twelfth Finance Commission Fund of the Government of India, 
and the Untied Fund granted by the Second State Finance Commission of the 
                                               
68See Chapter 4 for details of the Gram Sansad’s role in proposing works. 
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Government of West Bengal.  The number of infrastructural assets created and repaired 
by each GP under these programmes indicates the volume of its infrastructure 
development activities.  
 Under NREGA (which is the single largest fund source of the chosen GPs in 
West Bengal), a total of 90 works/projects were completed by Debipur GP in the year 
2008-09, as per GP records. Out of these 90 works, 44 were in the area of infrastructural 
development (road improvement, re-excavation of ponds, canal repair and land 
development), and the other 46 were non-infrastructural activities related to 
afforestation. In Nowdapanur GP, GP records state that a total of sixteen NREGA 
works were completed in 2008-09, of which two were non-infrastructural 
(afforestation) and the rest were infrastructural. The details of the completed 
infrastructural works under NREGA for 2008-09 for the two GPs are given in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Volume of NREGA Infrastructural Works Completed by the West 
Bengal GPs (2008-09)  
Sector No. of works done in Debipur GP 
No. of works done in 
Nowdapanur GP 
Pond re-excavation 33 9 
Road construction/improvement 5 4 
Canal re-excavation/repair 5 1 
Land development 1 0 
Total no. of infrastructural works 
under NREGA 44 14 
Source: Data from the Offices of the two GPs 
 
 Table 11 shows a significant difference between the two GPs with respect to the 
number of infrastructural works completed by them. However these figures by 
themselves are insufficient to be the basis for any judgment that identifies one GP as 
superior and the other as inferior in performance. Before making such a judgment, the 
differences in size and population between the GPs need to be taken into consideration. 
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Debipur GP is much larger than Nowdapanur GP in terms of area, number of villages, 
and population (see Appendix), and this might be one reason behind its much larger 
number of works. Therefore, effectiveness ratios--the ratios of actual output to targeted 
output--are a sounder basis for comparing the physical performance of the two GPs in 
the area of infrastructure than the varying quantities of the physical output. 
 The effectiveness ratios give us a precise idea about the physical performance of 
GPs by revealing the proportion of their intended or targeted projects that they were 
able to complete. The data for both GPs, obtained from their latest available audit 
reports (at the time of fieldwork), shows that for the financial year 2007-08, 69
Table 12: Effectiveness Ratios for Debipur GP for Various Programmes (2007-08)  
 both GPs 
showed a significant gap between actual physical achievement (output) and targeted 
physical achievement for the different infrastructural programmes that they implement. 
These figures are shown in Tables 12 and 13. 





NREGA 205 74 36.09% 
Twelfth Finance 
Commission Fund 10 8 80% 
Untied Fund 14 10 71.4% 
Source: Audit report obtained from the Debipur GP office. 
Table 13: Effectiveness Ratios for Nowdapanur GP for Various Programmes 
(2007-08)  





NREGA 218 16 7.34% 
Twelfth Finance 
Commission fund 18 1 5.55% 
Untied Fund 16 13 81.25% 
Source: Audit report obtained from the Nowdapanur GP office 
                                               
69Since 2007-08 performance figures have been used here, the author had made an attempt to present 
some accountability data for appropriate years (naturally 2008-09 accountability figures cannot be 
causally linked to 2007-08 performance figures). Therefore this author has tried to present a durable 
picture of electoral competition (by using 2003 and 2008 data) and Gram Sansad effectiveness (by using 




 Tables 12 and 13 show that Debipur GP had overall higher success in meeting 
targets compared to Nowdapanur GP, considering its much better target achievement 
for two out of three programmes of infrastructure development (NREGA and Twelfth 
Finance Commission Fund). However this does not mean that in absolute terms it is 
always very successful in meeting targets: as far as NREGA is concerned, Debipur GP 
was able to complete only about 36% of its targeted works. The data for 2008-09 is not 
much different: Debipur GP in 2008-09 had 444 targeted works for NREGA in its 
Annual Action Plan, and probably several more in its Additional Annual Action Plan,70
 One reason for the huge gap between the targeted and actual physical 
achievement of GPs is due to the unrealistically large number of targeted projects. 
However as stated in Chapter 4, all demands for infrastructure made by the Gram 
Sansad have to be accommodated in the Annual Action Plans of the programmes. 
Debipur GP- a larger GP than Nowdapanur GP in terms of its number of constituencies, 
geographical area and population - therefore has many more targeted projects on its 
Annual Action Plan. The 2007-08 data shows that Debipur GP had greater relative 
success in meeting the targets of infrastructural programmes.  
 
but it actually completed only 90 NREGA works. Nowdapanur GP had 273 targeted 
works in its Annual and Additional Action Plans for 2008-09, and actually completed 
only 16 works (5.86% of the targeted works).  
 The figures on effectiveness ratios seen so far however do not shed any light on 
the effectiveness of GPs with respect to the execution of the works that they actually 
take up from the list of targeted works in the Annual Action Plans. Naturally, they are 
                                               
70The author was unable to obtain the Additional Annual Action Plan of Debipur GP for 2008-09, and 
therefore was unable to find out the accurate total number of targeted works for the same year, and thus 
the proportion of completed works to all targeted works for the same year.  Hence there is reliance on 
2007-08 data to furnish the required insights.  
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not able to take up all the targeted works. The proportion of completed and in-progress 
works sheds further light on the effectiveness of the two GPs’ infrastructure 
development activities. Table 14 shows the comparative performance of the two GPs in 
completing infrastructural works taken up for implementation under NREGA. The data 
is for three infrastructural sectors for the financial year 2009-10.  
 
Table 14: Number of Completed and In-progress NREGA Works in the West 
Bengal GPs (2009-10)  
Sector/work area 










improvement 14 0 14 17 
Pond re-excavation (water 
conservation and 
harvesting + renovation of 
traditional water bodies) 
42          4 19 32 
Land development 0 0 1          3 
Source: Data collected from Work Status pages of NREGA website (Government of 
India 2009-10c) 
 
Table 14 also shows that Debipur GP has overall been able to complete more NREGA 
works taken up for implementation, and has lesser unfinished works than Nowdapanur 
GP. However, in the sector of road construction/improvement, both GPs have been able 
to finish an equal number of works, and Nowdapanur GP has a higher proportion of 
unfinished works because it had taken up more works in this sector. The pond 
excavation figures however show that Debipur GP had greater progress in finishing 
works.  As far as all categories of NREGA outputs (both infrastructural works and 
non-infrastructural works such as afforestation) for the financial year 2009-10 are 
concerned, Debipur GP had a work completion rate of 98.61%, completing 71 out of 72 
works started in the same year. For the same year, Nowdapanur GP had a work 
completion rate of 71.43%, completing 40 out of 56 of all NREGA works 
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(infrastructural and non-infrastructural) started in the same year (Government of India 
2012-13). The relative superiority of Debipur GP is also seen with respect to 2010-11 
NREGA output figures: Debipur GP completed 98.7% of all NREGA works started in 
the same year (i.e. 76 out of 77 works). For the same year, Nowdapanur GP completed 
none of the 70 works that it started in the same year (Government of India 2012-13).71
 The physical output figures presented above show that Debipur GP had 
relatively greater success than Nowdapanur GP on various objective output-based 
measures - the quantity of infrastructural outputs, fulfilment of a larger proportion of 
targets, and a larger proportion of completed works vis à vis in-progress works. 
However, such objective measures only convey one aspect of GP performance in 
providing infrastructure. Perceptions-based insights from the village residents, which 
give an idea of villagers’ satisfaction with the infrastructural assets provided by the GP, 
must also be considered in evaluating the overall performance of the GPs in the 
functional area of infrastructure. 
 
 
Villager Satisfaction  
In order to obtain an idea of village residents’ satisfaction with infrastructural assets 
provided by the GP, the author obtained perceptions-based insights from the sixteen 
villager survey respondents interviewed in each chosen West Bengal GP. These insights 
are valuable in the sense that they come from those who are the actual users of these 
assets, and therefore well-placed to assess their quality. The author obtained villagers’ 
opinions with respect to their satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the quality of roads, 
                                               
71The break-up of work status for a few categories of NREGA works for 2010-11 is given: Debipur GP 
completed seven road works and had  one such work in-progress. It completed 60 works of renovation of 
traditional water bodies, and had three such works in progress.  It completed two land development works 
and had no such work in progress. Nowdapanur GP could not complete any work in any category. It had 
30 ongoing road works, 36 ongoing water conservation  and harvesting works, and four ongoing land 
development works (Government of India 2010-11a).  
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quality of drinking water source and accessibility of drinking water source. 72
 
 In 
addition, open–ended responses from the villagers reveal qualitative insights on the 
extent to which villagers’ needs and preferences are being met by the available 
infrastructural assets (roads and drinking water sources). The following paragraphs 
elaborate the extent of villager satisfaction with infrastructural assets provided by the 
GP according to the satisfaction indicators. Table 15 summarizes the extent of villager 
satisfaction with infrastructural assets provided by the two GPs. 
Table 15: Villager Satisfaction with GP-provided Infrastructural Assets in the 
West Bengal GPs  
Satisfaction indicator 
Proportion of villager survey respondents satisfied 
Debipur GP Nowdapanur GP 
Quality of roads 56.25% 37.5% 
Quality of drinking water 
sources 
Not applicable  
Overwhelming dependence 
on public drinking water 
source not provided by GP.  
Majority dependent on 
private tube-wells.  
57.1%  public (GP) 
tube-well users satisfied 
 
Accessibility of drinking 
water source 
 
Not applicable  
Overwhelming dependence 
on public drinking water 
source not provided by GP. 
 
Majority dependence on 
private tube-wells indicates 
accessibility problems of 
GP tube-wells. 
50% public (GP) tube-well 
users satisfied with 
accessibility.  
Source: Villager survey interviews conducted in the two GPs  
 
 Nine out of sixteen villager respondents (56.25%) in Debipur GP expressed 
satisfaction with the quality of roads in their village. In Nowdapanur GP six out of 
sixteen respondents (37.5%) expressed satisfaction with the same. In Debipur GP, 
where a higher proportion of respondents expressed satisfaction with roads, some 
                                               
72Roads and drinking water sources (tube-wells) are usually provided by GPs, rather than by state 
government departments and other higher authorities. These assets are also highly relevant to the 
villagers’ quality of life, and frequently used by them. Hence villagers are asked about their satisfaction 
with these two specific categories of infrastructural assets.  
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degree of variation was seen in the responses, reflecting partly the actual condition of 
roads (which differ from one village to another73 or one neighbourhood to another in the 
GP) and also the expectation levels (which are modest for some subjects and higher for 
others). For instance, one respondent in Debipur GP revealed her satisfaction with the 
existing roads stating that she was happy with the earthen road in front of her household 
and all-weather roads nearby,74
 Most of the villager responses of Nowdapanur GP reflected negative 
perceptions of the condition of roads in the GP, pointing to problems such as water 
logging and muddiness in some villages, and dustiness or bumpy roads for others. Their 
responses indicate that the overall quality of roads in this GP is poorer compared to 
Debipur GP. One respondent expressed succinctly, “Roads are THE problem in this 
GP” (Author’s field interview with male, general category villager survey respondent 
of.Nowdapanur GP, dated 19/12/2009). In this GP too, some subjects revealed their 
 and that the experienced problem of muddy roads is an 
inevitable and understandable problem in villages (Author’s field interview with 
female, ST villager survey respondent of Debipur GP, dated 8/09/2010). Another 
villager stated that there was a morum road near her house and she doesn’t expect 
anything more (higher order roads like brick or pitch roads) (Author’s field interview 
with female, general category villager survey respondent of Debipur GP, dated 
19/09/2009). Some respondents, however, revealed higher expectations; for instance 
one subject said that the morum road near his house was quite good, but a pitch road 
would be even better (Author’s field interview with male, general category villager 
survey respondent of Debipur GP, dated 19/09/2009). 
                                               
73The negative perceptions regarding road quality mainly came from respondents living in Mobarokpur 
and Punnyagram villages of this GP. The former is controlled by an opposition political party while the 
latter is controlled by the ruling CPI (M).  
74Rural roads can be of various categories: they can be classified into seasonal and all-weather roads.  
Earthen roads are seasonal roads (also called kutcha roads), whereas all-weather ones are of different 
types viz. morum, brick, pitch and cement-concrete. 
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higher expectations in terms of preference for up-gradation of road categories (for 
instance five subjects opined that the existing roads should be converted to pitch roads). 
One villager believed that just having all-weather roads was not a satisfactory solution: 
he felt that brick roads are worse than earthen roads because they are bumpy, and should 
be up-graded to pitch roads (Author’s field interview with male, general category 
villager survey respondent of Nowdapanur GP, dated 5/01/2010).  
 While the two GPs could easily be compared with each other with respect to 
survey findings about satisfaction with roads, such comparison was not possible with 
respect to drinking water sources. This is because an overwhelming majority of the 
survey respondents of Debipur GP are dependent on public drinking water sources not 
provided by the GP, in spite of the fact that there are 226 GP-provided cylinder 
tube-wells75 in the GP (according to the annual report of Debipur GP for 2008-09). 
Only one villager survey respondent mentioned dependence on tube-wells as a water 
source, while the remaining 15 respondents were dependent on ‘time taps’ for drinking 
water supply. 76
 In spite of the widespread availability of time taps (alongside tube-wells) and 
the convenience offered by them,
 The construction and maintenance of time taps and the supply of water 
through them is done not by the GP but by the Public Health and Engineering 
Department of the Government of West Bengal.  
77
                                               
75 Cylinder tube-wells can reach deeper down into the ground to tap ground water. 
 there were some persistent complaints expressed 
about drinking water sources by the Debipur GP villager survey respondents. 
Accessibility rather than quality seemed to be a bigger problem for the users of public 
drinking water sources. One respondent, for instance said that both the tube-well and 
76Time taps are public taps providing piped water supply. While these are naturally more convenient to 
use than tube-wells, their water supply is not continuous. As implied by their name, water is supplied 
through these taps only during certain fixed time slots of the day.  
77Eleven out of 16 villager survey respondents (68.75%) in Debipur GP expressed satisfaction with the 
quality of the public drinking water source. Eight out of the 16 respondents (50%) in Debipur GP 
expressed satisfaction with the accessibility of the public drinking water source. 
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the time tap were quite far from her house (Author’s field interview with female, 
general category villager survey respondent of Debipur GP, dated 12/09/2009). Even 
though Debipur GP has a large number of public drinking water supply points (tube 
well and time taps), the large size of this GP implies that even more such supply points 
are required to make life easier for the people of this GP. The GP is therefore partly 
responsible for the persisting accessibility problems with respect to drinking water 
supply in the backward pockets of this GP, which it can ameliorate by providing more 
tube-wells in these areas.  
 In Nowdapanur GP, most of the respondents were users of private (own or 
neighbour’s) rather than GP provided public tube-wells. The dependence of only seven 
out of sixteen respondents on public (GP-provided) tube-wells implies that the coverage 
or accessibility of tube-wells is such that several villagers do not find a public tube-well 
within a reasonable distance near their homes and have to depend on their own or 
neighbour’s private tube-wells. The result is that several villagers in this economically 
backward GP have to bear the financial burden of constructing a tube-well or have to 
borrow water from neighbours’ tube-wells. As one respondent expressed, “I have to 
take water from my neighbour’s tube-well because the GP tube-well is too far” 
(Author’s field interview with female, general category villager survey respondent of 
Nowdapanur GP, dated 1/01/2010).78
                                               
78An elected representative of Nowdapanur GP belonging to the ruling party INC also admitted that there 
are GP tube-wells provided, but many villagers find these to be located at an inconvenient distance from 
their house. 
 There is no provision of piped water or time taps 
in this GP, because of which tube-wells are the only drinking water source. Out of the 
seven users of GP tube-wells among the 16 villager survey respondents, five depend 
partially on GP tube-wells (usually during summer) and partially on private tube-wells. 
Fifty percent of the users of GP-provided tubewells among the villager survey 
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respondents in Nowdapanur GP expressed satisfaction with the accessibility of the GP 
tube-wells.79
 Out of the seven villager survey respondents of Nowdapanur GP who were 
dependent on GP tube-wells, four (57.1%) expressed satisfaction with the quality of the 
same. The users of GP tube-wells expressed varied opinions of the quality of the GP 
tube-wells. One user said that the water is sometimes good and sometimes of bad 
quality (Author’s field interview with female, SC villager survey respondent of 
Nowdapanur GP, dated 19/12/2009). Another user said that the water from the GP 
tube-well is ‘not bad’, but there is a water shortage in summer (Author’s field interview 
with female, SC villager survey respondent of Nowdapanur GP, dated 19/12/2009). One 
user pointed out that the GP tube-well needs repair (Author’s field interview with 
female, general category villager survey respondent of Nowdapanur GP, dated 
2/01/2010), while another pointed to the problem of crowds at the GP tube-well and 
damage to the tube-wells because of crowds (Author’s field interview with male, 
general category villager survey respondent of Nowdapanur GP, dated 2/01/2010). The 
GP has provided some cylinder tube-wells which can reach deep into the ground and 
draw water even in the dry summer months. Repair of these cylinder tube-wells is, 
however, very expensive, and as a result several of these tube-wells are lying broken 
down in an unusable condition. The high dependence of villager survey respondents on 
private drinking water sources, together with the quality, accessibility and water 
shortage problems experienced by public tube-well users, point to the shorcomings in 




                                               
79Data for accessibility satisfaction was available for six out of seven users. Three users out of these six 
(50%) were satisfied with accessibility.  
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Overall Performance in the Area of Infrastructure 
On the basis of various objective output-based measures, Debipur GP can be seen to 
have superior performance compared to Nowdapanur GP in implementing 
infrastructure development programmes and creating infrastructural assets.  
 The satisfaction level of the villager survey respondents of Debipur GP with 
respect to the quality of roads is also higher.  The higher satisfaction level seen among 
Debipur GP villager survey respondents with respect to public drinking water sources, 
however, cannot form a basis for concluding the superior performance of Debipur GP. 
This is because such higher satisfaction level arises from the villagers’ convenience in 
using taps provided by the Public Health and Engineering Department of the 
Government of West Bengal and is thus not reflective of GP performance. No valid 
comparison between the two GPs is therefore possible on the indicators of satisfaction 
for drinking water sources. 
 On the basis of the inter-GP comparison on the objective output based indicators 
and the perception-based indicator of satisfaction with roads, Debipur GP is inferred as 
having overall better performance in the functional area of infrastructure.  
  
Performance in the Functional Area of Alternative Primary Education 
West Bengal’s Panchayat law gives GPs the broad power to undertake measures for the 
promotion of primary education within its jurisdiction (Government of West Bengal 
2009a, Section 19). The GP has been entrusted with a general responsibility to increase 
the enrolment of children in primary educational institutions and of ensuring that 
teaching and learning are progressing smoothly and classes are going on regularly in the 
primary educational institutions. However, its specific and concrete responsibility with 
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respect to primary education is to provide facilities (especially physical infrastructure) 
to primary educational institutions (Government of West Bengal 2008a). 
 Public primary schools in GPs are of two types: mainstream primary schools 
and alternative primary schools. While the GP has the duty to provide facilities to both 
these types of schools, its role with respect to the latter is more salient. Mainstream 
primary schools were not established by the GP or other tiers of Panchayats. Most of 
these schools were established much earlier and are usually already equipped with basic 
facilities. In contrast, alternative primary schools known as Shishu Shiksha Kendras 
(SSKs) have been set up more recently in areas which lack access to mainstream 
primary schools. GPs facilitate the process of setting up SSKs, but the actual approval 
of the decision to set up an SSK comes from the Panchayat Samiti. Most importantly, 
these nascent schools are often poorly equipped with facilities, and it is the duty of the 
GP to provide facilities to them.80
 Therefore GP performance in the functional area of alternative primary 
education is assessed in terms of the availability of basic facilities in the SSKs located in 
the GP’s jurisdiction. There are four SSKs in Nowdapanur GP and two in Debipur GP. 
The author visited and studied two SSKs each in both Nowdapanur GP and Debipur 
GP–Debipur SSK and Punnyagram SSK in Debipur GP, and Srirampur SSK and 
Bejpara SSK in Nowdapanur GP. The situation in these four SSKs (situated in the two 
GPs), with respect to the availability of basic facilities, is summarized in Table 16 and 
elaborated below. 
 The extent of availability of basic facilities such as 
building, enough classrooms, drinking water sources, toilets and boundary walls in 
SSKs therefore directly reflects the performance of the concerned GP.  
                                               
80Since the GPs have negligible Own-Source Revenue, they use central and state government funds such 
as Twelfth Finance Commission and Untied Fund for the maintenance and construction of the physical 
infrastructure of SSKs. The rules of these programmes permit their use for maintenance /construction 




Table 16: Availability of Basic Facilities of Alternative Primary Schools (SSKs) in 
West Bengal GPs 
Facility 






SSK Bejpara SSK 
Own Building yes yes no yes 
Classroom for each 
grade yes yes no no 
Own drinking water 
source yes yes no no 
Own toilet yes yes no Constructed, not yet usable 
Boundary wall no no no no 
Mid-day Meal kitchen no yes no yes 
Source: Author’s observation and teacher interviews 
 
Possession of Own Building 
Three out of the four SSKs studied in the two GPs had their own buildings at the time of 
fieldwork. The SSK lacking its own building was Srirampur SSK in Nowdapanur GP. 
The three SSKs that had their own buildings at the time of fieldwork (Debipur SSK and 
Punnyagram SSK in Debipur GP, and Bejpara SSK in Nowdapanur GP) did not have 
their own buildings when they were established. They were all set up in 2000 or 2001, 
and got their own buildings much later. Till then, these schools had to hold open air 
classes or share facilities with other educational centres such as Anganwadi Kendras. 
Punnyagram SSK got its own building two years after being set up, and Debipur SSK 
and Bejpara SSK got their own buildings six years and five years after their 
establishment respectively. Srirampur SSK lacked its own building even though it was 
established in 2000.81
                                               
81The author learnt from the head of the Education and Public Health committee of Nowdapanur GP that 
a reason behind Srirampur SSK lacking its building was the unavailability of land for constructing the 
building. No villager had voluntarily donated land for construction of the SSK building. Therefore land 
availability may be seen as an extraneous factor affecting GP performance in providing facilities to SSKs. 




 At the time of fieldwork in Nowdapanur GP (December 2009-January 2010), a 
new building for this SSK was under construction. The students and teachers of this 
SSK were seen undergoing extreme inconvenience because of having to hold classes in 




 SSKs teach students of four grades, the primary grades of I to IV. The minimal 
expectation is that there will at least one classroom to accommodate each grade, that is, 
an SSK will have at least four classrooms. Both the SSKs in Debipur GP were seen to 
have four classrooms, but the situation was comparatively unfortunate in the selected 
SSKs of Nowdapanur GP. Srirampur SSK did not even have a building at the time of 
fieldwork, with classes being held in an open space, with the students of different 
grades appearing mixed up. Bejpara SSK was seen to have its own building, but with 
only two classrooms. The Sahayikas (teachers) of Bejpara SSK told the author that one 
grade was taught in the verandah, one had its own classroom, and two grades were 
accommodated in a single classroom by putting a partition to separate them (Author’s 
field interview, dated 6/01/2010). The classrooms in SSKs buildings are quite small, 
therefore the space constraints and inconvenience emerging from putting two grades in 
a single classroom can only be imagined.  
 
Toilets and Drinking Water Source 
Apart from the availability of own building and enough classrooms, toilets and drinking 
water are the other most crucial and fundamental facilities required in any educational 
                                                                                                                                       
absence of voluntary land donations. The GP could have taken pro-active steps to procure land on its 
own, instead of waiting for voluntary land donation.  
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institution. Both the SSKs in Debipur GP had their own toilets and drinking water 
sources. Bejpara SSK is the first SSK in Nowdapanur GP to get its own toilet; at the 
time of fieldwork, however, its toilet had yet to be painted and be ready for use. 
Srirampur SSK uses the toilet and tube-well of the adjacent Anganwadi Kendra, 
whereas Bejpara SSK uses a nearby public tube-well provided by the GP.82
 
 
Other Facilities–Boundary Walls and Mid-Day Meal Kitchens 
None of the four SSKs studied in the two GPs had their own boundary wall: this 
resulted in a major risk to the safety of the school children. Children have been found to 
run into the adjoining road which has vehicles plying (Debipur SSK), and there is a 
possibility of children falling into ponds surrounding the SSKs (in the case of Debipur 
SSK and Punnyagram SSK). The Sahayikas of Bejpara SSK also expressed their need 
for a boundary wall to prevent children from running here and there during school 
hours.  
 Mid-day meals are provided in SSKs under Government of India’s Mid-day 
Meal Scheme in order to increase child enrolment and attendance in schools and 
increase students’ nutritional levels. Mid-day meals served in schools are prepared by 
Self-Help Groups. Punnyagram SSK in Debipur GP and Bejpara SSK in Nowdapanur 
GP had their own kitchens in the school premises to prepare the meals, whereas Debipur 
SSK (Debipur GP) and Srirampur SSK (Nowdapanur GP) lacked such kitchens. 
 
Teacher Perception of SSK Facilities and GP Support 
The author spoke to the Sahayikas of the studied SSKs in order to gauge their 
perceptions regarding SSK facilities and their satisfaction with the support received 
                                               




from the GP. The Sahayikas of all the four SSKs perceived the lack of certain important 
facilities for their respective SSKs. Table 17 shows the most urgent unfulfilled needs of 
the SSKs, as perceived by the Sahayikas. It can be seen that the SSK Sahayikas of 
Nowdapanur GP (especially of Srirampur SSK) perceive a lack of even more basic 
facilities, compared to the SSK Sahayikas of Debipur GP.  
 
Table 17: Most Urgent Unfulfilled Needs of SSKs Perceived by Teachers  
SSK name (with GP) Urgent unfulfilled need 
Debipur SSK (Debipur GP) Boundary wall and mid-day meal kitchen 
Punnyagram SSK (Debipur GP) Boundary wall 
Bejpara SSK (Nowdapanur GP) Drinking water source and boundary wall 
Srirampur SSK (Nowdapanur GP) Building, drinking water source and toilet 
Source: teacher interviews 
 
 While the SSKs of Nowdapanur GP suffer from a more serious problem of 
facilities, its Sahayikas did not express dissatisfaction with the support received from 
the GP. In fact, the Sahayikas in Debipur GP expressed more critical views. While 
Srirampur SSK suffered from a serious lack of facilities, its teachers were actually 
grateful to the GP member of the area for allowing his house to be used for conducting 
classes and cooking mid-day meals during rainy weather, and expressed a positive 
perception of the GP’s role (Author’s field interview with Sahayikas of Srirampur SSK, 
dated 2/01/2010). The Sahayikas of Bejpara SSK also felt that the GP was extending 
enough support (Author’s field interview, dated 6/01/2010).  
 The Sahayikas of Debipur SSK in Debipur GP complained that the GP had 
promised to provide the lacking facilities but had not yet fulfilled its promise. They also 
complained that the GP member representing the area where Debipur SSK is located 
fails to come for the Management Committee meeting of the school, even if called 
(Author’s field interview, dated 10/09/2009). The Punnyagram SSK Sahayikas gave a 
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neutral response, only revealing that the GP had provided an assurance of supplying the 
missing facilities (Author’s field interview, dated 5/10/2009). The patterns in the 
Sahayika responses show that dissatisfaction with GP support does not necessarily 
correspond to the actual severity of the problem of facilities. 
   
Overall GP Performance in Alternative Primary Education  
While the SSKs of Debipur GP lack certain basic facilities such as boundary walls (both 
SSKs) and Mid-day Meal kitchen (Debipur SSK), the SSKs of Nowdapanur GP are 
lacking in even more basic facilities such as own building, enough classrooms, toilets 
and drinking water. From the above account, it is quite clear that the SSKs of Debipur 
GP are superior to the ones in Nowdapanur GP, considering the four most basic 
infrastructural facilities of SSKs that GPs are responsible for providing – building, 
classrooms, drinking water and toilets.  
 The most glaring defect of Nowdapanur GP’s performance in the area of 
alternative primary education is the lack of a building in one SSK, a fact that creates a 
chaotic learning environment and very likely adversely affects learning and teaching. 
The absence of the most basic facilities in its SSKs implies that Nowdapanur GP is 
clearly inferior to Debipur GP with respect to availability of SSK facilities, even though 
its Sahayikas feel satisfied with the support received from GP (though they do perceive 
a pressing need for unavailable facilities). It can be inferred, on the basis of these 
findings, that Debipur GP’s overall performance in the functional area of alternative 




Overall Performance Assessment for the GPs of West Bengal 
As already seen, Debipur GP has performed better than Nowdapanur GP in the two 
functional areas of performance--infrastructure and alternative primary education.  
Debipur GP shows a clear superiority over Nowdapanur GP with respect to each 
functional area. In the functional area of infrastructure, Debipur GP performs better on 
objective output-based measures, and on people’ satisfaction with infrastructural assets 
(roads). It also performs better on the functional area of alternative primary education 
because of the relatively superior facilities of its SSKs. Therefore Debipur GP is 
inferred as having higher aggregate performance than Nowdapanur GP.  
 
Villagers’ Assessment of Overall GP Performance 
In the villager survey conducted by the author, the villager respondents in both GPs 
were asked to state their aggregate assessment of the performance of their respective 
GPs. In Debipur GP, no subject professed complete satisfaction83
However, in actuality, the pattern of responses shows an association with the 
beneficiary status of respondents: for instance out of the six subjects who professed 
, one subject professed 
being ‘satisfied to a large extent’ while having unfulfilled needs, nine respondents 
professed partial satisfaction, one professed complete dissatisfaction, and the remaining 
five had no opinion on the issue. In Nowdapanur GP, six subjects professed satisfaction, 
five subjects professed being not at all satisfied, and the remaining five said that they 
were partly satisfied. The existence of six ‘satisfied’ responses in Nowdapanur GP, 
compared to no such response for Debipur GP, appears to be a positive reflection on the 
GP’s performance.  
                                               
83It might be noted that four of the villager survey respondents in Debipur GP are members of the ruling 
party CPI (M), with one of these four being a professed die-hard loyalist of  the party. It is significant that 




satisfaction with the GP’s work in Nowdapanur GP, four respondents belonged to 
households receiving pension or IAY benefits, and made up all the IAY/pension 
beneficiaries among the respondents.84  Three out of these four respondents belonging 
to beneficiary households had personally received pension benefits from the GP, 
whereas the remaining respondent’s family had benefitted from IAY money, and his 
mother was the recipient of old age pension. There were only two beneficiaries in 
Debipur GP 85
The satisfaction levels among the respondents belonging to beneficiary 
households in Nowdapanur GP is higher, but this might be because three out of the four 
respondents belonging to beneficiary households had personally received pensions, and 
this personal experience appears to be shaping their satisfaction level.  While villagers 
give importance to distribution of welfare benefits in assessing GP performance, it must 
be noted that GPs have very limited autonomy with respect to decision making on 
beneficiary-oriented programmes. Decision making for these programmes is governed 
by procedural stipulations such as BPL status, and is mainly the preserve of 
administrators in higher tiers of government. The role of GPs is to channelize 
applications to the higher administrative tiers. 
; both were IAY beneficiaries, and both professed only partial 
satisfaction, with one of these respondents possessing a persisting demand for old age 
pension for her mother in law.  
As many as five subjects professed being not at all satisfied among the 
respondents of Nowpanur GP, compared to only one such response from the Debipur 
GP subjects. The reason given by one such Nowdapanur GP subject behind his total 
dissatisfaction was, “I did not get anything from the GP except for medicines for my 
                                               
84 Out of the remaining two who professed satisfaction, one was grateful because of the help that the GP 
has extended to the Self Help Group which she led and the other had not gained anything specific from 
the GP (apart from her son’s NREGA employment, which is a statutory right and  most villagers anyway 
receive). 
85‘ Beneficiaries’ here refers only to recipients of pensions or IAY. 
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cows” (Author’s field interview with male, general category villager survey respondent 
of Nowdapanur GP, dated 19/12/2009). Unfulfilled demands for various benefits, 
including IGNOAPS and/or IAY, were expressed by all the five subjects of 
Nowdapanur GP who professed total dissatisfaction.  
Therefore villagers’ perception of the overall performance of their respective 
GP appears to be significantly shaped by whether or not they have received benefits of 
beneficiary-oriented programmes, as also revealed in the reasons expressed behind 
dissatisfaction. One subject in Nowdapanur GP, who professed partial satisfaction with 
overall GP performance elaborated that roads, in his opinion were good, but BPL 
(Below Poverty Line) related matters were not alright; a lot of undeserving people were 
getting benefits which rightfully belong to the poor (Author’s field interview with male, 
general category villager survey respondent of Nowdapanur GP, dated 5/01/2010). 
 In spite of the superior infrastructural output-based performance of Debipur GP 
and also the higher satisfaction of its respondents with respect to the quality of roads, it 
cannot be inferred from the pattern of survey responses that the overall satisfaction 
levels among the survey respondents of this GP are higher than those seen in 
Nowdapanur GP.  The high proportion of ‘partially satisfied’ responses in Debipur GP 
indicate that villagers are perceiving that some of the needs and demands of their daily 
lives are being met through the activities of the GP, but they expect much more than 
what they are currently getting, especially individual benefits in areas such as pension 
programmes and IAY. Therefore, the low proportion of ‘satisfied’ responses in Debipur 
GP is possibly shaped, to an extent, by higher expectations. The proportion of 
respondents who are totally dissatisfied is much higher in Nowdapanur GP; this finding 
is consistent with the comparative inferior performance of this GP seen with respect to 




Performance of the Chosen GPs of Madhya Pradesh 
The performance of the two chosen GPs of Madhya Pradesh–Goutampur Colony GP 
and Ramgarh GP–is evaluated in this section. For the sake of uniformity with the West 
Bengal study, such performance is assessed for the areas of infrastructure and 
alternative primary education, leading to an assessment of aggregate performance for 
the two GPs.  
 
Performance in the Functional Area of Infrastructure  
As per Madhya Pradesh’s Panchayat law, GPs have the duty to construct and maintain 
infrastructural assets such as sources of water supply, drains, roads, streets and bridges 
(Government of Madhya Pradesh 2009a, Section 7).86
 The performance of the two chosen GPs in the area of infrastructure is assessed 
first using objective output-based measures and then on the basis of GP residents’ 
satisfaction with infrastructural assets provided by the GP. 
 Furthermore, GPs have been 
entrusted with the task of implementing central government infrastructural programmes 
such as NREGA and Twelfth Finance Commission Fund, and state government 
programmes such as Moolbhoot Yojana (Basic Needs Programme). GPs have the task 
of implementing specific works under these programmes, choosing from among the 
works proposed by the Gram Sabha (see Chapter 5). In implementing these works, GPs 
are obligated to follow the rules of these government programmes, and adhere to a 
spending ceiling of INR 500,000 on any specific work.  
 
 
                                               
86The law vests the power and duty of constructing infrastructural assets in the Gram Sabha (see Chapter 
5). In actual practice, however, it is the GP that undertakes these tasks and exercises these powers. 
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Objective Output-based Measures 
The infrastructural works of the selected GPs of Madhya Pradesh for the year 2008-09 
were carried out under NREGA, Twelfth Finance Commission Fund, Moolbhoot 
Yojana and Gaun Khanij Rashi (Minor Mineral Royalties) Fund.87
 The NREGA action plan (list of targeted works) of Goutampur Colony GP for 
2008-09 had as many as 42 works but in reality only four NREGA works were taken up 
that year. GP records show that out of these four works taken up, only two works were 
completed, and the other works were not completed. Therefore half (50%) of the works 
taken up were completed in 2008-09. The two completed works were med bandhan 
(construction of boundaries of plots of land) works. Since only two out of 42 targeted 
NREGA works of Goutampur Colony GP were completed in 2008-09, its effectiveness 
ratio for NREGA works was 4.8%. The unfinished works of 2008-09 were not 
completed even in 2009-10, nor were any other assets created in 2009-10.  
 The physical output 
performance of the two GPs is detailed below, first for NREGA and then for other 
programmes.  
 In Ramgarh GP, as per data from the GP office, thirteen well construction works 
were taken up in 2008-09 under NREGA. There is no available evidence of works 
completed in 2008-09 by this GP. 88
                                               
87Gaun Khanij Rashi is an Own Source Revenue source for Madhya Pradesh GPs. The rules of the 
Government of Madhya Pradesh entrust GPs with control over the royalties obtained from minor 
minerals occurring in the GP area.  
 Evidence from the NREGA website however 
shows that several NREGA works were completed in Ramgarh GP in 2009-10: an 
approach road construction work and a culvert construction work (started in 2009-10), 
one public well construction (started in 2008-9) and seven personal wells. Combining 
the years 2008-09 and 2009-10, the performance of Ramgarh GP (the economically less 
developed GP)  in creating infrastructural assets under NREGA was superior, even 
88 The GP records do not state which of the works started in 2008-09 were completed in the same year.  
The NREGA website has no record of works completed in 2008-09.  
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though both GPs had unfinished works under NREGA. Table 18 shows the comparison 
between the two GPs with respect to completion of NREGA works, combining the 
years 2008-09 and 2009-10. Ramgarh GP was able to complete ten NREGA works 
while Goutampur Colony GP was able to complete only two works.  The effectiveness 
ratio (ratio of completed works to targeted works) for Ramgarh GP could not be 
calculated because of lack of data on the number of targeted works.  
 
Table 18: Completed and Unfinished NREGA Works (for 2008-09 and 2009-10 
combined) in the Madhya Pradesh GPs  
Gram 
Panchayat Completed works Unfinished works 
Goutampur 
Colony GP 
Two med bandhan (construction 
of boundary of plots of land) 
works 
One Gravel road construction and 
one pond deepening. 
Ramgarh GP 
Ten completed works – 
Approach road construction 
Culvert construction 
Public well construction 
Construction of 7 personal wells 
Construction of one personal well 
Source: Goutampur Colony GP records and Work Status Pages of NREGA website 
(Government of India 2009-10d)  
 
  Data on completed NREGA works for the financial year 2010-11 also 
reveal the superiority of Ramgarh GP with respect to completion of NREGA works. For 
the financial year 2010-11, Goutampur Colony GP was still facing problems regarding 
completion of NREGA works; the two unfinished works of 2009-10 were still ongoing 
in 2010-11, and no other work had been completed, as per data obtained from the GP 
Secretary in May 2011. In contrast to Goutampur GP which had not completed any 
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work, Ramgarh GP had completed four NREGA works and had at least two ongoing 
NREGA works in 2010-11 (Government of India 2010-11b).89
The progress of NREGA works is dependent to an extent on the willingness of 
villager beneficiaries to do labour work. The Secretary of Goutampur Colony GP 
lamented that NREGA works started long back in his GP are still lying unfinished 
because of the unavailability of labour (Author’s telephonic interview, dated 
13/05/2010). The Secretary of Ramgarh GP however said that the demand for work in 
his GP was quite high, and there was no problem of labour availability for NREGA 
works. However, he said that the GP did take care to take up NREGA projects during 
the seasons when the villagers actually have a demand for employment, and are not 
preoccupied with doing agriculture work on their own plots of land (Author’s 
telephonic interview, dated 13/05/2010).  
  
 Apart from NREGA, infrastructural works in the two GPs were also done under 
other infrastructural programmes. Both GPs completed infrastructural works under 
Twelfth Finance Commission Fund, Moolbhoot Yojana, and the Gaun Khanij Rashi. In 
addition, Goutampur Colony GP also completed works under a programme known as 
Adivasi Upayojana, a state-government programme for the development of 
infrastructure in areas with concentration of tribal population.  
 Table 19 shows the works completed by the two GPs under infrastructural 
programmes other than NREGA. However, it is not possible to compare the 
effectiveness of the outputs of the two GPs for these programmes due to the absence of 
baseline data about the targeted number of works. The ratio of complete works to 
incomplete works for both GPs also cannot be compared due to the lack of required 
                                               
89The exact number of ongoing works in Ramgarh GP  for the year 2010-11 is not known, since the 
details of the ongoing works for 2010-11 in the NREGA website only show the works that are currently 
ongoing (as of August 2012). Two such works are earlier works i.e. started in 2007-8 and 2010-11, and 
therefore can be considered  to be ongoing works for 2010-11. Readers must note that there might have 
been more ongoing works in Ramgarh GP in 2010-11.  
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data. Therefore no conclusive comparison can be made as to which GP is superior and 
which is inferior with respect to objective output-based indicators for infrastructural 
programmes other than NREGA. Table 19 however shows that Goutampur Colony GP 
was able to implement higher order infrastructural works (such as cement concrete road 
construction) compared to Ramgarh GP. This difference possibly has a bearing on the 
differences between the two GPs as far the degree of popular satisfaction with roads is 
concerned. 
 
Table 19: Infrastructural Works Done Under Programmes other than NREGA in 
the Madhya Pradesh GPs (2008-09) 
Works Completed 
Goutampur Colony GP Ramgarh GP 
1) Three Road repair works (Goutampur 
Colony village, Jondra and 
Kesalwada). 
2) Two Cement-concrete road 
construction works (Jondra and 
Goutampur Colony village). 
3) Pond deepening in Kesalwada. 
4) Various tube-well repair works. 
 
1) Two tube-well sinking works. 
2) Filling of hole in road. 
3) Five road repair works. 
4) Three works of conversion of 
seasonal roads into Morum roads 
(Ramgarh and Neenaur villages). 
5) Sokhta gaddha (recharging of water 
supply) work next to a tube-well in a 
SC locality. 
Source: Data from records of both GPs 
 
Villager Satisfaction and Need Fulfilment  
The author interviewed sixteen villagers in each of the two selected GPs in Madhya 
Pradesh, to assess the extent of villagers’ satisfaction with basic infrastructural assets 
provided by the GP. Perception-based insights obtained from the villager survey 
interviews are essential for evaluating the performance of the selected GPs in the area of 
infrastructure provision, since objective measures convey an incomplete picture of the 
actual quality and usefulness of the assets created. The author obtained villagers’ 
opinions with respect to their satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the quality of roads, 
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quality of drinking water sources and accessibility of drinking water sources.These 
opinions are detailed below. Table 20 provides a summary of the extent of the 
satisfaction of villager survey respondents with the infrastructural assets provided by 
the GP.  
 
Table 20: Villager Satisfaction with GP-provided Infrastructural Assets in the 
Madhya Pradesh GPs 
Satisfaction Indicator Proportion of villager survey respondents satisfied Goutampur Colony GP Ramgarh GP 
Quality of roads 6.25% 0% 
Quality of drinking water 
sources 71.4% 33.3% 
Accessibility of drinking 
water source 64.3% 31.25% 
Source: Villager survey interviews conducted in the two GPs  
  
The author, through her own visits, observed that Goutampur Colony GP is well 
connected to the block headquarters through an all-weather road. The problem however 
lies with the quality of the roads that lie within the villages, and also the poor quality of 
the road connecting two constituent settlements of this GP viz. Goutampur Colony 
village and Goutampur Tola hamlet.90
                                               
90The connectivity between Goutampur Colony village and Jondra hamlet is quite good because of the 
presence of a recently constructed cement concrete road. 
 The villagers, as the frequent users of village 
roads, are best equipped to assess them, and their views are as follows:  As many as 
fourteen villager survey respondents of Goutampur Colony GP were not satisfied with 
the quality of village roads, only one respondent was satisfied (6.25%), and one 
expressed partial satisfaction. In Ramgarh GP, all sixteen respondents professed 
dissatisfaction with the quality of village roads. The author too noticed the extremely 
poor quality of village roads in Ramgarh GP, along with a severe connectivity problem 
as far as travelling between the constituent villages of the GP is concerned.  
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 Open-ended responses from the villager survey interviews carried out in both 
GPs shed light on the major problems experienced by the villagers with respect to roads. 
The major problem that became apparent from Goutampur Colony GP’s villager survey 
responses is the inconvenience of muddy roads, especially during the rainy season. One 
subject from Kesalwada village of the GP (Author’s field interview with female, ST 
villager survey respondent of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 23/03/2010), and another 
from Goutampur Colony village (Author’s field interview with male, SC villager 
survey respondent of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 21/03/2010) mentioned that there is 
a problem of flooding and water logging in the roads. One resident of Goutampur Tola 
hamlet complained about the difficulty experienced by children in reaching the school 
located in this hamlet, because of the submerging of the road during the rainy season 
(Author’s field interview with female, general category villager survey respondent of 
Goutampur Colony GP, dated 22/03/2010). Some villagers also pointed to the problem 
of dusty roads. However, the lone respondent who expressed satisfaction with the roads 
of Goutampur Colony GP had this to say, “There are some holes in the roads, but the 
roads are now better than before. Earlier one couldn’t even walk or use vehicles on the 
roads” (Author’s field interview with male, ST villager survey respondent of 
Goutampur Colony GP, dated 22/03/2010). The village resident who expressed partial 
satisfaction was satisfied with the connectivity of the GP and its villages, but expressed 
the need for repair of some roads (Author’s field interview with male, SC villager 
survey respondent of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 21/03/2010). 
 The level of unhappiness with roads was even higher in Ramgarh GP, with not a 
single respondent expressing satisfaction (or even partial satisfaction). Here the 
problem is not just muddiness during the rains, but of uneven roads that are full of holes 
and barely motorable. One villager remarked that it is not possible to travel from one 
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village of the GP to another, especially during the rainy season (Author’s field 
interview with male, OBC villager survey respondent of Ramgarh GP, dated 
3/04/2010). Another villager commented that roads of the village are extremely poor, 
and especially horrible during the rains because of the added problem of muddiness 
Author’s field interview with female, general category (Rajput) villager survey 
respondent of Ramgarh GP, dated 5/04/2010). The backwardness of the villages of this 
GP seems to be connected to their poor connectivity, and one villager summed up the 
problem saying, “If our roads improve then life will improve” (Author’s field interview 
with male, SC villager survey respondent of Ramgarh GP, dated 5/04/2010). 
 The village residents of Goutampur Colony are dependent on tube-wells for 
their drinking water needs, with fourteen out of sixteen villager survey respondents 
dependent on public (GP-provided) tube-wells, and two subjects dependent on their 
private tube-wells. The satisfaction levels with the tube-wells were much higher 
compared to the satisfaction levels for village roads. Ten out of the 14 users of public 
tube-wells (71.4%) in Goutampur Colony GP professed satisfaction with the quality of 
the tube-wells. In Ramgarh GP, the villagers were dependent on wells and tube-wells, 
and here the satisfaction levels were lower than in Goutampur Colony GP (but better 
compared to the satisfaction with road quality in the same GP). Five users of the 
GP-provided water sources (wells and tube-wells), out of a total of fifteen (33.3%), 
professed satisfaction with their quality.91
 The satisfaction levels with respect to accessibility of drinking water sources 
were as follows. Nine out of the fourteen public tube-well users in Goutampur Colony 
GP (64.3%) were satisfied and five dissatisfied with their accessibility. In Ramgarh GP, 
five out of the sixteen users of public drinking water sources (31.25%)  were satisfied 
   
                                               
91Data was available only for 15 out of 16 villager survey subjects in Ramgarh GP with respect to quality 
satisfaction. Data was missing for one subject.  
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(and one partially satisfied) with their accessibility, with ten respondents professing 
dissatisfaction. Therefore both the quality satisfaction and accessibility satisfaction 
with public drinking water sources were much higher in Goutampur Colony GP than in 
Ramgarh GP. 
 Some villager survey respondents in Goutampur Colony GP praised the public 
tube-wells provided in their respective villages. Two respondents pointed to frequent 
repairs done on them (Author’s field interview with male, SC and male ST villager 
survey respondents of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 21/03/2010 and 22/03/2010 
respectively), while a Kesalwada resident said that the public tube-well near her house 
was new and working properly (Author’s field interview with female, ST villager 
survey respondent of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 23/03/2010). One Jondra resident 
also commented that the water coming from the tube-well was of very good quality 
(Author’s field interview with male, ST villager survey respondent of Goutampur 
Colony GP, dated 22/03/2010). While the majority assessment of public drinking water 
sources was positive in Goutampur Colony GP, there were complaints raised by some 
respondents. One problem expressed was the water shortage during the summer; a 
Goutampur Tola resident, for instance, said that her neighbourhood needs one more 
tube-well because of the increased demand for water during summer (Author’s field 
interview with female, general category villager survey respondent of Goutampur 
Colony GP, dated 22/03/2010).  
 Quality and accessibility concerns about drinking water sources were expressed 
by several respondents of Ramgarh GP. The complaints were about wells and 
tube-wells. One resident of Bawdikheda village stated, “There is a huge water problem 
in this village: the hand-pump (tube-well) has dried up and the well is very far” 
(Author’s field interview with male, SC villager survey respondent of Ramgarh GP, 
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dated 5/04/2010). For another respondent, the problem was of lots of dry wells and the 
tube-well giving dirty water (Author’s field interview with male, general category 
villager survey respondent of Ramgarh GP, dated 5/04/2010). In fact, it is probably due 
to the lack of sufficient number of tube-wells, and the problems in the functioning of 
tube-wells, that residents have to bear the inconvenience of drawing water from wells. 
Accessibility concerns were elaborated, such as by one respondent who said that the 
public well near his house is dry, because of which he has to bring water from a well 
located 1.5 km away from his house (Author’s field interview with male, SC villager 
survey respondent of Ramgarh GP, dated 5/04/2010) . The need for more tube-wells is 
also apparent from some responses that pointed to huge crowds, and even fights over 
water, at public tube-wells. Some respondents also complained that the tube-wells often 
break down and repair is delayed.  
 
Overall Performance in the Area of Infrastructure 
The contrast between the performance of Goutampur Colony GP and Ramgarh GP in 
the area of infrastructure is marked as far as the satisfaction of the surveyed villagers 
with the quality and accessibility of a key infrastructural asset, drinking water sources, 
is concerned. The levels of dissatisfaction with respect to roads are very high in both 
GPs and the contrast between them is less marked, with the dissatisfaction levels being 
even higher in Ramgarh GP compared to Goutampur Colony GP. Ramgarh GP is the 
only one among the four GPs covered in this study where all villager survey 
respondents have expressed dissatisfaction with respect to an aspect of GP performance 
(as seen in the case of roads for Ramgarh GP). However, the objective data on the 
outputs of infrastructural development programmes does not indicate the superiority of 
Goutampur Colony GP unlike the villager satisfaction data.  
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 With respect to NREGA, it is clear that Ramgarh GP has shown greater success 
in completing infrastructural assets taken up for construction, while Goutampur Colony 
is struggling with unfinished infrastructural projects. Because of the absence of required 
data, it was not possible to detect performance variation between the two GPs using 
objective output-based indicators (such as effectiveness ratio or rate of completion of 
works taken up) for infrastructural programmes other than NREGA. Since valid 
comparison on objective output-based indicators was possible only with respect to 
NREGA works, the GP that performed better on NREGA works–Ramgarh GP- is 
inferred as having superior output-based performance.  
 One GP is therefore superior on villager satisfaction with infrastructural assets 
(Goutampur Colony GP) while a different GP is superior on objective output-based 
measures (Ramgarh GP). Which GP then should be assessed as having superior 
performance in the area of infrastructural performance? Given that Goutampur Colony 
GP shows superiority on the crucial sub-dimension of villager satisfaction (with marked 
superiority on the indicators of satisfaction with drinking water sources), it is inferred as 
having overall higher performance in this functional area.92
 
 
Performance in the Functional Area of Alternative Primary Education 
Education Guarantee Scheme (EGS) schools were set up as alternative primary schools 
in Madhya Pradesh. EGS schools are more nascent compared to mainstream primary 
schools. GPs facilitated the setting up of these schools in areas which lacked access to 
mainstream primary schools. GPs have the specific responsibility of providing facilities 
                                               
92 It has been stated in the methodology of this study (Chapter 3) that crucial indicators/sub-dimensions 
are used as a basis for detecting variation in performance in the event of different GPs doing better on 
different sub-dimensions/indicators within a single dimension of performance. 
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to these schools. 93
 There are two EGS schools in Goutampur Colony GP (Goutampur Tola EGS 
and Kesalwada EGS) and one in Ramgarh GP (Bawdikheda EGS). GP performance in 
the area of alternative primary education is assessed below, according to indicators 
pertaining to the availability of various basic facilities in these EGS schools, using 
information obtained from teacher interviews and school visits. Table 21 summarizes 
the situation regarding availability of basic facilities in the EGS schools located in the 
two GPs.  
 The extent of availability of basic facilities in EGS schools is 
therefore an appropriate basis for assessing and comparing the performance of the two 
chosen GPs.  
 
Table 21: Availability of Basic Facilities of Alternative Primary (EGS) Schools in 
Madhya Pradesh GPs  
GP  Goutampur Colony   Ramgarh  
EGS Goutampur Tola Kesalwada Bawdikheda 
Own Building yes yes yes 
Classroom for each 
grade no no no 
Drinking water source functional functional not functional 
Toilet no incomplete construction 
available, but not 
functional 
Boundary Wall no barbed wire fencing no 
Mid Day Meal 
Kitchen shed yes yes no 
Source: teacher interviews and the author’s observation during school visits  
 
Building and Classrooms 
All the EGS schools located in the two GPs have their own building. The EGS schools 
hold classes for grade I to grade V. None of the EGS schools in the two GPs have 
separate classrooms for all their grades, and neither is a shift system applied for holding 
                                               
93GPs in Madhya Pradesh can use central and state government infrastructural funds (such as Moolbhoot 
Yojana funds) to construct and maintain EGS facilities (Government of Madhya Pradesh 2008-09).  
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classes. In Goutampur Tola EGS of Goutampur Colony GP, there are two classrooms. 
A teacher of this school told the author that one classroom is used for holding classes for 
grade I, II and III and the other is used for holding classes for grade IV and V. In 
Kesalwada EGS of the same GP, the situation is slightly better since the school building 
has three classrooms: grade I and II are taught in one, grade III in one and grade IV and 
V in the remaining classroom. In Bawdikheda EGS of Ramgarh GP, too, two 
classrooms are used to accommodate five grades (Author’s field interviews with 
teachers of Goutampur Tola, Kesalwada, and Bawdikheda EGS, dated 25/03/2010, 
28/03/2010 and 5/04/2010 respectively).94
 
 Multi-grade pedagogy is employed by the 
teachers of the three EGS schools to simultaneously instruct children from two or more 
grades in a single classroom.  
Toilets and Drinking Water Source 
None of the three EGS schools located in the two GPs had functional toilets at the time 
of fieldwork. The toilet in Goutampur Tola EGS had not yet been constructed, while the 
toilet in Kesalwada EGS was in a state of incomplete construction. Bawdikheda EGS 
had a toilet which had no ceiling and only one wall, and (according to the teacher) was 
completely unsuitable for use. Drinking water, however, was a problem only for 
Bawdikheda EGS. At the time of fieldwork Bawdikheda EGS’s tube-well was not 
working, and according to the teacher, the problem had been reported but the GP had 
done nothing to solve the problem (Author’s field interview with teacher of 
Bawdikheda EGS, dated 5/04/2010). The two EGS schools of Goutampur Colony GP 
had functional tube-wells for drinking water supply.  
                                               
94 The author could not observe the functioning (holding of classes) of any of the EGS schools. 
Goutampur Tola and Bawdikheda EGS were closed on the visit days, even though the visit days were 
weekdays. The teachers of these schools were interviewed in their residences. Only Kesalwada EGS was 
open, but classes were not being held because the term had come to an end and teachers were involved in 




Other Facilities–Boundary Wall and Kitchen Shed 
None of the EGS schools in the two GPs had their own boundary walls. The Goutampur 
Tola Guruji (teacher) said that the boundary wall had not yet been constructed, even 
though the Gram Sabha resolution for its construction had been passed. The teacher of 
Bawdikheda EGS expressed an urgent demand for a boundary wall, but he was afraid 
that the construction of the wall and consequent demarcation of the school’s land might 
create a conflict with the neighbouring land-owning villagers (Author’s field interview, 
dated 5/04/2010). For the teacher of Kesalwada EGS, however, the absence of a 
boundary wall was not a major problem, because he felt that the barbed wire fencing 
was serving the purpose of a boundary wall (Author’s field interview, dated 
28/03/2010). The two EGS schools of Goutampur Colony had their own kitchen shed 
for preparing mid-day meals, while Bawdikheda EGS lacked a kitchen shed. 
 
Teacher Perception of EGS School Facilities and GP Support 
The teachers of all three EGS schools perceived the lack of certain important facilities 
and an urgent need for these facilities to be provided by the GP (see Table 22). The 
teachers of Goutampur Tola EGS and Bawdikheda EGS complained that they were not 
getting enough support from their respective GPs (Goutampur Colony GP for the 
former and Ramgarh GP for the latter), as evident in the non-availability of essential 
infrastructure (Author’s field interviews with teachers of Goutampur Tola and 
Bawdikheda EGS, dated 25/03/2010 and 5/04/2010 respectively). The teacher of 
Kesalwada EGS, however, felt that support was forthcoming from the GP (Goutampur 
Colony GP), as evident, for instance, from the GP’s ready repairing of the tube-well 
whenever it stops working (Author’s field interview, dated 28/03/2010). Therefore the 
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EGS teachers of Goutampur Colony GP showed a mixed assessment of support 
provided by the GP, while the EGS teacher of Ramgarh GP showed a negative 
assessment of the GP in this respect.  
 
Table 22: Most Urgent Unfulfilled Needs of EGS Schools Perceived by Teachers 
EGS school Urgent unfulfilled needs 
Goutampur Tola EGS Toilet, boundary wall, and keeping the school clean. 
Kesalwada EGS Functional toilet. 
Bawdikheda EGS Functional toilet, boundary wall, functional tube-well and kitchen shed. 
Source: Teacher interviews 
 
Overall Performance in Alternative Primary Education 
While all three EGS schools have poor facilities–in terms of the lack of functional 
toilets, boundary walls and enough classrooms--the sole EGS of Ramgarh GP 
(Bawdikheda EGS) seems to be in an especially disadvantageous position as far as the 
availability of basic facilities is concerned. Both the EGS schools of Goutampur Colony 
GP had functional tube-wells; therefore neither of them lacked both functional drinking 
water sources and functional toilets. However Bawdikheda EGS in Ramgarh GP lacked 
both at the time of fieldwork. Moreover, both the EGS schools in Goutampur Colony 
GP had their own kitchen sheds to cook mid-day meals, while this was not available in 
Bawdikheda EGS. As stated earlier, the extent of availability of basic facilities in 
alternative primary schools is a direct reflection of GP performance. Based on this 
dimension, Ramgarh GP is inferior in its performance compared to Goutampur Colony 




Overall Performance Assessment for the GPs of Madhya Pradesh  
It has been seen that Goutampur Colony GP has performed better than Ramgarh GP in 
the functional area of alternative primary education because of the relatively better 
availability of facilities in its alternative primary schools. It also has better overall 
performance in the functional area of infrastructure by virtue of higher villager 
satisfaction with infrastructural assets (though its performance on objective 
output-based measures is worse than that of Ramgarh GP). Because of its relative 
superiority on both the functional areas of performance, Goutampur Colony GP is 
inferred as having higher aggregate performance compared to Ramgarh GP. 
 
Villagers’ Assessment of Overall GP Performance 
Villager survey respondents in both Madhya Pradesh GPs were asked to subjectively 
evaluate overall GP performance. There is a clear contrast in the aggregate satisfaction 
levels between the villager survey results of the two GPs. In Goutampur Colony GP, 
four respondents (25%) professed satisfaction with GP performance, nine professed 
partial satisfaction (56.25%) and three expressed being not at all satisfied (18.75%). In 
Ramgarh GP, the high level of aggregate dissatisfaction among the survey respondents 
is noteworthy: as many as 12 respondents (75%) professed dissatisfaction with GP 
performance. Two subjects expressed satisfaction (12.5%) and the same number 
expressed partial satisfaction (12.5%).  
An association between beneficiary status and satisfaction of the survey 
respondents of Madhya Pradesh GPs with GP performance is seen. As in the West 
Bengal study, personal receipt of benefits shows an association with satisfaction levels.  
Among the two respondents in Goutampur Colony GP who personally recieved 
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pensions, one was satisfied and one was partially satisfied,95
The reasons stated by the respondents behind their perceived satisfaction levels 
(revealing insights on the factors that affect their judgment of GP performance) show 
that their assessment of performance is not completely based on whether or not they 
have received benefits such as pensions from the GP. A respondent in Goutampur 
Colony GP, who professed satisfaction, stated that he was happy because roads and 
hand-pumps had been constructed. He did however have unfulfilled demands (for IAY 
and cheap rations) and suggested that the GP should meet unfulfilled needs (Author’s 
field interview with male, SC villager survey respondent of Goutampur Colony GP, 
dated 21/03/2010). Another respondent of the same GP, whose family members had 
received IGNOAPS and widow pension money, complained that he was not at all 
satisfied, because of the GP’s failure to provide the amenities and benefits that it should 
have provided; this subject’s application for National Family Benefit Scheme (made 
after his father’s death) had not been responded to, and he felt that there was an urgent 
need for proper roads and drainage in the GP (Author’s field interview with male, SC 
villager survey respondent of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 21/03/2010).  
 and none was dissatisfied. 
The only respondent in Ramgarh GP to personally receive a pension was satisfied with 
GP performance. A female IGNOAPS beneficiary of Goutampur Colony GP professed 
her obtaining of pension as the reason behind her satisfaction with GP performance 
(Author’s interview with female, SC villager survey respondent of Goutampur Colony 
GP, dated 21/03/2010).  The recipient of widow pension (and also IAY money) in 
Ramgarh GP professed satisfaction with GP performance because she had got all that 
she wanted (Author’s interview with female, OBC villager survey respondent of 
Ramgarh GP, dated 3/04/2010).  
                                               
95 The partially satisfied beneficiary was personally receiving old age (IGNOAPS) pensions, but at the 
time of the interview complained that pension money had not arrived for the last four months.  
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The infrastructural problems in the Madhya Pradesh GPs have also given 
importance, in addition to beneficiary issues, by the respondents in their stated reasons 
behind their aggregate assessment of performance. A resident of Goutampur Colony GP 
who professed partial satisfaction suggested that the most important thing that the GP 
should provide is assured water supply (Author’s field interview with female, SC 
villager survey respondent of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 21/03/2010). In Ramgarh 
GP, a subject stated that he was not at all satisfied because nothing at all had been done 
for her village (Bawdikheda); roads and water supply were among the biggest problems 
being faced by the villagers (Author’s field interview with female, general category 
villager survey respondent of Ramgarh GP, dated 5/04/2010). Another Ramgarh GP 
respondent was partially satisfied because some work on constructing roads had been 
done recently, but a lot more remained to be done (Author’s field interview with male, 
OBC villager survey respondent of Ramgarh GP, dated 3/04/2010). Two respondents of 
Ramgarh GP were not at all satisfied with the GP they had for the last five years, but 
expressed high hopes from the newly elected GP. One respondent professed being 
totally dissatisfied simply because he never got any benefits from the GP (Author’s 
field interview with male, general category villager survey respondent of Ramgarh GP, 
dated 5/04/2010); in contrast another resident, who expressed partial satisfaction, felt 
that it was not possible for the GP to satisfy everyone, given that it already had a lot of 
pressure on it (Author’s field interview with female, general category survey 
respondent of Ramgarh GP, dated 3/04/2010). One respondent, in his assessment of 
aggregate performance said that there was too much chakkarbazi (self- interested 
behaviour) and no work done by the GP at all (Author’s field interview with male, 





On the basis of the two comparative studies of GP performance set in the states of West 
Bengal and Madhya Pradesh, Debipur GP in West Bengal and Goutampur Colony GP 
in Madhya Pradesh are found to be superior to their compared cases in performance. 
Now the question arises—what explains the superior performance of Debipur GP 
compared to Nowdapanur GP and of Goutampur Colony GP compared to Ramgarh GP?  
How important is accountability in explaining differences in performance? The coming 
chapters will explore these questions.        
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CHAPTER 7                                  
EXAMINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY-PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP 
FOR THE WEST BENGAL STUDY 
 
This thesis has already elaborated the state of accountability and performance in the two 
chosen GPs in West Bengal. The aim of this chapter is to arrive at inferences about the 
accountability-performance relationship, considering not only the variation in the levels 
of accountability and performance between the two GPs, but also the evidence of actual 
causal impact (through the operation of causal processes) between the two variables. 
 The first section of this chapter examines the impact of accountability on 
performance, aiming to discover if accountability does indeed have a significant impact 
on performance in the chosen GPs. The second section of this chapter examines the 
impact of performance determinants other than accountability. The concluding section 
infers which among the possible primary determinants of performance – accountability, 
finances or capacity, actually explains variation in performance between the two GPs, 
and makes final comments on the accountability-performance relationship for the West 
Bengal study. 
 
The Impact of Accountability on Performance 
The impact of accountability on performance is examined in this section.  Such impact 
is assessed firstly by looking at the impact of each accountability dimension on 
performance. Secondly, the relationship between accountability and GP performance in 
each functional area (infrastructure/alternative primary education) is explored. Finally, 
the overall relationship between accountability and performance is inferred, on the basis 
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of the overall results of the inter-GP comparison and the evidence of the impact of each 
accountability dimension on performance.  
 
Impact of Different Accountability Dimensions on Performance 
Accountability, as operationalized in this study has three dimensions–sanctioning, 
deliberation and monitoring. Each dimension has been assessed in terms of the 
effectiveness of its corresponding accountability mechanism, as seen in Chapter 4. The 
impact of each accountability dimension and its corresponding accountability 
mechanism on performance is assessed below.  
 
Sanctioning Dimension and Performance  
The sanctioning dimension of accountability has been assessed mainly in terms of the 
competitiveness of GP elections. A core difference between the two chosen West 
Bengal GPs is the highly competitive elections in one (Nowdapanur GP) compared to 
the heavy dominance of the ruling party in the other (Debipur GP). The former therefore 
did better on the sanctioning dimension of accountability than the latter. It should be 
seen, however, whether the higher electoral competition in Nowdapanur GP is having a 
positive impact on GP performance. The actual operation of the causal processes 
between electoral competition and performance in the chosen GPs is assessed below, 
according to the yardstick of the hypotheses (derived from the literature) given in 
Chapter 1.  
  The primary hypothesis about the impact of electoral competition on 
performance is that higher electoral competition can improve GP performance through 
the increased opportunity to sanction (punish) incumbent representatives. A high 
degree of electoral defeat of incumbents who contest re-elections would compel sitting 
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individual representatives to increase their efforts towards improving GP performance. 
For this hypothesis to be fulfilled, three conditions have to be met: firstly, incumbent 
representatives must seek re-election; secondly, there must be a fairly high degree of 
defeat of incumbent representatives contesting re-election; thirdly, voters must evaluate 
the incumbents contesting re-election on performance grounds, and bring about the 
defeat of those incumbents whose contributions to GP performance are not satisfactory. 
 In Debipur GP, it was seen that only one incumbent contested re-election in the 
2008 elections and was successfully re-elected (see Chapter 4). In Nowdapanur GP, six 
incumbents contested re-election in the 2008 election. Two out of these six incumbents 
who contested re-election in Nowdapanur GP lost. Though there was a degree of 
turnover through electoral defeat, the degree of such turnover was not high. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the experienced electoral defeat of incumbents had any 
significant impact on the performance of Nowdapanur GP. This is because, in reality, 
non-performance considerations such as kinship and money power play a key role in 
influencing the re-election of incumbent representatives of this GP.  
 The author learnt from a member of this GP (belonging to the ruling INC) about 
the re-election of most incumbents being based on non-performance considerations. 
One GP member (also belonging to INC) who was re-elected in 2008 spent a lot of 
money in influencing voters during the campaign period. Apparently, the practice of 
‘buying’ of votes of undecided voters (such as those who have no fixed loyalty to a 
political party) through gifts is prevalent in this GP. Another factor that operates in GP 
elections is kinship. One female member belonging to the INC was successfully 
re-elected because over a hundred of her relatives and members of her extended family 
voted for her (Author’s telephonic interview with elected member of Nowdapanur GP 
belonging to ruling party INC, dated 19/05/2010). Both these re-elected members 
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mentioned above also happen to hold key decision making positions in the GP. Another 
member of Nowdapanur GP (also belonging to INC) who was re-elected, heads an 
Upa-samiti96 of the GP, but rarely attends the GP office or takes an interest in the 
functioning of the Upa-samiti, choosing to focus only on the interests and problems of 
the village constituency that he represents.97
 It can be seen from the above account that elections, though the only available 
sanctioning mechanism available to the people, are hardly, in practice bringing about 
sanctioning of incumbents on performance grounds. Because of this, elections are not 
creating a concrete threat of removal in the minds of incumbents who wish to contest 
the next elections. This, along with the fact that only a narrow pool of incumbents 
choose, or are able to, contest re-elections, weakens the  compulsion or pressure on 
incumbents to contribute to GP performance to their best ability. 
   
 The second hypothesis about the impact of competitive elections on 
performance is that, they enable the selection of competent, responsible election 
candidates as representatives, and rejection of incompetent candidates. In other words, 
this hypothesis states that only competent candidates can pass the test of competitive 
elections. As per this hypothesis, competitive elections can improve GP performance 
even if incumbent representatives do not contest re-election. The candidates selected as 
representatives in any single election, who are supposed to be competent, skilled and 
able, in turn use their talents to contribute well to GP decision making and management 
of implementation, thus improving GP performance.  
                                               
96Upa-samitis are committees of the GP in particular functional areas.  
97The concerned GP member was praised by the alternative primary school teachers of his village for 
allowing his house to be used for holding classes of the school on rainy days. While it is part of a GP 
member’s duty to cater to the problems of his/her constituency, this is not the only component of his/her 
overall responsibility. This is especially relevant to key office holders such as committee heads, who have 
an obligation to actively contribute to the functioning of the concerned committee and the entire GP.  
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 In reality, however, a higher degree of electoral competition is rarely resulting in 
the selection of good quality, committed candidates as representatives in Nowdapanur 
GP. Nowdapanur GP suffers from the problem of low enthusiasm and involvement of 
most of its members who hardly come to the GP office (including three out of the five 
heads of Upa-samitis). Therefore higher competitiveness of elections is not leading to 
the election of better quality leaders in this GP, compared to Debipur GP. This may also 
be attributed to the prevalence of voting considerations such as kinship, money power 
and promises of individual, clientelistic benefits to voters, over considerations such as 
talent, commitment andskill.An elected member of Nowdapanur GP, belonging to the 
ruling party INC, shed light on the kind of considerations that shape voting in his GP:  
Clientelism is greatly prevalent; beneficiaries never forget that so-and so 
member personally helped them. So is kinship: candidates win when large 
network of relatives vote for them. Caste-based and community- based factors 
do not play a very important role, with the exception of Soluadanga 
constituency, where candidates representing the Muslim league (which stands 
for orthodox Islam) win Muslim votes. Development work and assistance given 
to needy members occasionally makes a difference; for example one particular 
senior member of this GP is able to elicit block-level NREGA works for his 
constituency because the chairperson of the Panchayat Samiti belongs to his 
village. The present Pradhan may also have helped needy or sick persons in his 
constituency in some way. Personality based factors also play a role. For 
example, I won against my opponent even though my opponent was an 
employed person; possibly it was my opponent’s reputation of being selfish and 
rude that was responsible for his defeat. Money power is an important factor 
determining voting; a former Pradhan of this GP is a rich person who spent a lot 
of money to win votes, for instance, by installing a tube-well for a voter who 
wanted it. A current member of this GP, belonging to our party, spent INR 
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80,000 to get elected, including INR 30,000 from his own pocket. I was sure on 
winning my seat. The residents of a particular SC locality of my constituency 
showed a liking for me and voted for me.  The votes from this locality were the 
‘balance votes’ that decided the outcome of the contest for my seat. The votes 
were almost equally split in favour of me and against me, so the votes of the SC 
locality were decisive. I would spend a lot of time in this locality before the 
elections (Author’s telephonic interview with elected member of Nowdapanur 
GP belonging to ruling party INC, dated 19/05/2010).    
The third hypothesis about the impact of electoral competition on performance 
is that electoral competition brings about a numerically significant and assertive 
opposition, which in turn can keep the ruling party alert to its shortcomings and 
pressurize it continuously, thus improving GP performance. Such oversight of the 
ruling party by the opposition group can take forms such as detection of corruption and 
wrongdoings, and detection and drawing of attention to performance failures. Both GPs 
have opposition groups, with Debipur GP having a smaller opposition (only 15% of the 
strength of the GP) and Nowdapanur GP being characterized by a numerically much 
larger opposition (about 43% of the GP’s strength). Whether the higher numerical 
strength of the opposition in Nowdapanur GP is leading to its greater effectiveness and 
assertiveness in actual practice, is assessed below.  
 One indicator of the influence of the opposition in a GP would be whether the 
opposition view that is expressed against GP decisions is recorded in the GP meeting 
registers. For both the GPs, however, (including Nowdapanur GP, which has a larger 
opposition), there was mention only of decisions adopted with consensus and no 
mention of any opposition view. The former Pradhan of Nowdapanur GP, who is 
currently a member of the opposition, commented that “the opposition exists only on 
paper in this GP. There is no real opposition. The opposition does not press for the 
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recording of opposing views during the GP meeting” (Author’s field interview, dated 
5/01/2010).  
 An opposition member of Debipur GP (belonging to the AITC) complained that 
he no longer comes to know what is written in the minutes register, and consensus is 
recorded without the information and assent of the opposition representatives (Author’s 
field interview, dated 8/10/2009). However, it might be noted that GP registers are 
available in the GP office, and nothing stops the opposition members from going to the 
GP office and asking to see the registers. Another opposition GP member of Debipur 
GP, also from AITC, expressed a different view: he said that while differences of views 
do exist, these are resolved through discussion, and ultimately consensus is achieved 
(Author’s field interview, dated 17/09/2009). While there might be hue and cry raised 
by opposition members in GP general body meetings,98
 An effective and assertive opposition is one that speaks up against and draws 
attention to wrongdoings, irregularities and shortcomings on the ruling group’s part. In 
actual practice, the opposition sometimes becomes aware of irregularities; for instance a 
current opposition member spoke of the retention of corrupt contractors linked to the 
ruling party INC (Author’s field interview, dated 5/01/2010).Yet just being aware of 
irregularities is one thing, but taking action to correct them is an entirely different 
matter. There is no evidence of any concrete effort by the opposition party members in 
Nowdapanur GP or Debipur GP to crusade, or even speak up, against corruption.  
 there is no sustained or clear 
pressure from these members on the Pradhan or the ruling party members to record 
opposition views.  
 The opposition GP members do keep a watch on the treatment accorded to their 
respective constituencies by the ruling party, and adopt an approach of persuasion and 
                                               
98While the author did not attend the general body meetings of the two GPs out of respect for the 
confidentiality of their proceedings, she was present in the GP office during one such meeting in 
Nowdapanur GP, and could clearly hear the shouting and noise going on.  
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compromise to obtain (a part of) the funds or development works that they demand for 
these areas, instead of whistle blowing or registering of protest. 99 Even in this respect, 
the numerically larger opposition of Nowdapanur GP does not show greater success. 
The NREGA output data for Debipur GP show that there was comparatively fairer 
representation of opposition constituencies among all the constituencies in which 
NREGA infrastructural works were carried out. In Nowdapanur GP, the representation 
of opposition area works among all NREGA works done is however far less than 
proportionate.100
 Given the limited assertiveness of the opposition groups in both GPs–including 
Nowdapanur GP which has a numerically much larger opposition–it does not appear 
that the opposition is playing a significant role in correcting the performance failures of 
the GP and significantly improving GP performance. The three hypotheses that propose 
positive impacts of electoral competition on local government performance therefore 
fail to be empirically borne out in the West Bengal GPs covered in this study. This 
means that there is no evidence of causal processes operating between the sanctioning 
dimension of accountability and GP performance.  
 This shows that a larger opposition does not necessarily lead to a 
much higher proportion of development gains to opposition areas.  
 The assessment of causal processes between the sanctioning dimension of 
accountability and performance, as elaborated above, was done using evidence from 
intra-GP analysis. However, the results of the comparison between the two GPs can also 
shed light on the relationship between the sanctioning dimension of accountability and 
                                               
99Naturally ruling party members never concede to all the demands of opposition areas. As a result of 
pressurization by the opposition, they might concede a portion of those demands. Opposition members, 
even if dissatisfied with the approach of the GP, accept that ‘something is better than nothing’ and do not 
register their formal protest in GP meetings. 
100In Debipur GP two out of 17 (11.76%) of constituencies are controlled by the opposition whereas nine 
out of 90 (10%) NREGA works were done in opposition constituencies in 2008-09.  Three works were 
done in opposition constituencies of Nowdapanur GP out of a total of 16 NREGA works done  in 2008-09 
(18.75%) while five out of 12 of its constituencies (41.6%) were controlled by the opposition; this is an 
indication of the much lower than proportion representation of opposition areas in Nowdapanur GP 
among the areas in which work was done. 
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GP performance. The results of the empirical study show that the GP which did worse 
on the sanctioning dimension of accountability (Debipur GP) has better overall 
performance than the GP which did better on the sanctioning dimension of 
accountability (Nowdapanur GP). Evidently, the pressure created on the GP by more 
competitive elections is unable to induce higher GP performance. The sanctioning 
dimension of accountability is therefore not having a significant impact on GP 
performance.  
 
Deliberation Dimension and Performance 
On the basis of the literature, it was hypothesized that the higher effectiveness of the 
deliberative mechanisms of accountability should lead to better performance (in terms 
of a higher extent of fulfilment of popular demands) because of a superior inflow of 
popular inputs. The deliberative forum of Gram Sansad enables the residents of West 
Bengal GPs to express their demands for various infrastructural assets or benefits of 
welfare programmes.  A perusal of the powers given to the Gram Sansads in West 
Bengal’s Panchayat law (especially the provision which states that the proposals made 
by the people in the Gram Sansad meetings are binding on the GP) seems to indicate 
that all such proposals have to be taken up for implementation. Chapter 6, however, has 
shown us how a very small percentage of Gram Sansad demands for infrastructural 
assets (embodied in the targets specified in the Annual Action Plans of the GPs for 
programmes such as NREGA, Untied Fund and Twelfth Finance Commission Fund) 
are actually fulfilled by the GP within a year. An important reason why only a small 
percentage of popular demands expressed in Gram Sansad meetings is fulfilled is 
because these demands have to pass through, and are filtered by, various decision 
making structures and stages of decision making (where prioritization and selection of 
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applied) before these are ultimately fulfilled. The account below gives us an idea about 
the complex processes that operate inside the ‘black box’ of GP decision making, and 
the factors that shape, contrain or promote the fulfilment of popular demands.  
After the Gram Sansads pass their respective lists of proposals, these proposals 
are approved in the Gram Sabha (see Chapter 4), arranged into Annual Action Plans of 
various programmes by the GP, approved in the general body meeting of the GP and 
then passed on to the higher levels for approval. The approval of the Action Plans of the 
GPs is followed by the selecting of specific works in the Action Plan for 
implementation. It should be noted that works are not taken up for implementation 
according to the serial order of works in the Action Plans (which is supposed to be 
based on the priority order identified by the Gram Sansads, as per the law). GPs and 
their committees, in reality, exercise discretion in selecting works for implementation. 
The final stage in the journey from expression of popular demands to fruition in outputs 
or created assets is the actual implementation of the selected works by the GP.  
 Preferences of decision makers play a role in selectivity and prioritization of 
works in different stages of decision making, especially at the stage of selecting works 
for implementation out of all the demands that have been expressed in the Gram 
Sansad. The considerations in selecting works are not just neutral but also often 
political. Such preferences therefore have a constraining impact on the realization of the 
popular demands expressed in Gram Sansad meetings. Apart from knowing the 
procedures used to decide the selection of works for implementation, it is thus 
important to know the considerations governing such selection.  
The interview responses and GP meeting minutes indicate that urgency of need, 
and practical considerations such as seasonal factors and the amount of funds available 
are some of the criteria applied in selecting works at a particular point of time. 
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Technical calculations have to be made by the staff of the GP (especially the Nirman 
Sahayak) so as to arrive at the appropriate number and type of works to take up at a 
point of time. Yet another type of considerations, which is not readily visible but 
extremely significant, is political considerations. GPs are supposed to maintain 
equitable resource allocation between the various constituencies, including those 
controlled by the opposition parties. Both the selected GPs have constituencies 
controlled by the opposition – two out of seventeen in Debipur GP and five out of 
twelve in Nowdapanur GP. Interview responses from GP members belonging to the 
opposition political parties of the two GPs indicate a perception of a certain degree of 
ruling party discrimination against opposition constituencies in carrying out 
development works and allocating resources.  
 While GP decision makers are obligated to maintain an equitable allocation of 
resources between all the constituencies of the GP area, and work in co-operation with 
members of all political parties, it is worth asking whether they actually do so.  
Mobarokpur constituency in Debipur GP is controlled by the opposition AITC, and one 
of the two GP members representing this area commented on his perception of 
discrimination by the ruling party against his constituency: 
The ruling party in the GP, CPI (M) exhibits partiality. It has an “allergy” 
towards Mobarokpur. Development has taken place in adjoining villages but not 
in Mobarokpur. A lot of development work has stopped midway (Author’s field 
interview with elected member of Debipur GP belonging to opposition party 
AITC, dated 8/10/2009).  
 This opposition GP member described how the ruling party of the GP was obstructing 
efforts to procure land for the Madhyamik Shiksha Kendra (alternative middle school) 
established in Mobarokpur. He commented, “The ruling party in the GP is making a 
political issue out of it, and delaying the sanctioning of land for the MSK (Madhyamik 
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Shiksha Kendra)” (Author’s field interview, dated 8/10/2009). The GUS Secretary of 
Mobarokpur also commented that there is evident neglect of Mobarokpur: 
Mobarokpur is after all an opposition area. There is an evident neglect of 
Mobarokpur’s needs; it was promised by the GP that the morum road would be 
constructed before other constituencies in Mobarokpur, but this promise was not 
fulfilled (Author’s field interview with GUS Secretary of Mobarokpur 
Constituency of Debipur GP, dated 30/12/2009).   
Debipur GP is one that is overwhelmingly dominated by one party, and 
therefore it is not surprising that its opposition members feel marginalized. 
Nowdapanur GP however has a much more competitive scenario, which is reflected in 
the presence of as many as eight members out of all its fourteen members who do not 
belong to the single largest party, the INC. The two members belonging to the Muslim 
League (both belonging to Soluadanga constituency) have experienced being part of the 
ruling coalition of the GP (between May 2008 to November 2009), as well as being part 
of the opposition thereafter. However, even when it was part of the ruling coalition, its 
constituency faced neglect by the single largest party (i.e. INC) that effectively 
controlled the GP, according to one of the two Muslim League member GP members: 
There is inadequate co-operation from the Congress (INC) controlled GP. Even 
when the Pradhan was from Muslim League and we were part of the ruling 
coalition, there was no proper co-operation from the GP (Author’s field 
interview with current opposition member of Nowdapanur GP belonging to 
Muslim League, dated 1/01/2010).  
 The GUS secretary of Soluadanga however said that financial allocations made 
by the government were eventually reaching the area, and therefore there was no real 
problem of co-operation from the GP in that sense (Author’s field interview, dated 
5/1/2010). The allegations of neglect against the opposition areas made in Debipur GP 
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are more vehement and severe than those made in Nowdapanur GP; this is possibly an 
indication that the opposition members of the latter, which has a more competitive 
electoral scenario, feel less alienated, or perceive their constutuencies as being less 
marginalized in comparison to the other constituencies of the GP.   
It is important to look at the objective output data before coming to any 
judgment about the discrimination of the ruling party against opposition constituencies 
in both GPs. The NREGA output data for Debipur GP show that there was fairer 
representation of opposition areas among all the areas in which works were carried out 
(see footnote number 101). While there might be instances of discrimination by the 
ruling party against opposition constituencies (as alleged by the GP and GUS members 
belonging to the opposition party), the data shows that opposition constituencies in 
Debipur GP are not completely deprived of development works done by the GP.  In 
Nowdapanur GP, which has the numerically larger opposition, the representation of 
opposition area works among all NREGA works done is however less than 
proportionate. This shows that a larger opposition does not necessarily lead to a higher 
proportion of development gains to opposition areas. Decision making procedures 
employed by GPs may explain their actual inclusiveness of decision making and 
treatment of opposition constituencies.  
Multiple mechanisms are used by Debipur GP to aid the selection of works for 
implementation. When selecting works for a particular constituency, the GP asks the 
concerned GUS or the representing GP member’s opinion about which works are 
needed most urgently. The GUS may also pass a resolution for a particular work to be 
taken up, and such resolution is binding on the Pradhan (Author’s field interview with 
Executive Assistant of Debipur GP, dated 10/09/2009). The GP general body meeting 
minutes reveal that the GP may also ask the GP members representing the different 
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constituencies to make a shortlist of the works most urgently needed for implementation 
in their respective constituencies, and arrange them in priority order as a basis for the 
GP to decide which work to take up. The GP meeting minutes of Debipur GP reveal 
frequent and focused discussion on the taking up of infrastructural works for 
implementation. This GP has also been seen to constitute and deploy inspection 
committees for the purpose of assessing the urgency of needs and demands. The 
function of such committees is to visit the various constituencies and neighbourhoods, 
assess the relative urgency of needs, and recommend to the GP the priority in which the 
various constituencies should be selected to carry out a particular type of work (say 
tube-well repair). One such inspection committee--appointed to assess the priority for 
carrying out tubewell sinking and re-sinking works in different constituencies using 
Untied Fund money -- consisted of the head of the infrastructure Upa-samiti of the GP, 
one GP member belonging to the opposition party, and two GP members from the 
ruling party (GP meeting minutes of Debipur GP, dated 22/09/2008).  
In Nowdapanur GP, however, neither is the GUS involved in the selection of 
works for implementation, nor are inspection committees used in the selection process. 
The GP members representing the concerned constituencies are asked about their 
opinion as to which works need to be taken up urgently (Author’s telephonic interview 
with elected member of Nowdapanur GP belonging to ruling party INC, dated 
20/05/2011). The GP meeting minutes of Nowdapanur GP also reveal discussion 
among GP members about the taking up of works for implementation. An interesting 
detail revealed by the GP meeting minutes of Nowdapanur GP is the GP adopting 
resolutions on taking up of works outside the Gram Sansad- approved Annual Action 
Plan of the GP.  These works presumably arise from the preferences of the Pradhan or 
other GP members, rather than those of the Gram Sansad attendees or GUSs. Items of 
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the GP meeting minutes of this GP reveal that certain works of afforestation and road 
construction, that were not part of the original action plan of the GP, were taken up for 
implementation in 2008-09. These works were labelled as works of the Additional 
Action Plan. In fact, the Pradhan of this GP revealed that “if a decision is taken outside 
what is adopted by the Gram Sansad, then a Gram Sansad resolution legitimizing that 
GP decision is later passed” (Author’s field interview, dated 18/12/2009). 
 Debipur GP shows greater inclusiveness than Nowdapanur GP not only in 
obtaining recommendations to aid the selection process, but also in the actual decision 
making. With respect to infrastructural works of Debipur GP, the decisions on works to 
be taken up are first taken by the Infrastructure Upa-samiti (Author’s field interview 
with Infrastructure Upa-samiti head of Debipur GP, dated 29/12/2009). Such decisions 
are then ratified in the Artha o Parikalpana (Finance and Planning) Upa-samiti of the 
GP, followed by ratification in the general body meeting of the GP.101 In Nowdapanur 
GP, the Finance and Planning Upa-samiti decides on the works to be carried out, and 
such decision is ratified in the general body meeting of the GP (Author’s telephonic 
interview with elected member of Nowdapanur GP belonging to ruling party INC, dated 
20/05/2011). Decision making in Nowdapanur GP appears to be more centralized since 
the various Upa-samitis, apart from the Finance and Planning Upa-samiti, are not 
active, and their meetings are irregular. While Nowdapanur GP is characterized by a 
high degree of electoral competition, the heads of all its Upa-samitis, who make up the 
Finance and Planning Upa-samiti, all belong to the ruling party. 102
                                               
101The five Upa-samitis of the GP are for finance and planning, education and public health, women and 
child development and social welfare, agriculture and animal husbandry development, and industry and 
infrastructure. Each is made up of GP members and headed by a GP member. The heads of the four other 
Upa-samitis are the members of the Artha o Parikalpana (Finance and Planning) Upa-samiti, and the 
Pradhan is its ex-officio head. The Finance and Planning Upa-samiti is concerned with the co-ordination 
of the overall spending and planning by the GP. 
 This probably 
102 Since all the Upa-samiti heads in Nowdapanur GP are from the ruling coalition, the high degree of 
political competition in this GP does not paralyze the working of the GP. In contrast, another GP in 
Berhampore block, Manindranagar GP, is paralyzed by its political competition since its Upa-samiti 
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explains why domination of decision making by the Finance and Planning Upa-samiti, 
and less inclusive decision making procedures, result in less equitable allocation of 
NREGA resources to opposition constituencies in Nowdapanur GP.  
The above accounts of selectivity in decision making and the impact of decision 
makers’ preferences on such selectivity give us an idea about factors that constrain the 
translation of popular demands into outputs and benefits.  On the other hand, there are 
certain actors present in the decision making process whose function is to highlight and 
push popular demands inside the decision making process. Intermediary entities such as 
the opposition group inside the GP and the Gram Unnayan Samiti (GUS) play the role 
of supervision, transmitting of information about people’s needs, and pressurization of 
the GP to meet such needs within the decision making and implementation structures. 
By performing these tasks on behalf of the people, the opposition group and GUS can 
act as a link between popular demand and actual GP decision making and 
implementation. However, in actual practice, these intermediary actors are not always 
effective in effectively supervising and pressurizing the GP.  
It has already been seen (pages 250-52) that the opposition groups in both GPs 
have limited effectiveness in pressurizing and monitoring the GP’s ruling group.  There 
is no sustained or clear pressure from these members on the Pradhan or the ruling party 
members to record opposition views. There is also no evidence of any concrete effort by 
the opposition party members in Nowdapanur GP or Debipur GP to protest against 
corruption. The opposition GP members do keep a watch on the treatment accorded to 
their respective constituencies by the ruling party, and adopt an approach of persuasion 
and compromise to obtain (a part of) the funds or development works that they demand 
                                                                                                                                       
heads belong to different political parties, which makes it very difficult for them to agree on resolutions. 
The example about Manindranagar GP was given by the Secretary of Nowdapanur GP, and the 
Panchayat Development Officer (PDO) of Berhampore block. This researcher is grateful to the Secretary 




for these areas, instead of whistle blowing or registering of protest. Even with respect to 
this limited function, the GP with the larger opposition might not necessarily be more 
successful. It has already been seen that the GP with the larger opposition group – 
Nowdapanur GP - has less fair allocation of NREGA works to opposition 
constituencies.  
The intermediary body of GUS, which exists at the constituency level, can play 
the role of conveying people’s demands to decision makers and pressurizing them to 
take up specific works for implementation. As seen in Chapter 4, in both Debipur and 
Nowdapanur GP, GUSs are involved in preparing the list of demands for their 
respective constituencies. Interview responses of GUS Secretaries in both GPs show 
that GUSs make use of means such as interaction with local residents, household visits 
and (only in Debipur GP) institutionalized neighbourhood meetings known as Para 
Baithaks to formulate these demand lists. These demand lists are then approved in 
Gram Sansad meetings, and along with proposals added by Gram Sansad meeting 
attendees, constitute the Action Plans of the GPs. Therefore the GUSs constitute an 
important source of information about people's needs for the GP. The former Pradhan 
of Nowdapanur GP (who is a current opposition member) told this researcher that GUS 
has a big role in providing information about people’s needs (Author’s field interview, 
dated 5/1/2010). An opposition member of Debipur GP and a ruling party 
representative of the same GP commented that GUS can help know people’s 
preferences better because (owing to their localized existence) they have information 
about the needs of people living in different neighbourhoods, including those living in 
remote neighbourhoods (Author’s field interviews with opposition elected member of 
Debipur GP, dated 8/10/2009, and with elected member of Debipur GP belonging to 
ruling CPI (M), dated 1/9/2009).  
 262 
 
In both GPs, therefore, GUSs help in channelizing people’s preferences into the 
GP’s decision making process at the stage of expression of people’s preferences and 
Action Plan preparation, though, as recognized in Chapter 4, intermediated expression 
has certain shortcomings and is not superior to expression by the people themselves. 
GUSs are, afterall, highly politicized in their nature and functioning, and political 
preferences shape their preparation of demand lists. Yet it must be recognized that 
GUSs perform the role of demand aggregation and are a source of information about 
people’s needs for the GP decision makers.   
 While GUSs play a role at the stage of demand expression and aggregation, it is 
pertinent to ask whether they also play a role at the stage of selection of specific works 
for implementation. As already seen, the decision makers of Nowdapanur GP do not 
consult the GUS at this stage; the decision making process followed in Debipur GP, 
however, involves consultation with GUS. The Pradhan of Debipur GP revealed, “The 
GUS informs which demand is the most important priority at the moment” (Author’s 
field interview, dated 14/09/2009). An elected member of the same GP belonging to the 
ruling CPI (M) added that GUSs convey information about people’s needs to the GP in 
the gap between two Gram Sansad meetings; for instance the GUS informs the GP 
when a tube-well in its constituency is in need of urgent repair (Author’s field 
interview, dated 3/09/2009).  
While GUSs are not involved in Nowdapanur GP’s decisions of taking up 
specific works for implementation, it must be noted that GUSs themselves have been 
empowered to take up and implement small-scale works in their respective 
constituencies. GUSs in Nowdapanur GP have been involved in works broadly related 
to hygiene, health and nutrition whereas GUSs in Debipur GP have been involved in 
works such as repair of toilets and Anganwadi Kendra buildings. The benefits of giving 
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money to GUSs are that works can be done by the GUS more quickly compared to work 
done by the GP (Author’s field interview with Education and Public Health Upa-samiti 
head of Nowdapanur GP, dated 14/12/2009). GUSs are also more localized and 
connected to needs on the ground, and can accordingly take prompt efforts to meet 
urgent needs such as for arranging for medical care for ill villagers (Author’s field 
interview with GUS Secretary of Srirampur-Panchberia constituency of Nowdapanur 
GP, dated 7/01/2010). 
The unique feature of the GUS is the representation of the opposition party 
members through inclusion of the second highest winner of votes in that constituency in 
the last GP election. The GUS secretary of Mobarokpur constituency in Debipur GP 
(belonging to the AITC, which is the opposition party of the GP but the ruling party in 
Mobarokpur constituency) testified to the positive impact of opposition representation 
on the working of the GUS: 
The presence of opposition members in GUS is a good idea. They exert pressure 
to get work done, and therefore their presence makes a positive difference. 
Earlier when the CPI (M) was the ruling party in Mobarokpur constituency, the 
GP members representing this constituency were not very competent. However, 
because of GUS and the presence of opposition members (belonging to AITC) in 
GUS, some work was done. I was a GUS member even then (Author’s field 
interview with GUS Secretary of Mobaorkpur constituency of Debipur GP, 
dated 30/12/2009).    
 The GUS’s effectiveness is undermined when opposition members in GUS 
refuse to come for meetings, or the formation or functioning of GUS is paralyzed 
because of disharmonious political competition. In some constituencies of Nowdapanur 
GP, the opposition is boycotting the meetings of GUS. Conversations with elected 
representatives of three out of the ten constituencies in which GUS was constituted in 
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Nowdapanur GP revealed that for the two of these three areas, opposition members did 
not come for GUS meetings and did not co-operate. For the other constituency, also 
controlled by the ruling INC, the opposition party member attended occasionally 
(Author’s telephonic interview with elected member of Nowdapanur GP representing 
Sripurdanga constituency, dated 21/09/2010). The refusal or unwillingness of 
opposition members to attend GUS meetings obliterates the possible advantages of 
opposition representation in the GUS viz. greater vigilance and applying positive 
pressure for development.  
 The GUS could be constituted in all the 17 constituencies of Debipur GP, 
including the opposition constituencies, which are marked by a higher degree of 
political competition. In two constituencies of Nowdapanur GP, on the other hand, 
GUSs could not be constituted due to political conflict. The attempt to constitute GUSs 
in these two constituencies of Nowdapanur GP was marked by violence and chaos.  The 
reason behind the outbreak of conflict between parties, that prevented the GUS from 
being constituted, was the irreconciliable and opportunistic disagreement between the 
ruling and opposition parties of these constituencies about which party the GUS 
Secretary would be from; each party was adamant in pushing its own candidate for the 
post.  
The GUS has several important functions: supervision, pressurization, 
conveying information about people’s needs, and also delegated spending on health 
related works. The non-constitution of GUS due to disharmonious political competition 
would thus be detrimental to GP service delivery in the concerned constituencies.  The 
Education and Public Health Upa-samiti head of Nowdapanur GP highlighted that the 
absence of GUS is a serious obstacle to development work, especially in view of its 
health-related spending functions (Author’s field interview, dated 18/12/2009).  
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Thus, the short-sighted nature of political competition in Nowdapanur GP is 
hindering GUS functioning in Nowdapanur GP.  Electoral competition (which results in 
opposition representation in GUS) could have had a wholesome effect or adverse effect 
on the working of GUS, depending on whether the nature of political competition is 
lively but harmonious (for example seen in Mobarokpur constituency of Debipur GP) or 
whether it is short sighted, opportunistic and taking the form of irresolvable political 
conflict as seen in some constituencies of Nowdapanur GP.103
 GUS also have an important role to play with respect to supervision of the 
implementation work going on in their respective constituencies, in order to keep track 
of the progress of work, and also to check irregularities and corruption.  Non-NREGA 
works that have an expenditure of above INR 20,000 can be implemented through 
contractors, and it is imperative (for the sake of fairness and transparency) to supervise 
and monitor the implementation work done through contractors, starting from the 
tender process to the awarding of the contract to the quality of the actual construction 
work taken up by the contractor. The GUS, by virtue of its ‘localness’ is well suited to 
monitor the tender process as well as the work being done by contractors in its 
constituency. The head of the Infrastructure Upa-samiti of Debipur GP revealed the 
valuable constribution of the GUS towards monitoring of ongoing works: 
   
GUS carries out inspection of ongoing infrastructural works; as a result works 
are carried out smoothly. GUS members know their village well and hence can 
carry out supervision more effectively (Author’s field interview with head of 
Infrastructure Upa-samiti of Debipur GP, dated 29/12/2009).  
                                               
103Certain studies have commented that electoral competition has a positive impact on performance as 
long as it is supplemented by political competition that is harmonious and devoid of gross opportunism 
(Crook and Manor 1998; Faguet 2006). We thus see that some specific findings of the comparative study 




All the GUS secretaries interviewed in the two GPs confirmed that their 
respective GUSs were involved in monitoring of implementation work being done in 
their respective constituencies, both for NREGA and non-NREGA works. The GUS 
Secretary of Debipur-Chhalalpur constituency of Debipur GP elaborated that with 
respect to NREGA, the GUS sees to it that materials are being supplied, works being 
done properly and NREGA wages are being paid to labourers (Author’s field interview, 
dated 1/09/2009). The GUS Secretary of Sripurdanga constituency in Nowdapanur GP 
clarified that the GUS has full responsibility to see that contractors are doing their work 
properly, and in the event that contractors fail in their job, then the GUS informs the GP, 
and money flow is stopped (Author’s field interview, dated 19/12/2009).  
The Executive Assistant of Debipur GP summed up the importance of GUSs in 
carrying out the task of monitoring: GUSs by taking up the monitoring of 
implementation were greatly helping the Pradhan and the GP, since it is not possible for 
the Pradhan to inspect the work on the ground at all times. The GUSs in Debipur GP, 
according to the Executive Assistant, were taking their task of supervision very 
seriously (Author’s field interview, dated 29/12/2009). The non-constitution of GUS in 
two constituencies of Nowdapanur GP therefore is hindering the task of supervision to 
some extent, compared to Debipur GP where GUSs have been constituted in all 
constituencies and are involved in supervision of ongoing work.  
Having seen the complex processes that transpire between the expression of 
people’s demands in Gram Sansad meetings and actual GP outputs, the impact of the 
deliberative mechanism of Gram Sansad on GP performance may be summed up as 
follows: Gram Sansad demands in both the chosen GPs are filtered through the layers 
of decision making mentioned above. However a relatively larger proportion of Gram 
Sansad demands for infrastructural assets (which also constitute GP targets) was 
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fulfilled in Debipur GP. While a larger proportion of Gram Sansad demands was 
fulfilled in Debipur GP, the functioning of Gram Sansad as a deliberative mechanism in 
this GP was ridden by major shortcomings of lower attendance in Gram Sansad 
meetings, and non-attendance of people not belonging to the ruling party (see Chapter 
4). Nowdapanur GP was found to be superior to Debipur GP in terms of the deliberation 
dimension of accountability due to the higher effectiveness of its deliberative 
mechanism (see Chapter 4); however Debipur GP is ahead on both measures of 
fulfilment of popular demand--extent of satisfaction of Gram Sansad demands and the 
satisfaction of villagers with infrastructural outputs (see Chapter 6). Debipur GP was 
also found to have overall superior GP performance. This implies the lack of any 
association between the deliberation dimension of accountability and fulfilment of 
popular demands, and also between this dimension of accountability and overall 
performance.  
 Contrary to the hypothesis, the higher effectiveness of the deliberative 
mechanism does not result in a higher fulfilment of popular demand. What then 
explains the variation between the two GPs with respect to the extent of fulfilment of 
popular demand? Evidently, other performance determinants such as finances and 
capacity are critical to translate a larger percentage of popular demands into outputs, 
and explain why Debipur GP was able to fulfil a larger portion of popular demands. 
Elements of the decision making processes described above also play a role in the 
translation of popular demands expressed in the deliberative forum, into outputs that 
satisfy people’s preferences. In the case of Debipur GP, the higher inclusiveness of 
decision making, and also the more effective role of intermediary bodies such as GUS, 
may not explain why a higher proportion of Gram Sansad demands were fulfilled. 
However they may possibly explain greater inclusiveness in this GP’s resource 
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allocation and service delivery among different constituencies of the GP, and less 
arbitrariness in allocating resources among competing demands (because of more 
painstaking efforts by the GP to assess the urgency of needs) . Such inclusiveness is a 
likely factor contributing to its overall higher popular satisfaction levels with respect to 
infrastructural assets provided by the GP. 
 
Monitoring Dimension and Performance 
Social Audit, carried out under NREGA, is the sole monitoring mechanism available in 
West Bengal GPs. Logically speaking, one may hypothesize that monitoring 
mechanisms such as Social Audit, by exposing wastage or loss of funds, may lead to 
correction of such loss or wastage, and consequent improvement in the GP’s fund 
utilization and performance. Social Audit, if done in a thorough and comprehensive 
way, may also expose other shortcomings in implementation such as defects in the 
quality of infrastructural works and delay in completing works, and induce corrective 
learning. Such corrective learning, in turn, may improve GP performance.  
 It was seen in Chapter 4 that Debipur GP was better than Nowdapanur GP on the 
monitoring dimension of accountability by virtue of its relatively higher effectiveness 
of Social Audit. Since Social Audit pertains to a scrutiny of NREGA implementation, it 
is necessary to see which GP did better on NREGA output performance in order to 
decipher the causal impact of Social Audit on performance. Debipur GP did better on 
NREGA output performance, and also on overall GP performance. The Social Audit 
figures presented in Chapter 4 pertain to 2009-10. As seen in Chapter 6, Debipur GP 
had better NREGA output performance for 2009-10 and 2010-11, in terms of a higher 
proportion of completed works.  
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One should note that Social Audit is a nascent accountability mechanism, 
introduced only in 2009-10. Logically speaking, a part of the impact of Social Audit on 
NREGA output performance could have been felt in the same financial year. This is 
because Social Audit in 2009-10 took place in the middle of the financial year (July or 
August of the calendar year 2009), which meant that it could have possibly influenced 
the ongoing and remaining NREGA works for that financial year (which ended in  
March of the calendar year 2010). The nature of Social Audit is also relevant in this 
respect; Social Audit also involves monitoring of on-going works, and not just an 
ex-post facto review of works completed in the past. It is conceivable that Social Audit 
in any particular financial year can have part of its impact felt in the same financial year. 
Nevertheless, the full impact of this nascent mechanism might not have been felt in the 
year of its introduction. The full impact of corrective learning (i.e. learning from the 
exposure of mistakes, and consequent performance improvement) can possibly only be 
felt on a more long time basis. NREGA output figures for 2010-11 however, show the 
same conclusions as 2009-10 figures, regarding the association between effectiveness 
of Social Audit (held in 2009-10) and NREGA output performance (for 2010-11). The 
reader must note that a more long-term observation of the impact of Social Audit on 
NREGA output (by collecting data for several years) is likely to yield more robust 
findings about the relationship between Social Audit and NREGA output performance.   
Debipur GP, which has better effectiveness of Social Audit, also shows better 
NREGA output performance. The West Bengal study therefore shows an association 
between the effectiveness of Social Audit and NREGA output performance, and also 
between the monitoring dimension of accountability and overall performance. 
However, such association does not necessarily indicate causality, and needs to be 
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substantiated with evidence of the operation of causal processes between Social Audit 
and NREGA output performance.  
 GP elected members and staff in Debipur GP testified to the positive impact of 
Social Audit (in terms of correcting faults in certain aspects of NREGA 
implementation), while those in Nowdapanur GP felt that it was being done in a very 
superficial way and having no positive impact, as seen in Chapter 4.  While Social Audit 
may be having some impact in Debipur GP (as claimed by the staff members and 
Pradhan), it is not affecting NREGA output performance. Interviews with a staff 
member of Debipur GP revealed that the defects exposed through Social Audit 
pertained to beneficiary-related matters under NREGA implementation, and had 
nothing to do with NREGA physical output (asset creation) performance. The Nirman 
Sahayak of Debipur GP revealed that Social Audit in the GP had revealed that some 
villagers were not aware that they had to apply at the GP office in order to obtain 
NREGA employment. They were therefore not taking the intiative to apply, and were 
losing out on NREGA employment as a result (Author’s telephonic interview, dated 
10/01/2012).104
 The absence of independence in the Social Audit process is possibly 
undermining its effectiveness in exposing faults and inducing corrective learning. The 
staff members of Debipur GP, such as the Secretary and the Nirman Sahayak, admitted 
that they were actively involved in carrying out Social Audit and completing the Social 
Audit report. The Nirman Sahayak of Debipur GP revealed that the interest and 
involvement of the Social Audit Team members is very limited because they are not 
  NREGA has both employment generation and infrastructure-creation 
functions, but Social Audit in Debipur GP is having an impact on the former and not the 
latter. 
                                               
104At the time of this telephonic interview, the Nirman Sahayak had very recently been transferred to 
another GP. Matters related to Social Audit in Debipur GP, were, however, fresh in his memory.  
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remunerated for their job (Author’s telephonic interview, dated 10/01/2012). The GP 
staff members are already over-burdened; therefore it is highly unlikely that the scrutiny 
of NREGA implementation involved in the Social Audit exercise is done in such a 
careful way that it is becoming a significant source of corrective learning with respect to 
improvement of fund utilization and output performance for the GP.  
 The degree of popular input used in preparing the Social Audit report is very 
meagre, and is from the interview responses of five NREGA beneficiaries elicited by 
the Social Audit team and conversation of the team members with a few workers at the 
NREGA worksites. Furthermore, such input is only related to the rights of NREGA 
beneficiaries as workers (such as the timely payment of wages, facilities for workers at 
work sites, and time taken between application and actual employment). These inputs 
are important, but do not have a significant bearing on NREGA output performance. 
There is no popular input on the assessment of NREGA outputs (for instance on the 
quality of assets created through NREGA implementation), on expenditure-related 
matters, or on the time taken to complete the construction of the assets.   
 The popular monitoring mechanism of Social Audit therefore cannot be held 
responsible for the superior NREGA output performance of Debipur GP. Audits and 
other forms of monitoring carried out by higher levels of government are much more 
comprehensive, frequent and substantial compared to Social Audit, and may possibly 
be having a more notable impact on both GPs’ fund utilization and performance than 
Social Audit. As far as monitoring of GP functioning is concerned, intermediate 
organizations such as GUS, and to an even greater extent, oversight conducted by 
higher levels of government, appear to be playing a more significant oversight role than 




Aspects of Performance and their Relationship with Accountability  
As seen in Chapter 6, GP performance has been assessed in two functional areas of 
infrastructure and alternative primary education. The impact of accountability on each 
of these functional areas is stated below.  
 
Performance in the Functional Area of Infrastructure  
It has been seen in Chapter 6 that Debipur GP had an overall superior performance in 
the area of infrastructure development. It is noteworthy that this GP performs better not 
only on physical output-based measures (such as achievement of larger proportion of 
targeted works, and higher rate of completion of works taken up) but also on 
satisfaction-based measures related to available infrastructure.  
 There is no association observed between overall accountability and overall 
performance in the area of infrastructure, since one GP does better on the former 
(Nowdapanur GP) and a different one on the latter (Debipur GP). There is also no 
association seen between overall accountability and satisfaction with infrastructural 
assets, because Debipur GP has lower overall accountability but higher satisfaction with 
infrastructural assets.   
 Two accountability mechanisms are specifically related to the functional area of 
infrastructure–the deliberative mechanism of Gram Sansad and the monitoring 
mechanism of Social Audit. The popular demands for infrastructural assets expressed 
by the Gram Sansad constitute the infrastructural targets of the GP. Debipur GP was 
able to fulfil a higher proportion of these targets or demands. However as already stated, 
such achievement is not due to the higher effectiveness of the deliberative mechanism, 
but due to the impact of other performance determinants. It has also been seen that the 
popular monitoring mechanism pertaining specifically to an infrastructural programme 
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--Social Audit of NREGA implementation–is not having a significant impact on 
NREGA output performance.  
 
Performance in the Functional Area of Alternative Primary Education 
Debipur GP has performed better than Nowdapanur GP in the functional area of 
alternative primary education, while Nowdapanur GP has higher overall accountability. 
Overall accountability of the GP therefore has no association with GP performance in 
the area of alternative primary education. Debipur GP, which performed better in this 
functional area, did better on only one dimension of accountability (the monitoring 
dimension). As already seen, the monitoring dimension is assessed in terms of the 
effectiveness of Social Audit, and the mechanism of Social Audit is only relevant for 
NREGA output performance under the functional area of infrastructure, and has no 
relevance for the functional area of alternative primary education.  
It is relevant to state here certain insights about accountability in the field of 
alternative primary education, compared to accountability in the field of infrastructure. 
These insights indicate that the degree of accountability (in terms of popular pressure) 
varies from one functional area to another, i.e. people are relatively more active in 
pressurizing their elected representatives for certain functional areas (such as 
infrastructure) compared to others (such as education). It should be noted that the 
interview-based insights and examples given below pertain to pressure imposed on 
various decision makers such as Panchayat Samiti, Zilla Parishad and state 
government, and not necessarily to pressure imposed on GP decision makers. 
Nevertheless, they shed light on the general nature of popular pressure, and the relative 
importance that people attach to different functional areas.  
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    The education Karmadhyakshas (standing committee heads) of Memari-I 
Panchayat Samiti and Burdwan Zilla Parishad (the district and block Panchayats 
above Debipur GP) were of the opinion that there is popular pressure on elected 
representatives to construct and repair roads and provide electricity, but not to provide 
facilities to educational institutions such as alternative primary schools (SSKs). They 
elaborated that people have been seen to boycott elections over issues such as the 
condition of roads and electricity, but never over the condition of educational 
institutions (Author’s field interview with Education Karmadhyaksha of Memari-I 
Panchayat Samiti, dated 12/10/2009 and of Education Karmadhyaksha of Burdwan 
Zilla Parishad, dated 7/10/2009). Such lack of popular pressure for the field of 
education possibly leads to the consequence of decision makers giving lower priority to 
the needs of educational institutions such as SSKs,105
Certain observations collected from this study reveal that people have been 
seen, occassionally, to organize themselves and collectively pressurize decision makers 
for the improvement of infrastructure. All the voters of Sripurdanga village of 
Nowdapanur GP (over 500  in number) boycotted voting in the May 2011 Assembly 
elections
and more importance to works 
such as road repair and construction (given  the context of fund constraints).  As a result, 
educational institutions such as SSKs are plagued by the problem of poor facilities.   
106
                                               
105While GPs have primary responsibility for providing facilities to SSKs within their area, the 
Panchayat Samiti and Zilla Parishad can also take up additional works to provide facilities to SSKs lying 
within their respective blocks/districts according to their discretion.  
 in West Bengal as a mark of protest against the very poor condition of the 
‘Badshahi Sadak’, the road that connects this village to the adjoining villages. Mass 
petitions have been submitted, in the past (not to the concerned GP, but to the concerned 
Panchayat Samiti and Zilla Parishad) for the improvement of a very poor quality road 
in Mobarokpur village of Debipur GP, which has not undergone any maintenance work 
106Assembly elections are held for the constitution of the legislative assembly (the lower house of the 
legislature) of the state of West Bengal.  
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since its construction (Author’s field interview with GUS Secretary of Mobarokpur 
constituency of Debipur GP, dated 30/12/2009).  A senior bureaucrat in  Burdwan Zilla 
Parishad  revealed that even though road construction activities in his district (Burdwan 
district) were at a very high level, there was still popular pressure for road 
improvement,  for instance to upgrade morum roads into pitch roads. He also opined 
that education, health and nutrition were areas of low priority in popular demand as 
compared to infrastructure (Author’s field interview with Additional District 
Magistrate, Burdwan Zilla Parishad, dated 7/10/2009).  
 
Overall Impact of Accountability on Performance 
Nowdapanur GP is rated higher than Debipur GP on overall accountability, because it 
does better on two out of three dimensions of accountability, including the crucial 
sanctioning dimension. However, in terms of overall performance, Debipur GP 
performs better. Therefore there is no association between overall accountability and 
overall performance seen in the results of the comparison between the two GPs in West 
Bengal.  
  Evidence of the non-operation of the required causal processes between each 
accountability dimension and performance also shows the lack of any significant causal 
impact of accountability in improving performance. The evidence from these two 
sources--case comparison and causal process tracing--therefore shows that 
accountability is not a significant determinant of GP performance in actual practice in 
the West Bengal GPs. Table 23 summarizes the relationship between accountability 




Table 23: Impact of Accountability Dimensions on Performance in the West 
Bengal GPs  
Accountability 
dimension 









No - Nowdapanur GP better on 
sanctioning dimension but Debipur 
GP has higher performance. 
No No 
Deliberation 
No - Nowdapanur GP better on 
deliberation dimension but Debipur 
GP has higher performance. 
    No107 No  
Monitoring 
Yes - Debipur GP better on 





No – Nowdapanur GP has higher 
aggregate accountability but lower 
performance. 
No No 
Source: The author’s analysis and inference 
 
 
 Table 23 shows that none of the dimensions of accountability has a notable 
causal impact on performance. Furthermore, it has already been seen that GP 
performance in the selected functional areas of infrastructure or alternative primary 
education cannot be explained by the impact of accountability. The higher overall 
performance of Debipur GP is explained not by higher accountability, but by variation 
in other performance determinants. The impact of other performance determinants is 
explored in the next section.   
 
Other Determinants of Performance 
It was seen in the framework of variables of this study (see Chapter 1) that there are 
three possible primary performance determinants that can explain performance 
                                               
107A clarification needs to be stated here. While there is a link (albeit constrained) between the popular 
demands expressed in the deliberative forum and decision making in both West Bengal GPs, there is no 
causal link seen between higher and more inclusive attendance in the deliberative forum (which is mainly 




variation: accountability, financial strength and capacity. Since the role of 
accountability in explaining variation in performance has already been examined and 
ruled out, this section shall examine the role of the other two primary determinants 
(finances and capacity) in explaining variation in performance between Debipur GP and 
Nowdapanur GP. The framework also contains a secondary independent variable, 
preferences of decision makers. The impact of this secondary determinant of 
performance will be examined in the latter part of this section.  
 
Primary Determinants: Finances and Capacity 
The possible primary determinants of performance (other than accountability) are 
finances and capacity. Their impact on performance is assessed in this section.   
 
Finances 
This factor is widely assumed to be a critical determinant of GP performance. It can be 
seen from Table 24 that the GP with the overall superior performance, Debipur GP, had 
much higher total revenue and expenditure than Nowdapanur GP in 2008-09.  
 
Table 24: Overall Financial Strength of the West Bengal GPs (2008-09) in Indian 
Rupees (INR) 
 Total revenue 
Revenue 





per head of by 
population 
Debipur GP 15,309,835 579.08 16,043,433 606.83 
Nowdapanur GP 5,593,736 263.31 5,174,677 243.58 




The financial superiority of Debipur GP is more clearly demonstrated when the 
population factor is controlled for in comparing financial strength.108
 The components of the revenue of GPs are two-fold: Own Source Revenue and 
financial allocation from higher levels of government (the latter mainly comprising 
funds of central and state programmes such as NREGA, Twelfth Finance Commission 
Fund, and Untied Fund of State Finance Commission). Table 25 shows that the 
financial allocations made by the higher levels of government under various 
programmes (barring BRGF)
 Debipur GP’s 
spending per head of its population, and its revenue per head of population, are more 
than twice those of Nowdapanur GP.  




Table 25: Financial Allocations Made under Different Programmes (2008-09) to 
the West Bengal GPs (in INR) 
Programme Debipur GP Nowdapanur GP 
NREGA 3,460,100 1,011,438 
Twelfth Finance Commission 881,939 462,485 
Untied Fund 615,374 335,376 
BRGF 0 216,077 
Source: Annual Income–Expenditure statements of the two GPs 
 
 What explains the differences in financial allocation between the two GPs? 
Some light can be thrown on this issue by examining the principles of fund allocation 
for some of these programmes. NREGA’s financial allocation is driven by the demand 
for work among villagers and every subsequent allocation in a financial year is 
                                               
108See the Appendix for population figures. 
109BRGF or Backward Regions Grant Fund allocations are given only to districts designated as backward 
areas. Murshidabad district to which Nowdapanur GP belongs receives BRGF funding while Burdwan 
district (to which Debipur GP belongs) does not. 
110The allocations stated in Table 25 do not add up to the total revenue of the two GPs stated in Table 24. 
This is because the programmes stated in Table 25 only pertain to infrastructural development. GPs also 
receive other fund allocations, such as for programmes in other functional areas like social security.  
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determined on the basis of the GP’s success in spending earlier funds. The higher 
NREGA allocation of Debipur GP indicates the higher aggregate demand for NREGA 
employment in this GP (though the higher demand is to an extent a function of higher 
population) and also its ability to spend the allocations.  
 The allocations of Twelfth Finance Commission and Untied (Second State 
Finance Commission) funds are done according to fixed formulae that are highly 
elaborate. Since the formulae are so specific, the likelihood of political motives 
influencing the allocation of these funds is not high. What is noteworthy is that 
distribution of the fund of each district among Panchayat Samitis is done largely on the 
basis of population (50% weightage) and the remaining weightage is divided on the 
basis of equal weightage on the criteria of SC and ST population, and three criteria of 
socio-economic backwardness. 111
 Debipur GP is the economically more developed GP, and it also has higher 
aggregate financial strength. The assumed relationship between economic development 
and higher financial strength is logically most obvious in the relationship between 
 The Panchayat Samiti fund, in turn, is divided 
among all the GPs in the block based on two criteria of 50% weightage each–population 
and proportion of illiterate population. The criterion of  higher population, followed by 
higher SC and ST population, are most significant in explaining the  higher allocation of 
funds to Burdwan district, Memari-I block and Debipur GP because Murshidabad 
district, Berhampore block and Nowdapanur GP appear to be more deserving of higher 
allocation considering the other criteria which are all indicators of socio-economic 
backwardness.  
                                               
111Distribution of the Twelfth Finance Commission district fund and Untied Fund’s district fund among 
Panchayat Samitis is done on the basis of population (50% weightage) and SC and ST population, 
illiterate population, number of villages without power and number of villages without pucca 
(all-weather) approach road (12.5% weightage each). The distribution of the state fund among districts is 
done on the basis of population (50% weightage) and density of population, rural population, ST 
population, SC population, illiterate population, infant mortality, and per capita district domestic product 
(7-8% weightage to each)  (Government of West Bengal 2005a, 2005b). 
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economic development and the extent of Own Source Revenue (OSR), the revenue 
raised by the GP through sources such as taxes, fees and rents,112
 
 and not between 
economic development and the extent of funds transferred from higher levels of 
government. Population strength and composition, and not economic development, 
largely explain why Debipur GP got higher allocations under central and state 
programmes. Table 26 shows the extent of OSR raised by both West Bengal GPs. 
Table 26: Own Source Revenue (OSR) of the West Bengal GPs (2008-09)  
 Total OSR (amount in INR) 
OSR as proportion 
of total revenue 
OSR per head of 
population 
Debipur GP 454,146 2.97% 17.18 
Nowdapanur GP 68,715 1.23% 3.23 
Source: Data from the Annual Income –Expenditure statements of the two GPs 
 
 Table 26 shows that for both the GPs, OSR forms a very small percentage of 
overall revenue. OSR is therefore not a very significant determinant behind GP 
performance. Even the economically developed GP, Debipur GP, mobilized only about 
3% of its total revenue on its own efforts; its OSR share and amount  are however higher 
than those of Nowdapanur GP. Nowdapanur GP is characterized by its dismal 
achievement in OSR mobilization: it was able to obtain, on average, a paltry amount of 
three Indian Rupees as OSR from each resident in the entire year. Therefore, Debipur 
GP has comparatively higher OSR (keeping with its status as an economically more 
developed GP). However, its overall financial superiority is explained to a very small 
extent by its superior OSR, and largely by the higher allocations it receives from higher 
levels of government.  
                                               
112The major source of OSR for GPs are house and land tax, followed by items such as house construction 
fee, business registration fee, and rents on houses and property owned by the GP. 
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 Financial superiority, in the form of higher aggregate revenue, has an 
undeniable relationship with GP performance. Finances are after all an indispensable 
ingredient of service delivery by GPs. Debipur GP, which shows better overall GP 
performance, has marked financial superiority over Nowdapanur GP. Elected 
representative responses affirm the importance of finances as a determinant of 
performance. The financial constraint was stated most frequently by the elected 
representatives interviewed in the two GPs as the top obstacle that hinders their ability 
to satisfy popular demands and needs. The Pradhan of Debipur GP commented, “Funds 
are always a barrier. The problem is that there are too many demands and too few 
funds” (Author’s field interview, dated 14/09/2009). The Pradhan of Nowdapanur GP 
too commented that fund flow is low compared to the magnitude of needs (Author’s 
field interview, dated 18/12/2009). The head of the Infrastructure Upa-samiti of 
Debipur GP added that his GP being a large one with 17 constituencies and over 20 
villages meant that there were a lot of demands, but the allotted funds are not sufficient 
to meet them (Author’s field interview, dated 29/12/2009). Such responses show that 
funds are a major determining factor behind GP performance. While elected 
representatives in both GPs perceive available funds to be insufficient, one can infer 
that the GP having larger financial strength would be at a relative advantage in meeting 
popular demands.  
Apart from the the insufficient amount of funds relative to the magnitude of 
popular demand, the other constraints identified by the Pradhans and other elected 
representatives of the two GPs were related to lack of autonomy in spending  and delays 
in arrival of funding. The existing programmatic funds such as Twelfth Finance 
Commission Fund, Untied Fund and BRGF are ridden by conditionalities. The 
Pradhans of Debipur GP and Nowdanapur GP commented that even though the Untied 
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Fund is named so, in actuality it is hardly untied (Author’s field interviews with 
Pradhans of Debipur GP and Nowdapanur GP, dated 14/09/2009 and 18/12/2009 
respectively). 113
The elected representatives of both GPs also identified delays in fund arrival 
from the higher levels as an important problem. The problem of delayed arrival of 
NREGA funds was experienced in Debipur GP; this had the consequences of NREGA 
pukur kata work having to be stopped, and when the money finally arrived, it was 
monsoon and these kinds of works could not be done (Author’s field interviews with 
Infrastructure Upa-samiti head of Debipur GP, dated 29/12/2009 and a ruling party 
elected representative of Debipur GP, dated 3/09/2009). The Secretary of Nowdapanur 
GP mentioned that the delay in arrival of certain programme funds is endemic; for 
 Even NREGA, the largest source of funds for GP and a key resource 
for infrastructural development, has a very important restricting factor: the stipulated 
60: 40 ratio of labour costs to capital costs means that there are limitations on material 
intensive construction work being taken up under NREGA, as per the rules. The 
Infrastructure Upa-samiti head of Debipur GP commented that because of such 
restrictions, the bulk of the NREGA fund has to be spent on pukur kata (pond 
excavation), and GP decision makers are constrained to take up other kinds of 
infrastructural work (such as road construction and repair) that might be needed 
(Author’s field interview, dated 29/12/2009) . Another constraint was revealed by the 
head of the Education and Public Health Upa-samiti of Nowdapanur GP - unused funds 
of one programme cannot be spent on another programme without obtaining approval 
from the higher authorities (Author’s telephonic interview, dated 12/07/2010).  
                                               
113 The Twelfth Finance Commission funds may only be spent on maintenance or repair of existing 
assets, while Untied fund may only be spent on construction of new assets (Murshidabad Zilla Parishad 
2009). At least 5% Twelfth Finance Commission funds have to be spent on maintenance of GP accounts, 
15% has to be spent on creation and improvement of database (including computerization) and 10% has 
to be spent on water and sanitation services including solid waste management; even the untied fund has 
fixed percentages for spending on certain functional areas ( Order of Panchayats and Rural Development 
Department, Government of West Bengal, dated 1st August 2005). 
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instance funds supposed to come in April, the beginning of the financial year, arrive 
only in November or December (Author’s field interview, dated 18/12/2009).114
However, the availability of funds is not sufficient by itself to ensure better 
performance. What is equally, if not more, significant is the utilization of available 
funds. Table 27 shows the extent of fund utilization in both GPs in 2008-09. The total 
amount of available funds shown in Table 27 represents a combination of revenue 
obtained by the GP in 2008-09 and its unspent funds from earlier years. 
 
 
Table 27: Aggregate Fund Utilization by the West Bengal GPs (2008-09)  
 
Total amount of 






Debipur GP 16,986,300 16,043,433 94.45% 
Nowdapanur GP 8,012,858 5,174,677 64.58% 
Source: Data from the Annual Income-Expenditure statements of the two GPs 
 
 It can be seen from Table 27 that Debipur GP is much ahead in utilizing 
available funds. This GP spent as much as 94.45% of its available finances in 2008-09. 
Nowdapanur GP lags far behind by being able to spend only 64.58% of its funds. 
Debipur GP’s superiority in financial strength, and even more crucially its superior 
utilization of available financial resources, is a very significant factor in explaining its 
better performance compared to Nowdapanur GP. What explains Debipur GP’s 
superiority in utilizing available funds? The differences in fund utilization between both 
GPs might be attributed to a complex mix of factors that include aspects of capacity 
such as skills of staff and elected members in strategic management and planning, GP 
leadership, elected member and staff efforts and contributions, as well as other factors 
                                               
114 The Education Karmadhyaksha of Berhampore Panchayat Samiti confirmed that programme funds 
such as Untied fund and Twelfth Finance Commission Fund arrive from the higher levels only at the end 
of the financial year (Author’s field interview, dated 9/12/2009). 
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such as fund arrival timings. The remaining primary performance determinant – 
capacity - can thus explain Debipur GP’s superiority in utilizing available funds to an 
extent.   
 
Capacity   
The capacity of GPs has certain components–human resource capacity, leadership, 
material capacity and financial management. Human resource capacity consists of the 
abilities and efforts of GP elected members and staff. Material capacity comprises the 
equipment and facilities of the GP office or establishment. GP capacity also includes 
elements financial management and leadership, because these elements play a role in 
explaining effective utilization of funds by GPs. Leadership is both a component of 
human resource capacity, and a component of GP capacity in its own right.  
 The capacity of the elected members is an important component of the human 
resource capacity of a GP, and skills and knowledge, in turn, are a component of the 
capacity of elected members. Training programmes for Pradhans and Upa-samiti heads 
in West Bengal GPs has been going for some years, whereas training programmes for 
elected representatives other than Pradhan and Upa-samiti heads are a more recent 
initiative, started in late 2009. All GP members, at the time of being sworn into office, 
are given a Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) book in the Bengali language which 
provides detailed information about GP structure, powers, fund sources, rules and other 
matters related to GP functioning.  
 One would expect that knowledge received from training would not be such a 
significant factor affecting decision making by elected representatives as it would affect 
bureaucrats. However there may be instances of training shaping the decisions of 
elected representatives. An NGO known as ‘Sebabrata’ in Berhampore block is 
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involved in training GP functionaries in issues related to health and sanitation. The 
Education and Public Health Upa-samiti head of Nowdapanur GP underwent such 
training at the Sebabrata headquarters, and revealed that after undergoing such training, 
he realized the importance of constructing platforms at the base of tube-wells to prevent 
contaminants present in the soil from seeping into the ground water. On such 
realization, he went on to order the construction of these platforms in various tube-wells 
of his GP on his own initiative, without any requests from the people emerging to this 
end (Author’s field interview, dated 19/12/2009). This also shows an instance of 
responsiveness to ‘need’ rather than to ‘expressed popular demand’.  
The author witnessed a training session for elected members (other than 
Pradhans and Upa-samiti heads) at Berhampore block Headquarters. Elected members 
from various GPs in Berhampore block, including Nowdapanur GP attended. The two 
elected members who attended from Nowdapanur GP were opposition members; none 
of the members belonging to the ruling party attended. In a conversation before the 
commencement of training, the two trainers expressed pessimism about the impact of 
such training; they felt that most attendees would not be able to assimilate most of what 
would be taught. The assistant trainer felt that education level and pre-occupation of 
poorer elected representatives with earning their livelihood were factors that 
constrained the efficacy and impact of training (Author’s field conversation with 
trainers of GP members, dated 10/12/2009). The low interest in training was evident in 
the fact that only ten elected representatives attended the session on its first day, 
representing as many as seventeen GPs of Berhampore block. This happened in spite of 
the fact that a lot of effort had been put in to attract elected representatives for the 
training session, such as sending letters to the elected representatives and their 
respective GP Pradhans, and phone calls to the GP representatives who owned 
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telephones (Author’s field conversation with trainers of GP members, dated 
10/12/2009). The author observed that the trainers put in a lot of effort to clarify issues 
related to the structure and functions of the GP using a colourful power point 
presentation and other audio-visual means. The attendance level among the attendees 
was mixed; they talked among themselves occasionally, but otherwise appeared to be 
attentive.  In an informal conversation during the lunch break, some of them expressed 
that they were enjoying the session and were feeling better informed.  
The existing nature of training for elected representatives (including Upa-samiti 
heads) is rather bookish in nature. More practically oriented training is the need of the 
hour. The Agriculture Upa-samiti head of Debipur GP, commented, “The training 
sessions merely revise what is said in the FAQ books; nothing new is said. But what is 
really needed from training is knowledge of practical matters and the real picture to be 
conveyed” (Author’s field interview, dated 1/09/2009).  Therefore, training needs to go 
far beyond the description of the law, rules and structural composition of the GP that are 
actually taught in training sessions. 
 Skills and knowledge, including that obtained from training, are important but 
cannot be of any use unless members show interest and involvement in GP functioning.   
Skills and knowledge therefore comprise passive capacity, whereas the actual efforts 
and contribution of GP members comprise active capacity. Whether or not the GP 
members come to the GP office regularly, take their duties seriously and sincerely 
involve themselves in the GP’s work has a fundamental bearing on the GP’s human 
resource capacity. The overall low degree of involvement of GP members is a problem 
in both GPs, and seen more seriously in the case of Nowdapanur GP. 
Low interest and involvement by elected representatives is recognized by 
certain active elected representatives in both GPs, and is seen by them as an obstacle to 
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GP performance. They identify the absence of minimum incentives and absence of 
knowledge as factors responsible for the poor motivation and involvement of GP 
members. The head of the Education and Public Health Upa-samiti of Nowdapanur GP 
commented: 
 GP members should be re-imbursed travelling expenses. If better Travelling 
Allowance and salary could be paid, then GP members could work better to fulfil 
needs of villagers. If one wants people to work hard, then one should pay them 
the value of their effort. GP members are often poor and this makes it difficult for 
them to bear expenses such as traveling to and from the office. GP members, 
especially Upa-samiti heads have myriad duties and complex, challenging jobs. 
However they are given a very measly honorarium (Author’s field interview 
with head of Education and Public Health Upa-samiti of Nowdapanur GP, dated 
14/12/2009).  
The Pradhan of Debipur GP felt that reimbursement of travelling expenditure and 
training would help GP members perform better: 
Two things are important for GP members to perform better. Training (since 
different GP members have different education levels), and reimbursement of 
travelling expenditure. Training should be held annually or half yearly to ensure 
that GP members are abreast of knowledge on technical matters. This will 
improve the ability of GP members to do work. GP members have jobs of their 
own, for example some of them are labourers. They should at least be given 
travelling allowance to come to the GP office (Author’s field interview with 
Pradhan of Debipur GP, dated 14/09/2009).  
  While the problems identified above, and the resulting low involvement of GP 
members is a problem for both GPs, Nowdapanur GP has even poorer involvement of 
elected members, compared to Debipur GP. One staff member of Nowdapanur GP 
complained to the author that GP members generally come to general body meetings 
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without adequate preparation and do not show enough initiative, which makes it very 
difficult to conduct the work of the GP (Author’s field interview, dated 18/12/2009). 
The infrequent visits to the GP office by most GP members further show the low degree 
of involvement of GP members. This is a problem especially in Nowdapanur GP where 
only two GP members (the head of one Upa-samiti and the Upa-Pradhan) visit the 
office frequently, in addition to the Pradhan.115
 There is a grave problem of non-seriousness among a majority of Upa-samiti 
heads in Nowdapanur GP. Unlike in Debipur GP, Upa-samitis other than the Finance 
and Planning Upa-samiti are not active in Nowdapanur GP, due to the poorer interest of 
the GP members and Upa-samiti heads. Regular Upa-samiti meetings (barring those of 
the Finance and Planning Upa-samiti) are not held in Nowdapanur GP, and these 
Upa-samitis show unwillingness to take initiative or responsibility (Author’s telephonic 
interview with elected member of Nowdapanur GP belonging to ruling party INC, dated 
28/07/2012). The failure of most GP members, especially of a majority of key office 
holders such as Upa-samiti heads, to perform their duties reduces the human resource 
capacity of Nowdapanur GP, and consequently has an adverse impact on its 
performance.  
  
Leadership may explain, to an extent, why Debipur GP is in a relatively better 
position as far as the involvement of elected members in GP functioning and 
mobilization of the efforts of the elected representatives is concerned. GP leadership, 
especially the Pradhan’s role, is important in mobilizing the human resources (staff and 
elected representatives) of the GP and getting the GP’s work done. Leadership therefore 
plays an important role improving the human resource capacity of the GP. It is also an 
important component of GP capacity in its own right because of its role in giving 
                                               
115The attendance of the GP members in the GP general body meetings, held about once a month, is 
however quite satisfactory for both GPs. 
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direction and momentum to the conduct of the GP’s work. Three dimensions of 
leadership-- inclusiveness, decisiveness and authority, and stability/unity—are of 
special importance in fulfilling these leadership functions. The actual situation in the 
two GPs, with respect to these dimensions of leadership, is elaborated below.  
 There is evidence of the more inclusive nature of leadership and decision 
making in Debipur GP, compared to Nowdapanur GP. As already seen, Debipur GP 
employs more inclusive methods of decision making, such as involving Upa-samitis, 
GUSs and inspection committees in the decision making process. Such inclusiveness of 
leadership probably plays a role in eliciting the contribution and participation of a 
greater number of GP members, as well as of intermediary actors such as GUS.  
Decision making in Debipur GP does not appear to be highly concentrated in the 
Pradhan or the Finance and Planning Upa-samiti. In fact, the opposition members of 
Debipur GP, who are otherwise critical of the ruling party of the GP, actually praised 
the Pradhan of the GP for his personal good qualities (even though the Pradhan 
belongs to the ruling party). One opposition elected member of Debipur GP commented 
that the Pradhan listens to what opposition members have to say (Author’s field 
interview, dated 17/09/2009). Another opposition member remarked that “The Pradhan 
is an intelligent man, but he is constrained by CPI (M) party control; therefore he cannot 
carry out his good intentions” (Author’s field interview, dated 8/10/2009).  
The second relevant dimension of leadership is decisiveness or authority, which 
involves the extent to which the leader takes firm decisions and pushes the GP members 
to get the GP’s work done. The GP meeting minutes of Debipur GP convey an 
impression of the decisiveness and authority of this GP’s leadership. For instance, in the 
minutes of the GP general body meetings held in 2008-09, there is frequent mention of 
GP decisions that require GP members to get certain tasks done “very quickly” (ati 
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satwar in Bengali). The minutes also show that the GP leadership has been seen to 
identify constituencies where tasks have not been completed, announce the names of 
those constituencies in the general body meeting, and order the members of the elected 
menbers representing such constituencies to complete the task within a certain time. In 
the GP meeting dated 22/09/2009, the names of ten constituencies which had failed to 
spend their respective share of the Untied fund and complete the assigned 
implementation tasks were announced (both ruling party and opposition constituencies 
were among such constituencies), as revealed in the record of GP meeting minutes. The 
representatives of such constituencies were told that if they did not complete the 
ongoing tasks within a week from the meetings’s date, then the remaining fund share 
would be divided among the constituencies who had successfully completed the tasks. 
The Pradhan, as Sabhapati (chairperson) of GP general body meetings, deserves credit 
for the expression of GP authority and decisiveness in such meetings. The language 
seen in Nowdapanur GP’s meeting minutes hardly conveys such impression of 
decisiveness, nor is there any mention of laggards being identified and pressurized. One 
rare item in the GP meeting minutes conveys an element of decisiveness: 
It is decided to take up five schemes of afforestation under NREGA. Members 
are asked to submit maps of their respective constituencies within 10/08/2008, 
otherwise the schemes cannot be sent to higher authorities for approval (Minutes 
of GP meeting dated 29/07/2008). 
The third aspect of leadership is stability and unity. Such stability is a factor 
contributing to the efficacy and authority of the GP’s leadership. The tenure of Debipur 
GP’s Pradhan has been stable and unchallenged ever since the he assumed leadership. 
The strong majority of the ruling CPI (M)—which holds 85% of the GP’s seats-- no 
doubt contributes to the stability of the Pradhan’s leadership. Futhermore, there is also 
evidence that even the opposition members of the GP respect him for his personal traits. 
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In the highly electorally competitive Nowdapanur GP, on the other hand, the Pradhan’s 
position has been contested and challenged.  The Pradhan of the GP, who assumed 
office when the current GP was constituted, belonged not to the single largest party 
INC, but to a small party known as Muslim League which had extended its support to 
the INC that had failed to win a majority of GP seats in the May 2008 elections.  In late 
2009, however, the INC members in the GP passed a vote of no-confidence against the 
Pradhan and had him dismissed, on account of conflict over a political matter.116
 In the West Bengal context, it is not just the efforts of elected members and staff 
members, but also the efforts of GUSs that make up GP capacity. GUSs play an 
important role in supervising and overseeing the GP’s implementation activities being 
carried out in their respective constituencies. In both the GPs, GUSs are actively 
 This 
resulted in an INC member gaining the office of the Pradhan. Two independent GP 
members supported the INC and enabled it to obtain a majority in the GP council. One 
of the supporting independent members was rewarded with the position of 
Upa-pradhan. Even with the INC member assuming the Pradhan position and winning 
the support of a majority, the contestation and struggle over this position in 
Nowdapanur GP has apparently not ceased. An opposition member of Nowdapanur GP 
revealed that there is a continuing conflict happening among the elected representatives 
belonging to the ruling party INC, with one of them opposing the Pradhan’s leadership 
in an intra-party struggle (Author’s field interview, dated 1/01/2010). On all three 
leadership dimensions of inclusiveness, decisiveness and unity/stability, therefore, 
Debipur GP shows superiority over Nowdapanur GP.  
                                               
116When elections to constitute the Management Committee  in a  primary school in a particular village of 
Nowdanapur GP were held, the Muslim League requested right to contest two seats out of the total of six 
but their request was not fulfilled.The political parties AITC, CPI (M) and Muslim league joined forces 
against the INC to put pressure on it. The resulting anger on the part of the INC led to revenge by it. The 
INC members of the GP initiated a no-confidence motion against the GP’s Pradhan (who belonged to 
Muslim League) and had him dismissed. 
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involved in playing such a role, as testified by the GUS secretaries and GP elected 
members. Nowdapanur GP, however, is at a relative disadvantage with respect to GUS 
contribution because GUSs could not be constituted in two of its constituencies owing 
to political conflict and incidents of violence. GUSs have been constituted in all the 17 
constituencies of Debipur GP.  
 Apart from the skills and efforts of GP members and GP leadership, the other 
component of the GP’s human resource capacity is the availability and quality of staff 
members. The number of staff members in both GPs was high. Both GPs, at the time of 
fieldwork, had an Executive Assistant, a Secretary, a Nirman Sahayak (who is a 
qualified engineer) and two Sahayak (administrative assistants) each. Debipur GP had a 
GP karmee to function as a peon and run errands while Nowdapanur GP did not have a 
GP karmee. In addition both GPs had a few staff members appointed on contract basis 
to perform specific tasks. 
 While there were no complaints from the elected representatives of Debipur GP 
regarding staff availability and quality, the Pradhan and the Secretary of Nowdapanur 
GP spoke about the need for more staff members to handle the huge and complex 
workload of the GP. The problem in Nowdapanur GP was not only the lack of GP 
karmees, but also that one of the Sahayaks was new and still learning her job, and one 
important staff member was not perceived of as being helpful or efficient by the elected 
representatives (Author’s field interview with Pradhan of Nowdapanur GP, dated 
18/12/2009). A large part of the burden therefore fell on the sincere and hardworking 
Secretary.  
 The  problem in staff capacity, together with the poorer levels of involvement 
among elected members, adds up to the problem of overall poorer human resource 
capacity of Nowdapanur GP (as compared to Debipur GP). The lack of capacity is a 
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serious obstacle considering the huge workload and complex tasks of the GP. There was 
no significant difference between the two GPs as far as material resources such as 
equipment and premises were concerned: both GPs had already been computerized and 
possessed office buildings with several rooms at the time of fieldwork.  
 Financial management is also an element of GP capacity. As already stated in 
Chapter 2, the financial management of local governments existing in rural areas of 
countries such as India must be assessed in rudimentary, and not sophisticated, terms. 
Both GPs maintain basic financial records such as budgets and supplementary budgets, 
cash books, income-expenditure reports, annual action plans, and reports on the 
spending of financial allocations. Such maintenance can be significantly attributed to 
the fact that GPs not only have to undergo annual audits conducted by government 
auditors, but also have to regularly submit such records for approval by the higher tiers 
of government. Certain weaknesses in basic financial management were also seen in 
both GPs. The Audit Reports of both GPs (for the year 2007-08) identified that the 
budgets of both GPs were prepared, but budget estimates were not prepared on the basis 
of the income-expenditure records of the past three years, as per administrative rules. 
The Audit Reports also identified that both GPs were violating government rules related 
to spending: for instance, Debipur GP violated rules by spending Untied Fund money 
on maintenance of infrastructural assets, while Nowdapanur GP violated rules by 
spending Twelfth Finance Commission funds on new construction.  
 Preparing sound budgets is a challenging task for GPs, since funds are allocated 
by high tiers of government, and GPs lack control over fund sources. The Secretary of 
Nowdapanur GP commented that “The GP budget is just a facade, since government 
funds never tally with the budget estimates of the GP” (Author’s field interview, dated 
18/12/2009).  He revealed the incremental nature of budgeting by stating that financial 
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estimates were prepared by adding 10-15% to the income-expenditure estimates of the 
previous year. The GP meeting minutes of Debipur GP also mention that budget 
estimates for programmes such as IAY and Twelfth Finance Commission Fund did not 
match with the actual amount allotted by the government, as a result of which an 
amended budget had to be presented (minutes of GP meeting held on 19/2/2009). Given 
such constraints, continuous financial and stragetic planning is more important than 
advanced planning embodied in the annual budget.  
 The author observed that both GPs were incorporating some elements of 
strategic planning to deal with the task of spending fund allocations which arrived from 
high levels of government. The infrastructure Upa-samiti head of Debipur GP revealed 
the seasonal considerations governing the taking up of infrastrutural works, and the 
GP’s strategic planning responses to the arrival of NREGA funds: 
In the summer months, all pond excavation works under NREGA are taken up 
since ponds are dry. In the early autumn months, morum road works are easier to 
carry out, and are taken up. Therefore the underlying principle is that work is 
taken up that is possible to take up, given the circumstances and the amount of 
money available (Author’s field interview with head of Infrastructure 
Upa-samiti of Debipur GP, dated 29/12/2009).  
The head of the Education and Public Health Upa-samiti of Nowdapanur GP shed light 
on strategic planning carried out in his GP to deal with the arrival of NREGA funds: 
The Nirman Sahayak gives clever advice on the seasonal taking up of works. For 
example in March-June each year, a lot of NREGA works are completed, so that 
brick road works can be done in the Monsoon season. It must be remembered 
that subsequent fund allocations are conditional on earlier spending, therefore 
spending of earlier allocations is necessary for there to be sufficient funds for 
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later works (Author’s telephonic interview with head of Education and Public 
Health Upa-samiti of Nowdapanur  GP, dated 20/05/2011).  
While there are certain commonalities in financial management in both GP, as 
seen above, there are also certain differences between them. A perusal of the GP 
meeting minutes suggests that there is a more strategic and focused approach among 
Debipur GP’s leadership towards managing funds, in addition to the already mentioned 
decisiveness in getting works done and money spent. Therefore there appears to be a 
link between the quality of leadership and the extent of fund utilization. Excerpts of 
items from Debipur GP’s general body meeting minutes that convey a strategic and 
focused approach towards utilizing funds are given below: 
Whatever Untied Fund money is available will be used for tube-well repair and 
road repair. For road repair, big constituencies will be given INR 10,000 each 
and small constituencies will be given INR 7000 each (names of big and small 
constituencies given) (Minutes of GP meeting dated 16/7/2008). 
A decision is taken that as early as possible, morum road works under NREGA 
will be started in Sitarambati, Chhilinda, Amudpur and Maheshpur villages. 
After these works are done, bridge work in Mobarokpur village will be started 
(Minutes of GP meeting dated 5/1/1009). 
With respect to the taking up of works under the Annual Action Plan of NREGA, 
it is decided that GP members have to select five works out of list of works for 
their respective constituencies, order them on priority basis, and send them to the 
GP office (Minutes of GP meeting dated 27/1/2009). 
A strategic approach to spending was hardly conveyed in the GP meeting minutes of 
Nowdapanur GP. A few items of the meeting minutes of this GP convey a sense of 




In today’s meeting, there was discussion on adoption of schemes and 
implementation of works for the utilization of unused BRGF funds. A scheme 
for the repair of a road in front of Sundipur SSK was adopted (Minutes of GP 
meeting dated 29/07/08).  
While both GPs are involved in strategic planning for spending funds, Debipur 
GP exhibits a more strategic and focused approach to spending funds. It can also be 
recalled that Debipur GP has a much higher fund utilization rate than Nowdapanur GP. 
This indicates that Debipur GP has an edge as well as financial management is 
concerned.   
The ability to utilize available funds depends, to a significant extent, on 
systematic and pro-active planning by GP elected members (using the expert advice of 
staff members). Such planning assumes special significance because of the presence of 
rule–based constraints - for instance, GPs can only use Untied Funds for new 
construction activities, and Twelfth Finance Commission Funds only for repair. Active 
interest among a majority of elected members (representing different constituencies), 
and a commitment among them to optimally utilize available GP funds in a productive 
way, would surely have a positive impact on the GP’s extent of fund utilization. The 
inflow of a variety of sugge stions from elected members (regarding how to utilize the 
available funds) at the decision making stage of selection of works for implementation, 
would improve a GP’s ability to productively utilize funds, in the context of rule-based 
constraints on GP spending. Therefore, inclusiveness of decision making, leadership, 
the extent of elected members’ contribution, and the expertise of staff members all have 
an important bearing on the GP’s ability to strategically manage and utilize available 
funds. GP members need to smartly carry out planning and implementation to 
effectively utilize available funds, and to this end, they should inculcate skills (not just 
through training but by actually doing i.e. learning by involving themselves in GP 
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work). This kind of capacity would possibly have positive pay-offs for fund utilization, 
thus improving the performance of GPs.  
Therefore, Debipur GP does better than Nowdapanur GP on capacity 
components such as efforts and contributions of elected members, staff availability, 
strategic management of funds, and leadership. There is no appreciable difference on 
the remaining element of capacity, material capacity. Debipur GP thus has overall 
higher capacity than Nowdapanur GP.     
 
Secondary Determinant 
The preferences of decision makers constitute a secondary determinant of GP 
performance. This determinant also affects GP performance, though its role in 
explaining variations in performance between GPs is less obvious and fundamental than 
that of the primary determinants.   
 
Preferences of Decision Makers 
The preferences of decision makers at the GP level and also at the higher levels of 
Panchayat Samiti and Zilla Parishad have a subtle impact on GP performance. The 
impact of the preferences of GP decision makers is first elaborated, followed by the 
impact of the preferences of the higher-level decision makers.   
 As already stated, popular demands made by the deliberative forum of Gram 
Sansad are filtered by being subjected to discretionary decision making by the GP. GPs 
exercise discretion in selecting works for implementation from the list of Gram Sansad 
demands. Greater inclusiveness in such selection leads to less arbitrariness in the 
selection of demands for fulfilment and results in fairer assessment of the relative 
importance of different demands. This in turn, possibly contributes to greater levels of 
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popular satisfaction with GP service delivery.As already seen, the   decision making 
processes used in Debipur GP are conducive to greater inclusiveness in decision 
making, compared to those in Nowdapanur GP. 
There is evidence of positive outcomes created by the greater inclusiveness of 
decision making in Debipur GP. Such evidence pertains to the representation of 
opposition constituencies in the works carried out by Debipur GP in its different 
constituencies. As already seen, the NREGA output data for Debipur GP show that 
there was relatively fairer representation of opposition constituencies among all the 
areas in which works were carried out, than in Nowdapanur GP. In spite of particular 
instances of discrimination alleged by opposition representatives, the ruling party of 
Debipur GP does carry out a fair proportion of works in opposition areas. In spite of the 
overwhelming dominance of the ruling party in Debipur GP, there is a greater degree of 
inclusiveness in decision making in this GP compared to Nowdapanur GP, leading to a 
fairer representation of opposition areas in works done by it 
 The responsiveness of the higher tiers of Panchayat Samiti and Zilla Parishad 
towards the demands of the GPs has a bearing on GP performance. The Panchayat 
Samiti and Zilla Parishad can help the GP by using their own funds to take up projects 
located in a single GP or across GPs. or by financing or implementing ‘large’ projects 
that are above the spending limit of the GP. Such assistance contributes to the better 
availability or quality of infrastructural assets such as roads and tube-wells in the GP 
area, and thus increases satisfaction of villagers with these assets. The preferences of 
the decision makers at these higher levels naturally influence their responsiveness 
towards the demands of GPs.   
 The responsiveness of the higher level decision makers can be assessed on the 
basis of the perception of the GP members about them. The GP office holders 
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(specifically the Pradhan and Upa-samiti heads) interviewed in Debipur GP expressed 
a generally positive perception of Memari-I Panchayat Samiti and Burdwan Zilla 
Parishad. The Pradhan and Upa-samiti heads all expressed satisfaction with the 
assistance being received from these higher tiers. The Pradhan clarified that while GP 
demands were sometimes delayed for fulfilment, they were never rejected (Author’s 
field interview, dated 14/09/2009).  
 In Nowdapanur GP, however, the Pradhan and Upa-samiti heads expressed a 
negative perception of Berhampore Panchayat Samiti and Murshidabad Zilla Parishad 
(especially the Zilla Parishad). The Pradhan of Nowdapanur GP expressed 
dissatisfaction with the lack of funds given by the Zilla Parishad for works in his GP 
(Author’s field interview, dated 18/09/2009) whereas the infrastructure and education 
and public health Upa-samiti heads complained that the Panchayat Samiti and Zilla 
Parishad members do not give any importance to GP members (Author’s field 
interviews with heads of Infrastructure Upa-samiti and Education and Public Health 
Upa-samiti of Nowdapanur GP, dated 7/1/2010 and 6/1/2010 respectively) .  
 It is important to note that the ruling party in Debipur GP as well as its 
corresponding Panchayat Samiti and Zilla Parishad levels--the CPI (M)--is the same. 
For Nowdapanur GP, however, the situation is different: while the INC is the ruling 
party in both the GP and the Panchayat Samiti, the ruling party in the Zilla Parishad is 
the CPI (M). The Education and Public Health Upa-samiti head of Nowdapanur GP 
expressed that he found it relatively easier to approach and obtain benefits from the 
Panchayat Samiti decision makers since they were from the same party as his, i.e. INC 
(Author’s telephonic interview, dated 20/05/2011). Therefore GPs find it easier to have 
 300 
 
their demands fulfilled by higher tiers when these are controlled by the same political 
party.117
 The support received by Debipur GP from its higher tiers facilitates the taking 
up of additional projects in the area of Debipur GP, and this contributes to the better 
quality and availability of infrastructural assets. Nowdapanur GP however suffers in 
this respect due to the lack of support from the Zilla Parishad. For Nowdapanur GP, 
support from higher levels is critical because of its more acute fund shortage: for 
instance this GP often finds itself unable to take up repair of cylinder tube-wells which 
is very costly, and depends on the Zilla Parishad for bearing such expenses (Author’s 
field interview with head of Education and Public Health Upa-samiti of Nowdapanur 
GP, dated 6/01/2010). Given such a situation of dependence, discrimination by the Zilla 
Parishad seems to be detrimental to the GP’s attempts to satisfy people’s needs. 
   
 In addition to preferences of decision makers, upward accountability might also 
possibly be having an impact on GP performance and a subtle role in explaining 
performance variation between GPs. Upward accountability refers to the control 
exercised on GPs by their higher tiers, especially their respective block and district level 
authorities. GPs have to regularly and frequently report to the higher authorities 
(especially to the Executive Officer of the Panchayat Samiti) all details of 
implementation work done on central and state government programmes. Funding 
given by the higher levels is conditional on the receipt of the required reports from the 
GP, and also (for programmes such as NREGA and BRGF), total utilization of the 
earlier allocation within a stipulated time period. GPs are thus kept on their toes by the 
higher levels of government and such control very likely affects fund utilization by 
                                               
117Interviews with bureaucrats in the Memari-I and Berhampore block offices revealed that political 
considerations do play a role behind the decisions of the Panchayat Samiti. A bureaucratic official from 
Berhampore block revealed that demands coming from a particular GP may be rejected by Panchayat 
Samiti when different political parties rule in the Panchayat Samiti and the concerned GP (Author’s. field 
interview, dated 8/12/2009).  
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GPs. Oversight by the higher levels is taken seriously by GPs, given that such oversight 
is backed by the sanctioning power of the higher levels of government.  
  Upward accountability of GPs, therefore, is a factor affecting GP performance. 
While both chosen GPs are subjected to extensive control from their respective block 
and district authorities, the actual variation in the extent of upward accountability 
between the two GPs is difficult to detect. The inability to detect such variation is a 
limitation of this study. No inference is made in this study about such variation and the 
extent of its impact on fund utilization and GP performance.   
 
Conclusion 
The findings of the West Bengal study show that the GP with higher overall 
performance--Debipur GP--has a lower level of overall accountability. The GP with 
better performance is seen to possess much higher financial strength and higher 
capacity. Table 28 shows the association between each of these determinants and 
performance.  
 
Table 28: Association between Performance Determinants and Performance in 
the West Bengal Study  
Gram Panchayat Performance 
Determinants of performance 
Accountability Financial Strength Capacity 
Debipur GP Higher Lower Higher Higher 
Nowdapanur GP Lower Higher Lower Lower 
Source: Analysis and inference carried out by the author 
 
 The study findings show that financial strength and capacity are critical to better 
GP performance, and the latter is even more significant. Higher capacity explains, to a 
large extent, why Debipur GP was able to utilize its financial resources in a better way 
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to achieve better performance. Secondary variables such as favourable preferences of 
decision makers subtly contribute to the better performance of Debipur GP.   
Given that the GP with higher accountability has worse performance, it is 
pertinent to ask what explains the ineffectiveness of accountability in inducing better 
performance. One reason behind such ineffectiveness is the failure of the actual 
functioning of accountability mechanisms to fulfil the conditions (causal processes) 
through which they could have had an impact on performance. The cumulative failure 
of accountability to have a notable impact on performance in the chosen GPs can be 
attributed to the failure of all the three types of accountability mechanisms 
(deliberative, monitoring and sanctioning) to improve performance, as already seen in 
this chapter.  
However, the single most important factor responsible for such failure is the 
shortcoming seen in the functioning of the sanctioning mechanism (elections). More 
competitive elections in Nowdapanur GP fail to push their members to be more 
seriously involved in the work of the GP, and thus fail to improve GP performance. This 
is happening mainly because the selection of GP members in such elections is not based 
on performance considerations. 
 The concrete possibility of performance-based sanctioning of functionaries is 
necessary for accountability to have a decisive impact on performance. In other words, 
the concerned functionary should have a desire of being re-elected, and feel a concrete 
threat of being thrown out of office if he/she fails to perform well. This can be 
illustrated through an analogy related to the accountability-performance relationship for 
a particular type of functionaries– alternative primary school (SSK) teachers. The 
provided illustration is not about GP accountability or performance, but can shed 
 303 
 
insights on the accountability-performance relationship that can be applied to any 
service-providing functionary, including GP members.  
  SSK teachers (Sahayikas) are generally found to be better performing than their 
mainstream primary school counterparts in terms of their higher sincerity, closeness 
with students and lower absenteeism.118 The accountability of Sahayikas has a positive 
impact on their performance. Sahayikas are subjected to monitoring mechanisms such 
as regular mothers’ meetings and monthly reporting to the block administration, which 
leads to regular oversight of their performance. However, the crucial factor that results 
in such accountability having a direct impact on performance is the contract-based or 
temporary appointment of these teachers, compared to the permanent appointment of 
mainstream primary school teachers.119 Sahayikas therefore face concrete pressure to 
perform well, under the fear that vigilant parents and/or the Management Committee of 
the SSK will detect their shortcomings. This might lead to the Management Committee 
bringing about the removal of the errant Sahayika. As a result work, Sahayikas work 
harder and perform more sincerely in spite of their much poorer remuneration.120
 The significance of accountability as a determinant of SSK teacher performance 
is therefore linked to the opportunities to sanction them because of their contractual or 
temporary tenure, and the linking of performance failures to such sanctioning.  
  
                                               
118There is a general perception that SSK teachers usually perform more seriously than mainstream 
primary school teachers. This was also highlighted by Education Karmadhyaksha of Burdwan Zilla 
Parishad (Author’s field interview, dated 7/10/2009). A Sahayika of Punnyagram SSK of Debipur GP 
told the author that a lot of students leave nearby mainstream primary schools and join SSKs, attracted by 
the quality of SSK teaching (Author’s field interview, dated 5/10/2009). The literature also highlights the 
better performance of SSK teachers compared to mainstream primary school teachers (Rana, Rafique, 
and Sengupta 2002). See Chapter 2 for details.    
119Sahayikas can enjoy their tenure as long as the Management Committee of the SSK wishes. Only the 
Management Committee of the SSK has been given the power to recommend removal of Sahayikas. The 
Management Committee consists of seven parent representatives, a GP member and a Panchayat Samiti 
nominee. The actual removal of Sahayikas is done by the Panchayat Samiti (Government of West Bengal 
2008c). The Management Committee may also appoint Sahayikas on an annual contractual basis 
(Government of West Bengal 2004).  
120The author is grateful to the Education Karmadhyakshas of Memari-I Panchayat Samiti and Burdwan 
Zilla Parishad  for revealing the significance of contract-based or temporary appointment of Sahayikas as 
a determinant of their performance (Author’s field interviews, dated 7/10/2009 and 12/10/2009). Such 
significance is also highlighted in the literature by Rana et al. (2003). 
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Similarly, GP accountability could be effective in improving GP performance if the 
functioning of sanctioning mechanisms (elections) could be linked to performance 
considerations. The concrete threat of removal of the ruling group and GP members 
based on performance considerations could have improved the efforts put in by them, 
thus bringing about a certain degree of improvement in GP performance. ‘Performance 
considerations’ refers to voters’ consideration of overall GP performance and their 
consideration of the individual effort of the concerned GP member. 121
 At the level of the ruling group of the GP, effective accountability pressures 
resulting from the possibility of electoral defeat of the incumbent ruling party linked to 
overall GP performance, would push the ruling group to increase its cumulative effort 
towards improving GP performance. At the level of individual GP members, effective 
accountability pressures from elections (linking re-election of individual GP members 
to overall GP performance and their individual contribution and effort) would compel 
them to increase their efforts towards the overall functioning of the GP. If such pressure 
could be effectively applied to all or most GP members (especially the important 
functionaries such as Pradhan and Upa-samiti heads), their efforts would increase as a 
result, and the capacity of the GP would go up, resulting in an improvement of 
aggregate GP performance. However, as already seen, the sanctioning mechanism of 
elections fails to induce performance improvements because voting in reality is based 
on non-performance considerations such as kinship and money power of contesting 
incumbents. It must be noted that performance-based sanctioning will succeed in 
pushing elected representatives of GPs to step up their efforts only if they have the true 
desire or interest to be re-elected. Furthermore, villagers have to notice the performance 
   
                                               
121Some may argue that it is not fair to hold individual GP members answerable for overall GP 
performance. However it cannot be denied that GP members belonging to the ruling party or coalition 
(and especially the office holders such as Pradhan and Upa-samiti heads)  are individually responsible 
for performing the duties of their position, and collectively responsible for the functioning of the GP.  
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contributions of the representatives and give due importance to such contributions. 
Therefore, this condition, though fundamental for accountability to have a significant 
impact on GP performance, is actually quite difficult to fulfil.  
 Having stated the importance of performance-based sanctioning, it is important 
to clarify that this condition, by itself, might not result in improvement of performance 
beyond a certain extent. Improvements in other crucial performance determinants such 
as capacity and finances are indispensable for more far-reaching performance 
improvements to happen. After all, GPs perform complex and multi-faceted tasks, for 
which ample finances and capacity are indispensable. The analogy with SSK teachers is 
therefore relevant only to a certain extent.  
 Accountability (specifically sanctioning) pressures can push up the capacity of a 
GP by increasing the efforts of GP members. However, as seen in the case of Debipur 
GP, this particular component of GP capacity (higher level of effort from elected 
members) can also be shaped by factors other than accountability pressures. The level 
of effort from individual elected members is relatively higher in Debipur GP (compared 
to Nowdapanur GP), even though its level of accountability is relatively lower, and it 
did not experience any electoral defeat of incumbent representatives. Effective 
accountability pressures, that meet the condition of performance-based sanctioning, 
may however push capacity up from previously lower levels within a particular GP (like 
Nowdapanur GP) by compelling elected members to increase their efforts.  
 Aggregate capacity consists of not only the skills and efforts of the elected 
members, but also the quality and availability of staff members: these capacity 
components are independent of accountability pressures.The impact of accountability, 
by itself, is therefore likely to push up the performance of a GP only to a certain level. 
The importance of the availability of an adequate level of capacity and finances for 
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achieving high performance levels remains. Nowdapanur GP would very likely be 
unable to match up to Debipur GP’s performance without an improved availability of 
finances and capacity. Capacity is especially important because it is critical for effective 
utilization of available finances. When the capacity and financial strength of a local 
government are at a poor level, accountability pressures can improve performance only 
to a limited extent.   
 It is therefore inferred in the West Bengal study that accountability mechanisms 
are creating a degree of popular control in the chosen West Bengal GPs, but such 
control is not having an impact on performance. What indeed is the nature of pressure or 
control exercised by villagers, and what are the reasons for its limited effectiveness? 
More qualitative insights can shed light on this complex question, going beyond the 
analysis of the impact of specific formal accountability mechanisms. Some such 
insights are shared below. 
It is interesting to see what residents of the two GPs demand from their 
respective GPs, and whether they obtain what they ask for. An analysis of villager 
survey responses for the two GPs revealed the following: In Debipur GP, only four out 
of sixteen villager survey respondents stated that they had never demanded anything 
from the GP. In Nowdapanur GP, only three out of sixteen respondents stated that they 
had never demanded anything from the GP. This seems to show that people are active in 
demanding things from the GP, and therefore there is a lot of popular pressure on GPs.  
However, further analysis of the villager survey responses reveals that the 
demands that the respondents of both GPs made were mostly for individual welfare 
benefits for themselves or their family members, such as IAY money for house 
construction, employment under NREGA, monetary benefit for pregnant women under 
the government programme known as Janani Suraksha Yojana, BPL status that could 
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make them eligible for various welfare benefits, old age pension, widow pension, and 
ration card. Some of these demands were fulfilled, while others were not. Not all 
individual demands were for welfare benefits; a few were for infrastructural assets in 
the respondent’s locality. One subject in Debipur GP demanded and obtained a tap for 
his locality122
Elected representatives perceive a high degree of popular pressure because of 
high demand for personal benefits. The spouse of a female GP member of Nowdapanur 
GP belonging to the opposition party CPI (M) commented, “Popular pressure has 
definitely been created”. He added that available benefits were limited in number, while 
the demands far exceeded the available benefits in magnitude. He went on to say, “Poor 
people are now aware about the available benefits, and are vocal in asking for these, 
Therefore some people are criticizing their elected representatives, while others, who 
got benefits, are happy” (Author’s field interview, dated 5/01/2010). 
 (Author’s field interview with male, general category villager survey 
respondent of Debipur GP, dated 19/09/2009), while a female subject in Nowdapanur 
GP demanded a tubewell for her locality (Author’s field interview with female, SC 
villager survey respondent of Nowdapanur GP, dated 19/12/2009). Only a few 
respondents had asked for slightly wider benefits: A female subject in Nowdapanur GP, 
who leads an SHG, requested land for setting up an office for running her SHG 
(Author’s field interview with female, general category villager survey respondent of 
Nowdapanur GP, dated 2/01/2010). One affluent, educated subject, who belongs to the 
INC and is a GUS member in a particular constituency of Nowdapanur GP, had 
requested a brick road for his village, and also frequently makes demands for welfare 
benefits on behalf of poor villagers (Author’s field interview with male, general 
category villager survey respondent of Nowdapanur GP, dated 5/01/2010).  
                                               
122 While demands for taps may be expressed in Gram Sansad meetings or presented to GP members, the 
GP itself cannot fulfil such demands, since taps, unlike tube-wells and roads, can only be provided by the 
higher tiers of government. The GP has to channelize demands for taps to the higher tiers for fulfilment. 
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As seen above, personal demands for welfare benefits are pre-dominant among 
the things that people demand from their GPs. However, the reality is that the GP has 
little autonomous authority in providing these benefits. The GP’s role is merely to 
channelize applications and demands for welfare benefits to higher tiers such as the 
block-level and district level administration, which have decision making powers in this 
respect. Furthermore, eligibility for benefits of these welfare programmes is determined 
by certain procedural stipulations such as BPL status and score obtained in the Rural 
Household Survey, over which the GP has no control.  
There is further evidence that villagers are holding the GP responsible 
pre-dominantly for the benefits distributed under government welfare programmes, 
over which the GPs have little control. As seen in Chapter 6, villagers’ overall 
satisfaction with overall GP performance is associated with their beneficiary status. 
Villagers seem to be happiest with GP performance when their demands for personal 
benefits (specifically personal pensions) are met.  
The individualized nature of popular pressure is also reflected in the functioning 
of formal accountability mechanisms. Insights obtained from Chapter 4 showed that the 
deliberative body of Gram Sansad is a forum for making personal demands for welfare 
benefits and infrastructural assets, rather than for exerting collective pressure or 
rationally debating governance issues. Individual demands are prominent in questions 
asked and proposals made in Gram Sansad meetings.  The prevalence of clientelism as 
a voting consideration in GP elections is also a manifestation of the culture of giving 
precedence to individual benefits. A comment made by a GUS Secretary in 
Nowdapanur GP neatly sums up the apparent situation: “There is no collective or 
organized pressure but only individual pressure for personal demands” (Author’s field 
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interview with GUS Secretary of Soluadanga constituency of Nowdapanur GP, dated 
5/01/2010).  
While the predominance of individual pressure is an evident reality, it is not 
entirely correct to say that collective pressure is completely absent. It would rather be 
more accurate to say that collective pressure is rare. It has already been seen that there 
have been instances when villagers have presented mass petitions for the improvement 
of roads, and have even participated in election boycotts to protest over the poor state of 
roads. However, it must be noted that such collective mobilization is only occassional 
and difficult to achieve: For instance, the mass movement for demanding the 
improvement of the Badshahi Sadak in Sripurdanga village of Nowdapanur GP  
experienced initial failure since villagers, because of differences in political affiliation, 
had initially failed to unite and present a mass petition to the Member of Parliament for 
their area (Author’s field interview with GUS Secretary of Sripurdanga constituency of 
Nowdapanur GP, dated 19/12/2009).  
It was also observed that education is an area of low priority as far as popular 
demand and pressure are concerned. There seems to be a hierarchy of significance as far 
as popular pressure is concerned: the item of greatest priority is personal benefits of 
welfare programmes, though pressure for such demands is necessarily individual-based 
and fragmented. The middle tier in the hierarchy is pressure for improving 
infrastructure such as roads, which occasionally takes the form of collective pressure. 
Such instances of collective pressurization are, however, not regular or frequent, since 
collective mobilization is difficult to achieve. The lowest tier, which represents the 
lowest area of priority for the people is the improvement of facilities in educational 
institutions. The significance of education  in generating long term development gains, 
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and the importance of providing proper facilities for education, have not yet registered 
in people’s psyche.123
The above account shows that certain characteristics of popular pressure - the 
predominantly individual nature of popular pressure, people’s holding GPs responsible 
for decisions over which the GP has little control, and the low priority given by people 
to important development needs such as education– possibly constrain the impact of 
popular pressure on performance. Such characteristics of popular pressure are likely to 
inhibit the efficacy of popular pressure in having a positive impact on GP performance.  
  
 Having seen the findings about the determinants of performance and the 
relationship between accountability and performance for the West Bengal study, one 
may raise concerns about the generalizability of these findings. The next chapter will 
explore the relationship between accountability and performance, and the determinants 
of GP performance for the chosen cases in Madhya Pradesh to take this study towards a 
conclusion based on the findings of the two state studies.   
                                               
123While the earlier mentioned instances of collective action for infrastructural improvement were 
directed not at the GP but at higher tiers, the observation that popular pressure is more intense for 
improvement of infrastructural assets than for improvement of educational facilities appears to applicable 
to the GP level as well. The demands presented by the villager survey respondents of both GPs to their 
respective GPs pertained only to individual welfare benefits and infrastructural amenities such as 





CHAPTER 8                                  
EXAMINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY-PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP 
FOR THE MADHYA PRADESH STUDY  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 assessed the variation in accountability and performance between the 
two chosen GPs of Madhya Pradesh. The goal of this chapter is to infer the 
accountability-performance relationship for the Madhya Pradesh study, considering not 
only the variation in the levels of accountability and performance between the two 
chosen GPs, but also the operation of causal processes between the two variables.  
 The structure of this chapter is similar to that of Chapter 7. The first section 
assesses the impact of accountability on performance. The second section examines the 
impact of possible performance determinants – both primary and secondary - other than 
accountability. The conclusion infers whether it is accountability, or other performance 
determinants, that actually explain variation in performance between the two GPs, and 
follows this inference with a final analysis of the accountability-performance 
relationship for the Madhya Pradesh study.  
 
The Impact of Accountability on Performance 
The impact of accountability on GP performance is assessed in this section.  Firstly, 
there is an examination of the impact of each accountability dimension on GP 
performance. Secondly, the relationship between accountability and GP performance in 
each functional area (infrastructure and alternative primary education) is assessed. 
Finally, the overall relationship between accountability and performance is inferred, on 
the basis of the findings from the comparative study, and the evidence of causal 
processes between accountability and performance.  
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Impact of Different Accountability Dimensions on Performance 
The impact of the three dimensions of accountability–sanctioning, deliberation and 
monitoring--is assessed below. In exploring the impact of each dimension on GP 
performance, there is consideration of the association between the concerned dimension 
and performance (as revealed by the inter-GP comparison) and the evaluation of the 
causal impact of the accountability mechanism corresponding to that dimension, on 
relevant aspects of GP performance.  
 
Sanctioning Dimension 
Among the two chosen GPs of Madhya Pradesh, it is Ramgarh GP that has done better 
on the sanctioning dimension of accountability, by virtue of its more competitive 
elections. But is such higher electoral competition having a positive impact on GP 
performance? The inter-GP comparison shows that Ramgarh GP has worse 
performance than the GP which did worse on the sanctioning dimension of 
accountability (Goutampur Colony GP). Therefore, the sanctioning dimension of 
accountability is not responsible for the better performance of Goutampur Colony GP.  
  While Ramgarh GP has higher electoral competition, the required causal 
processes between competitive elections and performance do not operate in this GP. 
This explains why its competitive elections are not able to improve its performance. 
The actual operation of the causal processes between electoral competition and 
performance in the chosen Madhya Pradesh GPs is assessed below, according to the 
benchmark of the causal processes hypothesized in Chapter 1.  
 The primary hypothesis about the impact of electoral competition on 
performance is that higher electoral competition can improve GP performance through 
the increased opportunity to sanction (punish) incumbent representatives. A high 
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degree of electoral defeat of incumbents who contest re-elections would compel sitting 
individual representatives to increase their efforts towards improving GP performance. 
Three conditions are necessary for this hypothesis to become reality: first, some 
incumbent representatives must contest re-election; secondly, there has to be a fairly 
high degree of defeat of incumbent representatives standing for re-election and thirdly, 
the defeat of incumbent representatives has to be linked to performance considerations 
(that is, the contribution of the incumbents to the work of the GP). In Ramgarh GP, the 
GP with more competitive GP elections, the first condition itself (that is, incumbent 
representatives standing for re-election) was not fulfilled, therefore the question of the 
fulfilment of the other two conditions does not arise. As seen in Chapter 5, none of the 
incumbent GP members contested re-election in 2010. When incumbent GP members 
do not contest re-elections, they do not feel the compulsion to perform well. This is turn 
has an adverse impact on GP performance. Furthermore, because of the absence of 
party-based elections, there is no such thing as a coherent ruling group or party that 
desires to retain power in the next elections even if individual incumbents change. Thus, 
there is no pressure on the GP Sarpanch or Panchas created by the possibility of 
turnover of the ruling group through competitive elections. 
 When the possibility of the defeat of incumbent representatives in re-elections is 
non-existent, competitive elections can still possibly have a positive impact on GP 
performance: this can be achieved when competitive elections lead to the selection of 
only responsible and competent candidates and rejection of the rest. However even this 
condition is not satisfied with respect to Sarpanch and Panch elections in Ramgarh GP. 
As far as the Sarpanch election is concerned, it seems that voters in Ramgarh GP are 
mainly driven by their village-based loyalties rather than by an assessment of the 
qualities of the candidates. The Sarpanch election of 2010 was seen as an inter-village 
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contest by the villagers of this GP, rather than as a contest to elect the most competent 
candidate. The low degree of involvement of most Panchas in the work of Ramgarh GP 
shows that committed and serious candidates are rarely chosen as Panchas. The interest 
in contesting Panch elections in this GP (though relatively higher than in Goutampur 
Colony GP) also appears to be low, as evident in the fact that as many as eight out of 
fourteen Panch positions of this GP were filled in an uncontested manner in 2010, and 
one seat remained vacant. The low perceived importance of Panch positions is leading 
to low interest in contesting Panch elections. It is unlikely that talented or skilled 
candidates are attracted to contest GP elections, given that Panch positions are not 
perceived as being particularly attractive.   
 Another hypothesis about the impact of electoral competition on performance is 
that electoral competition brings about a significant and assertive opposition, which in 
turn can keep the ruling party alert to its shortcomings, and thus improve performance. 
Such oversight can take forms such as detection of corruption and wrongdoings, and 
drawing of attention to various performance failures. The impact of opposition on GP 
performance, however, can be forthcoming only when a coherent opposition exists in 
the first place. In Madhya Pradesh GPs, a coherent opposition is not easily identifiable 
because GP elections are not contested not a party basis. This hinders, to great extent, 
the emergence of an organized group-based opposition.  
 The legal basis of opposition in Madhya Pradesh GPs is individual based. Such 
individual based opposition is likely to be highly fragmented, and therefore, not a 
source of effective pressure on the Sarpanch. As per Madhya Pradesh’s Panchayat law, 
individual Panchas have been given a power known as the right of sankalp. According 
to this right, if individual Panchas feel that the GP’s work is not being done properly, 
then they may table a proposal in the GP meeting suggesting measures for the 
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correction of the defects. The GP is obliged to discuss the tabled proposal and the 
proposal shall be adopted as the decision of the GP if it passed by a majority of all GP 
members. Panchas have also been given the power of dhyan-akarshan (drawing of 
attention) for placing desired topics on the agenda of GP meetings, or to seek 
clarification or information on any aspect of GP functioning (Government of Madhya 
Pradesh 2005, 2010).  
 In spite of the legal constraints that prevent the emergence of a group-based 
opposition, there was a possibility of the formation of a group-based opposition in 
Ramgarh GP. The inter-village divide accentuated by the highly competitive Sarpanch 
elections did create the possibility of a village-based opposition in Ramgarh GP. The 
opinions of the Panchas of this GP also reflect the village-based divide. In spite of the 
presence of such inter-village divide, the low actual interest, involvement and 
assertiveness of most Panchas is negating the benefits of opposition presence such as 
vigilance and exerting of effective pressure on the Sarpanch. There is no evidence that 
Ramgarh GP’s ‘opposition’ is more assertive or effective than that of Goutampur 
Colony GP. 
 While the common sense view is that the presence of an opposition is the result 
of competitive elections, the findings of this study show that the presence of opposition 
is not entirely linked to the competitiveness of elections in Madhya Pradesh GPs. In 
other words, it is not necessary that a GP with entirely uncontested elections will lack an 
opposition. In Goutampur Colony GP, as seen in Chapter 5, the current GP has been 
constituted entirely through uncontested selection of elected representatives (Sarpanch 
and Panchas). The previous GP (2005-10) too had 90% of its Panchas chosen through 
uncontested selection. Such a situation leads one to expect that there will be no such 
thing as an ‘opposition’ in the GP. The Secretary of this GP however divulged that the 
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ruler-opposition divide is a permanent state of affairs in the GP, even when the GP is 
constituted entirely in an uncontested manner. All the Panchas are opposition members 
in Goutampur Colony GP (Author’s telephonic interview with Secretary of Goutampur 
Colony GP, dated 11/06/2011).124
  The hypotheses that propose positive impacts of electoral competition on local 
government performance therefore fail to be empirically borne out in the chosen 
Madhya Pradesh GPs. The evidence shows that the causal processes, which could have 
brought about the positive impact of electoral competition on GP performance, are 
actually not operating. The results of inter-GP comparison can also shed light on the 
relationship between the sanctioning dimension of accountability and GP performance. 
As already seen,  the GP that is assessed as better on the sanctioning dimension of 
accountability (by virtue of having more competitive elections)–Ramgarh GP--has 
worse performance than the GP which lagged behind on the sanctioning dimension 
(Goutampur Colony GP). The implication of this finding is that the popular control 
created by competitive elections in the GP that has higher electoral competitiveness 
(Ramgarh GP) is not able to induce higher performance than in the other GP. The 
 Interviews with individual Panchas of the previous 
GP of Goutampur Colony (2005-10) also affirmed the existence of the ruler-opposition 
divide, and revealed attitudes of dissatisfaction among these members with respect to 
the Sarpanch, Secretary and the GP as a whole. Each Panch pressurizes the Sarpanch to 
take up development works in his/her respective constituency: this also brings out that 
the opposition is not a coherent or organized group here, but is in fact characterized by 
competition among all the opposition actors (Panchas) for resource allocation.  
                                               
124The author also observed that the Panchas keep asking the Sarpanch to do something about the 
problems of their villages and constituencies. The CEO (JP) of Obaidullahgunj Janpad Panchayat also 
revealed that the accusatory stance employed by Panchas towards the Sarpanch is a common scenario in 
GPs (Author’s field interview, dated 18/03/2010). 
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sanctioning dimension of accountability therefore fails to have a significant impact on 
GP performance.  
 
Deliberation Dimension 
The hypothesis that emerged from the literature is that the higher effectiveness of the 
deliberative mechanism of accountability leads to better performance (in terms of a 
higher extent of fulfilment of popular demands) because of a superior inflow of popular 
inputs. This hypothesis creates an expectation of a high level of congruence between 
popular demands and actual service delivery resulting from the operation of the 
deliberative mechanism of Gram Sabha.    
 A perusal of Madhya Pradesh’s Panchayat law (that lays down the binding 
nature of the decisions of the deliberative forum of Gram Sabha) creates an expectation 
that all popular demands made by Gram Sabha are actually fulfilled by the GP. In 
reality, however, only a small portion of Gram Sabha proposals are taken up for 
implementation or actually implemented. In Goutampur Colony GP, for example, there 
were 42 works in the NREGA Action Plan (which is also the list of Gram Sabha 
proposals for NREGA works) for 2008-09, of which only four have been taken up till 
date and only two have been completed. There were five road works in the NREGA 
Action Plan of Ramgarh GP for 2009-10, but only one was completed in the same year.  
 The decision of the deliberative forum known as Gram Sabha embodies the 
Action Plan--the list of targeted works of a GP--for the concerned year. In Madhya 
Pradesh GPs, these lists contain an imperfect expression of popular demand because the 
GP dominates the preparation of these lists (see Chapter 5). Whatever popular demand 
or popular need is embodied in these lists is further constrained by being made to pass 
through various layers of decision making before finding fruition in actual outputs. 
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These stages of decision making are - approval of Action Plans (list of Gram Sabha 
proposals) by higher levels, selecting of specific works for implementation, approval of 
each selected work by the higher tiers, and actual implementation of each selected work 
for which money has arrived from the higher tiers. The work proposals contained in the 
Action Plan are thus subjected to filtering in successive layers of decision making. 
Furthermore, preferences of decision makers affect the passage of these proposals 
through these layers. It is at the stage of selection of particular works for 
implementation (among all the works listed in the action plan) that the impact of 
decision makers’ preferences is most significant.  
GPs select particular works for implementation out of all the works in the 
Action Plan, not necessarily adhering to the order of priority stated in the Gram Sabha 
-approved Action Plan. The Secretaries of both GPs mentioned that the preferences of 
the Gram Sabha are considered in the selection of works. The Secretary of Ramgarh GP 
revealed that in some instances it is not possible to accommodate the requests of Gram 
Sabha for selecting a particular work, since funds are in limited supply; in such an 
event, the Gram Sabha is accordingly informed that its requests would be considered 
the next time that funds arrived (Author’s telephonic interview, dated 11/06/2011). 
The accounts given by Secretaries of the two GPs makes it seem that neutral 
considerations such as ‘urgency of need’ ‘fund availability’ and ‘preferences of Gram 
Sabha’ are the only ones affecting decision making. The opinions of Panchas in the two 
GPs, however, point to a perception among them that certain villages in a GP are 
discriminated against in the GP’s work selection, and consequently suffer from relative 
backwardness.  
In Goutampur Colony GP, Panchas belonging to the villages of Goutampur 
Tola, Kesalwada and Jondra (more backward than the largest village of Goutampur 
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Colony) expressed complaints about the responsiveness of the Sarpanch, Secretary and 
the GP towards the needs of their respective villages. A village resident also 
complained of village-based bias in demand fulfilment. These perceptions are presented 
below:  
I expressed the grievances of my village to the GP, but the Sarpanch and 
Secretary did not do anything. The Sarpanch only comes to the matter of votes 
(is only interested in votes, and helping people who voted for him)…Kesalwada 
is more neglected and backward than the other villages of this GP. Handpumps 
(tube-wells) here lie unrepaired for months, but the Sarpanch and Secretary do 
not pay any heed (Author’s field interview with former Goutampur Colony GP 
Panch representing Kesalwada,  dated 25/03/2010 ). 
 
We are not getting enough co-operation from the GP. The GP says, no matter 
how much we scream, nothing can be done. Work will be done only if the 
Sarpanch and Secretary co-operate (Author’s field interview with former 
Goutampur Colony GP Panch representing Goutampur Tola, dated 25/03/2010).  
 
The attitude of the Secretary is problematic; he does not listen to what people 
need. There is no co-operation from the Sarpanch either (Author’s field 
interview with former Goutampur Colony GP Panch representing Jondra, dated 
28/03/2010 ).  
 
The GP fulfils popular demands only of Goutampur Colony village, not of 
Goutampur Tola  (Author’s interview with male, ST villager survey respondent 




The situation in Ramgarh GP was also similar. An analysis of the interview 
responses of the former and current Panchas of this GP show that Panchas expect 
development works to be done in their respective villages only when their Sarpanch 
belongs to the same village. Furthermore, they blame a Sarpanch belonging to a 
different village for development works not done in their village. Village residents 
express beliefs similar to those of the Panchas.125
The reason why the needs of our village remained unfulfilled till date is that the 
former Sarpanch belonged to a different village, and he did not do anything for 
Neenaur village (Author’s field interview with a current Panch of Ramgarh GP 
representing Neenaur village, dated 3/04/2010).  
 Some views of Panchas and villagers 
belonging to different villages of this GP are quoted below:  
 
The biggest obstacle hindering the satisfaction of the needs of Ramgarh village is 
that the new Sarpanch is of the vipaksh (opponent’s side). I have no hope that the 
next five years will bring any development because the Sarpanch is of the 
vipaksh. (Author’s field interview with husband of current Panch of Ramgarh 
GP, representing Ramgarh village, dated 5/04/2010).  
 
There was no development work done at all till the new GP was elected (in 
2010). The previous Sarpanch got only around 15 or 16 votes from my village 
when he was elected, and therefore he did not care about this village (Author’s 
field interview with male, SC villager survey respondent of Ramgarh GP 
residing in Bawdikheda village, dated 05/04/2010).  
                                               
125The predominant inter-village conflict in this GP is between Neenaur and Ramgarh villages. The 
position of the remaining village of Bawdikheda, vis-a`-vis this conflict is ambiguous. However, one 
village resident belonging to Bawdikheda blamed the former Sarpanch belonging to Ramgarh village for 
the lack of development in his village, and was hopeful that the new Sarpanch belonging to Neenaur and 
the new Up-sarpanch belonging to his village Bawdikheda would do well in meeting the needs of his 




 The above stated interview responses from both GPs indicate that 
considerations governing the selection of works are possibly not always neutral. These 
responses indicate that allocation of works among constituencies is not always 
equitable, and village-based loyalties and political considerations (such as whether the 
Sarpanch got a significant number of votes from a particular village) play a likely role 
in influencing the selection of works. In Goutampur Colony GP, however, the actual 
output figures (for non-NREGA works) for 2008-09 show that road repair and 
construction works were taken up not only in the largest village of Goutampur Colony, 
but also in Jondra and Kesalwada. In spite of this, there is persistent discontent among 
the Panchas of these smaller and more backward villages. There is a possibility of 
subtle bias existing in the prioritization of smaller works such as tube-well repair (this 
was mentioned by the former Panch representing Kesalwada). It is also possible that the 
unhappiness of the Panchas has not only to do with the actual stationing of works in 
their respective villages, but also related to the inclusiveness of GP decision making, in 
terms of the degree of importance or voice that it accords to all its Panchas.  
In addition to the considerations governing work selection, it is important to 
examine the procedures that govern the selection of works. The Secretary of Goutampur 
Colony GP informed that the decision about work selection is taken by the GP and 
passed (ratified) in the Gram Sabha meeting (Author’s telephonic interview, dated 
29/06/2011). The Secretary of Ramgarh GP revealed that the decision was made by the 
GP, considering the suggestions made by Gram Sabha. For instance, the GP chooses 
one work out of five works for a particular village on the basis of the suggestions made 
by the Gram Sabha of that village (Author’s telephonic interview, dated 11/06/2011).  
One would expect that consulting the Gram Sabha in decision making would 
greatly reduce the possibility of arbitrary discretion on the GP’s part when selecting 
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works, and result in selection of works according to people’s expressed demands. 
However two factors are likely to constrain such impact of Gram Sabha on GP decision 
making: firstly, as seen in Chapter 5, a coherent expression of popular demand rarely 
emerges from Gram Sabha. The expression of popular demand is all the more imperfect 
when the attendance is as low and non-inclusive as in the Gram Sabhas of Ramgarh GP. 
Secondly, even if the Gram Sabha of a particular village (Madhya Pradesh has single 
village Gram Sabhas) is consulted about the works to be taken up for that particular 
village, this does not preclude the possibility of bias in work selection. The GP might 
adhere to those suggestions when it chooses to attend to the demands of that village, but 
it might choose to give priority to the demands of a different village when selecting 
works.   
The GPs, which make decisions regarding works selection, are heavily 
dominated by the Sarpanch and Secretary in their actual functioning due to low 
inclusiveness of functioning and low involvement of Panchas. The standing 
committees of the GP for different functional areas are also headed by the Sarpanch, as 
dictated by the law; 126
 Madhya Pradesh’s Panchayat law provides for the establishment of two 
committees of Gram Sabha – the Gram Vikas Samiti and the Gram Nirman Samiti (see 
Chapter 5). In actual practice, however, these committees are non-functional in both 
GPs. The non-functionality of the committees of Gram Sabha that could have 
performed the task of conveying people’s demands to the GP (equivalent to GUS in 
West Bengal GPs) and the pre-eminence of the Sarpanch over all aspects of decision 
making of GP (because of the absence of separate heads of functional committees) very 
likely has the impact of reducing the inclusiveness of GP decision making. 
 this further lowers the inclusiveness of GP functioning.  
                                               
126 Madhya Pradesh GPs have three standing committees: Nirman tatha Vikas Samiti (construction and 
development committee), Shiksha avam Swashtya  Samiti (education and health committee) and 
Samanya Prashasan Samiti (general administration committee) 
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The role of intermediaries in representing people’s preferences inside the ‘black 
box’ of decision making and implementation in West Bengal GPs was elaborated in 
Chapter 7. In West Bengal GPs, opposition groups in the GP and the GUS play the role 
of supervision and pressurization of GPs on behalf of the people, and thus act as a link 
between popular demands and GP decision making and implementation. The role of 
intermediaries in influencing GP decision making and implementation in the chosen 
Madhya Pradesh GPs is elaborated below. 
The opposition of a GP is expected to play a role in exercising vigilance on the 
GP and exerting pressure on it to implement the demanded development works.  But 
this role may be performed only when a noteworthy opposition exists in the first place. 
In West Bengal GPs the opposition is readily visible because of the explicit party 
affiliation of GP members, whereas in Madhya Pradesh GPs, the opposition is not easily 
identifiable. The Panchayat law affirms the idea of a group or party based opposition in 
West Bengal, while Madhya Pradesh’s Panchayat law recognizes and give importance 
to the idea of individual opposition.  
In Goutampur Colony GP, the current GP has been constituted entirely through 
uncontested election of elected representatives (Sarpanch and Panchas). The previous 
GP (2005-10) too had 90% of its Panchas chosen through uncontested election. Such a 
situation leads one to expect that there will be no such thing as an opposition in the GP. 
The Secretary of this GP however divulged that the ruler-opposition divide is always 
seen in the GP, even when the GP is constituted entirely in an uncontested manner.127
The paksh-vipaksh (ruler-opposition) divide is a permanent situation. Panchas 
want to get works done in their respective villages. But through discussion they 
come to a consensus to take up works that are most urgent no matter which 
  
                                               
127The CEO (JP) of Obaidullahgunj JP also revealed that the accusatory stance employed by Panchas 
towards the Sarpanch is a common scenario in Madhya Pradesh GPs. 
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village or ward the work is being done in. All the Panchas are active in 
pressurizing the Sarpanch to do work in their respective wards. This situation is 
quite unlike the past. However, once consensus-based decision is taken about 
priority of works to take up, the Panchas abide by such decision (Author’s 
telephonic interview with Secretary of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 
11/06/2011).  
Each Panch in Goutampur Colony GP pressurizes the Sarpanch to take up 
development works in his/her respective ward; this also brings out that the opposition is 
not a coherent or organized group here, but is in fact characterized by competition 
among all the opposition actors (Panchas) for resource allocation. Interview responses 
of Panchas in both GPs, already presented, also indicate the existence of opposition, in 
terms of the us-versus-them and blaming attitude of the individual Panchas vis-a`-vis 
the Sarpanch, the GP as a whole, and the Secretary. The nature of the opposition in 
Ramgarh GP is revealed in the following account given by the Secretary of the GP: 
Where money is concerned, it is natural to have the paksh-vipaksh 
(ruler-opposition divide). The opposition exercises pressure on the ruler. 
Conflict between paksh and vipaksh centers around the allocation of money. But 
GP decisions are always consensus-based. In case any particular issue cannot be 
resolved in one GP meeting, it is resolved in the next meeting (Author’s 
telephonic interview with Secretary of Ramgarh GP, dated 11/06/2011).  
 It can be seen from the above accounts that in both GPs, in spite of 
pressurization from Panchas, actual GP decisions are always made through consensus 
of all GP members. Nervertheless, there is persisting unhappiness among many 
Panchas, as seen in their quoted interview responses. Therefore, it seems that the 
consensus generated in GP meetings is not always genuine or true.  
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Given the fragmented nature of opposition in Goutampur Colony GP, it is 
questionable how much influence the ‘opposition’ actually has on decision making by 
the GP. In Ramgarh GP the inter-village conflict has created a visible ruler-opposition 
divide and potentially coherent opposition group in the GP. However, whether this 
divide is actually engendering an assertive and vigilant opposition depends on the 
sustained interest and involvement of the Panchas. Given the low interest, involvement 
and assertiveness of most Panchas in this GP, it does not appear that such an opposition 
does indeed exist.  
In West Bengal GPs, the task of monitoring implementation is performed, to a 
great extent, by the GUS. As already seen, the committees of Gram Sabha in Madhya 
Pradesh (Gram Nirman Samiti and Gram Vikas Samiti) that could have served as the 
equivalent of GUS remain non-existent or non- functional in the chosen cases.128
                                               
128 Even if these committees had been functional, it is doubtful how effective they would have been in the 
task of monitoring. This is because the Sarpanch, as per the law, has been made the ex-officio  head of 
these committees. The independence of such a body would always be questionable.  
 In 
Goutampur Colony GP, the task of monitoring of construction projects was bestowed 
on the Nirman tatha Vikas Samiti (Construction and Development Committee) of the 
GP.  The rules of GP administration in Madhya Pradesh too envisage that the task of 
monitoring is to be performed by this standing committee (Government of Madhya 
Pradesh 2005). This committee of four Panchas headed by the Sarpanch does keep 
watch on on-going infrastructural projects in Goutampur Colony GP to some extent, but 
the Secretary of the GP confessed that in reality, the major part of monitoring was being 
done by him (Author’s telephonic interview, dated 11/06/2010). In Ramgarh GP, the 
Secretary revealed that a handful of Panchas (about two or three in number) who were 
more educated and intelligent compared to the majority of Panchas, were delegated the 
task of monitoring ongoing works (Author’s telephonic interview, dated 11/06/2011).  
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In West Bengal GPs, GUSs have already been institutionalized as mechanisms 
of monitoring, but in the Madhya Pradesh GPs, the institutionalization of intermediate 
monitoring mechanisms has not been achieved. There is an advantage in localized 
mechanisms such as GUS carrying out the task of monitoring in particular villages or 
neighbourhoods (due to the superior knowledge about local conditions), which is 
greatly reduced when the Secretary of the GP or a handful of Panchas take up this task. 
Furthermore, it is desirable that alongside monitoring by the Panchas, Sarpanch or the 
Secretary, some external actor should also be involved in vigilant monitoring to be able 
to keep watch in a more detached way and check irregularities in which the GP’s elected 
representatives or staff may have complicity. To cater to the diversity within GPs that 
comes from the co-existence of constituent villages that have unique problems and 
socio-economic conditions, it is imperative that there should be village–based 
monitoring committees. Giving control to local representatives and residents over the 
monitoring process is especially necessary given the feelings of deprivation and 
dissatisfaction expressed by Panchas and residents of certain constituent villages of 
both the GPs. There is thus a need for an appropriate alternative of the intermediate 
monitoring mechanism of GUS in the Madhya Pradesh context. The need for GUS in 
West Bengal GPs may be more acute because of their larger size and population, but the 
need for localized monitoring mechanisms also remains in the context of Madhya 
Pradesh GPs. In summary, the only intermediaries involved in the tasks of 
pressurization (and supervision, to a much lesser degree) of Madhya Pradesh GPs are 
the individual Panchas (who are the so-called ‘opposition’ actors), and these actors 
have limited effectiveness in carrying out these tasks.  
Having seen the intermediate decision making processes that transpire between 
the deliberative mechanism of Gram Sabha and actual GP outputs, the impact of this 
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mechanism on the performance of the chosen Madhya Pradesh GPs is summarized as 
follows: With respect to discovering the association between the deliberative dimension 
of accountability and GP performance, this study uses the degree of popular satisfaction 
with infrastructural assets as the relevant performance indicator of fulfilment of popular 
demand (instead of the proportion of Gram Sabha proposals fulfilled). This is done for 
two reasons–firstly, Gram Sabha proposals are not highly reflective of actual popular 
demands, since the GP dominates the preparation of the proposals and the level of Gram 
Sabha attendee inputs in preparation of such proposals is low. Secondly, there is no data 
available (for the same year) according to which the two GPs can be compared for their 
proportion of Gram Sabha proposals fulfilled. As already seen in Chapter 6, Goutampur 
Colony GP has higher popular satisfaction with infrastructural assets compared to 
Ramgarh GP. The study finding shows that the Madhya Pradesh GP that does better on 
the deliberation dimension of accountability (Goutampur Colony GP) also has higher 
popular satisfaction with infrastructural assets. The same GP also has higher aggregate 
GP performance. However mere association is not sufficient to indicate a causal 
relationship between the deliberation dimension of accountability and performance; it is 
important to have evidence of causal processes existing between them. Evidence from 
Goutampur Colony GP shows that while its Gram Sabha attendance, people’s 
participation and regularity of meetings are higher than those in Ramgarh GP, its actual  
Gram Sabha role in channelling popular input into GP decision making is minimal and 
not significantly different from that in Ramgarh GP. The Gram Sabha of Goutampur 
Colony GP mainly performs the role of informing people about the decisions of the GP 
and the rules of government welfare programmes, and not of collecting people’s 
demands for development works. This greatly reduces the possibility of Goutampur 
Colony GP’s Gram Sabha having any noteworthy impact on GP performance.  
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Furthermore, the so-called decisions of the deliberative forum—which are 
highly imperfect expressions of popular demand—are further constrained and delayed 
for fulfilment because of having to pass through intermediate decision making strata. 
Intermediary actors such as the opposition actors have limited effectiveness in 
pressurizing the GP within decision making structures. The impact of the deliberative 
mechanism of Madhya Pradesh GPs on their performance is therefore highly tenuous.  
 There is thus no perceptible link between the relatively more effective 
functioning of Gram Sabha in Goutampur Colony GP and its higher popular 
satisfaction with infrastructural assets. The variation in satisfaction levels between the 
two Madhya Pradesh GPs is therefore much better explained by other variables (such as 
finances and capacity) than by the deliberation dimension of accountability.  
 
Monitoring Dimension 
One may expect that monitoring mechanisms, by exposing wastage or loss of funds, 
may lead to correction of such loss or wastage and consequent improvement in the GP’s 
fund utilization and performance. Goutampur Colony GP, as already seen in Chapter 5, 
does better on the monitoring dimension of accountability in the Madhya Pradesh study 
by virtue of its higher effectiveness of the available monitoring mechanism of Social 
Audit. The same GP also has higher aggregate GP performance, indicating a positive 
association between the monitoring dimension and aggregate performance in the 
Madhya Pradesh study.  
 Since Social Audit pertains to a scrutiny of NREGA implementation, it is 
necessary to see which GP did better on NREGA output performance in order to 
decipher the actual causal impact of Social Audit on performance. 129
                                               
129The Social Audit figures for the chosen Madhya Pradesh GPs, presented in Chapter 5 and the NREGA 




Colony GP has relatively higher effectiveness of NREGA Social Audit, but has done 
worse on NREGA output performance (see Chapter 6). Therefore there is no 
association seen between Social Audit and NREGA output performance. This precludes 
the causal impact of Social Audit on GP performance (even though there is an 
association between the effectiveness of Social Audit and overall GP performance). As 
seen in Chapter 6, worse NREGA output performance in Goutampur Colony GP is due 
to unavailability of labour willing to work at existing wage rates, a problem that cannot 
conceivably be addressed by Social Audit.130
 Compared to a popular monitoring mechanism such as Social Audit, monitoring 
of GPs by the bureaucratic personnel at higher tiers of government is much more 
significant and substantial. GPs in Madhya Pradesh are obliged to frequently report to 
the Chief Executive Officers of their respective Janpad Panchayats on how funds of 
various programmes such as NREGA have been spent, and future fund allocation is 
conditional on the receipt of such reports. Such monitoring, very likely, has a greater 




Aspects of Performance and their Relationship with Accountability 
GP performance has been assessed in two functional areas of infrastructure and 
alternative primary education. The impact of accountability on each of these functional 
areas is assessed below.  
                                                                                                                                       
stated for the West Bengal study (see Chapter 7), it is conceivable that a part of the impact of Social Audit 
on NREGA output performance could have been felt in the same financial year because of factors related 
to the timing and nature of Social Audit. Nevertheless, the full impact of corrective learning induced by 
Social Audit can possibly only be felt on a more long time basis. NREGA output figures for 2010-11 
however, show the same conclusions as 2009-10 figures, regarding the association between effectiveness 
of Social Audit held in 2009-10 in Madhya Pradesh GPs and NREGA output performance (for 2010-11). 
130 The extraneous factor of labour availability therefore explains the variation in NREGA output 
performance in the Madhya Pradesh study. In the West Bengal study, variations in NREGA output 




Performance in the Functional Area of Infrastructure 
It has been seen in Chapter 6 that Goutampur Colony GP has overall superior 
performance in the area of infrastructure. This GP also has higher aggregate 
accountability, indicating an association between overall accountability and 
performance in this functional area. Goutampur Colony GP did better on the 
deliberation and monitoring dimensions of accountability (but worse on the other 
dimension of sanctioning). Therefore the impact of the deliberation and monitoring 
dimensions on infrastructural performance must be assessed before inferring any causal 
relationship between accountability and infrastructural performance. The impact of the 
deliberative mechanism of Gram Sabha and the monitoring mechanism of Social 
Audit--which also happen to be accountability mechanisms that are specifically related 
to the functional area of infrastructure--must be assessed before concluding any causal 
impact of accountability on performance in the area of infrastructure. 
 As already seen, the Gram Sabha, in actuality, has a minimal impact on the GP’s 
decision making in the functional area of infrastructure, since the GP dominates the 
selection of works that make up Action Plans of various programmes. Therefore the 
Gram Sabha is not responsible for Goutampur Colony GP’s overall higher performance 
in the area of infrastructure, and its higher popular satisfaction with infrastructural 
assets.  
 The other accountability mechanism relevant to the area of 
infrastructure--Social Audit--also does not have a causal impact on infrastructural 
performance. This is evident from the lack of association between effectiveness of 
Social Audit and NREGA output performance in Goutampur Colony GP. The lack of 
causal impact of the deliberative and monitoring mechanisms of accountability on the 
 331 
 
infrastructural performance of Goutampur Colony GP implies that accountability does 
not explain the better overall infrastructural performance of Goutampur Colony GP.  
 
Performance in the Functional Area of Alternative Primary Education 
The Madhya Pradesh GP that has better performance in the functional area of 
alternative primary education–Goutampur Colony GP--also has higher aggregate 
accountability. While there is an association between accountability and GP 
performance in providing infrastructure to EGS schools, is Goutampur Colony’s better 
performance in this functional area explained by its higher accountability?  
 As already stated, Goutampur Colony GP has done better than Ramgarh GP on 
the deliberation and monitoring dimensions of accountability. Since the monitoring 
mechanism of Social Audit is relevant only to NREGA implementation and not relevant 
to alternative primary education, only the impact of the deliberative mechanism of 
Gram Sabha is relevant. 
 People attending Gram Sabha meetings could have potentially influenced the 
availability of facilities in EGS schools by using the decision making powers of Gram 
Sabha to demand the provision of such facilities. However, the actual reality in both 
GPs is that people hardly have any say in formulating the proposals that make up Gram 
Sabha decisions, including proposals for provision of infrastructure to EGS schools. 
The formulation of the so-called Gram Sabha decisions that comprise the list of 
proposed works, and the selecting of specific works for implementation are in the GP’s 
hands, and dictated by GP preferences. Proposals for providing school infrastructure 
have to compete with proposals for providing other kinds of infrastructure (such as 
roads) for selection. The GP decides which kind of infrastructural work is urgent and 




Overall Impact of Accountability on Performance 
The findings of the Madhya Pradesh study show that the same GP–Goutampur Colony 
GP–has both higher aggregate accountability and higher aggregate performance. 
However, the causal processes that could have brought about the impact of 
accountability on performance do not operate in actual practice. Table 29 summarizes 
the relationship between the various dimensions of accountability and performance for 
the two chosen GPs of Madhya Pradesh. 
 
Table 29: Impact of Accountability Dimensions on Performance in the Madhya 
Pradesh GPs  
Accountability 








No - Ramgarh GP better on 
sanctioning dimension but Goutampur 
Colony GP has higher performance 
No No 
Deliberation 
Yes – Goutampur Colony GP better on 
deliberation dimension and has higher 
performance 
     No131 No  
Monitoring 
Yes – Goutampur Colony  GP better 





Yes – Goutampur Colony  GP has 
higher aggregate accountability and 
higher aggregate performance 
No No 
Source: The author’s analysis and inference  
 
                                               
131This does not mean that the functioning of the deliberative mechanism of Gram Sabha does not have 
any impact on GP functioning. There is a linkage, though highly constrained and very tenuous, between 
popular inputs expressed in the Gram Sabha meetings, and actual GP outputs. What is implied here is that 
the higher effectiveness of Gram Sabha meetings in Goutampur Colony GP (mainly in terms of higher, 
more inclusive attendance ) cannot be held responsible for its higher performance (in terms of people’s 
satisfaction with infrastructural assets).  
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 Table 29 shows that none of the dimensions of accountability has a significant 
causal impact on performance. Furthermore, GP performance in each selected 
functional area – whether infrastructure or alternative primary education – cannot be 
explained by the impact of accountability. In spite of the association between aggregate 
accountability and aggregate performance observed in the Madhya Pradesh study, a 
causal relationship between the two variables cannot be inferred. This is because of the 
evidence that points to the required causal processes not operating in actual practice. 
Therefore the higher aggregate performance of Goutampur Colony GP is explained not 
by its higher aggregate accountability, but by other variables. The other determinants of 
performance are explored in the next section.  
 
Other Determinants of Performance 
Three possible primary determinants--accountability, finances and capacity--can 
explain performance variation between GPs (as discussed in Chapter 1). Since the role 
of accountability in explaining variation in performance between Goutampur Colony 
GP and Ramgarh GP has been already been examined and ruled out, it is necessary to 
examine the role of the other two possible primary determinants (finances and capacity) 
in explaining variation in performance. The secondary determinant of performance, 
preferences of decision makers, makes a subtle contribution towards GP performance, 
and its impact will be assessed in the latter part of this section.  
 
Primary Determinants: Finances and Capacity 
Apart from accountability, finances and capacity constitute the possible primary 





A very interesting and counter-intuitive finding for the Madhya Pradesh study is that the 
GP with lower economic development and lower aggregate performance--Ramgarh 
GP--has higher overall revenue and expenditure. It can be seen from Table 30 that the 
total revenue per head of population and total expenditure per head of population are 
also higher for Ramgarh GP than for Goutampur Colony GP (see the Appendix for 
population figures).  
  
Table 30: Overall Financial Strength of the Madhya Pradesh GPs (2008-09) in 
Indian Rupees (INR)  







per head of 
population 
Goutampur Colony GP 1,203,402 829.93 1,299,065 895.91 
Ramgarh GP 1,780,066 1112.54 1,684,314 1052.70 
Source: Data from Annual Income-expenditure statements of the two GPs. 
 
The overwhelming share of the revenue of a GP comes from the financial 
allocations made under central and state government programmes implemented by the 
GP, though a small share may also come from OSR or self-mobilization of resources. 
Table 31 shows the allocations received from the higher levels by the two GPs in 
2008-09 under various state and central programmes. 132 NREGA, Twelfth Finance 
Commission Fund and BRGF are central government programmes while Moolbhoot 
Yojana133
 
 and Adivasi Upayojana are Madhya Pradesh state government programmes.  
                                               
132The allocations given in Table 31 do not add up to the total revenue of the two GPs (given in Table 30). 
The programmes mentioned in Table 31 pertain to the functional area of infrastructure. However GPs 
also receive allocations under non-infrastructural programmes such as social security programmes.  
133 Moolbhoot Yojana is a fund given as per the Madhya Pradesh State Finance Commission’s 
recommendations. Certain spending priorities for this fund have been pre-defined by the state 
government. The criteria for allocation to GPs are population, area and extent of tax revenue mobilization 
(Government of Madhya Pradesh 2008-09).  
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Table 31: Financial Allocations made under Different Programmes (2008-09) to 
the Madhya Pradesh GPs (in INR)  
Programme Goutampur Colony GP Ramgarh GP 
NREGA 240,740 1,151,067 
Twelfth Finance Commission Fund 212,588 57,119 
Moolbhoot Yojana 167,054 61,089 
Adivasi Upayojana 250,000 0 
BRGF 0 42,180 
Source: Annual Income –Expenditure statement of the two GPs. 
 
 One GP is not consistently higher than the other in allocations received under all 
the programmes. Goutampur Colony GP receives higher allocations under some 
programmes whereas Ramgarh GP receives higher allocations for the others. The main 
factor responsible for the higher aggregate revenue of Ramgarh GP is the almost five 
times higher allocation received under NREGA. In fact, Goutampur Colony GP’s 
aggregate non-NREGA revenue and expenditure for 2008-09 are 1.5 times higher than 
those of Ramgarh GP (see Table 32).  
 
Table 32: NREGA and Non-NREGA Revenue and Expenditure of the Madhya 




Goutampur Colony GP Ramgarh GP 
 revenue expenditure revenue expenditure 
NREGA 240,740 199,249 1,151,067 984,161 
Non-NREGA 962,662 1,099,816 628,999 700,153 
Source: Data from the Annual Income-Expenditure statements of the two GPs 
   
 Table 31 shows that the financial allocations received by Goutampur Colony GP 
under the Twelfth Finance Commission Fund and the Moolbhoot Yojana fund are 3.7 
and 2.7 times higher respectively than those received by Ramgarh GP. Ramgarh GP 
actually receives a very small amount of funds under these programmes in spite of its 
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higher population and socio-economic backwardness. Furthermore, Goutampur Colony 
GP, unlike Ramgarh GP, was able to receive the Adivasi Upayojana allocation because 
of its high tribal population. Goutampur Colony GP was able to construct two cement 
concrete roads using its Adivasi Upayojana and Twelfth Finance Commission Fund 
allocations. The low availability of these funds explains to an extent Ramgarh GP’s 
poorer infrastructural situation in roads and drinking water sources (see Chapter 6). 
Even though Ramgarh GP receives higher NREGA funding and has superior NREGA 
output performance, the fact remains that some kinds of crucial (material-intensive) 
infrastructural work such as repair of tube-wells and construction and repair work on 
some kinds of roads cannot be done under NREGA because of the rule-based 
restrictions on the proportion of material costs.134
 GPs in Madhya Pradesh can mobilize Own Source Revenue (OSR) from 
sources such as taxes, voluntary donations from residents, fines, loans from financial 
institutions, royalties from sale of minor minerals, and land revenue (Government of 
Madhya Pradesh 2005, 2008-09). Table 33 shows that the economically more advanced 
and better performing GP (Goutampur Colony GP), did not mobilize any OSR while the 
more backward and more poorly performing GP (Ramgarh GP) mobilized 5.6% of its 
total revenue for 2008-09 through OSR. Ramgarh GP obtained its OSR from land tax 
revenue and royalties from the sale of minor minerals.
 It was seen in Chapter 6 that a 
majority of works done by Ramgarh GP using NREGA funds were well construction 
works; this reveals the constraints involved in relying on NREGA funds to develop 
infrastructure.  
135
                                               
134 NREGA rules prescribe a 60:40 labour cost: material cost ratio for construction projects.  
 OSR however constitutes a 
small portion of this GP’s total finances, In spite of its higher OSR, Ramgarh GP is not 
able to achieve better performance than Goutampur Colony GP.   
135 The Madhya Pradesh government has given GPs the power to obtain royalties from the sale of minor 




Table 33: Own Source Revenue (OSR) of the Madhya Pradesh GPs (2008-09)  




OSR per head of 
population 
(INR) 
Goutampur Colony GP 0 0% 0 
Ramgarh GP 99,985 5.61% 62.49 
Source: Data from the Annual Income –Expenditure statements of the two GPs. 
 
 An analysis of the finances of the two Madhya Pradesh GPs shows that the 
composition of finances (that is, the availability of suitable kinds of funds), rather than 
aggregate financial strength or volume of funds, is an important ingredient behind 
Goutampur Colony GP’s superior overall performance. The higher availability of 
non-NREGA infrastructural funds--such as Twelfth Finance Commission Fund, 
Moolbhoot Yojana and Adivasi Upayojana funds--explains Goutampur Colony GP’s 
ability to take up higher-order, material intensive infrastructural works, and 
consequently contributes to its better quality and availability of infrastructural assets. 
This in turn explains the higher popular satisfaction with such assets. Ramgarh GP’s 
allocation from non-NREGA infrastructural funds is very small, which prevents it from 
taking up certain kinds of crucial infrastructural work (and probably also compromises 
the quality of the works that it does take up). The poorer availability of suitable funds 
explains why Ramgarh GP has poorer aggregate performance in spite of its higher 
aggregate financial strength.  
As seen in the West Bengal study, office bearers in Madhya Pradesh GPs also 
view financial factors as a significant constraint that hinders the GPs attempts to meet 
people’s needs. The former Sarpanch of Goutampur Colony GP complained that, “the 
GP suffered from a problem of enough funds to meet all its needs, especially because 
there was no single robust fund source available furnishing substantial amounts of 
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money such as INR 10-12 lakh (one to 1.2 million), that the GP could use to meet 
people’s needs” (Author’s field interview, dated 21/03/2010).  A former Panch of 
Ramgarh GP commented that “the amount of money available was not enough, more 
was needed. Some of the funds supposed to come did not arrive, because of which 
spending was low” (Author’s field interview, dated 3/04/2010). The husband of the 
current Sarpanch of Ramgarh GP lamented that  
There is not enough money coming here. If there was money, then I would fix all 
problems and improve the condition of the villages. There is a total shortage of 
basic facilities here such as Anganwadi building, health centres and tube-wells. 
A lot of money comes from World Bank etc, but where does the money go? 
(Author’s field interview, dated 30/03/2010).  
The Secretary of Ramgarh GP, however commented that because of the 
availability of NREGA funds, some development work such as digging of wells for 
drinking water and irrigation was made possible, and he felt that this was one 
programme for which there was no fund shortage (Author’s field interview, dated 
30/03/2010); the other fund sources, he felt, were highly inadequate (Author’s 
telephonic interview, dated 15/07/2012).   
Apart from the amount of funds available, it is the lack of financial autonomy 
that is seen as a major obstacle by the GP office holders. The current Sarpanch and a 
current Panch of Goutampur Colony GP (who is serving his third term as a Panch) 
commented that the GP decision makers felt constrained because of too many 
conditionalities imposed by the government on existing funds. The current Sarpanch 
(who has been a Panch in a previous term) complained: 
The GP can only spend according to pre-stated estimates and cannot spend as 
much as it likes. A problem is created when expenses on a particular work go up 
due to inflation. An untied fund does exist, but a report on money spent under 
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this fund has to be given to the government. The valuation done by the engineer 
is an essential requirement for expenditure to be sanctioned (approved). All 
programmes are connected to the government. The signature of government 
officials is required to certify that work is done. Our GP would like to carry out 
construction work on religious shrines, but it cannot do so on account of 
programmatic and other government regulations. The engineer refuses to carry 
out valuation of works on religious shrines. There is no freedom to spend.The 
government has tied up the hands of the Sarpanch (Author’s field interview with 
current Sarpanch of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 17/03/2010).  
The experienced current Panch of Goutampur Colony commented: 
The available funds are not enough to meet people’s needs…Programmes should 
be started in which the Sarpanch and Panchas, and not government officials, 
have power to take decisions about the kind of work to be done...sometimes the 
expenses go above the amounts stipulated by the government. These stipulated 
amounts should be fixed according to current labour and material prices. 
Sometimes, buildings cannot be completed because of insufficient funds 
(Author’s field interview with third time Panch of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 
24/03/2010).  
.  The Secretary of Ramgarh GP felt that his GP could get more infrastructure 
development work done if either the NREGA stipulation of 60:40 labour cost to 
material cost ratio was relaxed (to make possible more material intensive projects) or if 
more funds were provided by the higher tiers under other programmes such as Twelfth 
Finance Commission funds (Author’s field interview, dated 3/04/2010). The former 
Sarpanch of Goutampur Colony GP opined that rules attached to the various funds are 
fair, but there is a need for a genuine untied fund to be given to GPs that is truly 
unfettered by rules, and can be spent by the GP according to its discretion to meet urgent 
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needs (Author’s field interview, dated 21/03/2010). Such responses point to the need for 
the availability of suitable fund sources for GPs that are less constrained by rules.  
The interview responses of the GP elected representatives and staff members 
therefore point to the importance of the amount of funds available and the composition 
of funds (availability of suitable funds). Given such widely recognized importance of 
funds, it can be inferred that GPs having higher fund availability and more suitable fund 
composition would be in a more advantageous position as far as fulfilment of popular 
demands is concerned.   
While the adequate availability of suitable funds is an indispensable ingredient 
of Goutampur Colony GP’s superior performance, it does not completely explain why 
this GP performed better than Ramgarh GP. The utilization of available funds is a 
critical determinant of performance in addition to the availability of suitable funds. 
Table 34 shows the extent of fund utilization in both GPs in 2008-09. The total amount 
of available funds shown in Table 34 represents a combination of revenue obtained by 
the GP in 2008-09 and its unspent funds from earlier years. 
 
Table 34: Aggregate Fund Utilization by the Madhya Pradesh GPs (2008-09)  









Goutampur Colony GP 1,532,965 1,299,065 84.74% 
Ramgarh GP 2,202,976 1,684,314 76.46% 
Source: Data from the Income-Expenditure statements of the two GPs 
 
 Table 34 shows that Goutampur Colony GP, which has overall better 
performance, has a slightly higher rate of fund utilization than Ramgarh GP. This 
finding points to the importance of the ability to utilize available funds as a determinant 
of performance, alongside the superior availability of suitable funds. The slightly 
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superior fund utilization of Goutampur Colony GP is the possible consequence of a 
complex mix of factors, including skills and efforts of GP members and staff, and fund 
arrival timings. The variation in the extent of fund utilization between the two GPs is 
not large, thus making it quite difficult to infer the precise reasons behind such 
variation. GP capacity- comprising elements such as the skills and efforts of elected 
members and staff—is one possible factor explaining the extent of fund utilization by 
GPs.   
 
Capacity 
GP capacity comprises the components of human resource capacity, leadership, 
financial management and material capacity. The abilities and efforts of elected 
representatives (Sarpanch and Panchas) and staff, and staff availability make up human 
resource capacity. Leadership is both an element of human resource capacity and a 
capacity component in its own right.  
 As far as the efforts of elected GP members are concerned, both Goutampur 
Colony GP and Ramgarh GP suffer from certain common problems.  There is low 
involvement of Panchas, and concentration of power and responsibilities in the 
Sarpanch and the staff member (Secretary). Actual powers and responsibility over 
implementation work pass into the hands of the Secretary because of the Sarpanch’s 
lack of technical knowledge.  
 In both Goutampur Colony and Ramgarh GP, there is a problem of low 
involvement of Panchas in the implementation work of the GP. This can be attributed, 
to a large extent, to the institutional structure of Madhya Pradesh GPs, as established by 
the state’s Panchayat law. The direct election of the Sarpanch and the Sarpanch’s 
ex-officio chairpersonship of all the functional committees of the GP establish a power 
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asymmetry between the Sarpanch and Panchas. This factor curtails the involvement of 
Panchas in GP functioning. The current situation in both GPs is such that Panchas, 
even when they do express their voices, are often involved in blaming the Sarpanch and 
Secretary for the problems seen in their respective constituencies or villages, rather than 
in taking responsibility to solve the problems.  
 When the Sarpanch (because of the lack of technical knowledge) is unable to 
comprehend the administrative duties of his position, the implementation 
responsibilities accrue to the staff member, the Secretary. In both the selected GPs, the 
respective Secretaries admitted that the GP’s entire implementation workload is on their 
shoulders. The Goutampur Colony GP Secretary revealed that the Sarpanch did not 
understand administrative matters such as how to prepare a budget (Author’s field 
interview, dated 17/03/2010). The Ramgarh GP Secretary said that because the 
Sarpanch of the GP was uneducated, the entire burden of the administrative functioning 
fell on him (Author’s telephonic interview, dated 27/01/2011).   
 While both GPs suffer from the above-stated common problems, there is a 
degree of variation between the two GPs with respect to the awareness levels of the 
Panchas. The awareness of Panchas is poorer in Ramgarh GP compared to Goutampur 
Colony GP. More Panchas in Goutampur Colony GP have heard of and undergone 
training sessions. Training can help Panchas develop skills, awareness and attitudes 
relevant to their position.  
Training can help Panchas and the Sarpanch understand their basic duties and 
teach them basic skills relevant to GP decision making and functioning (for example 
how to place proposals in a GP meeting (Author’s field interview with Secretary of 
Ramgarh GP, dated 30/03/2010). Training is required in order to inculcate in Panchas a 
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sense of responsibility, maturity and initiative, as expressed by the CEO of 
Obaidullahgunj Janpad Panchayat: 
Usually the Sarpanch does everything, but is also blamed for everything by the 
Panchas. Panchas are often opposing Sarpanchas, for example asking why was 
so-and-so person removed from the BPL list? Or why did that person get benefits 
while the other person did not get? They would understand these matters if they 
had training and knew the rules. Panchas are also ultimately responsible. A long 
time will be needed for them to become mature, but training can help in bringing 
about maturity in them. Training should be regular, and not just given at the 
beginning of the tenure (Author’s field interview, dated 18/03/2010). 136
Half the Panchas in any GP are now women, and therefore women 
representatives constitute a potentially significant human resource pool for GPs. 
Women representatives (whether Sarpanch or Panch), however, are very rarely 
assertive or pro-active. As expressed by the CEO of Narsinghgarh Janpad Panchayat, 
“There is 50% reservation for women, and a lot of the elected women representatives 
are mere ‘dummies’. There is a need for capacity building of such women” (Author’s 
field interview, dated 31/03/2010). This is seen very clearly in the case of the current 
Sarpanch of Ramgarh GP, who does not even appear in front of the males of her village, 
and whose husband functions as the de facto Sarpanch. Training is critical to build 
capacity in and empower such female representatives so that they may develop and 
utilize their inherent potentialities in serving the GP and its people.  
 
Thus, the domination of the Sarpanch and the low involvement of Panchas, 
makes it necessary to have regular and proper training for Panchas. The CEO of 
                                               
136The researcher also observed the blaming of the Sarpanch by Panchas. In an interaction between the 
new Panchas and Sarpanch of Goutampur Colony GP before the first GP meeting, dated 18/03/2010,  a 
GP member accused the Sarpanch of being goonga (meaning ‘mute’ in Hindi) in expressing the GP’s 
problems to the higher authorities.  This propensity to blame is also evident in many interview responses 




Narsinghgarh Janpad Panchayat states, “There is still limited awareness at lower 
levels. Not all Panchas are involved in decision making. Only a handful of people are 
involved in making decisions.There is a need for the spread of literacy and awareness” 
(Author’s field interview, dated 31/03/2010). Proper training can make the functioning 
of the GP more inclusive, make elected representatives more aware, responsible and 
active, lead to better ultilization of the abilities of elected representatives, and reduce 
the knowledge assymetry between the Secretary and the elected representatives.   
 In Ramgarh GP, none of the ex-Panchas of the three constituent villages of this 
GP, whom the author interviewed, had ever attending training, 137  and all but one of the 
current and ex-Panchas interviewed confessed to never having heard of the existence of 
training for Panchas. In Goutampur Colony GP, all but one of the ex-Panchas 
(representing the villages and hamlets of Goutampur Colony, Goutampur Tola and 
Kesalwada) interviewed told the author that they had attended training and gained 
useful knowledge from it.138
 The Panchas of Goutampur Colony GP are also more assertive, and more 
involved in GP decision making, relative to their counterparts in Ramgarh GP (although 
their involvement is low in absolute terms). The relatively lower involvement and 
assertiveness of the Panchas of Ramgarh GP can be attributed to two factors–firstly, the 
irregular holding of GP meetings and secondly, the feudal socio-economic context. It is 
 A third-time Panch in Goutampur Colony GP professed 
that he felt more empowered and better equipped to function as a Panch as a result of 
training (Author’s field interview, dated 24/03/2010). The interview responses of the 
Goutampur Colony GP Panchas about the problems of their villages and the obstacles 
faced by them were also, in general, more articulate compared to those of the Ramgarh 
GP Panchas.  
                                               
137At the time of fieldwork, the current Panchas had just been elected; thus one cannot expect them to 
have undergone training by that time.  
138The ex-Panch representing Jondra hamlet did not attend training.  
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obvious that Panchas would have a much lower likelihood of influencing GP decisions 
if GP meetings are held infrequently or irregularly. An ex-Panch of Ramgarh GP, 
revealed that only one or two GP meetings were held in the five years of his tenure 
(2005-10) (Author’s field interview, dated 5/04/2010). No such problem of infrequent 
GP meetings was alleged in Goutampur Colony GP.   
 The socio-economic context in Goutampur Colony GP is far more egalitarian 
than that of Ramgarh GP, as far as the status of women are concerned. This leads to 
greater assertiveness of its female Panchas. In Goutampur Colony GP, most female 
Panchas attend GP meetings (as seen by the author), are articulate in talking about the 
problems of their respective villages, and are free from customs of female seclusion. In 
the highly feudal Ramgarh GP, in contrast, there is social marginalization of women.  
There is a serious problem of poor involvement and assertiveness of the woman elected 
representatives (Panchas and Sarpanch) of Ramgarh GP. The current Sarpanch of 
Ramgarh GP follows the strict social norms of female seclusion, and does not even 
appear in front of the males of her village. One woman ex- Panch of Ramgarh GP said 
that she never attended any GP meeting, and her husband attended on her behalf. She 
also did not have any experience of interacting with villagers (even women) about their 
problems, and expressed a perception that villagers with problems approach the block 
office, and not the GP member, for help (Author’s field interview, dated 5/04/2010).  
The nature of leadership in a GP is inextricably linked to its human resource 
capacity. GP leaders (Sarpanchas) can play a role in promoting or hindering the 
involvement of Panchas in GP functioning. They also have a wider role of planning and 
co-ordinating the work of the GP and mobilizing all its resources to  get its work done. 
Leadership is thus a pivotal component of GP capacity. Leadership in Goutampur 
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Colony GP and Ramgarh GP is analyzed here according to the three parameters of 
inclusiveness, decisiveness and control, and stability/unity.  
The low inclusiveness of leadership in both GPs has already been described. 
The Sarpanch in both GPs dominates the functioning of the GP and there is low 
involvement of Panchas. However, there appears to be a  relatively greater attempt at 
inclusive leadership in Goutampur Colony GP, because its GP meetings are held more 
regularly, giving GP members a relatively greater voice in decision making. An 
ex-Panch of Ramgarh GP stated, “The Secretary and Sarpanch do everything. They 
don’t take the opinion of the other Panchas” (Author’s field interview, dated 
5/04/2010).  
The second dimension of leadership is decisiveness and control. The 
concentration of power in the hands of the Sarpanch in Madhya Pradesh GPs does not 
result in decisiveness and control in pushing Panchas to contribute to GP work. In both 
the GPs, the extent of delegation of work to Panchas is unsatisfactory. Sarpanchas are 
not putting pressure on most Panchas to get them involved in the GP’s  implementation 
work or getting them to complete tasks. If Sarpanchas were more authoritative as 
leaders and focused on utilizing the GP’s human resources to get its work done, then 
Panchas would probably be more involved in carrying out tasks delegated to them, and 
less involved in blaming and accusing the Sarpanch.  
The third dimension of leadership is stability and unity. The Sarpanch of 
Goutampur Colony GP and all its 20 Panchas were elected in an unopposed manner in 
2010, and this makes it seem that its leadership would be undisputed and unchallenged. 
In fact, at the beginning of the tenure, the Sarpanch and newly elected Panchas were 
very hopeful that the GP was entering an era of stability and unity that would be 
conducive for development and good performance. In the earlier term (2005-2010) the 
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Sarpanch was elected in a contested manner, but 90% Panchas were elected in an 
unopposed manner. The Sarpanch for that term commented that, “there were problems 
created by the opposition” (Author’s field interview with former Sarpanch of 
Goutampur Colony GP, dated 21/03/2010). As already seen, Panchas of that term 
(belonging to the more backward villages of the GP-Kesalwada, Jondra and Goutampur 
Tola) expressed their unhappiness with the Sarpanch and Secretary and accused the GP 
of neglect towards their villages. One Panch, who is a member of the GP elected in 
2010 and has also been a Panch in the two earlier terms, commented on the prospects of 
the new GP elected in 2010: “There will be less trouble in getting work done. Work will 
be done more quickly compared to the earlier GP. Those who were in opposition earlier 
are now part of the ruling group” (Author’s field interview, dated 24/03/2010).  
However, the actual situation in the present term of Goutampur Colony GP is not as 
ideal as envisaged in these views. Even in this term of the GP, all the individual 
Panchas are acting as individual opposition forces vis-a`-vis the Sarpanch, as already 
seen.  
In Ramgarh GP, the position of Sarpanch has been contentious right from the 
beginning of the term of the present GP (elected in 2010).  The Sarpanch election in 
2010 ended in a tie that had to be resolved through a draw of lots, and there was some 
disorder and violence in Ramgarh village, where some people were unhappy with the 
election results. Inter-village divide has influenced the GP’s leadership and the 
Panchas’ attitude towards such leadership, both in the earlier term (2005-2010) and the 
new term (2010-present).  The current Panchas belonging to Neenaur village showed 
hope and optimism about the impact of the leadership for the coming term (since the 
Sarpanch also belongs to Neenaur), while the current Panchas belonging to Ramgarh 
village showed lack of hope (see page 320 for quotations of their interview responses).  
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As already stated, the involvement of Panchas in GP functioning in low in both 
GPs, and even lower in Ramgarh GP. Therefore there is no apparent likelihood of 
Panchas of the ‘opposition’ villages turning so assertive as to challenge the leadership 
of the current Sarpanch of Ramgarh GP. The inter-village divide seen in Ramgarh GP is 
probably having the impact of furthering lowering the involvement of Panchas 
belonging to the ‘opposition’ villages. Village based divide also exists to a degree in 
Goutampur Colony GP, but the degree of acrimony is much lesser. While a degree of 
‘opposition’ remains in Goutampur Colony GP, the acceptance of leadership, and 
consequently the unity of leadership, is greater in Goutampur Colony GP. Goutampur 
Colony GP therefore has overall better leadership than Ramgarh GP, due to its relative 
superiority on the dimensions of inclusiveness and unity and stability.  
 In addition to the capacity of elected members, staff capacity is an important 
component of a GP’s human resource capacity. Staff members are an important 
resource for GPs because they are equipped with knowledge of rules and regulations as 
well as skills related to record and account keeping, budgeting and handling finances 
that are important aspects of the GP’s administrative work. Both the selected GPs of 
Madhya Pradesh suffer from the same staff-capacity related problems, and there is no 
perceptible variation in staff capacity between them. The unfortunate situation seen in 
both the GPs is that they have only one staff member each, one Secretary only, to handle 
the entire administrative workload. The very poor salary given to GP Secretaries, who 
have such a heavy workload, no doubt undermines their morale and motivation. The 
only technical assistance for construction works in Madhya Pradesh GPs comes from 
the block level assistant engineers. The current Sarpanch of Goutampur Colony GP 
complained that the engineers often do not arrive in time to repair non-functional 
tube-wells (Author’s field interview, dated 17/03/2010). Adding to this problem of 
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technical capacity in both GPs is that the use of contractors for doing construction work 
is legally prohibited, and the GP has to take on the complete responsibility of procuring 
labour and materials for such work and also overseeing and co-ordinating it.   
Basic financial management, such as budgeting and strategic planning and 
management of funds are also elements of GP capacity. Certain constraints and 
limitations are characteristic of the budgeting process in both GPs. The Secretaries of 
both GPs admitted that budgets are mere estimates, and do not totally conform to the 
actual income and expenditure of the GP for the coming year. The comments of the 
Secretaries of the two GPs make this clear: 
Budgets are estimates, based on the possibilities of income and expenditure for 
the coming year, approved in Gram Sabha meetings and sent to higher levels for 
approval. Some actual expenses are not mentioned in the budget, because they 
could not be foreseen when the budget was prepared. In every year’s budget, 
10% addition is made to the income-expenditure of the previous year (Author’s 
telephonic interview with Secretary of Ramgarh GP, dated 15/07/2012).  
 
In its budget, Goutampur Colony GP actually asks for more funds than it expects 
to spend in the coming year. This is because one cannot be sure of how much 
money the higher tiers will actually send. In fact, if we keep a low ceiling in the 
budget itself, then we might be constrained by the low targeted amount, and the 
actual money sent might be even lower than what is asked for (Author’s 
telephonic interview with Secretary of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 
15/07/2012).  
An important constraint that relates to budgeting in both the Madhya Pradesh 
GPs is that the GP is overwhelmingly dependent on funds arriving from higher tiers.  
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GPs therefore lack control on the amount of funds actually arriving. The Secretary of 
Ramgarh GP elaborated, 
The budget of a GP would be good if its tax revenue was good. If tax revenue is 
not good, then the budget would also not be good. In the absence of tax revenue, 
the budget can only rest on an estimate of funds supposed to arrive from higher 
levels. This GP has very little tax revenue and most of its funds come from above 
(Author’s telephonic interview with Secretary of Ramgarh GP, dated 15/07/12).  
Yet another constraint on budgeting in both GPs is that the Secretary dominates 
the process. The input of the Sarpanch and Panchas is very low because of the lack of 
technical knowledge on the part of such elected representatives. It is unfortunate that 
elected representatives are not able to play a significant part in voicing their opinions in 
budget preparation. Budgets, no matter how rough, represent a prior plan of how the GP 
proposes to spend its funds. The responses of the Secretaries of both GPs reveal their 
dominance in budget preparation: 
There is consultation with the Sarpanch, but Sarpanch does not always have the 
knowledge required to make the budget (Author’s field interview with Secretary 
of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 17/03/2010). 
 
The Secretary prepares the budget, taking opinions from the Sarpanch. The 
Sarpanch, however, is inexperienced and does not know much (Author’s field 
interview with Secretary of Ramgarh GP, dated 30/03/2010).  
Certain basic elements of strategic planning of spending are seen in both GPs. In 
both GPs, seasonal principles govern the taking up of works. The Secretaries of both 
GPs revealed that afforestation works were taken up by the GP in the monsoon season 
(Author’s telephonic interviews, dated 15/07/2012). The Secretary of Goutampur 
Colony GP revealed that road works were not taken up in the rainy season. The GPs 
 351 
 
take up works from the Gram Sabha-approved action plan according to the urgency of 
need and intensity of popular demand (keeping in mind, but not strictly adhering to, the 
order of priorities stated in the Gram Sabha approved action plan, according to the 
Secretary of Goutampur Colony GP). Apart from such rudimentary planning, there does 
not seem to be much strategic planning in place, and there appears to be limited scope 
for strategic planning:  
Programmatic funds from higher tiers do not arrive in lump sum amounts. 
Whenever the GP intends to take up a particular work (say construction of a bus 
stop in a particular village), it has to send the demand for funds for that work up 
to the higher tiers. The funds that arrive can be spent only on that specific work. 
Furthermore, the funds arrive on instalment basis. When part of the work is done, 
an evaluation has to be done by the block-level engineer and pictures of the 
completed portion sent to the higher tiers when demanding the next portion of 
funds for the concerned work. It is only on completion of these requirements that 
the next fund instalment is sent by the higher tiers (Author’s telephonic interview 
with Secretary of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 15/07/2012).  
 Madhya Pradesh GPs thus do not have much autonomy in strategic planning, 
since they do not have the option of strategically dividing an available lump sum 
amount among different priorities. Therefore, the budgeting and strategic planning seen 
in the two Madhya Pradesh GPs is rudimentary and highly constrained. This gives an 
idea about the nature of financial management in the two GPs.  
As far as the material capacity (equipment and facilities) of the GP offices and 
their use are concerned, two important weaknesses were seen in both the selected GPs. 
Firstly, there is no computerization of GPs, which adds to the burden of the sole staff 
member in maintaining copious records and accounts manually. The second weakness 
is the infrequent or rare use of the GP Bhavan or office building. In Goutampur Colony 
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GP, the Secretary’s residence is the venue of the office work and the GP office is 
opened only to hold the GP meetings. Official GP work being done in the Secretary’s 
residence in effect aggravates the personalization of GP work in one individual (the 
Secretary) and is possibly a factor contributing to the low involvement of the Panchas. 
 In Ramgarh GP, the Secretary does his official work at the Janpad Panchayat 
office at the block Head Quarter in Narsinghgarh (as observed by the author and 
admitted by the Secretary). The situation in Ramgarh GP, with respect to the utilization 
of material facilities, is even worse than that of Goutampur Colony GP. In Goutampur 
Colony GP, at least the GP Bhavan is used for the monthly GP meetings. In Ramgarh 
GP, however, even GP meetings happen infrequently, as revealed by a former Panch of 
this GP (Author’s field interview, dated 5/04/2010),139
 Summing up, it can be inferred that while both GPs suffer from problems of 
poor capacity, Goutampur Colony GP has relatively higher aggregate capacity than 
Ramgarh GP. This is because of the higher awareness of its Panchas, greater 
assertiveness and involvement of Panchas in GP decision making, and relatively 
greater inclusiveness and unity of leadership. Its utilization of the GP office building, 
while very poor, is better than that of Ramgarh GP. There is no perceptible inter-GP 
difference as far as the remaining capacity component of financial management is 
concerned.  
 the GP building is used to 
conduct the activities of the Anganwadi Kendra (Author’s field interview with husband 
of current Sarpanch of Ramgarh GP, dated 30/03/2010), and the conduct of GP work at 
the block Head Quarters further distances its functioning from its Panchas.  
 
                                               




The secondary performance determinant--preferences of decision makers--also affects 
performance, although its impact on GP performance is less obvious and fundamental 
than that of the primary determinants. It plays a subtle role in explaining performance 
variation between GPs.  
 
Preferences of Decision Makers 
The preferences of decision makers at the GP level influence the behaviour of decision 
makers at this level and have a subtle impact on GP performance. The preferences of 
GP decision makers determine the level of inclusiveness in GP decision making. 
Greater the inclusiveness of decision making, the lesser would be its arbitrariness. Such 
inclusiveness (or lack of it) affects the GP’s selection of works for implementation, and 
thus has a bearing on the satisfaction levels of the villagers. Both the selected GPs 
--Goutampur Colony GP and Ramgarh GP--have the common feature of low levels of 
inclusiveness in decision making.  
 In spite of the common shortcomings in inclusiveness in both GPs, it appears 
that the decision making process in Goutampur Colony GP is relatively more inclusive 
than in Ramgarh GP. The higher assertiveness and involvement of Panchas and the 
more regular convening of GP general body meetings by the Sarpanch and the 
Secretary are responsible for the relatively higher inclusiveness of decision making in 
Goutampur Colony GP. 
 It was seen in the West Bengal study that the preferences of the decision makers 
at the levels of the block-level and district-level Panchayats have a subtle impact on GP 
performance, since decision makers at these tiers can extend assistance to GPs and 
augment their resources. In Madhya Pradesh, the Janpad Panchayat enjoys discretion 
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only in the allocation of funds known as the Sansad Nidhi (Member of Parliament Local 
Area Development Fund) and Vidhayak Nidhi (Local Area Development Fund of 
Members of Legislative Assembly). The Sarpanchas, Secretaries and Panchas of 
Goutampur Colony GP and Ramgarh GP complained that they hardly ever receive 
allocations from these funds, owing to the political preferences of the decision makers 
at these levels. 140
 In addition to the preferences of decision makers, upward accountability of GPs 
might also be subtly contributing to performance variations between the two chosen 
GPs of Madhya Pradesh. Upward accountability refers to the pressure or control 
exercised on GPs by their higher tiers, especially their respective block and district level 
authorities.  
 The official records of both GPs also show that no money was 
received by both GPs from these funds in the year 2008-09, and no work or project was 
carried out using these funds. Therefore, there is no variation between the two GPs with 
respect to assistance or support received from the higher level Panchayats. 
 The Chief Executive Officer of the Janpad Panchayat (CEO (JP)) is a source of 
substantial control on any Madhya Pradesh GP. The Secretary of the GP is required to 
frequently submit reports on spending of funds to the CEO (JP) and be answerable to 
the CEO (JP) for the protection of rules in GP decisions. There is, however, no 
conclusive evidence that Goutampur Colony GP experiences more pro-active control 
from its CEO (JP) compared to Ramgarh GP. The Secretaries of both GPs spoke of 
vigilant control and frequent demanding of reports by their respective Janpad 
                                               
140The Secretary of Ramgarh GP complained that political leaders refuse to give funds to GPs like his 
one, stating the grounds that they did not receive enough votes from the area (Author’s field interview, 
dated 3/04/2010). A Panch of Goutampur Colony GP revealed that “Sarpanchas with political reach get 
these benefits from the Janpad Panchayat while others don’t” (Author’s field interview, dated 
24/03/2010). A former representative of Goutampur Colony GP in Obaidullahgunj Janpad Panchayat 
revealed that currently Sansad Nidhi and Vidhayak Nidhi funds were only reaching those GPs whose 
Sarpanchas were actually affiliated to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (Author’s field interview, dated 
18/03/2010). While political party role in GP elections or functioning is not recognized by Madhya 
Pradesh’s Panchayat law, Sarpanchas and Panchas are in actual practice, often affiliated to a particular 




   
 This study is unable to detect actual variation in the extent of 
upward accountability between the two GPs. Therefore no inference is made in the 
Madhya Pradesh study about such variation and the extent of its impact on fund 
utilization and GP performance. 
Conclusion 
Table 35 shows the association between each of the possible primary performance 
determinants (accountability, finances and capacity) and performance, revealed through 
the comparison between the two Madhya Pradesh GPs.  
  
Table 35: Association between Performance Determinants and Performance in 
the Madhya Pradesh Study  
Gram 
Panchayat Performance 
Determinants of performance 
Accountability Finances Capacity 
Goutampur 
Colony GP Higher Higher 
Lower financial 




Ramgarh GP Lower Lower 
Higher financial 




Source: Analysis and inference carried out by the author 
 
Table 35 shows that the GP with higher accountability--Goutampur Colony 
GP--also has higher performance compared to the other chosen GP, Ramgarh GP. An 
association between accountability and performance by itself, however, does not 
indicate causality. The findings of the Madhya Pradesh study show that there is no 
                                               
141The Secretary of Goutampur Colony GP revealed that the CEO(JP) sometimes demanded reports at 
very short notice: for instance the CEO would send a mobile phone text message to the Secretary, and the 




evidence of the operation of the causal processes that are required to bring about the 
impact of accountability on GP performance. Therefore, accountability cannot be 
inferred as having a causal impact on GP performance in the Madhya Pradesh study. 
Since accountability is not salient in explaining performance variation between 
the two Madhya Pradesh GPs, finances (funding composition, not aggregate financial 
strength) and capacity are the primary performance determinants that explain the 
superior performance of Goutampur Colony GP. The preferences of the decision 
makers, that result in relatively greater inclusiveness in GP decision making, also 
contribute (albeit subtly) to the superior performance of Goutampur Colony GP.  
 While Goutampur Colony GP has lower aggregate financial strength than 
Ramgarh GP, it has a more favourable fund composition (that is, a higher amount of 
non-NREGA infrastructural funds) that gives it an advantage in taking up higher order 
infrastructural works, and achieving better quality of construction work, which in turn 
leads to higher public satisfaction with infrastructural assets. Goutampur Colony GP 
was also able to utilize its financial resources in a better way to achieve better 
performance because of relatively superior capacity. In the Madhya Pradesh study, 
however, the differences in capacity and fund utilization between the two GPs are not 
large. Therefore, the combination of fund composition and capacity, rather than 
capacity by itself, is salient in explaining variation in performance between the two 
GPs.  
 Why is accountability not having a significant impact on GP performance in the 
Madhya Pradesh study? This is happening because the actual operation of available 
accountability mechanisms, while creating a degree of popular control, are failing to 
fulfil the conditions through which such impact could have been brought about. The 
failure of accountability to make a significant difference to performance is due to the 
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combined failure of all three types of accountability mechanisms–sanctioning 
(elections), deliberative (Gram Sabha) and monitoring (Social Audit) – to have a 
notable impact on performance, but most notably due to the failures of the sanctioning 
mechanism.  
 Goutampur Colony GP, which has higher aggregate accountability, does better 
on the deliberation and monitoring dimensions of accountability. However the 
deliberative and monitoring mechanisms have a minimal impact on GP performance as 
already seen in this chapter. Goutampur Colony GP’s accountability failed to have a 
decisive impact on its performance not only due to the failure of its deliberative and 
monitoring mechanisms but also due to its shortcomings on the sanctioning dimension 
of accountability. This GP was worse than Ramgarh GP on the sanctioning dimension 
of accountability. It had very low levels of electoral contestation in the 2005 elections, 
and non-existent electoral competition in the 2010 elections. Such shortcoming on the 
sanctioning dimension is the most important reason for the failure of Goutampur 
Colony GP’s accountability to have a decisive impact on performance.   
 In Ramgarh GP, the degree of sanctioning is at a relatively higher level, but such 
sanctioning is not having an impact on performance. The selection of elected 
representatives in Ramgarh GP is not based on criteria such as competence or talent; it 
is no wonder that the evaluation and rejection of candidates in the GP elections of 
Ramgarh GP does not have any impact on its performance. None of the incumbent 
elected representatives of Ramgarh GP even stood for re-election: this rules out the 
possibility of performance-based sanctioning of incumbent GP members. Sanctioning 
based on performance considerations is necessary for accountability to have a decisive 
impact on performance. GP members should feel the concrete threat of being thrown 
out of office if they fail to seriously contribute to GP functioning. Such concrete threat, 
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in turn, would push the incumbent GP members to step up their contribution towards the 
GP.   
 The significance of performance-based sanctioning of GP members was 
brought out in the West Bengal study (Chapter 7). Such significance can also be 
illustrated for the Madhya Pradesh study by drawing on the example of the 
accountability-performance relationship with respect to alternative primary school 
teachers (EGS school teachers). Insights on the impact of accountability on the 
performance of EGS teachers can be applied to any service-providing functionary, 
including GP members such as the Sarpanch and Panchas.  
In Madhya Pradesh, both EGS and mainstream primary school teachers are 
made answerable to the Parent Teacher Association (PTA), the Gram Sabha and the 
GP. Both school types are exposed to the same accountability mechanisms, yet it is seen 
that accountability is having more of an impact on the performance of EGS teachers in 
Goutampur Colony GP than on the performance of the mainstream primary school 
teacher of this GP. Evidence of the better performance of EGS teachers in Goutampur 
Colony GP (in terms of lower absenteeism), compared to the performance of 
mainstream primary school teachers, brings out the the significance of 
performance-based sanctioning in this respect.  
In spite of the much lower salary of EGS teachers, they are found to be more 
sincere than mainstream primary school teachers (Author’s field interview with male, 
SC villager survey respondent of Goutampur Colony GP, dated 21/03/2010). The 
former Sarpanch of this GP expressed that the EGS teachers never give any opportunity 
for complaint (Author’s field interview with former Sarpanch, dated 21/03/2010). On 
the other hand, there is a problem of the rampant absenteeism, negligence and 
problematic attitude of some mainstream primary school teachers (Author’s field 
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conversation with newly elected Panchas, dated 18/03/2010; Author’s field interviews 
with current Sarpanch, dated 17/03/2010, and with former Sarpanch, dated 
21/03/2010). No action was taken by the government against one particularly errant 
mainstream primary school teacher of Goutampur Colony GP who is a notorious 
absentee, in spite of numerous and repeated complaints against him made by the PTA 
and the GP (Author’s field conversation with newly elected Panchas, dated 
18/03/2010). The main reason for the impunity of such errant mainstream primary 
school teachers is their permanent appointment. A newly elected Pancha of this GP told 
the author that “the permanent teachers are the notorious ones” (Author’s field 
conversation with newly elected Panchas, dated 18/03/2010) while the former 
Sarpanch of this GP said that “temporary teachers are not so bad” (Author’s field 
interview, dated 21/03/2010). The contractual or temporary appointment of EGS 
teachers opens opportunities for the PTA and GP to bring about the sanctioning of 
errant teachers on performance grounds. EGS teachers have more insecure tenures 
because of their contractual appointment, and complaints made by the PTA or the GP 
may result in the termination of their services by the Janpad Panchayat. The 
contractual tenure of EGS teachers forces them to take their duties more seriously than 
mainstream primary school teachers.  
The significance of accountability as a determinant of EGS teacher performance 
is therefore linked to the opportunities to sanction them because of their contractual 
tenure, and the real threat of performance-based sanctioning felt by the EGS teachers. 
Similarly, GP accountability could be effective in improving GP performance if (a) 
opportunities for sanctioning of incumbent GP members were available and (b) the such 
sanctioning could be linked to performance considerations. The contesting of 
re-election by incumbent representatives and the impending likelihood of the removal 
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of such representatives based on performance considerations, could have improved the 
efforts put in by them, thus bringing about a certain degree of improvement in GP 
performance. If such pressure could be effectively applied to GP members, their 
involvement in GP functioning would increase as a result, and the capacity of the GP 
would go up, resulting in an improvement of aggregate GP performance. However, the 
actual achievement of performance-based sanctioning and its impact on performance is 
very difficult to achieve, since two important conditions have to be met: firstly, 
villagers must be able to notice and evaluate GP members’ performance contribution. 
Secondly, GP members willing to seek re-election must be sufficiently motivated or 
interested to win the re-election; only then  will they feel the pressure of impending 
performance-based sanctioning, and put in their best efforts into improving GP 
functioning.  
 The impact of accountability, through the operation of the causal process of 
performance-based sanctioning, is likely to push up the performance of a GP only to a 
certain level. As already seen, the better performing GP, Goutampur Colony GP, has 
superior financial composition and capacity. Even if Ramgarh GP were to achieve the 
occurrence of performance-based sanctioning, it does not seem likely that it would be 
able to match up to Goutampur Colony GP’s performance without an improved 
availability of the appropriate kinds of funds and improvement of overall capacity. Its 
capacity problem of lower involvement of elected members could however be 
addressed to a certain extent (but not completely) by the impact of performance-based 
sanctioning.142
                                               
142 One source of the low involvement of GP members in Ramgarh GP is the feudal social context that 
results in the passivity of female GP members. It is unlikely that the impact of this factor can be overcome 
through the impact of accountability pressures. 
 Without a reasonable availability of capacity and suitable fund sources, 
Ramgarh GP will not be able to improve its performance beyond a limited extent.  
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 The Madhya Pradesh study has shown that the functioning of the existing 
accountability mechanisms is characterized by certain shortcomings. While the degree 
of accountability or popular control is seen to be relatively higher in Goutampur Colony 
GP, the degree of popular control in both GPs, in absolute terms, is low. The level of 
electoral competitiveness in both GPs is low in absolute terms. Furthermore, Gram 
Sabha attendees are not playing any significant role in decision making. Nor is Gram 
Sabha able to serve as a forum of collective decision making and action, or rational 
debate, for the village people. A village elder in Ramgarh GP (belonging to Neenaur 
village) commented on the low degree of popular pressure in his GP: 
The Panchas and Sarpanch so far have not done anything for this village. 
However, more consciousness and awareness among villagers is needed… It is 
up to the people of this village to be more aware and conscious… The degree of 
popular pressure is very low because the people are too busy with their own 
work. They are pre-occupied with their worries and earning their livelihood. 
There is a problem of unemployment here (Author’s field interview, dated 
3/04/2010). 
Whatever popular control is generated through accountability mechanisms has a 
highly constrained impact on GP performance because of the inability to meet certain 
conditions, as already seen. In other words, the ability of people to pressurize the GP to 
meet their demands is very limited. The result is that there is a gap between popular 
demands and what is actually delivered by the GP. Qualitative insights, derived from 
villager interviews in both GPs, highlight this gap.   
The West Bengal study had found that people often evaluate overall GP 
performance in terms of whether the GP has fulfilled their demands for welfare benefits 
such as pensions. In the Madhya Pradesh GPs, too, there is an association between 
personal beneficiary status and overall satisfaction with GP performance. People in the 
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Madhya Pradesh GPs also hold GPs responsible, to an extent, for performance in 
providing welfare benefits, an area in which the GP has limited autonomy. In fact, as 
also seen in the West Bengal study, demands presented by the villagers to the Madhya 
Pradesh GPs largely pertain to welfare benefits, such as IAY money, old age pension, 
widow pension, and ration cards.  However the reasons stated by the respondents in the 
Madhya Pradesh GPs behind their satisfaction with overall GP performance, show that 
their assessment of GP performance is not completely based on whether or not they 
have received personal benefits such as pensions from the GP. The infrastructural 
problems in the Madhya Pradesh GPs – such as the condition of tube-wells and other 
water supply sources, roads and drainage--have also given importance, in addition to 
beneficiary issues, by the respondents in their stated reasons behind their aggregate 
assessment of performance, as seen in Chapter 6. Therefore, it appears that people in 
Madhya Pradesh GPs also give importance to basic infrastructure provision, an area 
over which the GP has the power of autonomous decision making, in evaluating the GP.  
As many as 75% villager survey respondents in Ramgarh GP were totally 
dissatisfied with GP performance, compared to 18.75% in Goutampur Colony GP. 
There is therefore a large difference between the two Madhya Pradesh GPs, as far as 
people’s assessment of overall GP performance is concerned. In both GPs, there is a gap 
between the level of popular demands and their actual fulfilment, allegations of bias 
against particular villages, and shortcomings in service delivery. Nevertheless, there 
might be some specific reasons that contribute to the much poorer perceived 
responsiveness of Ramgarh GP, apart from the lack of appropriate funds and capacity. 
As already mentioned, some villagers and Panchas of Ramgarh GP mention elements 
of systematic bias, such as neglect of particular villages by Sarpanchas who belong to a 
different village or do not win a significant number of votes from a particular village. 
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Other aggravating factors are revealed in survey responses of some residents of 
Ramgarh GP: 
I am not hopeful about the needs of my village being fulfilled because of the 
inter-village dispute over the Sarpanch election (Author’s field interview with 
male, general category villager survey respondent residing in Ramgarh village, 
dated 5/04/2010). 
 
I am not hopeful about the needs of the village being fulfilled because there is too 
much ‘kheecha-tani’ (dispute) in this GP (Author’s field interview with male, 
general category villager survey respondent residing in Ramgarh village, dated 
5/04/2010). 
 
I am not at all satisfied with the GP. There is too much ‘chakkarbazi’ (loosely 
translated as self-interested behavior) in this GP, and no work done (Author’s 
field interview with male, general category villager survey respondent residing 
in Ramgarh village, dated 5/04/2010).  
The level of popular pressure and impact of popular pressure is therefore low in 
both GPs. However the level of such pressure and its impact seems to be even lower in 
Ramgarh GP. Villagers of this GP identify aggravating factors such as intra-GP 
disputes and self-interested behaviour of functionaries as factors that are responsible for 
the poor receptiveness of their GP to popular demands. While the inter-village divide is 
seen even in Goutampur Colony, it appears that inter-village divide-- a manifestation of 
lack of unity among villagers and inside the GP--is a more serious factor affecting 





CHAPTER 9                                  
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter concludes this study by presenting a summary and comparison of the 
findings of the West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh studies, and the common inferences 
arising from the two state studies. It also highlights the contribution of this study to the 
literature and its policy relevance. It finally proposes some areas of future research that 
can enhance the understanding of the relationship between accountability and 
performance in local government.  
 
Comparing the Findings of the West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh Studies  
This study has been carried out in the two Indian states of West Bengal and Madhya 
Pradesh. Two local government units (GPs) have been compared with each other in 
each state–Debipur GP and Nowdapanur GP in West Bengal, and Goutampur Colony 
GP and Ramgarh GP in Madhya Pradesh. This section presents a summary of the 
findings from the two state studies, and also notes the similarities and differences 
between the findings of the two state studies. Corresponding to the structure of this 
thesis, the findings on accountability, performance, and the accountability-performance 
relationship are presented in sequence in this section. The common conclusions of the 
two state studies form a basis for the overall study’s inferences with respect to the 
accountability-performance relationship and the identification of the salient 





Accountability has been operationalized in this study in terms of three dimensions of 
sanctioning, deliberation and monitoring. These dimensions have been assessed on the 
basis of the effectiveness of the corresponding accountability mechanisms of elections, 
Village Assembly and Social Audit respectively.  
 In the West Bengal study, Nowdapanur GP was inferred as having higher 
aggregate accountability than Debipur GP primarily due to its better position on two out 
of three dimensions of accountability–the crucial sanctioning dimension and the 
deliberation dimension. Nowdapanur GP did better on the sanctioning dimension 
because of its more competitive GP elections, and on the deliberation dimension due to 
its relatively higher effectiveness of the deliberative mechanism of Gram Sansad. Its 
higher effectiveness of Gram Sansad can be attributed mainly to its higher and more 
inclusive Gram Sansad meeting attendance. On the monitoring dimension of 
accountability, however, Debipur GP did better owing to its comparatively higher 
effectiveness of Social Audit, which was evident in its more serious conduct of Social 
Audit and higher perceived effectiveness.  
 In the Madhya Pradesh study, Goutampur Colony GP was found to have higher 
aggregate accountability because it did better on two dimensions of accountability, viz. 
deliberation and monitoring. Its better position on the deliberation dimension was 
because of its better functioning of the deliberative mechanism of Gram Sabha. It had 
higher and more inclusive Gram Sabha attendance, compared to the dismal situation 
with respect to the same in the other chosen GP, Ramgarh GP. Goutampur Colony GP’s 
better situation on the monitoring dimension is because of its better functioning of the 
monitoring mechanism of Social Audit. There is available evidence that the elements of 
the Social Audit process, such as conduct of the public meeting to involve villagers in 
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the Social Audit process and examination of GP records, were carried out in Goutampur 
Colony GP. There is no such available credible evidence for Ramgarh GP.    
 In the West Bengal study, the GP that did better on the sanctioning dimension 
(Nowdapanur GP) had higher aggregate accountability. Contrary to this, the GP with 
higher aggregate accountability in the Madhya Pradesh study (Goutampur Colony GP) 
was relatively worse than the other GP on the sanctioning dimension due to its lower 
electoral competition. In Goutampur Colony GP, as many as 90% Panchas were elected 
in an unopposed manner in 2005, and in the 2010 elections all its Panchas and its 
Sarpanch were chosen in an unopposed manner. However, the dismal record of 
Ramgarh GP (the one with the more competitive GP elections) with respect to the 
functioning of the deliberative and monitoring mechanisms, together with its weakness 
seen in the shortcoming of elections as a sanctioning mechanism (low levels of 
competitiveness of Panch elections in absolute terms) lead to Ramgarh GP being 
assessed as having lower aggregate accountability.  
 While the accountability mechanisms available in the local government systems 
of West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh - elections, Village Assembly and Social Audit - 
are the same, their institutional or legal features are different. These differences in 
institutional features have implications for their actual functioning. As already seen in 
this thesis (Chapters 4 and 5), West Bengal has party-based GP elections while Madhya 
Pradesh does not. This affects the overall extent of competitiveness of elections in these 
two states. In West Bengal, uncontested election of GP members is rare (Author’s field 
interview with Assistant Secretary of West Bengal State Election Commission, dated 
21/12/2009),143
                                               
143 Data also shows that only 10.94% of GP seats were filled in an uncontested manner in the 2003 
Panchayat elections in West Bengal (Government of West Bengal 2007). 




 The role of political parties in GP elections in West Bengal implies that the 
political party based ruling groups of West Bengal GPs (in addition to individual 
incumbent representatives) face a degree of pressure from competitive elections. Unlike 
in Madhya Pradesh GPs (which lack any coherent ruling group due to the absence of 
party role in GP elections) the ruling groups of West Bengal GPs face the threat of being 
replaced by other political parties in the next elections. Such pressure on the ruling 
group, which makes relevant a notion of collective responsibility of the ruling group, is 
a source of popular pressure seen in West Bengal GPs but not in Madhya Pradesh GPs.  
 Party involvement in GP elections leads to higher interest in 
contesting such elections, and results in increased competitiveness of GP elections. As 
already seen, a high proportion of Panch seats were filled in an uncontested manner in 
Goutampur Colony GP and Ramgarh GP, both the chosen GPs of Madhya Pradesh 
(with an even higher proportion of uncontested seats in the former). In the electorally 
more competitive Madhya Pradesh GP (Ramgarh GP), 61.5% Panchas were chosen in 
an unopposed manner in 2010, whereas 15% GP members were chosen in the same 
manner in the electorally less competitive West Bengal GP in 2008 (Debipur GP).   
 The influence of political parties in West Bengal GPs not only extends to GP 
elections and decision making within the GP, but also affects the functioning of the 
deliberative mechanism of Gram Sansad. Debipur GP has less inclusive Gram Sansad 
meeting attendance than Nowdapanur GP because the overwhelming dominance of the 
ruling party in the former repels non-partisan and opposition party-affiliated villagers 
from attending the meetings. The less inclusive Gram Sabha meeting attendance in 
Ramgarh GP of Madhya Pradesh, compared to Goutampur Colony GP in the same state, 
is mainly due to the feudal socio-economic context in the former which disempowers 
                                               
144In the 2005 Panchayat elections in Madhya Pradesh, 57.2% Panch seats were filled in an uncontested 
manner (Madhya Pradesh State Election Commission 2006).  
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women and people belonging to the lower caste groups. The variation in the 
inclusiveness of attendance between the two chosen GPs is explained by the political 
factor in the West Bengal study, but by socio-economic factors in the Madhya Pradesh 
study.  
 Madhya Pradesh’s Panchayat law lays down a system of Gram Swaraj 
(sovereignty of the deliberative body of Gram Sabha in village governance). West 
Bengal’s Panchayat law does not state such sovereignty of its deliberative body of 
Gram Sansad.  However, the reality in the chosen Madhya Pradesh GPs shows a glaring 
gap between law and practice, as far as the actual decision making role of the 
deliberative forum (Gram Sabha) is concerned.  
 It has been seen in Chapters 4 and 5 that the respective Panchayat laws of West 
Bengal and Madhya Pradesh bestow decision making powers of proposing 
infrastructural works on their respective deliberative bodies. In the chosen GPs of both 
West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh, however, the lists of proposed works are actually 
not formulated by the deliberative bodies. Nevertheless, decision making in the West 
Bengal GPs is more inclusive because the village-constituency level intermediary 
bodies known as GUSs prepare this list for their respective constituencies. Furthermore, 
there is evidence that Gram Sansad attendees also recommend some proposals that are 
added to the list. In Madhya Pradesh GPs, however, the GP dominates decision making 
by preparing the proposal lists. There is no intermediary organization, in actual practice, 
corresponding to the GUS. Furthermore, there is no evidence of the Gram Sabha 
attendees playing a role in suggesting additional proposals in both the chosen GPs. The 
Gram Sabhas of the chosen Madhya Pradesh GPs are actually playing the mere role of 




 The rules related to Social Audit are similar in both West Bengal and Madhya 
Pradesh, in the sense that they envisage the combined involvement of an elite Social 
Audit Team/VMC and a popular assembly of villagers. The involvement of the popular 
assembly (Gram Sabha) is an accepted requirement in the GPs of Madhya Pradesh, 
since the agenda of Gram Sabha meetings of both GPs shows Social Audit as a regular 
item. This is not the case in West Bengal GPs, where neither of the chosen GPs has 
involved its Gram Sansad in Social Audit, and Social Audit was never seen to be an 
item on the Gram Sansad meetings of both GPs. The Social Audit procedure followed 
in the West Bengal GPs is therefore less participatory and more top-down than in the 
Madhya Pradesh GPs.  
 
Performance 
Performance in the West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh GPs was assessed for the same 
functional areas of infrastructure and alternative primary education. In both states, these 
are functional areas where GPs enjoy a degree of autonomous decision making.  
 In both the state studies, the economically more developed GP showed better 
overall performance. In West Bengal, Debipur GP was found to be the better 
performing GP, on the basis of its superior performance in both the chosen functional 
areas. With respect to infrastructure, Debipur GP performed far better on objective 
output-based measures and popular satisfaction with infrastructural assets. Goutampur 
Colony GP was found to be the better performing GP in the Madhya Pradesh study, on 
the basis of its overall superior functioning in both the chosen functional areas. With 
respect to infrastructure, Goutampur Colony GP overall performed better on 
satisfaction with infrastructural assets, while Ramgarh GP did better on the objective 
output-based measures (based on NREGA output figures). Goutampur Colony GP was 
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however adjudged as having higher overall performance in the area of infrastructure 
owing to its better performance on the crucial satisfaction indicators. Compared to the 
relatively more mixed performance assessment in the Madhya Pradesh study (where 
Ramgarh GP did better on the objective output-based indicators for infrastructural 
programmes but Goutampur Colony GP did better on the other performance indicators), 
the better performing GP in the West Bengal study–Debipur GP–had consistently 
higher performance on all the performance indicators.  
  
Accountability-Performance Relationship 
Debipur GP had higher aggregate performance in the West Bengal study, but had lower 
aggregate accountability than the other selected GP, Nowdapanur GP. Since different 
GPs had higher performance and higher accountability, there is no association between 
accountability and performance seen in the West Bengal study. The actual operation of 
accountability mechanisms, in the West Bengal cases, was unable to fulfil important 
mediating conditions required for having an impact on performance. The West Bengal 
study therefore shows no evidence of accountability having a significant impact on GP 
performance. The impact of accountability on GP performance in the West Bengal GPs 
is highly constrained because of the non-fulfillment of important mediating conditions.  
 Unlike in the West Bengal study, the Madhya Pradesh GP that had better 
performance (Goutampur Colony GP) also had higher aggregate accountability. 
However the important mediating conditions required for accountability mechanisms to 
have an impact on GP performance were not fulfilled. The impact of accountability on 
performance of Madhya Pradesh GPs is also highly constrained, and there is no 
evidence of accountability having a significant impact on GP performance even in the 
Madhya Pradesh study.   
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 As seen in both the West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh studies, the inability of 
accountability to have a significant impact on GP performance can be attributed to the 
cumulative shortcomings of all three types of accountability mechanisms–deliberative, 
monitoring and sanctioning–to have an impact on performance. These accountability 
mechanisms are creating a degree of popular control, but the impact of such popular 
control on GP performance is highly constrained.  
 The list of proposed works approved by the respective deliberative forum 
defines the work agenda of GPs in both West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh. In the West 
Bengal GPs, however, the deliberative mechanism of Gram Sansad is playing a much 
greater role in channelling popular input into decision making compared to the Madhya 
Pradesh GPs where the GP actually formulates the list of proposed works (which is then 
subjected to a superficial endorsement by the Gram Sabha). However a common reality 
in both West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh GPs is that the works approved by the 
deliberative body are subjected to filtering within the GP’s decision making and 
implementation structures, especially at the specific stage of selection of works for 
implementation. Complex decision making procedures therefore transpire between the 
operation of the deliberative mechanism and final outputs delivered by the GP.  
 Between the two West Bengal GPs, the GP that fulfils a larger proportion of 
Gram Sansad demands (proposals) and has higher popular satisfaction with 
infrastructural assets (Debipur GP) actually has lower Gram Sansad effectiveness. In 
the Madhya Pradesh study, the same GP–Goutampur Colony GP–has higher Gram 
Sabha effectiveness and higher popular satisfaction with infrastructural assets. Yet the 
actual functioning of the Gram Sabha in Goutampur Colony GP shows that its attendees 
do not play any decision making role; the GP merely informs Gram Sabha attendees 
about its decisions. This means that the Gram Sabha of Goutampur Colony GP does not 
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have a significant impact on its performance. The findings of both state studies show 
that other variables, such as finances and capacity (and not effectiveness of deliberative 
forum), explain a GP’s greater success in satisfying a higher proportion of popular 
demands.  
 The monitoring mechanism of Social Audit, too, does not have a significant 
causal impact on GP performance, as revealed by the findings of both the state studies. 
In both state studies, there is evident of the lack of operation of the required causal 
processes between Social Audit and GP performance. In both the West Bengal and 
Madhya Pradesh studies, the GPs that had higher aggregate performance also did better 
on effectiveness of Social Audit. In the West Bengal study, the same GP (Debipur GP) 
had better NREGA output performance and better functioning of Social Audit. 
However the effectiveness of Social Audit does not explain Debipur GP’s better 
NREGA output performance because Social Audit, as carried out in this GP, has 
exposed issues that have no bearing on NREGA output performance. Goutampur 
Colony GP in Madhya Pradesh, which had more effective Social Audit than Ramgarh 
GP, however had worse NREGA output performance than Ramgarh GP; its worse 
NREGA output performance is due to factors that cannot be conceivable addressed 
through Social Audit (see Chapter 5).  
 Debipur GP of West Bengal and Goutampur Colony GP of Madhya Pradesh, 
which had relatively more effective Social Audits than the cases that they were 
compared with, had a common weakness relating to the conduct of Social Audit: their 
respective GP staff members were actually playing an important role in carrying out 
Social Audit because of the lack of technical knowledge of the Social Audit team/VMC 
members. Such involvement possibly undermines independence and careful, 
comprehensive scrutiny in the conduct of Social Audit, and hinders Social Audit from 
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having a substantial impact on NREGA fund utilization and NREGA output 
performance.  
 The single most important factor responsible for the inability of accountability 
mechanisms to have a significant impact on GP performance is the failure of the 
sanctioning mechanism of elections to fulfil certain mediating conditions through 
which such impact could be brought about. This was seen in both state studies. GPs that 
had relatively more competitive elections in the two states–Nowdapanur GP in West 
Bengal and Ramgarh GP in Madhya Pradesh–had worse GP performance than the GPs 
they were compared with (Debipur GP and Goutampur Colony GP respectively).  The 
most important reason for the failure of competitive elections to improve GP 
performance is the absence of performance-based sanctioning of incumbent elected 
representatives. In Nowdapanur GP, one-third of the incumbents who sought 
re-election were defeated; yet the retention and rejection of incumbents was based on 
non-performance considerations such as kinship and money power. In Ramgarh GP, the 
problem is one of incumbents not seeking re-election, which obviously precludes the 
possibility of performance-based sanctioning. Performance-based sanctioning is 
necessary for accountability to have a decisive impact on performance.  
 As already seen, the better performing GP in Madhya Pradesh (Goutampur 
Colony GP) had higher overall accountability as well, by virtue of its better position on 
the deliberative and monitoring dimensions. However, Goutampur Colony GP lacks 
any sanctioning of elected representatives (thus obviously lacking performance-based 
sanctioning) because of very low competitiveness of elections. This mainly explains 
why this GP’s aggregate accountability (though relatively higher than Ramgarh GP) 




 Observations related to alternative primary school teachers in both states reveal 
that accountability of such teachers has a significant impact on their performance, 
because of the concrete possibilities of performance-based sanctioning of such teachers. 
The threat of performance based sanctioning (resulting from their contract-based or 
temporary tenure) pushes these teachers to fear performance-related complaints that can 
result in termination of their services, and thus perform more sincerely than mainstream 
primary school teachers. Similarly, GP members would also take their dut ies mores 
seriously and contribute more sincerely towards GP functioning if they faced the 
concrete threat of performance-based sanctioning.  
 In addition to performance–based sanctioning of incumbents, competitive 
elections can possibly have an impact on GP performance through the fulfilment of two 
other causal pathways. The first is through the increased likelihood of selection of good 
quality candidates as elected representatives, and the second is through the impact of a 
numerically larger opposition. The findings of both state studies show that these 
possible conditions are not being realized in actual practice.   
 As hypothesized on the basis of the literature, competitive elections would make 
it likely that only competent or qualified candidates would survive the test of stiff 
electoral competition. Such competent candidates, on selection as elected 
representatives, would contribute their skills and efforts to improve the performance of 
the GP. In reality, however, better quality candidates are not being chosen as elected 
representatives in the electorally more competitive GPs. This is evident in the poor 
involvement and contribution of most elected representatives in GP functioning in all 
the chosen GPs, but more so in the electorally more competitive GPs, Nowdapanur GP 
(West Bengal) and Ramgarh GP (Madhya Pradesh). The reasons for this phenomena are 
two-fold: the prevalence of voting considerations (such as kinship or communal 
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factors), that undermine the consideration of advantageous qualities (such as 
dependability, knowledge or skill) of contesting candidates, and the fact that highly 
educated or talented individuals are rarely attracted to contest GP elections.    
 Competitive elections are naturally expected to foster a numerically large 
opposition. The literature hypothesizes that a numerically strong opposition would be 
powerful and assertive, and would keep the ruling group/chairperson of the GP alert to 
its shortcomings; this in turn may improve the performance of the GP.  
 There are some interesting differences between West Bengal and Madhya 
Pradesh as far as the nature of the GP opposition is concerned. West Bengal’s 
Panchayat election law allows GP elections to be contested on a political party basis, as 
a result of which the GP opposition is constituted on a political party basis. The legal 
provision of Anti-defection that applies to GP decision making145
 Higher competitiveness of elections, as seen in both the state studies, is not 
yielding the benefits of increased opposition effectiveness. In both the West Bengal 
GPs, the opposition members are involved in persuasion of and compromise with the 
ruling group, rather than in drawing attention to the shortcomings of the ruling group 
and registering their opposition to GP decisions. In Nowdapanur GP (which has greater 
electoral competition) there is actually less fair representation of opposition 
 further reinforces the 
idea of a party-based or group-based opposition. In contrast, Madhya Pradesh’s 
Panchayat law does not allow for party role in GP elections and envisages the idea of an 
individual-based opposition (see Chapter 8). Naturally the so-called ‘opposition’ in the 
Madhya Pradesh GPs is much more fragmented and unorganized compared to the 
party-based opposition groups in the West Bengal GPs.  
                                               
145According to West Bengal’s Panchayat law, an elected GP member affiliated to a political party 
cannot, in any GP decision that is put to vote, vote in a matter contrary to that of the majority of the GP 
members belonging to the same political party. He/she can be disqualified in the event of violation of this 
legal provision (Government of West Bengal 2009a, Section 213A).  
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constituencies among all the constituencies in which NREGA works were carried out in 
2008-09, compared to the same in Debipur GP. In the electorally more competitive 
Madhya Pradesh GP–Ramgarh GP–a noteworthy opposition has not developed (in spite 
of an inter-village divide that could have been a rallying ground for the emergence of an 
opposition), primarily due to the low interest, involvement and assertiveness of 
Panchas.  
 Considering the overall results of the inter-GP comparisons and the evidence on 
the causal impact of the various accountability mechanisms, the two state studies 
therefore show that there is no evidence of accountability having a significant impact on 
GP performance in the chosen cases. The impact of accountability on GP performance 
is highly constrained because the actual operation of accountability mechanisms is 
failing to meet important mediating conditions required for having an impact on 
performance. Accountability therefore does not appear to explain variation in 
performance between the chosen GPs in each state. Finances and capacity are inferred 
to be the crucial determinants of GP performance in both the state studies. Capacity is 
found to be an especially critical factor in explaining performance differences between 
the West Bengal GPs because of its role in explaining the much higher fund utilization 
in the better performing GP (Debipur GP). A combination of fund composition and 
capacity explains performance variation between the two chosen GPs of Madhya 
Pradesh.  
 As already argued, the major reason why the impact of accountability on GP 
performance is highly limited, is the absence of performance-based sanctioning in the 
chosen GPs. However, even if this condition is fulfilled, improvements in GP 
performance beyond a certain extent cannot be achieved in the absence of a sufficient 
amount of finances and capacity. Accountability may however (through 
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performance-based sanctioning) improve the capacity of a GP from previously lower 
levels, if it is able to push incumbent elected representatives to be more involved in the 
working of the GP.146
 
 This increase in (one aspect of) GP capacity would then improve 
the performance of a GP. Capacity, in any event, remains a critical determinant of GP 
performance.  
Contributions to the Literature 
The findings of this study serve to reconsider and modify prevalent arguments and 
assumptions related to the accountability-performance relationship in local government 
in developing countries. The central insight revealed by this study is that higher levels 
of accountability (in terms of popular control) do not automatically lead to better local 
government performance. Certain conditions have to be fulfilled for accountability to 
have an impact on performance, the most important condition being performance-based 
sanctioning of incumbent elected representatives. This finding can serve to refine the 
understanding of the impact of accountability on local government performance that 
emerges from the arguments of the available studies such as Crook and Manor (1998).   
 Another contribution of this study comes from the empirical examination of 
theoretical propositions about the accountability-performance relationship (World 
Bank 1992; Walsh 1996). The findings of this study can serve to refine theoretical 
hypothesis suggested in the literature. The World Bank (1992) hypothesis states that 
higher accountability leads to greater congruence between policy and implementation 
(that is, effectiveness of performance or congruence between targets and actual 
outputs). This study reveals that accountability in the sense of popular control 
(accountability to the people) does not have such an impact in the chosen cases. Upward 
                                               
146This argument is consistent with Fiszbein’s (1997) finding that accountability can actually promote 
capacity of local government, as seen in his study of local government in Columbia. 
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accountability (accountability to higher levels of government) may however possibly 
have such an impact, and this is a topic for future research to explore. Furthermore, this 
study has shown that other variables (such as finances and capacity) significantly affect 
the extent to which targets are met by local governments, and it is not only 
accountability that can determine the fulfilment of targets.  
 This study reveals the significance of local government performance 
determinants other than accountability, such as finances and capacity. It argues that 
mere accountability, in the context of low levels of capacity and financial resources, 
might not be able to push up the performance of a local government beyond a limited 
extent. A specific contribution of this study is its revelation of a case that has higher 
accountability but lower finances and capacity. This case (Nowdapanur GP in West 
Bengal) has poorer performance than the GP that has lower accountability but higher 
finances and capacity (Debipur GP), thus providing convincing evidence that higher 
accountability, by itself, might not ensure better local government performance. The 
available studies have not investigated the accountability-performance relationship for 
such a case.  
This study also provides nuanced insights related to the nature of finances and 
capacity in local governments, by exploring these variables in terms of various 
indicators. It reveals the significance of not just the magnitude of finances, but also the 
composition of finances, for achieving higher GP performance. It subjects the presumed 
importance of fund availability to scrutiny by investigating the extent of fund utilization 
by the chosen GPs. With respect to capacity, it analyses various elements such as the 
training and awareness of GP members and their involvement in GP functioning, staff 
quality and availability, the nature of leadership, and strategic planning and financial 
management. The analytical treatment of capacity reveals reasons for the low degree of 
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involvement of most elected representatives in GP functioning. The complex nature of 
local government capacity is revealed by showing the inter-linkages existing between 
the nature of GP leadership, the extent of GP member involvement in GP functioning, 
the inclusiveness of decision making, strategic planning and financial management, and 
the extent of fund utilization.  
 This study contributes to a better understanding of local government 
accountability in developing countries by revealing that unique contextual factors affect 
the actual functioning of accountability mechanisms. The findings of each state study 
shows differences in the actual effectiveness of accountability mechanisms that have 
the same institutional (legal) features. The West Bengal study shows that political 
factors affect the effectiveness of the deliberative mechanism (Gram Sansad) while the 
Madhya Pradesh study shows that socio-economic factors affect the effectiveness of the 
deliberative mechanism of Gram Sabha. At same time, this study also provides insights 
on the impact of institutional features of accountability mechanisms on their actual 
effectiveness. It notes the implications of the different institutional features of elections 
and Village Assembly in West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh (see previous section of this 
chapter).  
 This study generates insights related to the impact of specific accountability 
mechanisms such as elections, Village Assembly and Social Audit. As far as the impact 
of elections is concerned, it adds meaningful insights to the available empirical 
literature on the impact of electoral competition on local government performance. This 
study provides empirical evidence that competitive elections do not necessarily have a 
positive impact on local government performance. It serves to refine the view proposed 
by many studies that competitive elections improve local government performance 
(Echeverri-Gent 1992; Crook and Manor 1998; Faguet 2006; Majumdar 2009), by 
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showing that competitive elections have to fulfil certain conditions to have a positive 
impact on performance, the most important condition being performance-based 
sanctioning. The findings of this study empirically uphold the theoretical views of 
Keefer and Khemani (2005) who argued that certain constraints (such as voting that is 
based on identity-based factors and not performance considerations) undermine the 
impact of competitive elections on service delivery.  
 This study provides additional insights to the literature that examines the impact 
of deliberative mechanisms, especially the EDD literature (Baiocchi 2001; Fung and 
Wright 2001; Heller 2001). Like the EDD studies, this study carries out an empirical 
examination of the EDD hypothesis related to the impact of deliberative bodies on local 
government performance in specific cases (see Chapter 2), but explores certain aspects 
neglected by the available EDD studies. It carries out a detailed investigation of the 
intermediate decision making procedures that operate between the deliberative 
mechanism’s functioning and actual GP service delivery. It analyses decision making 
procedures and considerations, and also the impact of intermediary actors that shape the 
passage of popular demands expressed in the deliberative forum through the ‘black box’ 
of local government decision making. It provides evidence of the filtering of popular 
demands expressed in the deliberative forum, unlike the available EDD studies .Unlike 
Baiocchi (2001) it does not rely on evidence of mere association of the effectiveness of 
deliberative forum with service delivery gains in order to prove the impact of the 
deliberative mechanism on performance. This study also reveals the importance of 
variables such as finances and capacity that are critical for the fulfilment of a higher 
proportion of popular demands. It reveals that deliberative mechanisms are not a magic 
bullet to cure all service delivery problems of local governments, and affirms the need 
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for realistic assessment of the potential of these mechanisms to improve local 
government performance.  
 Available findings on the impact of Social Audit mainly come from studies of 
local governments in ‘success story’ Indian states such as Andhra Pradesh and 
Rajasthan (Aakella and Kidambi 2007; Afridi 2008). This study explores the operation 
of Social Audit in the Indian states of West Bengal, whose actual experience with Social 
Audit has not yet been documented in the academic literature, as far as this author 
knows. The available studies, while revealing the effectiveness of Social Audit in their 
chosen cases, have not provided any evidence of the impact of Social Audit on the 
actual performance of their chosen local governments.  This study shows that Social 
Audit, in its actual operation in the chosen states, is not having a significant impact on 
local government performance (specifically NREGA output performance). It reveals 
that the defects largely lie in the manner in which Social Audit is being carried out; the 
Social Audit process needs to be far more substantial, comprehensive and independent 
to have a notable impact on GP performance.  
 This study therefore contributes a nuanced exploration of the relationship 
between accountability and performance in local government. It unpacks the 
complexity in the accountability-performance relationship, by scrutinizing the 
operation of various mediating conditions that are required for accountability to have an 
impact on GP performance. Furthermore, it reveals the intermediate processes that 
operate between accountability and performance in local government. Qualitative 
insights provided by the stakeholders in local governance—local residents, elected 
representatives and staff members—are extensively used in this study, and shed light on 




Policy Relevance and Recommendations 
Policy makers in some developing countries such as India have instituted a variety of 
formal accountability mechanisms such as elections, Village Assembly meetings or 
public meetings, and Social Audits in their local government experiments with an 
expectation of service delivery improvements resulting from the impact of these 
mechanisms. This study reveals insights on the actual effectiveness and impact of 
formal accountability mechanisms in the rural local government (Panchayat) systems 
of two Indian states. The findings of this study are therefore most directly relevant to 
policy architects of rural local government experiments in developing countries, 
especially India. The central argument of this study is that the formal accountability 
mechanisms in the chosen local government units (GPs) in India are creating a degree 
of popular control, but such control is not having a significant impact on local 
government performance. Furthermore, accountability mechanisms are actually 
functioning less effectively in some local government units, as a result of which the 
degree of popular control created by them is low. The findings of this study can help 
policy makers become aware of the weaknesses affecting the functioning of these 
mechanisms, and why they are not having a significant impact on local government 
performance. This may lead them to initiate reforms to address these weaknesses.  
 The most important failure of formal accountability mechanisms lies in the 
failure of elections (which are, in most local government experiments, the only 
available sanctioning mechanism) 147
                                               
147Right to Recall is a sanctioning mechanism found in very few local government experiments such as 
Madhya Pradesh in India. 
to have an impact on local government 
performance. Policy makers should take some steps to increase the likelihood of 
elections having a positive impact on local government performance. Firstly, policy 
makers should institute measures to ensure that interested incumbent elected 
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representatives of local governments have the opportunity to contest re-election. This in 
turn would open up opportunities for sanctioning of incumbents (which is necessary, 
but not sufficient, for performance-based sanctioning to take place). Increased 
opportunities for interested incumbents to contest re-election may be achieved by 
removing or modifying the practice of reservation of constituencies on rotational basis 
(seen in the case of women’s and SC and ST reservation in West Bengal, and women’s 
and OBC reservation in Madhya Pradesh). The practice of subjecting a large proportion 
of seats to rotational reservation prevents many incumbent elected representatives from 
re-contesting from their seats, even if they are interested to stand for re-elections.  
Secondly, policy makers should contemplate and implement measures to make the 
positions of elected representatives of local governments more rewarding, so that more 
incumbents feel the genuine desire to re-contest election and be successfully re-elected. 
If incumbents feel genuinely motivated to be successfully re-elected, then they will they 
be pushed to work hard in their present term, provided that people select or reject 
incumbents on performance grounds. Increasing the remuneration, perks and 
recognition given to incumbents will motivate more of them to seek re-election. 
Similarly, such steps will also make the position of elected representatives more 
attractive to prospective election candidates so that more talented and educated local 
residents possessing awareness, cognitive skills or leadership qualities may be attracted 
to contest local government elections. Local government membership should be 
presented as a viable profession; this will make it more likely that competitive elections 
will result in the selection of talented candidates as representatives.  
 Policy makers should also take measures to increase the effectiveness of Social 
Audit. Higher authorities should be pro-active in ensuring that public participation in 
Social Audit is as broad based as possible, relevant local government records are 
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presented to the public in a simplified manner, and there is thorough review of all local 
government records and the local government’s implementation activities in the Social 
Audit process. Higher authorities should pressurize persons carrying out Social Audit 
(such as Social Audit Team/VMC members) to ensure that they record all grievances 
and criticisms raised in the Social Audit process, and keep track of the action taken by 
the local governments to address the shortcomings exposed through Social Audit. 
Higher authorities should also forbid the involvement of local government staff or 
elected members in the Social Audit process in order to ensure its independence. 
Members of the Social Audit Teams/VMCs should be trained, and if possible, rewarded 
in some way for their efforts to ensure that they execute their task of scrutiny in a 
competent, serious way. Different aspects of local government functioning such as fund 
utilization, the quality of construction work and the time taken to complete works 
should come under scrutiny in the Social Audit process. In short, Social Audit should be 
more substantial, independent and comprehensive, and should not be treated as a mere 
formality. 
  Policy makers have to take pro-active steps to ensure that village assemblies 
play more than a superficial or endorsing role with respect to decision making in local 
governments. The higher authorities should ensure that local government staff or 
elected representatives conducting the meeting actively ask villager attendees for (and 
note down) proposals or demands for development works. The Madhya Pradesh 
government’s practice of sending nodal officers to observe Gram Sabha meetings in 
some GPs is commendable, but the presence of nodal officers should become more 
regular and cover all GPs. The nodal officers in Madhya Pradesh should ensure that 
Gram Sabha meetings are being used to actually involve villagers in decision making, 
and not just inform villagers about the rules of government programmes and the 
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decisions of the GP. Authorities should also pressurize all local governments to 
publicize the dates and venues of Village Assembly meetings, and carry out awareness 
drives to make villagers aware of the significance of Village Assembly meetings. Such 
steps would lead to higher and more inclusive attendance in Village Assembly 
meetings.  
 This study will not suggest that all proposals made in the deliberative forum of 
Village Assembly should actually be implemented by the local government because to 
do is likely to be humanly impossible, given the enormous volume of Village Assembly 
proposals is some cases such as the West Bengal GPs (especially as seen in Debipur 
GP). Policy makers should, however, increase the flow of appropriate funds and take 
steps to increase the capacity of local governments. Adequate availability of untied 
funds and non-NREGA funds is absolutely critical for Indian GPs to be able to fulfil a 
higher proportion of popular demands in the context of a plethora of restrictive rules 
and regulations. Accountability, as established through mechanisms such as Village 
Assembly, is no substitute for finances and capacity in fulfilling popular demand. 
 Given the importance of capacity as a determinant of local government 
performance, increasing the human resource capacity of local government units should 
be a top priority of policy makers. Such capacity would enable local governments to 
better utilize their financial resources. The primary solution to the problem of capacity, 
in the single staff-member Madhya Pradesh GPs, lies in taking immediate steps to 
provide more staff members to GPs. In all Indian states (including West Bengal and 
Madhya Pradesh) there should also be urgent steps taken to institute regular and 
intensive training of elected representatives all over the concerned state. Various 
measures should also be initiated to make elected member positions more attractive so 
that talented and educated individuals stand for local government elections. Such 
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measures would in turn lead to elected members being more aware, motivated and 
involved in the activities of the GP, and making superior contributions to GP 
functioning. In the Madhya Pradesh context, policy architects should seriously consider 
amending the provision of Sarpanch chairpersonship of all standing committees of the 
GP, so that more elected representatives get an opportunity to enjoy leadership 
positions through committee chairpersonship (as in West Bengal). Such a reform would 
lead to increased interest and involvement of elected representatives and consequently 
improve the GP’s capacity and the inclusiveness of GP functioning. 
 
Areas of Future Research 
This study develops an inference on the accountability-performance relationship in 
local government that should be subjected to future empirical examination for the sake 
of greater robustness. There are two ways in which future studies may test this inference 
and add further insights to it – firstly, by exploring other cases and if possible, covering 
a larger number of cases; and secondly, by introducing temporal variation (in addition 
to spatial variation that this study covers) 
 This study has covered four cases--two GPs each in the Indian states of West 
Bengal and Madhya Pradesh. Increasing the number of cases would have the benefit of 
adding more robustness to the findings, as long as totally diverse cases (for e.g. GPs in 
two different states) are not compared directly with each other. Different case 
combinations may be explored in different studies, by controlling some key variables 
and varying others when comparing cases.  
 Another improvement on this study that could add greater robustness would be 
the incorporation of temporal variation in addition to spatial variation. In future 
accountability-performance research, not only should different cases (local government 
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units) be compared, but there should also be comparison within a single case between 
different years. Assessing long term trends in accountability and performance may lead 
to more robust results than assessing accountability and performance for one point of 
time.  
 This study has carried out a comprehensive examination of the impact of 
accountability on performance. The conceptualization and operationalization of 
accountability in this study has been very wide to capture the notion of overall popular 
control generated through the available formal accountability mechanisms in local 
government. Future research may add fresh insights through more in-depth examination 
of the functioning and impact of particular accountability mechanisms such as 
elections, Social Audit, Village Assembly and Right to Recall.  
 In-depth studies in future should examine elections as a mechanism of 
sanctioning of incumbent elected members of local government, focusing on the 
grounds for such sanctioning and the impact of such sanctioning on local government 
performance. Such a study may have the following components–firstly, a measurement 
of the extent to which incumbent local government representatives stand for re-election 
(assessed for several years for each case through the reliable election data); secondly, 
the measurement of the extent of defeat of incumbents who stand for re-election; 
thirdly, an assessment of the factors determining voter choice (through survey of local 
residents) to reveal the extent to which performance considerations affect voting. In 
cases where there is sound evidence of frequent performance-based sanctioning of 
incumbents, it should be seen whether there is a trend of performance improvement 
over years (within the case) and better performance in comparison to other cases.  Such 
studies should be carried out in one or few provinces/countries that have party based 
rural local government elections (such as West Bengal) and for others that do not have 
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party based rural local government elections (such as Madhya Pradesh) for the sake of 
greater generalizability 
 Studies on the impact of Social Audit on GP performance in India (for NREGA 
or for other programmes for which Social Audit might be mandated in the chosen 
states) must be carried out. The aim of such study would be to yield robust conclusions 
on the effectiveness of Social Audit and its impact on GP performance, and an 
identification of the contextual and institutional features that make it effective. Such 
studies may explore elements such as the institutional features of Social Audit, the 
processes and actors involved, the nature of public and NGO participation, and the 
tracing of the outcome of Social Audit (that is, whether any punitive measure has been 
taken against guilty parties or remedial measures have been taken in response to the 
findings of Social Audit) and its eventual impact on GP performance. Such a study may 
be conducted in one or both of the ‘success story’ states (Rajasthan and Andhra 
Pradesh), selecting GPs within them that are noted for their successes in Social Audit. 
The findings thereof should be compared with the findings of similar studies in other 
states that have no such reputation for successful Social Audit.  
 The actual functioning of deliberative mechanisms such as Village Assemblies 
should be explored in diverse empirical contexts, which will shed further light on the 
contextual and institutional factors affecting their actual functioning. More studies 
should be taken up to trace the impact of the functioning of Village Assemblies (or other 
deliberative forums) on local government performance. More refined insights may 
come from future studies that accurately discern the extent of genuine popular demands 
expressed in the deliberative forums of their chosen cases, separating such genuine 
popular demands from the demands that are prepared by intermediary organizations or 
the local government and formally endorsed in the meetings of the deliberative forum.  
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Having identified the extent of such genuine popular demands, the researcher may then 
proceed to gauge the extent to which such demands have been fulfilled in the outputs of 
the concerned local government.  
 The state of Madhya Pradesh is one of the very few cases in the developing 
world that has the provision of Right to Recall of elected representatives of local 
government. Right to Recall can make for a very direct connection between 
performance and sanctioning, and if properly used, can prove to be a potent means of 
performance-based sanctioning. None of the GPs in Madhya Pradesh covered in this 
study had however ever experienced actual exercise of this right. Future research should 
select some local government units in Madhya Pradesh (or any other relevant province 
or country) that have actually experienced exercise of this right, and carry out intensive 
analysis in the chosen cases of the grounds on which the right was used, and the tracing 
of the impact of its exercise on GP performance.  
 It can be seen that there is considerable room for future research on the very 
complex but intriguing topic of the relationship between accountability and 
performance in local government. This study has provided a comprehensive but broad 
perspective on the topic, and findings from more specific and in-depth studies will 













Aakella, Karuna Vakati and Sowmya Kidambi. 2007. Challenging Corruption with 
Social Audits. Economic and Political Weekly 42 (5): 345-7.  
Afridi, Farzana. 2008. Can Community Monitoring Improve the Accountability of 
Public Officials? Economic and Political Weekly 43 (42): 35-40. 
Audit Commission. 1984. Improving Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness in Local 
Government in England and Wales – Audit Commission Handbook. London: 
Audit Commission.  
Azfar, Omar, S. Kähkönen and P. Meagher. 2001. Conditions for Effective 
Decentralized Governance: A Synthesis of Research Findings. IRIS Working 
Paper 256. Maryland: IRIS Centre, University of Maryland.  
Azfar, Omar, Jeffrey Livingston, and Patrick Meagher. 2006. Decentralization in 
Uganda. In Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries: A 
Comparative Perspective, eds. Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee. 
Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT. 
Aziz, Abdul, N. Sivanna, M. Devendra Babu, Madhushree Sekher, and C. Charles 
Nelson. 2002. Decentralized Governance and Planning: A Comparative Study 
of Three South Indian States. New Delhi: Macmillan India ltd. 
Baekkeskov, Erik. 2007. Effectiveness. In Encyclopedia of Governance, ed. Mark 
Bevir. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Baiocchi, Gianpaolo. 2001. Participation, Activism and Politics: The Porto Alegre 
Experiment and Deliberative Democratic Theory. Politics and Society 29 (1): 
43-72. 
Bandopadhyay, D. 1997. People’s Participation in Planning: Kerala Experiment. 
Economic and Political Weekly 32 (39): 2450-54. 
Bardhan, Pranab.  2002. Decentralization of Governance and Development. The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 (4): 185-205. 
Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip Mookherjee. 2006a. Decentralization in West Bengal: 
Origins, Functioning, and Impact. In Decentralization and Local Governance in 
Developing countries: A Comparative Perspective, eds.  Pranab Bardhan and 
Dilip Mookherjee. Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT. 
 _____. 2006b. The Rise of Local Governments: An Overview. In Decentralization and 
Local Governance in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective, eds. 
Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee. Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT.  
Behar, Amitabh. 2003. Madhya Pradesh Experiment with Direct Democracy: Time for 
Reappraisal. Economic and Political Weekly 38 (20): 1927-29.  
Behar, Amitabh and Yogesh Kumar. 2002. Decentralization in Madhya Pradesh, India: 
From Panchayati Raj to Gram Swaraj (1995-2001). Working Paper no. 170. 
London: Overseas Development Institute. 
Bird, Richard and Edgard R. Rodriguez. 1999. Decentralization and Poverty 
Alleviation: International Experience and the Case of Philippines. Public 
Administration and Development 19 (3): 299-319.  
Blair, Harry. 2000. Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local 
Governance in Six Countries. World Development 28 (1): 21-39. 
 391 
 
Boon, Suzan. 2007. How not to Decentralise: Accountability and Representation in 
Health Boards in Tanzania. SNV Publications H0702-08. The Hague: SNV 
Netherlands Development Organization.  
Brudney, Jeffrey L. and Robert E. England. 1982. Urban Policy Making and Subjective 
Service Evaluations: Are they Compatible? Public Administration Review 42 
(2): 127-135. 
Caiden, Gerald. 1988. The Problem of Ensuring the Public Accountability of Public 
Officials. In Public Service Accountability: A Comparative Perspective, eds. 
O.P. Dwivedi and Joseph G. Jabbra. West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press. 
Chaudhuri, Shubham. 2006. What Difference does a Constitutional Amendment Make? 
The 1994 Panchayati Raj Act and the Attempt to Revitalize Rural Local 
Government in India. In Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing 
Countries: A Comparative Perspective, eds. Pranab Bardhan and Dilip 
Mookherjee. Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT. 
Cohen, Joshua. 1997. Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy. In Deliberative 
Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William 
Rehg. Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT. 
Crook, Richard and James Manor. 1998. Democracy and Decentralization in South 
Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance. 
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Crook, Richard C. and Alan Sturla Sverrisson. 2001. Decentralization and Poverty 
Alleviation in Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis, or is West 
Bengal Unique? Working Paper no. 130. Brighton, UK: Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Sussex.  
Devas, Nick and Ursula Grant. 2003. Local Government Decision Making-Citizen 
Participation and Local Accountability: Some Evidence from Kenya and 
Uganda. Public Administration and Development 23 (4): 307-16.  
Echeverri-Gent, John. 1992. Public Participation and Poverty Alleviation: The 
Experience of Reform Communists in India’s West Bengal. World Development 
20 (10): 1401-1422. 
Faguet, Jean-Paul. 2006. Decentralizing Bolivia: Local Government in the Jungle. In 
Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries: A 
Comparative Perspective, eds. Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee. 
Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT. 
Fiszbein, Ariel. 1997. The Emergence of Local Capacity: Lessons from Columbia. 
World Development 25 (7): 1029-43. 
Fung, Archon and Erik Olin Wright. 2001. Deepening Democracy: Innovations in 
Empowered Participatory Governance. Politics and Society 29 (1): 5-41.  
Gerring, John. 2007. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ghatak, Maitreesh and Maitreya Ghatak. 2002. Recent Reforms in the Panchayat 
System in West Bengal: Toward Greater Participatory Governance? Economic 
and Political Weekly 37 (1): 45-58. 
Government of India. 2009-10a. Social Audit Calendar (West Bengal). 
http://164.100.112.66/Netnrega/writereaddata/state_out/s_dist_32_0910.html 
(September 24, 2010). 
_____. 2009-10b. Social Audit Calendar (Madhya Pradesh). 
http://164.100.112.66/Netnrega/writereaddata/state_out/s_dist_17_0910.html 
(September 24, 2010). 
 392 
 
_____. 2009-10c. Works Under NREGA During the Financial Year 2009-2010 (West 
Bengal). 
http://164.100.112.66/netnrega/writereaddata/citizen_out/phy_prf_32_local_09
10_out.html (July 27, 2012).  
_____. 2009-10d. Works Under NREGA During the Financial Year 2009-2010 
(MadhyaPradesh). 
http://164.100.112.66/netnrega/writereaddata/citizen_out/phy_prf_17_0910_o
ut.html (March 30, 2011).  
____. 2010-11a. Works under MGNREGA During the Financial Year 2010-2011 
(WestBengal). 
http://164.100.112.66/netnrega/writereaddata/citizen_out/phy_prf_32_1011_o
ut.html (July 20, 2012).  
____. 2010-11b. Works under MGNREGA During the Financial Year 
2010-11(MadhyaPradesh).  
http://164.100.112.66/netnrega/writereaddata/citizen_out/physicalperf_blk_17
26006_1011.html (July 27, 2012).   
____. 2012-13. The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act: 
Percentage of Works Completed since Inception in MIS (West Bengal). 
http://164.100.112.66/netnrega/takenup_compwrk.aspx?lflag=local&state_cod
e=32&state_name=WEST+BENGAL&page=s&fin_year=2012-2013 (July 20, 
2012).  
Government of Madhya Pradesh. 1995. The Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Nirvanchan 
Niyam, 1995 (The Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Election Rules, 1995). Bhopal: 
Government of Madhya Pradesh.  
_____. 2002. The Madhya Pradesh Human Development Report 2002: Using the 
Power of Democracy for Development. Bhopal: Government of Madhya 
Pradesh.  
_____. 2005. Madhya Pradesh mein Gram Panchayat: Karya avam adhikar – Pathya 
samagri [Gram Panchayats in Madhya Pradesh: Duties and Rights – Study 
Material]. Bhopal: RCVP Noronha Academy of Administration.  
_____. 2007. Madhya Pradesh Human Development Report. New Delhi: Oxford. 
_____. 2008-09. Panchayat avam Grameen Vikas Vibhag: Vibhagiya Prashasakiya 
Prativedan 2008-09 [Panchayat and Rural Development Department: 
Departmental Administrative Report 2008-09]. Bhopal: Panchayat and Rural 
Development Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh. 
_____. 2009a. The Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 
1993 (The Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj and Gram Swaraj Act, 1993) 
(modified upto July 2007). In Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam Gram 
Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 Along with Rules, Notifications and Case Laws 
(Reproduced from Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh Local Acts), ed.  S.K. 
Awasthi. Bhopal: Suvidha Law House Private Limited.  
_____. 2009b. The Madhya Pradesh Gram Panchayat (Powers and Functions of the 
Secretary) Rules, 1999. In Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj 
Adhiniyam, 1993 Along with Rules, Notifications and Case Laws (Reproduced 
from Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh Local Acts), ed.  S.K. Awasthi. 
Bhopal: Suvidha Law House Private Limited.  
_____. 2010. Gram Panchayat Sarpanch, Up-sarpanch avam Panch Prashikshan 
Margdarshika [Gram Panchayat Sarpanch, Up-sarpanch and Panch Training 
Guidelines]. Bhopal: Panchayat and Rural Development Department, 
Government of Madhya Pradesh. 
 393 
 
Government of West Bengal. 2003. The West Bengal Panchayat Elections Act, 2003. 
Kolkata: Law Department, Government of West Bengal.  
_____. 2004. West Bengal Human Development Report. Kolkata: Development and 
Planning Department, Government of West Bengal. 
_____. 2005a. 12th Finance Commission (12th F.C.). July 29. 
http://www.uttardinajpurzillaparishad.com/major-project/12th-finance-commis
sion-12th-fc.html (December 27, 2011). 
_____. 2005b. 2nd State Finance Commission Fund. August 1. 
http://www.uttardinajpurzillaparishad.com/major-project/2nd-state-finance-co
mmission.html (December 27, 2011).  
_____.  2006. The West Bengal State Panchayat Election Rules. Kolkata: Department 
of Panchayats and Rural Development, Government of West Bengal.  
_____. 2007. Information on West Bengal Panchayats. Kalyani, Nadia: State Institute 
of Panchayats and Rural Development, Government of West Bengal. 
_____. 2008a. Proshnottore Gram Panchayat - pratham bhag [Questions and answers 
about Gram Panchayats - volume 1]. Kolkata: Department of Panchayats and 
Rural Development, Government of West Bengal. 
_____. 2008b. Jatiyo Grameen Karmasansthan Guarantee Karmashuchi Sahayika 
[National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme Guidelines]. Kalyani, West 
Bengal: State Institute of Panchayats and Rural Development. 
_____. 2008c. Proshnottore sakaler janya shiksha [Questions and answers about 
education for all]. Kolkata: Department of Panchayats and Rural Development, 
Government of West Bengal. 
_____. 2009a. The West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 (as modified upto 31st May 2009). 
Kolkata: Law Department, Government of West Bengal. 
_____. 2009b. Gram Panchayat Sadasyader Prashikshan Upalakshye Pathopokaran 
[Reading materials for the training of Gram Panchayat members]. Kolkata: 
Department of Panchayats and Rural Development, Government of West 
Bengal.   
Grindle, Merilee S. 2007. Going Local: Decentralization, Democratization, and the 
Promise of Good Governance. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press.  
Haque, M. Shamsul. 2008. Decentering the State for Local Accountability through 
Representation: Social Divides as a Barrier in South Asia. Public 
Administration Quarterly 32 (1): 33-58. 
Hatry, Harry P. 1978. The Status of Productivity Measurement in the Public Sector. 
Public Administration Review 38 (1): 28-33. 
Heller, Patrick. 2001. Moving the State: The Politics of Democratic Decentralization in 
Kerala, South Africa and Porto Alegre. Politics and Society 29 (1): 131-163. 
Hickok, Eugene W. 1995. Accountability of Public Officials. In The Encyclopedia of 
Democracy, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset. London: Routledge.  
Hill, Dilys M. 1974. Democratic Theory and Local Government. London: George Allen 
and Unwin Limited.  
Hiskey, Jonathan T. 2010. The Promise of Decentralized Democratic Governance. In 
Making Decentralization Work: Democracy, Development and Security, eds. 
Ed Connerly, Kent Eaton and Paul Smoke. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.  
Huther, Jeff and Anwar Shah. 1998. Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governance 
to the Debate on Fiscal Decentralization. Policy Research Working Paper 1894. 
Washington D.C.: World Bank Operations Evaluations Department.  
 394 
 
Ingraham, Patricia, Philip G. Joyce, and Amy Kneedler Donahue. 2003. Government 
Performance: Why Management Matters? Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press.  
Jha, Jyotsna. 2003. Primary Schools in West Bengal. Economic and Political Weekly 38 
(27): 2839-40. 
Keefer, Philip and Stuti Khemani. 2005. Democracy, Public expenditures and the Poor: 
Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services. The World 
Bank Research Observer 20 (1): 1-27. 
Keefer, Philip, Ambar Narayan and Tara Vishwanath. 2006. Decentralization in 
Pakistan: Are Local Governments likely to be more Accountable than Central 
Governments? In Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing 
Countries: A Comparative Perspective, eds. Pranab Bardhan and Dilip 
Mookherjee. Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT. 
Kumar, Girish. 2006. Local Democracy in India. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Langrod, Professor Georges. 1953. Local Government and Democracy. Public 
Administration 31 (1): 26-31.  
Lankina, Tomila. 2008. Cross Cutting Literature Review on the Drivers of Local 
Council Accountability and Performance. World Bank Social Development 
Working Papers, Local Governance and Accountability Series Paper no. 112. 
Washington D.C.: Social Development Department, World Bank.   
Litvack, Jennie, Junaid Ahmed and Richard Bird. 1998. Rethinking Decentralization in 
Developing Countries. Sector Studies Series No. 21491, Washington D.C.: 
World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) Network. 
Madhya Pradesh State Election Commission. 2006. Madhya Pradesh mein 
Panchayaton ke Tritiya Aam Chunav 2004-05: Prativedan Varsh 2006 [The 
Third General Elections of Panchayats in Madhya Pradesh 2004-05: Report 
Year 2006]. Bhopal: Madhya Pradesh State Election Commission. 
Mahatma Gandhi State Institute of Rural Development. 2010. Pathya Samagri Varsh 
2010: Grameen vikas ki pramukh yojanayen avam karyakram (Panchayatraj 
pratinidhiyon, adhikariyon, avam karmachariyon ke prashikshan hetu) 
[Reading Material Year 2010: The major schemes and programmes of rural 
development (for the training of Panchayat Raj representatives, officials and 
employees)]. Adhartal, Jabalpur (Madhya Pradesh): Mahatma Gandhi State 
Institute of Rural Development. 
Majumdar, Manabi. 2009. Democracy in Praxis: Two Non-Left Gram Panchayats in 
West Bengal. Economic and Political Weekly 44 (9): 82-93.  
Manor, James. 1999. The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization. 
Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
_____. 2001. Madhya Pradesh Experiments with Direct Democracy. Economic and 
Political Weekly 36 (9): 715-6.  
March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1995. Democratic Governance. New York: The 
Free Press. 
Mathew, George. 2007a. Panchayati Raj and Political Parties Participation. In 
Panchayati Raj and Empowering People: New Agenda for Rural India, ed. D. 
Sundar Ram. Tirupati, Andhra Pradesh: Academy of Grassroots Studies and 
Research of India, and New Delhi: Kanishka Publisher and Distributors.  
_____. 2007b. Decentralization and Local Governance: How Clientelism and 
Accountability Work: A Case Study of West Bengal. In Decentralization: 
Institutions and Politics in Rural India, ed. Satyajit Singh and Pradeep K. 
Sharma. New Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press.  
 395 
 
McCarten, William and Vinod Vyasulu. 2004. Democratic Decentralization and 
Poverty Reduction in Madhya Pradesh: Searching for an Institutional 
Equilibrium. Development in Practice 14 (6): 733-40. 
_____. 2006. Democratic Decentralization in Madhya Pradesh, India: Neither Big Bang 
nor Gradualism. In Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing 
Countries: A Comparative Perspective, eds. Pranab Bardhan and Dilip 
Mookherjee. Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT. 
Meyers, Roy T. 1997. Is there a Key to the Normative Budgeting Lock? Policy Sciences 
29 (3): 171-88.  
Mill, John Stuart. 1861. Considerations on Representative Government in 
Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government. London: J.M. Dent. 
Mill, John Stuart. 1911. Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government. 
London: Dent. 
Moncrieffe, Joy M. 2001. Accountability: Idea, Ideals, Constraints. Democratization 8 
(3): 26-50. 
Moreno-Jaimes, Carlos. 2007. Do Competitive Elections Produce Better-Quality 
Governments?: Evidence from Mexican Municipalities, 1990-2000. Latin 
American Research Review 42 (2): 136-53.  
Morgan, David R. 1979. Managing Urban America. North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury 
Press. 
Mulgan, Richard. 2000. ‘Accountability’: An Ever Expanding Concept? Public 
Administration 78 (3): 555-73. 
Murshidabad Zilla Parishad. 2009. Gram Panchayat stare rupayita bibhinna 
karmashuchir ruprekha ek najare (Guidelines of different programmes 
implemented at the Gram Panchayat level at a glance). Berhampore, 
Murshidabad: Murshidabad Zilla Parishad.  
Narayana, D. 2005. Local Governance Without Capacity Building: Ten Years of 
Panchayati Raj. Economic and Political Weekly 40 (26): 2822-32. 
Oates, Wallace. 1972. Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Philp, Mark. 2009. Delimiting Democratic Accountability. Political Studies 57 (1): 
28-53.  
Pinto, Marina R. 2000. Metropolitan City Governance in India. New Delhi: Sage 
Publications. 
Poister and Streib. 1997. Strategic Management: A Core Responsibility of Local 
Government Administrators. In Handbook of Local Government 
Administration, ed. John J. Gargan. New York: Marcel Dekker Inc. 
Przeworski, Adam, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin. 1999. Democracy, 
Accountability and Representation. Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.  
Rana, Kumar, Abdur Rafique and Amrita Sengupta. 2002. The Delivery of Primary 
Education: A Study in West Bengal. New Delhi: Pratichi (India) Trust and TLM 
Books. 
Rana, Kumar, Samantak Das, Amrita Sengupta and Abdur Rafique. 2003. State of 
Primary Education in West Bengal. Economic and Political Weekly 38 (22): 
2159-64. 
Romzek, Barbara S. and Dubnick, Melvin J. 1998. Accountability. In International 
Encyclopedia of Public Policy and Administration, ed. Jay M. Shafritz. Boulder: 
Westview Press.  
 396 
 
Schedler, Kuno. 1998. Performance Measurement. In The International Encyclopedia 
of Public Policy and Administration, ed. Jay M. Shafritz.  Boulder: Westview 
Press.   
Sengupta, Debjani and Dilip Kumar Ghosh. 2006. West Bengal: State and People – 
Development and People’s Choice. Kolkata: Centre for Rural Resources. 
Sengupta, Sunil and Haris Gazdar. 1997. Agrarian Politics and Rural Development in 
West Bengal. In Indian Development: Selected Regional Perspectives, eds. Jean 
Dreze and Amartya Sen. Delhi: Oxford University Press.  
Shafritz, Jay. 1988. The Dorsey Dictionary of American Government and politics. 
Chicago, Ill.: Dorsey Press. 
Shafritz, Jay M. and E.W. Russell. 2003. Introducing Public Administration. Longman. 
Sharma, Rashmi. 2007. Kerala’s Decentralization: The Idea in Practice. In 
Decentralization: Institutions and Politics in Rural India, eds.  Satyajit Singh 
and Pradeep K. Sharma. New Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press.  
Sisodia, Yatindra Singh. 2007. Experiment of Direct Democracy. Jaipur: Rawat 
Publications. 
Smoke, Paul. 2010. Implementing Decentralization: Meeting Neglected Challenges. In 
Making Decentralization Work: Democracy, Development and Security, eds. 
Ed Connerly, Kent Eaton and Paul Smoke. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Sodhi, J.S. and M.S. Ramanujam. 2006. Panchayati Raj System: A Study in Five States 
of India. Indian Journal of Industrial Relations 42 (1): 1-41.  
Stoker, Gerry. 1996. Introduction: Normative Theories of Local Government and 
Democracy. In Rethinking Local Democracy, eds. Desmond King and Gerry 
Stoker. Basingstoke, England: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Talbott, Colin. 1998. Public Performance: Towards a Public Service Excellence Model. 
Llantilio Crossenny, UK: Public Futures.  
Talbott, Colin. 1999. Public Performance: Towards a New Model? Public Policy and 
Administration 14 (3): 16-34.  
Talbott, Colin. 2010. Theories of Performance: Organizational and Service 
Improvement in the Public Domain. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Tiebout, Charles. M. 1956. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. The Journal of 
Political Economy 64 (5): 416-24. 
Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1835. Democracy in America, Volume 1. New York: George 
Dearborn and Co. and Adlard and Saunders.  
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. n.d. What are the 10 elements of MAF? 
http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/maf-crg/overview-apercu/elements-eng.asp.  
Vijayalakshmi, V. 2006. Transparency, Accountability and Governance: Local 
Government in Kerala and Karnataka. In Local governance in India: 
Decentralization and Beyond, eds. Niraja Gopal Jayal, Amit Prakash and 
Pradeep K. Sharma. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.  
Vijayanand, S.M. 2007. Second Generation Issues for Decentralization: Lessons from 
Kerala. In Decentralization: Institutions and Politics in Rural India, eds.  
Satyajit Singh and Pradeep K. Sharma. New Delhi; New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
Vyasulu, Vinod. 2004. Transformation in Governance since 1990s: Some Reflections. 
Economic and Political Weekly 39 (23): 2377-85.   
Walsh, Kieron. 1996. Public Services, Efficiency and Local Democracy. In Rethinking 
Local Democracy, eds. Desmond King and Gerry Stoker. Basingstoke, 
England: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
 397 
 
West Bengal State Election Commission 2003a. Panchayat General Elections, 2003: 
Results of Gram Panchayat Elections--Volume No. VI, District Murshidabad. 
Kolkata: West Bengal State Election Commission.  
_____. 2003b. Panchayat General Elections, 2003: Results of Gram Panchayat 
Elections--Volume No. XVI, District Burdwan. Kolkata: West Bengal State 
Election Commission.  
_____. 2008. West Bengal Panchayat Election Results-2008. 
http://wbsec.gov.in/(S(koay1z45iugibbnls2guziiu))/West%20Bengal%20Electi
on%20Detailed%20Results%20-%202008.htm (January 20, 2011).  
Westergaard, Kirsten. 1986. People’s Participation, Local Government and Rural 
Development: The Case of West Bengal, India. CDR Research Report no.8. 
Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research. 
Wildavsky, Aaron. 1961. Political Implications of Budgetary Reform. Public 
Administration Review 21 (4): 183-90.  
Wolman, Harold. 1996. Theories of Local Democracy in the United States. In 
Rethinking Local Democracy, eds. Desmond King and Gerry Stoker. 
Basingstoke, England: Macmillan Press Ltd.  
World Bank. 1992. Governance and Development. Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
World Bank. 2009. Local Government Discretion and Accountability: Application of a 
Local Governance Framework. Report no. 49059-GLB, Social Development 








APPENDIX - CHARACTERISTICS OF CHOSEN CASES (GPs) 
 
The Chosen GPs of West Bengal  
Debipur GP, located in Memari-I Block of Burdwan District, has an area of 3171.53 
hectares and a population of 26, 438. It has an SC population of 7239 (27.4%) and an ST 
population of 4114 (15.6%). It has a literacy percentage of 59.94% (Government of 
West Bengal 2007). This is a large GP with 27 villages and 17 constituencies. It is well 
connected by a motorable all-weather road and a regular bus service and available 
rickshaws from the nearest railway station of Debipur, the bus journey taking about 10 
minutes. As per the Self-evaluation Exercise Report of this GP, 21-30% of its families 
live below the poverty line.  
 Nowdapanur GP, located in Berhampore Block of Murshidabad District of West 
Bengal, has an area of 1947.62 hectares and a population of 21,244. It has an SC 
population of 2122 (10%) and no ST population. 53.05% of its population is literate 
(Government of West Bengal 2007). This GP has twelve villages and twelve 
constituencies. It is about 8 km from the nearest town of Berhampore, which is the 
block and district Headquarter. This GP is comparatively inaccessible, there being no 
bus service and an intermittent rickshaw service to reach it, and the road leading to it 
being of poor condition. As per the Audit Report of the GP, 53.2% of its families live 
below the poverty line. 
 
The Chosen GPs of Madhya Pradesh 
Goutampur Colony GP is located in Obaidullahgunj Block in Raisen District of 
Madhya Pradesh. The total population of Goutampur Colony GP (as per figures given 
by the Secretary of the GP) is 1450. This GP has two constituent villages of Goutampur 
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Colony (population 800) and Kesalwada (population 130), and two hamlets of Jondra 
(population 400) and Goutampur Tola (population 120). Goutampur Colony village is 
mainly SC and the others are mainly ST in caste composition. The overall population is 
60% ST, 30% SC and 10% others. This GP is located about 8 km away from the block 
Headquarter Obaidullahgunj, and is connected by a motorable all-weather road to the 
block headquarter.  
 Ramgarh GP is situated in Narsinghgarh Block of Rajgarh District of Madhya 
Pradesh. The population of Ramgarh GP (as per figures given by the Secretary of the 
GP) is 1600. There are three villages in this GP: Ramgarh (72 families), Bawdikheda 
(25 families) and Neenaur (101 families). This GP has 198 families of whom 89 are 
OBC (44.9%), 39 are Rajput (19.7%), 59 are SC (29.8%) and 11 are ST (5.5%). 
Neenaur has mainly OBCs in its population, whereas Ramgarh village and Bawdikheda 
village have Rajput-dominated populations. The connectivity of this GP is very poor 
since the road from the nearest town and block Headquarter (Narsinghgarh) to the GP is 
of very poor quality. Ramgarh and Bawdikheda villages of Ramgarh GP are not 
accessible by motorable roads. The road from Narsinghgarh town to Neenaur village of 
this GP is motorable. Inter-village connectivity within the GP is also very poor because 
the roads connecting the constituent villages of the GP are not motorable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
